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**RĀMĀNUJA'S  
VEDĀRTHASAMGRAHA**

BY

J. A. B. VAN BUITENEN



**POONA**

1956

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
# RĀMĀNUJA'S VEDĀRTHASAMGRAHA

INTRODUCTION, CRITICAL EDITION  
AND ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

BY

J. A. B. VAN BUITENEN

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TO  
THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AND THE STAFF  
OF THE SANSKRIT DICTIONARY ON  
HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES  
POONA



RAMĀNUJA'S  
VEDĀRTHASAMGRAHA



**16**

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J. A. B. VAN BUITENEN**

**DECCAN COLLEGE  
POSTGRADUATE AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
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## PREFACE

RAMANUJA'S Vedārthasaṃgraha marks a new era in Vedānta philosophy. It is the *début* of a thinker who, with all the force of his remarkable talents, set out to restate the theology of the Absolute in the terms of religion and worship. It was, according to tradition, in front of the sacred image of Śrīśailapati in the temple of Tirumaḷai that Rāmānuja delivered this lecture on the interpretation of the Upaniṣads. We may suppose that it was first public appearance as a mature theologian. No doubt many years of erudite disputations with the followers of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, of Yādaprakāśa and Prabhākara, and also with the Vaiṣṇavas of his own *milieu*, preceded this function. But now his doctrine was complete, his truth definitive: in this short but extremely rich lecture he was able to choose his principal adversaries and to outline a both philosophically and theologically sound refutation of their views. That he offered it to one of the multiple forms of the one God is characteristic of this deeply religious thinker.

This Vedārthasaṃgraha is virtually unknown to Western scholarship; and even in India, where its usefulness as a compendious introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita has long been recognized in the pāṭhaśālās, it has not inspired to the study which it certainly deserves. I know of one old English translation, exceedingly, even excessively literal, published by the South-Indian scholar VASUDEVACHARIAR in the issues of the *Brahmavādin*. This translation, still more his Tamil rendering, is all but inaccessible in the West.

The present work offers a critical edition of the Sanskrit text, a liberally annotated translation into English, and an Introduction. As the work was undertaken in connexion with my post on the Staff of the Sanskrit Dictionary Department of the Deccan College at Poona, I have made it my object to study the text primarily from the philological point of view: to which I was the more inclined by the consideration that without a sound philological basis the philosophical study of Indian thought and its comparison with other patterns of thought will never achieve finality. Therefore I have made the notes to the English translation as exhaustive in dealing with terms and references as was possible to me; not exhaustive enough by far: many studies like those which HACKER devotes to *advaita* will have to be made in all systems before the entire context of concepts in Indian thought is rightly intelligible. I have made full use of SUDARSANASURI's excellent commentary: Western scholars disregard these erudite studies by privileged colleagues with great disadvantage to their comprehension of the scholastic background of the studied authors.

In the Introduction I have sought to avoid all duplication and to centre the attention on relevant topics which so far have been dealt with insufficiently or not at all. Special regard has been given to Rāmānuja's place in the history of Vedānta thought. The importance of Uddālaka's Sadvidyā for Vedānta as a whole and the variety of its interpretations led naturally to a more detailed description of Uddālaka's teaching as a convenient starting-point. Rāmānuja's ancient predecessors have been studied anew and their fragments collected in an appendix. The relative date of the Vedārtha-saṃgraha has then been established and Rāmānuja's sources, in the widest sense, have been investigated: in that connexion special interest has been shown to the place of Pañcarātra and the doctrine of Yāmuna. A chapter of observations on Rāmānuja's hermeneutics concludes the introduction. Several Indexes will, I hope, enhance the usefulness of the book.

This study has been made possible by my stay in Poona. The Minister of Education of the Netherlands, who granted me a travelling subsidy, the Curators of the State University of Utrecht, who arranged generously for a long study-leave, and the Council of the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute, who appointed me a Sub-Editor of the Sanskrit Dictionary, are the first to whom my gratitude is to be acknowledged. In the course of my daily routine in the Dictionary Department I have been able to benefit greatly by intimate contacts with Indian friends, colleagues and scholars; the readiness with which they have accepted me in their midst and shown me their friendship will for ever remain unforgettable to me. Professor V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, whose liberal friendship I consider a privilege, has followed the work of this study with the greatest interest and sympathy; his helpfulness in matters pertaining to Karmamīmāṃsā has been invaluable; I owe more to his advice and encouragement, and to our innumerable neighbourly verandah discussions, than I am able to express.

It is to Dr. S. M. KATRE, Editor-in-Chief of the Sanskrit Dictionary, who invited me to Poona, that my warmest thanks are due. I do not know a better way of expressing my gratitude to him, reputed scholar, understanding friend and most charming host, than by dedicating this volume to the Staff of the Poona Sanskrit Dictionary, his creation.

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## PART I: INTRODUCTION



## I. THE SADVIDYA IN VEDĀNTA

The moment that the ancient Indian speculations on the creation and origin of the world passed from a mythological stage to a more or less philosophical one is often, and in my opinion correctly, fixed by the first occurrences of the term *sat* in cosmogonical Veda texts. This is of course not much more than a convenient landmark, the selection of which has been determined by the role of the term and conception of *sat* in later thought rather than by its significance in the Veda. Moreover, it would be too rash to assume a direct and complete evolution of cosmogonic speculations from a mythological to a philosophical plane: not only do mythological elements accompany the speculations on *sat*'s origin—elements which will persist, though later on they may conveniently be called theistic—, but also the manner in which they are introduced into some of the Vedic hymns creates the impression that the conception of *sat* and correlated ideas had already reached an advanced stage of elaboration before they were accepted in a Vedic context: in other words, that they derived from another milieu than that commonly represented by the Vedic poets. On the other hand, the strictly philosophical import of the notion of *sat* should not be exaggerated: it is anachronistic to render it as "being" in the sense of *esse*. It is a very concrete term with a distinct demonstrative value<sup>1</sup> and can perhaps best be rendered by "this which is here and now"—a meaning that can be followed through the Upaniṣads.

The paramount importance in later Indian thought of the idea complex that is from the beginning connected with *sat* needs no proof. Although in other systems of philosophy its influence can be shown, it is most conspicuous in Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. But when we survey these two *darśanas* as the clear-cut systems of later date, we find that *sat*, or corresponding terms, have assumed different, even opposite, connotations which reflect the fundamental difference between the *darśanas*: for Vedānta as a whole *sat* is the transcendent and immaterial, for Sāṃkhya the immanent and material first cause of the world. Within the fold of Vedānta again the elaboration of the

1. Cf. such formulae as *sac ca tyac ca* (TaittUp. 2, 6, where the context tempts us to understand *asat* by *tyad*), which is not merely a folk-etymology of the etymologically transparent *satya* but in which *sat* "that which is here" is also opposed to "that which is that or there", e.g. Brahman (cf. BĀUp. 3, 2, 9 *katamo deva iti—prāṇa iti—sa brahma tyad ity ācakṣate*, where we may recall that ib. 2, 3, 1 *sat* as an embodied form is distinguished from a disembodied form described as the wind and the sky: *prāṇa* as the micro-cosmic counterpart of *vāyu* is quite well known).

problems involved in the idea complex of sat as transcendent *causa prima* has led to extremely diverging solutions. We have therefore in the presystematic speculations about sat and its origin a convenient starting-point to seek a point of vantage from which we can survey the relation between Vedānta and Sāṃkhya, and between the systems of Vedānta, among which especially Rāmānuja's system will interest us most. We shall try to sketch in broad outlines the complex of notions associated with sat in its presystematic usage to see if there is anything in it that may add to our understanding of the later differences.

We may depart from the *sadvidyā* of Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6, Uddālaka's teaching of his son Śvetaketu, easily the most celebrated śruti text. It plays an important part in Vedāntamīmāṃsā, not only for its own sake, but also indirectly because it has been dealt with in the Brahmasūtras, so that all system-building commentators had to explain it precisely. Their explanations concern invariably the relation between the first cause and the effected world, and in so far as this relation is the fundamental problem of Vedānta the commentaries on the *ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* represent the central doctrines of the systems. The general interpretation is of sat as the self-existent, transcendent and absolute Brahman as an essentially perfect entity in opposition—of varying degree—to its effect, the phenomenal world. Modern scholarship, on the other hand, has long since recognized<sup>2</sup> that the same *sadvidyā* represents an early stage of more or less 'Sāṃkhyan' speculations; and whereas translators like Böhtlingk, Deussen, Senart, Hume and Radhakrishnan render their text in a spiritualist sense, other scholars like Jacobi, Betty Heimann and Ruben<sup>3</sup> urge that this famous *prapāṭhaka* voices a materialist tendency. We have to go beyond our text to discover its meaning in the context to which it belongs.

The earliest form—but not necessarily the most primitive one—of the question of the provenance of "this which is" is found in R̥gveda 10, 72: it is asked how the gods came to be. The poet describes how Brāhmaṇaspāti forged these worlds as a blacksmith: for in the age before the gods sat originated from *asat*, and after it, or rather along with it, originated the worlds.<sup>4</sup> The sequel shows that the poet had other, probably more congenial, cosmic associations in mind where Dakṣa and Aditi were the primeval progeni-

2. cf. OLDENBERG, *Die Lehre der Upanishaden*, pp. 185f.; JACOBI, *Ueber das Verhältnis des Vedānta zum Sāṃkhyam*, Festschrift Kuhn, p. 38.

3. JACOBI, o.c.; HEIMANN, *Studien zur Eigenart des indischen Denkens*, p. 49; RUBEN, *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, pp. 156ff., and again, but extremely tendentious, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, pp. 87 ff.

4. *brāhmaṇaspātir etā sāṃ karmāra tvāḍhamat / devānam pūrvayē yugē 'sataḥ sād ājayata* (with c. cf. 10, 129, 6 *arvāg devā asyē* (sc. *sato*) *visārjanena* / "the gods are since its emanation")// *tād āsā āno ajāyanta*.



tors from whom the worlds were born. The relation between sat and the personality of Brāhmaṇaspāti, who somehow assisted at its origination, remains obscure. His personality reminds us of RV. 10, 81 where creation is described as the handiwork of the divine artisan Viśvākarma—who significantly is called Vācāspāti.<sup>5</sup> In this *sūkta* the question is posed: what is the foundation, what the foothold on which Viśvakarma created; and again: seek with your minds, O sages, for that on which he stood while supporting the worlds. This question is, it would seem, directly answered in RV. 10, 129; the sages found out that sat is fastened to asat.

This famous hymn formulates elaborately and in an already advanced form the view that sat arose from asat. The progress made in this hymn concerns not so much the relation between sat and asat as that between both and the personality behind it: Brāhmaṇaspāti and Viśvākarma Vācāspāti are succeeded by a vague and anonymous *ādhyakṣa* or superintending person whose actual assistance at, and knowledge of, sat's origination is questioned: under whose protection did it take place? and: he knows, or does he?<sup>6</sup> Henceforth the question of a personal agency behind the creation of this world will remain connected with the question of the relation between sat and asat.

The latter relation is expressed in this *sūkta* in the terms of conception and procreation:<sup>7</sup> in the womb of asat, the dark hidden within the dark, in which the embryonic water was as yet 'unaccidented',<sup>8</sup> the one first embryo (*ābhū*) is conceived with an excess of heat—orgasm; the procreative impulse (*kāma*) takes shape in that germ which is the first germ of will (*mānas*):<sup>9</sup>

5. Stt. 2 and 4 (see below), 3 (*sām bāhūbhyām dhāmati sām pātatrair dyāvābhūmī janāyan devā ekah*), and 7 (*vācāspatīm viśvākarmāṇam*); Brhaspati, of course, is called *vācāspati* in such texts as MS. 2, 6, 6 and ŚatBr. 14, 4, 1, 23. Note that Rāmānuja cites the *ādhyakṣa* as the personal deity in the immaterial heaven (§§ 81; 127f.).

6. 1 c *kāśya śārmann*; 7 *iyām viṣṣtir yāta ābābhūvāyādi vā dadhé vā nā / yō asyādhyakṣaḥ paramē vyōman sō aṅgā veda yādi vā nā veda*:

7. Cf. GELDNER ad 10, 129 "das Bild der Zeugung und Geburt wird in dem ganzen Liede folgerichtig durchgeführt"; it is difficult, however, to decide to what extent it is just "Bild" or symbolic representation: could, in that mythological period, world creation be easily conceived in other terms than those of procreation?

8. *tāma āsit tāmasā gūlham āgre 'praketām salilām sāvram ā idām*; GELDNER: *apraketā* "unerkenntlich" in the sense of "unterschiedslos" which is perhaps already too abstract.

9. *kāmas tād āgre sām avaratādhi mānaso rétaḥ prathamām yād āsit* (4 ab); GELDNER: "über dieses kam am Anfang das Liebesverlangen, was des Denkens erster Same war," where *yād* is a loose relative conjunction; perhaps it is preferable to take *sām*-√*vṛt* in the attested sense of "to conglomerate, take shape in, become": the procreative impulse took concrete shape in that which then became the first seed of *mānas* (which is nearer to 'will' than 'thought'); cf. this will-to-create personified as the first self-created creature AthV. 9, 2, 19ff.; cf. also 13, 1, 6ff. and 13, 2, 25ff. where the sun personifying *tapas* (*rohita-*) is the first creating creature.

sages found out that this *sat* is fastened to *asat*—and one is inclined to add: with the omphalical cord.<sup>10</sup> This intimate connexion between that which is *sat* and that which is not *sat* enables us to understand the somewhat enigmatic beginning of the hymn: *asat* “another than *sat*” is there only to account for *sat*’s origin and has no proper existence apart from *sat*, so that before *sat* came to be, its counterpart was not there either; it is rightly said that originally there was absolutely nothing, neither *sat*, or this which is here, nor another than this.<sup>11</sup> *Asat*, the other, the womb from which *sat* arises, has been completely abstracted from a primeval progenitrix; a reminiscence of a progenitor persists, though his function is questioned and he is at most, if at all, someone watching the process from the far-away sky.<sup>12</sup>

This tendency to do away with both the relicts of a creator person and *asat* as a necessary hypothesis for the origination of *sat* finds its conclusion in Uddālaka’s *sadvidyā* where for the first time the originality and eternity of *this which is* is posed in a polemical manner: originally *sat* was only here, nothing else; for how could it arise from *asat*?<sup>13</sup> Something that is of a certain kind cannot arise from something else which is not of the same kind: *sat* is the irreducible, it is ‘kind’ itself, like in a clay pitcher clay is the ‘kind’ beyond which the pitcher cannot be reduced.

How does Uddālaka account for this view in the terms of his age? He begins by asking his son: “What is the instruction by which the unrevealed is revealed,<sup>14</sup> the not understood understood, the unknown known?” The instruction is given in the following lessons which are summarized (4, 5) “this

10. *sató bāndhum āsati nīr avindan* (4c).

11. I cannot quite believe in a mystical or alogical “neither being nor non-being” as generally translated, which renders the poet at once capable of admirable abstractions but incapable of logical thinking; the poet is neither “ganz barock” nor guilty of “geheimnisvolle Gestammel” (RUBEN, *Philosophen*, p. 161), but, trying to do away with *asat* as an independent magnitude but still allowing a beginning of *sat*, he reduces *asat* to *sat*’s matrix, existing only by virtue of *sat*.

12. This *ādhyakṣa* in the sky must be a solar deity corresponding to Dakṣa in 10, 72, Viśvakarman ib. (cf. 10, 170, 4), Brahmanaspati in 10, 81 (cf. 2, 24, 3; 4, 50, 4; 10, 68, 12); worth noting is also TaittBr. 2, 2, 9 where the sun originates from *asat*.

13. As against the more or less contemporaneous contentions of TaittUp. 2, 7, 1; BĀUp. 1, 2, 1; ChUp. 3, 19, 1, that *sat* originated from *asat*, which was the old-fashioned position.

14. *śruta-* in a more technical sense of “known by or as Vedic revelation.”

is what the ancient who knew it, those who were great in disputations<sup>15</sup> and great experts in śruti, have said: 'Now there is no one who could name a single thing that is not yet revealed, understood and known;' for they knew it by those (three colours): that which is red, they knew it for the colour of glowing-heat; that which is resplendent, they knew it for the colour of water; that which is black, they knew it for the colour of grown food; that which is not known (for anyone of these three colours), they knew it for a combination of these three deities."

It is clear that the instruction is primarily concerned with an inventory of the world under the three 'aspects' (*rūpa*- "colour, coloured form") of *tejas* "glowing-heat", *āpas* "water", *anna* "grown food". These three aspects are described as the successive offspring of what is called *sat*. All the beings that in their turn went forth from the deities which are these 'aspects' (from *tejas* derives sun and all that is of sun etc.<sup>16</sup>) are described as "change proceeding from speech, or name." What exactly is meant by this phrase becomes clear from the illustrations given by Uddālaka. His son asks what is the instruction which promises to reveal everything, and Uddālaka answers: "It is like this, my son: we can know all that is made of clay by knowing one lump of clay: the change is that which proceeds from speech or name: it is clay: that is the truth." Similarly we know all that is made of copper by knowing a lump of copper ore,<sup>17</sup> and all that is iron by knowing a nail-cutter. The last instance warns us that the point is not so much that we first are to know the first or rough material but that a small piece of the same kind is enough to classify the kindred; as indeed it is.

15. *mahāśālā mahāśrotṛiyāḥ*; the former term is invariably translated "having great houses" (BÖHTLINGK "grosze Hausherren"; DEUSSEN even "Groszen an Reichthum"; SENART "grands maîtres de maison"; RADHAKRISHNAN "great householders") but the term in this sense is pointless in this connexion; besides *śālā* is "court, compound, enclosure, hall" rather than "house as living-quarters", and used for receiving guests, etc., as place of meeting, teaching and discussion (cf. *pāṭhaśālā*, etc.); in connexion with *mahāśrotṛiya* I would suggest "he who entertains large parties of theologians in his hall and hence himself shining in disputations" or "whose hall-disputes are great"; cf. ChUp. 5, 11, 1/3.

16. *apāgād agner agnitvam .. ādityād ādityatvam*, invariably translated "the quality of fire, etc. vanished from fire, etc." can be understood much more significantly as describing further emanations: for this is the topic of this and the following khaṇḍas where creation by triplication is described (*tejas*/fire > sun and sun-like, moon and moon-like, lightning and the like); suffix *-tva-* in the sense of a collective (cf. RENOU, *Grammaire sanscrite* § 187); esp. the translation of DEUSSEN, and those based on it (HUME's, RADHAKRISHNAN's) reveal a monistic bias more inspired by Śaṅkara than by their texts.

17. *lōhamāṇi*;-*māṇi*- "any more or less precious stone, or stone-like metal ore, that is mined or delved"; RADHAKRISHNAN "nugget of gold", but "gold" is a late sense of *lōha* borrowed from Śaṅkara.

When this is made clear Uddālaka declares: "only sat was here<sup>18</sup> originally, nothing else; i.e., nothing that was not sat, i.e., *asat*. "That wished: <sup>19</sup> 'I will be many, I will beget,' it begot *tejas*. That *tejas* thought: 'I will be many, I will beget,' it begot water. That is why whenever a man is hot then he sweats; consequently from the (engendered) heat water arises.<sup>19a</sup> Water wished: "I will be many, I will beget,' it begot grown food. That is why whenever it rains, then there is plenty of food. Food and eatables consequently arise from water. All beings have three ways of being born, from an egg, a living being, or a plant. That first deity wished: "Well, now will I make separate forms and names by entering into these three deities as a living being myself: I will make each of them threefold." So she entered and divided.

We see that in this instruction an inventory is attempted of all beings under the three aspects or 'elements' *tejas*, water and food. These 'elements' however do not sum up the entire world: they are 'classes'. Nor do they sum up *sat*: as the comparisons show *sat* is the field on which *tejas* works to produce water, and both to produce food. This vision was no doubt inspired by nature: sun, rain and food work from and on earth. Later commentators invariably take these three 'elements' to imply the classical five. But, if not more primitive,<sup>20</sup> the series is of a different kind. Not only does it intend to distinguish the three spatial layers of sun, clouds and land,<sup>21</sup> but also three

18. *idam* adverbially, as its position would indicate; otherwise BÖRTLINGK, SENART, DEUSSEN *cum suis*.

19. RADHAKRISHNAN's comment that "*aikṣata*, thought, lit. saw [but rather ~ *akāmayata*, cf. ŚatBr. 14, 4, 2, 30, TaittUp. 2, 6, 1 etc.; DEUSSEN rightly "beabsichtete"] indicates that pure being [abstract; but the term is a concrete "a being", less equivocal "this which is"] is conscious" suggests more than there is to it and rather begs the question if these mythologizing thinkers were able to conceive of world creation in non-anthomorphic terms; RADHAKRISHNAN's remark is inspired by BrS. 1, 1, 4 *ikṣater nāśabdām*.

19a. I follow here Edgerton's translation (JAOS, 1915, p. 240f.).

20. According to ChUp. 3, 11, Uddālaka Āruṇi was the eldest son of Āruṇa: this Āruṇa (his name "the ruddy one" is significant in view of his preoccupation with the sun) described the sun-power under five colours or aspects, under which the existent beings are classified: in this respect Āruṇa's five correspond to Uddālaka's three; noteworthy is moreover that his five colours are evidently built on the three mentioned by Uddālaka: they are 1. *rohita* (3, 1, 4); 2. *śukla* (3, 2, 3); 3. *kṛṣṇa* (3, 3, 3); 4. *paraṅ-kṛṣṇa* (3, 4, 3); and 5. *yad etadādityasya madhye kṣobhata iva*. Obviously father and son had a common starting-point; RUBEN's remark that Uddālaka "unter dem erdrückenden Eindruck der mythisch-mystischen Sonnenverherrlichung seines Vaters Āruṇa zu seinem realistischen Gegner werden musste, weil der Sohn (= Śvetaketu) unter der Grösze des Vaters litt" (*Philosophen*, pp. 158-59) is rather facile romance.

21. So SENART ad ChUp. 6, 3, 2, note.

temporal events: hot season, rainy season, harvest time.<sup>22</sup> The stage of Uddālaka's speculations is yet more advanced: the three are also the three aspects under which the existent beings can be grouped according to colour. From this point of view the series shows affinities with that of the three *guṇas* under which the world, constituted by the five elements, is classified as being bright, moving and stationary. It is interesting to note how the colours persist: Śvetāśvatara 'puns' on an unborn male (*aja*- "constant self and puruṣa" or "he-goat") who copulates with an unborn female (*ajā*- "constant matter" or "she-goat") who is red, white and black;<sup>23</sup> red, white and black threads woven in a piece of cloth will be the Sāṃkhya's stock-example of the material cause persisting in the effect.

We may now ask: how does the *sadvidyā* continue RV. 10, 129? Fundamental is Uddālaka's polemic against those who hold a more original *asat* to account for *sat*. So did the Vedic poet hold, but his *asat* is by no means original: originally there was nothing at all. Uddālaka's did away with the hypothesis of *asat*: *sat* in the beginning—the beginning as far as the world is concerned, creation—was there alone. Is Rāmānuja right in explaining *advītiya* as denying that there was a separate *adhiṣṭhātṛ* who was 'instrumental' to the process of creation?<sup>24</sup> In any case the vague watching person has disappeared. Yet we find traces of the original birth-process of *sat* as described in the *sūkta*; but the events which in the Vedic hymn took place as successive stages in a conception are now represented as primary emanations of *sat* itself and the chronological sequence has become a causal chain. Nonetheless, the emanations of *tejas*, water and food are of a different kind from creation proper which only sets in *after* food has been produced and *sat* has entered the 'elements'.<sup>25</sup> The parallelism is unmistakable: in the *sūkta* the embryo which was conceived by an excess of heat (*tāpas*)<sup>26</sup> in the formerly unaccidented water was the germ in which the primary creative impulse took shape: an order *kāma*—*tāpas*—Water—conceived germ presents itself clearly. In Uddālaka's account these succeeding events are moments in a causal series proceeding from *sat*'s first impulse: *sat* *desires* to multiply and *tejas* appears, after and through *tejas* *water*, after and through *water* the *fruit* (*anna*).

22. For the original three seasons, cf. e.g. FILLIOZAT, *L'Enigme des 256 Nuits d'Asoka*, J. As. 1949; OLDENBERG, o.c., p. 185, makes in passing a similar suggestion.

23. ŚvetUp. 4, 5 *ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjyamānām*, etc. where *sat* has already completely become matter.

24. Ved. §§ 16; 33.

25. In this respect ŚvetUp. 4, 5 is illustrative: matter which is red, etc. starts to create.

26. An important parallel is furnished by AthV. 13, 1 and 2 where *rohita* is a personification of *tapas* (cf. 2, 25) from which or whom *agni*, sun, etc. arise: 1, 48; 2, 49 (with which compare ChUp. 6, 4, 4 and the note above 9).

Bearing the Vedic archetype in mind we could speak of sat's self-creation, which is completed with the origination of anna.

At this exact point we find a remark that is highly significant: there are three ways of being born, from an egg, as a living being, a plant. So long as we do not recognize that sat is creating itself, this remark seems irrelevant, and Senart was indeed led to regard it as an interpolation. But it is a necessary observation: how does the definitive birth of the now completely conceived sat proceed? To each of its constitutive 'elements' corresponds a mode of birth: to tejas that of the brooded egg, to water that of the living being born in the embryonic liquid, to anna that of a plant.<sup>27</sup> So naturally the next sentence reads: "I will now make separate names and forms (i.e. start creation proper) by entering the three deities as a *living being myself*." The three constitutive events of conception elaborated as separate moments of a causal series are now again condensed and integralized, and it is *sat*, not *anna*, which starts creation by being born in the manner of a living being itself.<sup>28</sup>

It goes without saying that Uddālaka's vision is not a mere recast of the Vedic archetype. The contents of the Vedic description are its structure rather than its contents: to use our terms, the events of a more or less symbolical creation by procreation provide the structure of a temporal-spatial coherence of the three layers of the world and three successive creative changes, which is integralized in the self-creation of sat. This self-creation is preceded by, or proceeds from, a phase of sat as *ābhū*, a potentiality which actualizes itself by passing through a series of primary emanations, prototypes of the following creation by triplication; but these three prototypes form the triunity of the actual sat. Hence it is rightly said that in the final analysis sat is the

27. The latter function of the egg in cosmogony is already announced early: cf. Aitareya Up. 1 in a very similar context *ātmā vā idam eko 'gra āsin . . so 'dbya eva puruṣam samuddhṛtyāmūrçhayat / tam abhyatapat tasyābhitaptasya mukham nirabhid-yate yathāṇḍam / mukhād vāg*, etc. and more explicitly ChUp. 3, 19 in similar context: *asad evedam agra āsit tat sad āsit tat samabhavat tad āṇḍam niravartate tat saṃvatsa-rasya mātṛam āsayata tan nirabhid-yate te āṇḍakapāle rajataṃ ca suvarṇam cābhavatām*; already ad RV. 10, 129, 4 GELDNER remarks "im tāpas steckt zugleich die Vorstellung des brütenden Vogels" (cf. also Sāyaṇa ad ekam RV. 10, 82, 6 *āṇḍāhiprāyenoḥktaṃ*); the idea that *tapas* "heat, body-heat" was a creative power naturally led to creation being conceived as originating from the brooded egg.—How near the notion of originating from a plant was to Uddālaka himself shows 6, 8, 6 clearly. A fourth way of birth, mentioned AitUp. 3, 3, origination from sweat, has a cosmic correspondent in Gopatha Br. 1, 1 where the primeval waters originate from Brahman's sweat.

28. I take *ātmanā* as a reflexive pronoun; cf. a parallel passage in ŚatBr. 13, 1, 1, 1 *brahma vai svayambhū tapo 'tapyate / tad aikṣata—na vai tapasya ānantyam āsti: hantāhaṃ bhūteṣv ātmānaṃ juhuvāni bhūtāni cātmani*, etc., cf. also RENOU, *On the word ātman*, esp. § 6 (Vāk 2, Poona 1952); we may also compare such expressions as *ātmanā* i.f.c. in the sense of *bhāvena*, *tayā*, *tvena* "as being . . ."

*anīmā*, the irreducible stuff of which everything is made, root, meeting-place,<sup>29</sup> solidity, ātman of everything: the atomic minimum that remains after all successive products have inversely been dissolved in their causes, and "you are it, Śvetaketu."

We have but lightly passed by the meaning of the phrase *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam*, describing the process by which the effect emerges from its cause.<sup>30</sup> This phrase has become the bone of content of the later commentators explaining BrS. 2, 1, 14 *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādi-bhyaḥ*. There can be little doubt that the term *ārambhaṇa* is taken from, or inspired by, RV. 10, 81, 2 where it is asked: *kim svid āsīd adhiṣṭhānam ārambhaṇam katamāt svit kathāsīt / yāto bhūmiṃ janāyan viśvākarmā vī dyūm aūrnon mahimā viśvācakṣāḥ* "what was the underlay or foothold, what the support, and how was it, out of which Viśvakarman, producing the earth, separated the sky by his power, he the all-seeing One?"<sup>31</sup> This question is repeated and illustrated (4): "What was the forest and what the wood, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth? Seek for that with your minds, O sages, on which he stood while supporting the worlds." One reply was given in 10, 129: *sat is fastened to asat*. Uddālaka replies: the effect is *vācārambhaṇam*, i.e. *nāmadheyam*.

No doubt with this connexion of the Vedic hymn in mind Rāmānuja tries to show that the *sadvidyā* by *advitīya* denies a separate *adhiṣṭhātṛ*, and he quotes TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6 where the question of the Vedic poet was directly answered: brahman is the forest and the wood on which the creator stood, i.e., the *materia prima* out of which he created. Mādhva, even more explicitly, refers directly to the Vedic hymn,<sup>32</sup> and though the use he makes of it is objectionable, GHATE is wrong in declaring that "the topic is irrelevant".<sup>33</sup> *Ārambhaṇa* is synonymous with *adhiṣṭhāna* "the stable and solid

29. ChUp. 6, 8, 6-7; *āyatana* in *sadāyatana* can be more significantly translated than "abode" by deriving it from  $\sqrt{\text{yat}} + \text{ā}$  "place where": "the place where the beings meet, their common ground."

30. Since this was written I have resumed the subject in greater detail in *Vācārambhaṇam*, Festschrift S. K. CHATTERJEE Indian Linguistics vol. XVI (Poona 1955).

31. GELDNER "er der ganz Auge ist"; but Viśvakarman/Dakṣa here represent the sun which separates earth from heaven by rising from night; cf. 10, 170, 4.

32. He comments on the sūtra: *svatantrabahuśāddhanā sṛṣṭir loke dṛṣṭī / naivam brahmaṇaḥ / svarūpasāmarthyād evaitasya sṛṣṭiḥ / kim svid .... kathāsīt ity ākṣepaḥ / adhiṣṭhānādyukteḥ*: "creation in the world proceeds in our experience with the aid of many instruments that have an independent existence; this is not so in brahman's case: his creation proceeds from his essentially self-sufficient creativeness: this is implicit in RV. 10, 81, 2 ab, because of the mention of *adhiṣṭhāna*, etc., (which may be explained as 'instrument')."

33. V. S. GHATE, *Vedānta*, p. 81.

foundation" which in Indian thought, where the notion of cause is inseparably linked up with that of a permanent, immobile and solid substructure, is virtually synonymous with our "material cause". As the second quoted stanza shows *ārambhaṇa* is the *materia prima* from which things take their beginnings and in which, apart from some individual modifications, they consist. So one would translate: "Name is the effect, name which has its basis in speech". We are reminded of the fact that Viśvakarman, who created the worlds while standing on the *ārambhaṇa* was called the Lord of Vāc and that Brahmanaspati, who forged the worlds when sat emerged from *asat*, is the Lord of *Brahman*, and that according to Taitt Br. that on which Viśvakarman stood was again *Brahman*. Sat, wishing to multiply, said: "I be many", and it was many. Vāc and Brahman, it seems, both<sup>34</sup> stand for the powerful and powerfully creative word that creates a thing in its individuality by pointing it out and thus distinguishing it from the common stuff it is made of. He who names uses of the power of naming to create:—name is what he resorts to (*ā√rabh*) when singling out a new thing from the common undistinguished stuff. Uddālaka, doing away with the creating and naming person, still preserves the power of naming to account for the emergence of new things out of the common stuff that is sat, or of sat: *satya*.

Is this stuff, this sat that is the *ātman* of everything, a material or or immaterial entity for Uddālaka? In an interesting śruti<sup>35</sup> Uddālaka himself replies to a similar question of king Aśvapati: "Gautama, how do you conceive of the *ātman*?" "As the earth." Aśvapati paraphrases this answer: Uddālaka's *ātman* is the solid basis,<sup>36</sup> on which he stands solid himself, solid in children and cattle, and eats and enjoys life: but his *ātman* is the *ātman*'s feet. Important are other descriptions of sat: BĀU. 1, 3, 28, ChUp. 8, 3, 5 it is deathless (*amṛta*), so BhG. 9, 12; BĀUp. 2, 3, 1 it is Brahman's embodied form, corresponding to that which is stationary and transient, this embodied form being distinguished from a disembodied one that is described as being wind and sky: sat is clearly the earth here. Later on, Praśn. Up. 2, 5; 4, 5; BhG. 4, 5 sat and *asat* simply sum up the entire world.

34. The relation between *vāc* and *brahman* is very close as witness RV. 10, 114, 8d *yāvād brahma tiṣṭhati tāvati vāk* (GELDERER remarks: "brāhman ist hier die Grundlage der vāc"); AitBr. 4, 21, 1, ŚatBr. 2, 1, 4, 10, BĀUp. 1, 3, 20 *vāg vai brahma*; TS. 7, 3, 1, 4, etc., etc. One wonders if a detailed study of the relation *brahman-vāc* as sacred and sacrally creative speech would not contribute materially to our understanding the 'evolution' of the notion of brahman "sacred powerful speech, creative word, the word that is creation" to that of cause of creation, etc.

35. ChUp. 5, 17, 1 *atha hovācoddālakam Āruṇim—Gautamā kaṃ tvam ātmānam upāsa iti / prthivīm eva bhagavo rājann iti hovāca / eṣo vai pratiṣṭhātmā vaiśvānaro yaṃ tvam upāse, etc.*

36. *pratiṣṭhā*.



It is clear that Uddālaka's teaching is not 'spiritualist' in the sense that the irreducible stuff at the bottom or root of all things is conceived as an entity different in kind from the matter of the phenomenal world and transcending it as an immaterial spirit that happens to be also immanent to some extent. Yet, no more can it be urged that the teaching is materialist. Matter and spirit—the term nearest to spirit is neither ātman nor manas, but *vāc* in *vācārambhaṇam*—are not treated as different or distinct. Actually the question of matter and spirit does not arise. Nor is the diversity emerging from the stuff *sat* disparaged as being *merely* effects: there is nothing discreditable in things being created by naming out of their common substratum: rather is the discovery of name as a principle of individuality a precious one. One might go further and suggest that Uddālaka's main purpose was not to set forth the rather obvious unity of things in general, but just the manner of deriving diversity from it: his is after all a creation myth.

Another point is worth interest: Uddālaka manages to elaborate a cosmic vision without once borrowing terms from ritual terminology. The majority of Upaniṣad thinkers cannot conceive of wide perspectives in both macrocosmos and microcosmos except in ritual terms: small wonder, for it was in these terms that the Brāhmaṇas had described a coherent sacrocentric universe. Uddālaka, one may gather, did not care to depart from the ritually sacred, and his brahman was *vāc*.

We may read an essentially 'Sāmkhyan' tendency in his discourse: Sāmkhya not in the sense of a coherent system with a psychology and eschatology of its own, but rather of an attitude, an approach of study, an interest in classifying the world, a summing-up and inventorizing, indifferent to a distinction between matter and spirit, or even sacred and non-sacred, but primarily concerned with *this which is*, or *sat*.

Does this long analysis justify itself in helping us to understand the latter differences in interpreting the relation between the first cause and the effected world? I think it does. Though necessarily we must study the history of thought by the texts that have come down to us, we should while doing so never lose sight of the fact that the actual history moved on another plane, stages of which happened in passing to be fixed and perpetuated in texts while thought moved on. Indian culture was incomparably less *livresque* than the Western. The continuity of thought was at first served unconsciously by the thinkers, but when gradually the spirit changed, the time came when they began to return consciously to former thought as preserved in ancient texts to receive inspiration from it and so to be better able to serve its continuity. Trends that had been partly or incidentally or not at all voiced in those texts had then been developed, and original visions of a more primitive, and hence often more comprehensive, character

been elaborated and distinguished. So texts came to be vehicles of views which, if expressed in them at all, had been part of a different context; and gradually the Word became really transcendent.

When the inspiration of the Upaniṣad fragments, with their sudden *aperçus*, cosmic imagery and criss-cross flashes of penetration, had given way to a spirit of systematization, and, after the example of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, brahmajñāna was succeeded by brahmajijñāsā or Vedāntamīmāṃsā, order was imposed on the kaleidoscopic teachings of the ancient. Later darśanas or outlooks distinguished themselves. Sāṃkhya, from a more or less independent attitude, became a more independent inquiry. Among those principally interested in the sacred, distinction began to be made—though not yet contradistinction—between the study of the rites proper and the study of that comprehensive power hovering over the rites, their language, their function and their fruits, that more or less objective but mysterious and enigmatic object of speculations about the cosmic constancy correlated to the not less cosmic dynamics of the all-comprising ritual—the *brahman*. With this brahman dealt the upāsanas of the upaniṣads and now this in its vastness unalterable constancy was sought to be grasped, described and defined on the basis of these texts—mainly, if not exclusively at first, on the basis of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.<sup>37</sup>

Though we saw that Uddālaka did not conceive of his *sat* as an immaterial entity, yet he must have been surrounded by thinkers who tended to do so. A vedic poet already declared that *ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti*.<sup>38</sup> What he called *sat* was elsewhere named *brahman* or *ātman* or *Nārāyaṇa*.<sup>39</sup> It was conceived as the one principle existing *par excellence* as the stable foundation of cosmic ritual,<sup>40</sup> which to recognize and command would secure release from the retributory effects of ritual, from world itself. In this respect the brahman, too, was *satya* "true, real" with the peculiarly Indian connotation of "permanently and underivably real". Macrocosmically that vast, hidden power that supports the world, microcosmically the solid soul of the body, its character of basic constancy attracted the function of cause, which was inseparably connected with the notion of permanent, underlying solidity. Side by side, a brahma-centric and a more tellurian approach developed out of the sacrocentric cosmology of former ages, but in constant interaction. *Sat* was conceived of differently as cause. Simultaneously a mythology of the creator god, of a strictly personal character

37. cf. BELVALKAR, *Lectures on Vedānta*, I, p. 141 ff.

38. RV. 1, 164, 46 "The visionaries give many names to the One that is".

39. AitUp. 1, 1 *brahmaivedam agra āsīt*; BĀUp. 1, 4, 1, *ātmaivedam agra āsīt*; MahUp. 1 *eko ha vai Nārāyaṇa āsīt*.

40. The origin of this equation *sat* = *brahman* should be studied further.

which forbade microcosmic identifications, persisted and gained new importance with the rise of the religions. Though more allied to the Sāṃkhyan spirit of lucid distinctions by names and forms, this personalism influenced the monistically tending brahmanical spirit profoundly and persistently. Such is the composite picture which the Gītā shows, and in this picture belong historically the activities of the Brahmasūtrakāras. They conceived synthetically of the mystic relation between this effected word of transitory phenomena and Brahman, the hypostatized constancy, as a relation of immanent causality. Brahman—never exclusively regarded as an undifferentiated abstract entity—emanated the world; the effect grew upon it: while remaining essentially its constant and undisturbed self it passed by a process of *pariṇāma* into the condition of effect.<sup>41</sup> That in Bādarāyaṇa's collection this view is summarized under the 'Sāṃkhyan' *sadvidyā* is not surprising: Uddālaka's indifference did not preclude a dichotomy of matter and spirit, still less such a vague and pantheistic relation as envisioned by the sūtras; and early Sāṃkhya formed part and parcel of early Vedānta where it would remain its substructure.

It took long before the logical difficulties of maintaining the immanence of a transcendent Absolute in an imperfect, relative and transitory world were recognized, and the *pariṇāma* doctrine was challenged. The doctrine of *vivarta* was formulated, at first it seems by śabādādvaita,<sup>42</sup> and later elaborated in Śaṅkara's school. HACKER has shown that the *vivarta* doctrine was not yet fully accepted by Śaṅkara who tended towards modifying *pariṇāma* in an illusionist sense.<sup>43</sup> A more oldfashioned position was taken up by Bhāskara who maintained *pariṇāma* in its full force, allowing *upādhis* or limiting conditions to render the absolute and perfect partly relative and imperfect. Yāmuna,<sup>44</sup> and more systematically Rāmānuja, represented a very different view in which *pariṇāma* took place not in the Absolute but in the phenomenal world of matter and souls which were eternally and really related to the Absolute as its natural modes. Mādhva, at last, went one step further and rejected this relationship: he professed a radical dualism.

However divergent these solutions, they show one basic agreement: all agree upon the primacy of the transcendence of the Absolute that is *sat*. We have reached the end of the development.

41. That the Sūtrakāra adhered to the *pariṇāmavāda* is now generally recognized.

42. HACKER, *Vivarta*, § 5, pp. 197 ff.

43. HACKER, *o.c.* pp. 208 ff.

44. See Ch. III.

ŚRINIVASACHARI<sup>45</sup> in his useful study of *bhedābheda*vāda says that Bhāskara's philosophy marks a transition from Śaṅkara to Rāmānuja, but it is doubtful if such an evolution Śaṅkara — Bhāskara — Rāmānuja, suggested by the relative chronology of their works, can be maintained historically. One would hesitate even to speak of an evolution *within* Vedānta exclusively: for Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja at least one would rather assume influence, or inspiration, from without Vedānta. That Śaṅkara was influenced by Buddhist thought is now generally recognized, and the inspirations of the popular Sāṃkhya of the Purāṇas are manifest in Rāmānuja's philosophy. Bhāskara would seem to represent a more traditional view of Vedānta which admitted *pariṇāma* within the absolute and perfect Brahman, a view which both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja declined to accept without profound modification. Śaṅkara's modification towards illusionism was perhaps the simplest and, on the given premisses, the most logical procedure: given the unique reality of Brahman as the eternal spirit, the reality of the phenomenal world with its plurality and variety of transitory material and conscient entities could not be of the same degree of ultimate reality. The world, obviously imperfect and relative effect of the perfect and absolute sat, could not be described as wholly sat; but somehow deriving its relative reality from its perfect cause, it could neither be described as wholly asat, but, for merely practical purposes, it could be taken at least provisionally as real. This view is, in the final analysis, a development of a more ancient Vedānta view — as represented later on by Bhāskara — in that it accepts some effected change of and in Brahman, yet questions the ultimate validity of the conditions of this change and consequently of the change itself.

Rāmānuja's thesis is essentially different from both Śaṅkara's and Bhāskara's in that it attributes an ultimately valid, distinct and definable reality to the phenomenal world, and within the phenomenal world to the component orders of non-spiritual matter and individual spirits or souls. The souls are not real (or *practically* real) and conditioned *projections* of the absolute spirit, but fundamentally uniform spiritual monads, which in a beginningless process of causation (*karman*) happen to suffer degrees of change in their essential attribute knowledge.

This thesis is basically Sāṃkhyan, but not dualistic for that. Even with regard to Sāṃkhya itself one hesitates to subscribe to the qualification of dualism. Eternally soul and matter are interrelated in interaction; however different both may be, soul is accessible to matter in its essential quality of knowledge. Though soul may be free from matter, still in potentiality it is vulnerable to it. The union of soul and body is no doubt

brought about by a deception: the soul mistakes itself for a material ego. From the soul's point of view the union is a deficiency, but from the ego's point of view a harmony: the body obeys the orders of the captive soul to fulfil its purposes: it is completely dependent on the soul for its very existence, it is the mode and the particularization of the egotized soul, without which it is purposeless; and through the body the soul may ultimately rediscover itself in its essential difference.

It is this microcosmic harmony of the soul, as the consciously directing agent and the body as its perfect instrument,<sup>46</sup> which Rāmānuja has elaborated into an analogy for a macrocosmic harmony. It is remarkable that the conception of the body as the defect of the soul has hardly any significance for Rāmānuja: the marvellous utility of the body is for him its most significant function. This attitude is the consequence of his positive interpretation of Release: it is not an escape from the evils of embodied life but a supreme hankering after a higher fulfilment in the loving adoration of God. So Rāmānuja could conceive of a harmonious Universe, in which the harmony of body and soul was repeated in the harmony of matter and souls which form the body of God who himself is the directing spirit within it. This harmony is eternal; soul and matter exist, and have existed, eternally as modes of God, essentially dependent and subserving the single but supreme purpose of glorifying his Majesty.

Sat at the beginning of creation is God Nārāyaṇa as modified by soul and matter which both constitute His body. The *vikāra* or *pariṇāma* described by Uddālaka takes place only in God's modes. God is His perfect self, with the modifying body that at the beginning of creation abides in the subtle or causal phase. Thus God is the material cause, though only his mode of matter undergoes transformation in its essence and his mode of soul in its attribute of knowledge. God is also the operative cause inasmuch as He is the inner Ruler, setting in motion and allowing to operate the causality of *karman* which brings about the diversity of the finished products, or the gross, effectual phase of God's body.

We are not concerned here with the question how far Rāmānuja's exegesis of the *sadvidyā* is the 'correct' one, but only with the developments of the idea-complex for which Uddālaka in the terms of his age had found a suggestive expression in the famous sixth prapāṭhaka. The regularity with which the Indian thinkers have ever since returned to the *sadvidyā* to interpret into it their own theses is proof of the fundamental significance for

46. Rāmānuja defines the body: "that substance (*dravya*) that a spiritual entity can use and support entirely for his own purposes and that in its essence is exclusively subordinate (*śeṣa-*) to that entity, is the body of that soul"; cf. trsl. note 21.

Indian thought of the concept which it expresses. Sat, originally determined neither as an impersonal law nor as a personal demiurge, took in the course of history either form without excluding the other completely. The divergencies between the different schools concern the degree in which the immanence of the transcendent is admitted. But basically they all agree that the transcendent is somehow present and accessible. Even the more radical advaitins, restating the satkāryavāda as satkāraṇavāda, allow that the Absolute be cause. The perfect is never completely unattainable to the imperfect, the absolutely real never wholly inaccessible to the relatively real. The instinct urge to Release of the soul implicated in saṃsāra is a bridge between world and godhead. And sat preserves its ancient meaning throughout the fluctuations between an eminently transcendent, disembodied and unqualified Brahman and an eminently immanent, embodied and qualified Deity: the sat is the one that is *present*, the transcendent that is immanent.

Uddālaka expressed sat's immanence in creation to some extent as the soul's presence within it, from which presence all this derives its satya: similarly Rāmānuja formulated God's immanence in the world as His inner presence as the soul of the Universe, His body. For Uddālaka sat was the animā, the subtlest possible reduction, for Rāmānuja it is God whose body abides in the subtle phase of cause. Though in other respects their views are far apart, yet both thinkers have a common approach in dealing with the most ancient and most vital problem of Indian thought: the cause is approached from the effect, not the effect from the cause. The formula in which their common approach is summed up is, not *tvam tad asti* "it is you", but *tat tvam asi* "you are it".

It is not for merely polemical reasons that Rāmānuja begins his exposition of his views in his philosophical *début* the Vedārthasaṃgraha by a fresh interpretation of the sadvidyā, but because he recognized the basic significance of this text, which for him, not less than for Śaṅkara, expresses the profoundest truth that man is able to grasp.

## II. THE ANCIENT MASTERS

Among the names which Rāmānuja mentions in his list of ancient commentators,<sup>47</sup> Bodhāyana, Tanka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardi and Bhāruci, only the three first mentioned are known as authors of specific commentarial texts, whereas of the others nothing but the names has been

47. Ved. §93; Śrīnivāsa, YID. I, p. 2 gives a similar list where Bodhāyana's name is followed by those of Guhadeva and Bhāruci, then Brahmanandin's (= Tanka) and Dramiḍa's: does he suggest that Guhadeva and Bhāruci were the masters who summarized the Vṛtti?

saved from oblivion. Nonetheless, the identities of the first three are hardly less obscure and they have been obscured further by several attempts to clarify them. It would seem to be necessary, after KUPPUSWAMI's interesting but unconvincing identifications<sup>48</sup> and DASGUPTA's critical but incomplete account,<sup>49</sup> to restate the problems and rearrange the available evidence.

### § 1. *Bodhāyana the Vṛttikāra* :

Rāmānuja declares in the first line of his Śrībhāṣya<sup>50</sup> that he will follow the interpretation that Bodhāyana has given of the Brahmasūtras in his extensive *vṛtti*, which has been abbreviated by the ancient Masters. He quotes this *Vṛtti*—to conform to the custom and use the class-name as its title—some seven times in his Śrībhāṣya and nowhere else.<sup>51</sup> These seven fragments, it would seem, are all that is known of a *vṛtti* by a Bodhāyana. Śaṅkara, however, according to his commentators Rāmānanda and Ānandagiri refers implicitly to a *Vṛttikāra* in several places of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.<sup>52</sup> They identify this author with an Upavarṣa, possibly<sup>53</sup> on the strength of a remark by Śaṅkara ad BrS. 3, 3, 53: *ata eva bhagavatopavarṣeṇa prathamā tantrē ātmāstitvābhidhānaprasaktau 'śārīrake vakṣyāma ity' uddhāra uktaḥ* "therefore the venerable Upavarṣa declared at a point in the First Tantra where there was occasion to discuss the existence of the Soul: "We shall explain this in the Śārīraka". This remark is, according to KUPPUSWAMI, a clear indication that Upavarṣa was the author of

48. MM. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRICAL, *Bodhāyana and Dramiḍācārya—two old Vedāntins presupposed by Rāmānuja* (Proc. & Tr. 3rd Or. Conf. Madras 1924), pp. 465.

49. DASGUPTA, *Indian Philosophy* III, pp. 105 ff.; cf. also S. KRISHNASWAMI IYENGAR, *Manimekhalai in its historical setting*, pp. 91 ff.; V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, intr. to *Vācaspati's Tattvabindu* (Annamalai Un. Skt. Ser. 3, 1936), pp. 14 ff.

50. *bhagavadbodhāyanakṛtāṃ vistīrṇāṃ brahmasūtravṛttīṃ pūrvācāryāḥ saṃci-kṣipuh / tanmatānusareṇa sūtrākṣarāṇi vyākhyasyante*; Abhyankar's reading *Baudh'* is incorrect.

51. Collected and shown against the relevant sūtras in Appendix § 1.

52. BrSBh. 1, 1, 19/23/31; 1, 2, 23; Ś. quotes him by name ad 1, 3, 28 *varṇā eva tu śabda iti bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ*.

53. The utmost caution should be observed in assuming that comparatively late commentators knew works which have been lost long since; in many cases it is probable that they too inferred rather than knew. We should not even be too sure that Ś. knew Upavarṣa's complete commentary: both citations may easily have been current dicta in school-tradition; his one citation *varṇā eva tu śabda iti* summarizes Śabara's Upavarṣa quotation; his other one is also found in Bhāskara 1, 1, 1, (Chaukh. ed. p. 6) *ata eva opavarṣācāryeṇoktaṃ prathamapāde—ātmavādaṃ tu śārīrake vakṣyāma iti*. If Upavarṣa's prestige was great enough to render these relatively unimportant citations significant, one wonders why his authority is not evoked in more controversial sections—if his views were known. That Bhāskara quotes Upavarṣa in exactly the same connexions as Ś. (though under different sūtras) and only there makes it probable that Bh. quoted from Ś.

vṛttis in both karma—and brahmasūtras and he proceeds to identify him with Rāmānuja's vṛttikāra Bodhāyana.

The question is, however, appreciably more complicated than at a first glance it would appear to be. An Upavaṛṣa is mentioned by Śabarasvāmin *ad* Karmasūtra 1, 1, 5 in a discussion on the topic of what constitutes a word.<sup>54</sup> So, on the basis of Śaṅkara's and Śabara's references and citations and of Rāmānanda's identification, we may conclude that Upavaṛṣa did indeed write a vṛtti on both Karma- and Brahmasūtras. Venkaṭanātha, writing in the 14th Century, suggests the identity of this Upavaṛṣa with our Bodhāyana, but it is noteworthy that he refers to him by quoting Śabara's quotation.<sup>55</sup> One wonders whether he knew much more of him than just that analysis of the word *gauḥ*, and whether, for that matter, Śaṅkara's commentators did.

The citation from Upavaṛṣa by Śaṅkara is in itself most interesting. It is remarkably worded. *Tantra* may indeed mean "system, doctrine" but much more frequent is the sense of "chapter, part of a larger treatise". If we accept this sense we shall be led to conclude that Upavaṛṣa's text contained both the Karma and Śārīrakasūtras as one context.<sup>56</sup> KUPPUSWAMI just stops before this conclusion: "Upavaṛṣa was decisively in favour of treating the Karma-Mīmāṃsā and Brahma-Mīmāṃsā as forming the former and the latter parts of an integral whole". Left at this the statement *vakṣyāmaḥ* means simply that Upavaṛṣa contemplated writing a vṛtti on the Śārīraka part. Yet, to express such an intention of commenting on another work some time in the future is most uncommon with Indian commentators; but very frequent indeed are references to, and anticipations of, what is to follow later on in the same text. Reading the citation naturally we under-

54. *kaḥ śabdaḥ—gākāraukāraṇavisaṃjāniyā iti bhagavān Upavaṛṣaḥ*: if, as is generally accepted, the quotation of the Vṛttikāra (*vṛttikāras tv anyathenaṃ granthaṃ varṇayāṃ cakre*, etc.) runs to the end of *bhāṣya* ad 1, 1, 5, then, JACOB argues (*the Dates of the philosophical sūtras of the Brahmins*, p. 17 (JAOS 1911); followed by P. V. KANE, *Gleanings from the Śabarabhāṣya* (JBBRAS 1921)), the Vṛttikāra quotes Upavaṛṣa and cannot be identical with him; this is too cautious: it is clear from the context as well as Śaṅkara's reference 1, 3, 28 that this Vṛttikāra is Upavaṛṣa; for an account of his views, cf. V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, *Old Vṛttikāras on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* (IHQ 1934), p. 431 ff.

55. *Tattvaṭikā*, p. 149.

56. Another interpretation is possible by which *prathama tantra* comprises I-XII, a second *tantra* the *Samkarasakāṇḍa* XIII-XVI, and the *Śārīraka* is appended as the third part; cf. this use is *Prapañcahrdaya*, p. 39. A third one is suggested by Bhāskara who has *prathame pāde* where Ś. has *prathamatantra*—; ad 1, 3, 10 Bh. however uses *tantra* for the entire corpus of KM Sūtras when quoting Upavaṛṣa: *prathamatantrasiddhatvāc oātra sphoṭanīrākaraṇam niṣphalam syāt*. The use of *tantra* as a whole of *sūtras* "threads" is of course natural.



stand that Upavaṛṣa postponed the discussion of a certain topic to a later chapter of the treatise on which he was commenting. But all our evidence points to the fact that Jaimini's and Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras are not only different treatises by different authors but belong to two altogether different śāstras; and any evidence extracted from one stray sentence crumbles before this firm fact.

Sureśvara, however, in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi sambandhokti* ad 1, 91 makes incidentally a surprising statement: .. *yato na Jaiminer ayam abhiprāya 'āmnāyasya sarva eva kriyārtha' iti: yadi hy ayam abhiprāyo 'bhaviṣyad 'athāto brahmajijñāsā janmādy asya yata'ityevamādi .. sarva-vedāntamimāṃsaṇaṃ śrīmacchārīrakaṇaṃ nāsūtrayīṣyat; asūtrayac ca* "Jaimini cannot have meant that 'all scripture bears on acts': if he had he would not have composed his Śārīrakasūtras *athāto brahmajijñāsā* etc. in which he interprets the sense of all Upaniṣads: but the fact is that he *did*!" In the light of this remark<sup>57</sup> our explanation of Upavaṛṣa's statement as referring to one treatise of both corpora of Sūtras becomes more plausible.

Let us also consider the testimony of one of Bodhāyana's fragments: *saṃhitam etac chārīrakaṇaṃ Jaiminīyena ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇeneti śāstraikatvasiddhiḥ*, "that Karma- and Brahmasūtras constitute one śāstra is proved by the fact that this Śārīraka is incorporated in one treatise with Jaimini's Sūtras in 16 Chapters": the wording again is significant: *etat* must mean that Bodhāyana refers to the work on which he is commenting, whereas the pregnancy of the word-order *Jaiminīyena ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇena* can only be brought out in rendering it "Jaimini's work, i.e. the one in 16 chapters": in other words at least two forms of the *Jaiminīya* were already known to Bodhāyana, one in 16 and one *not* in 16 chapters.

There is little doubt that the 16 Chapters refer to KMSūtras I-XII with *Samkarṣakāṇḍa* XIII-XVI.<sup>58</sup> It follows that we have three corpora of

57. S. K. BELVALKAR was the first to accept the direct sense of this remark (*Jaiminīya's Śārīraka-Sūtra*, Fest-Gabe Garbe "Aus Indiens Kultur", Erlangen 1927), but he has not answered Hiriyanna's pertinent objection to taking it literally: H. rightly points out that Padmapāda, Sureśvara's contemporary, does not know a *Jaiminīyaśārīraka* (even denies it: cf. *Pañcapādika* 40, 153-54 cf. also *Śaṅkara BrSBh.* 1, 1, 4); Belvalkar's summary condemnation of the traditional view that the pupil shares his teacher's opinions and that Jaimini therefore may just stand for Bādarāyaṇa may be right from the point of view of modern scholarship, but the question is what view Sureśvara himself held. On the other hand the fact remains that the point of Sureśvara's argumentation is that Jaimini (and no other) *did* compose a sūtra; striking also is the almost conversational tone which suggests that it is a fact of common knowledge.

58. I refer to V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, *Samkarṣakāṇḍa—a genuine supplement to the Pūrva Mimāṃsā Sūtra* (IHQ. IX, 1933).

sūtras known to Bodhāyana: one in 12, one in 16, and one in 20 chapters including the 4 adhyāyas of the śārīraka. Did he comment on the preceding 16 Chapters of the Jaiminīya also? I doubt it. The quoted fragment II must have been connected with fragment I in some discussion like this: "Atha has the sense of immediate succession. [Objection: No; for Karmamīmāṃsā and Brahmanīmāṃsā being different śāstras immediate succession is excluded. Reply: No;] that both constitute one śāstra is proved by the fact etc." It is possible to explain *ṣoḍaśa*<sup>59</sup> as 12 KMS. + 4 BrS., as Rāmānuja clearly does.<sup>59</sup> In that case we are to conclude that Jaimini wrote a Śārīrakam, which as we saw is quite possible, and that Bodhāyana did not comment on that one but a different one, since otherwise the specific mention of Jaiminīya would be pointless; moreover Rāmānuja, had he known about such a Śārīrakam, would no doubt have made the most of it because the continuity of the śāstras is the corner-stone of his system: that he does not think of it although it is implied by his own interpretation of *ṣoḍaśa* proves that he did not know of the existence of a continuous treatise of Sūtras that was commented on in its entirety by Bodhāyana. As Rāmānuja is the only author of whom we know that he consulted this vṛtti, we have to accept his evidence—whether he was right or wrong—and leave it at that.

There is other confusing evidence which contradicts this. The Prapañcahṛdaya states that Bodhāyana did write vṛttis on both Sūtras, even a complete extensive commentary called *Kṛtakoṭi* "Disputation on Karman"<sup>59a</sup>; this bulky commentary was abbreviated by Upavaṛṣa, but slightly (*kiṃcit*), and further abbreviated—for the slow-witted—by Devaśvāmin.<sup>60</sup> Then Bhavadāsa was the first to comment the 16 Chapters of the Jaiminīya only; finally Śabarāśvāmin was the first to comment on the 12 Chapters only, leaving out the Saṃkarśakāṇḍa. How reliable is this account? We know nothing about the author and its age, but we gather that he was a Vaiṣṇava bhākta following Sāṃkhya and a tantric kind of Yoga, which would render his date rather late. Of the Vedānta systems he describes only an advaita

59. Right after the quotation he remarks: *ataḥ pratipādayiṣitārthabhedena ṣaṭ-kabhedavad adhyāyabhedavac ca pūrvottaramīmāṃsāyor bhedaḥ*, etc. "pūrva and uttaramīmāṃsā are distinguished according to their subject-matter like the division of (the 12 chapters of KMS in two parts of) six adhyāyas and in separate adhyāyas".

59a. If we read it as a bahuvrīhi: "(the commentary) in which arguments are made".

60. *tasya viṃśatyadhyāyanibaddhasya mīmāṃsāśāstrasya kṛtakoṭināmadheyam bhāṣyam Bodhāyanena kṛtam / tadgranthabāhulyabhayād upekṣya kiṃcit saṃkṣiptam Upavaṛṣaṇa kṛtam / tad api mandamatīn prati duṣpratipādaṃ vistīrnatvād ity upekṣya ṣoḍaśa-lakṣaṇapūrvamīmāṃsāśāstramātrasya Devaśvāminātisaṃkṣiptam kṛtam*, etc. Prapañcahṛdaya IV, p. 39.

school, which seems to be post-Śaṅkara and he mentions the names of Śaṅkara, Brahmadatta and Bhāskara. He is right about Śabara, at least partly right about Devaśvāmin of whom we have a commentary on the Saṃkaraśakāṇḍa left.<sup>62</sup> His other data conflict with what little evidence we have. Rāmānuja did not know about a Sūtra collection in 20 Chapters. Besides, the convincing name of the Commentary is more probably that of Upaśarṣa's, whom the Vaijayantī calls *Kṛtakotiḥ* "author of the Kṛtakoti".<sup>63</sup> His history of the Sūtras and its commentaries sounds plausible, but some of the earlier names may have been filled in to make it stick. Withal its authority is dubious.

To sum up. On our evidence the probabilities are that Upaśarṣa, author of a vṛtti on both Sūtras, probably entitled *Kṛtakoti*, is different from Bodhāyana known from Rāmānuja's quotations; that Bodhāyana did not compose a vṛtti on the KMSūtras; that therefore he was later than Upaśarṣa, recognised the schism between the two śāstras but did not accept it. Further we may consider the possibility that Upaśarṣa's *śārīrakam* not only formed part of, but also went under the name of, *Jaiminīyasūtras*; and finally that—abstracting from the dubious Devaśvāmin—since Śabaraśvāmin was the first commentator to explain the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras only and therefore also recognised the schism, Bodhāyana's date will not be far removed from Śabara's.

Again we may ask: what is Rāmānuja's evidence worth? In other words, how much did he know of Bodhāyana himself? Tradition relates<sup>64</sup> that Rāmānuja had his pupil Kureśa procure a copy of the vṛtti from a Śāradā Māth in Kaśmīr;<sup>65</sup> possibly it was purloined, for as soon as it was missing Rāmānuja and Kureśa were chased by the temple-keepers and the manuscript was recovered; meanwhile Kureśa had learnt it by heart. The circumstances of the story may be fictitious, but they would hardly have been invented unless Bodhāyana MSS. were known to have been extremely scarce. And is it a coincidence that all the quotations are from the first adhyāya? Arguments *ex silentio* are seldom conclusive; but that neither Sudarśanaśūri nor Veṅkaṭanātha quote once from the vṛtti in their com-

61. cf. p. 40 *tato māyāśabalabrahmaṇi samanvayād avirodho dvitīye*; that he mentions neither Rāmānuja nor Mādhva does not necessarily mean that he preceded both Vaiṣṇava vedāntins.

62. He is usually dated much later than Śabara.

63. ed. G. OPPERT (Madras 1893) I, 3, Brāhmaṇakāṇḍa, 158 cd. *halabhūtiḥ tūpavarṣaḥ kṛtakotiḥ ca saḥ*.

64. DASGUPTA III, p. 102.

65. Far from the battle-fields of India, Kaśmīr and, in the extreme south, Travancore, have been traditionally the find-spots of rare or unique MSS.

mentaries on a treatise that professes to have been inspired by it—whereas they do quote both the Vākya and the Bhāṣya, which are far less fundamental to the Śrībhāṣya—renders the conclusion that neither one ever saw a copy of it virtually unavoidable. Significant is also Rāmānuja's statement that Bodhāyana's supposedly extensive *vṛtti* has been abbreviated by ancient Masters; he does not actually say that he is following the *vṛtti*, but the *vṛtti* as abbreviated. It is quite possible that Rāmānuja, too, knew it only by fragments from quotations. This possibility is further increased by the comparative insignificance of the fragments quoted; except for I and II they hardly contribute anything to the argumentation and sometimes they are added as an after-thought. But they may conceivably have been found cited in early treatises which continued ancient traditions of interpretation.

Against this background no special authority can be attributed to Venkaṭanātha's identification Bodhāyana = Upavarṣa on which Kuppaswami's case rests but which Venkaṭanātha himself offers as a guess.

Of interest also is another point. Yāmuna, at the beginning of his *Ātmasiddhi*,<sup>66</sup> gives a list of ancient Vedāntins. Strangely enough he does not mention the *Vṛtti* by which Rāmānuja set great store and which must have enjoyed great authority—if only by report—in their common milieu. But he mentions a *bhāṣyakṛt* who had explained Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras "briefly and profoundly": *bhagavatā Bādarāyaṇenedamarthāṇy eva sūtrāṇi praṇītāni vivṛtāni ca tāni parimitagambhīrabhāṣiṇā bhāṣyakṛtā*. This *bhāṣyakṛt* is always identified with Dramiḍa the Bhāṣyakāra, for which, as we shall see, there are no arguments. Rāmānuja declares that the *vṛtti* was an extensive one, Yāmuna that the *bhāṣya* was a brief one. *Vṛtti* "gloss, scholion" is mainly distinguished from a *bhāṣya* "commentary" by its size:<sup>67</sup> a long *vṛtti* will be very similar to a short *bhāṣya*. As Bodhāyana's omission cannot be accounted for in this context—where also a sub-commentary by a Śrīvatsāṅkamiśra, another ancient Master, is mentioned—I am inclined to think that Yāmuna and Rāmānuja both referred to the same work by different descriptions; Rāmānuja may have preferred the term *vṛtti* to avoid confusion with Dramiḍa's *bhāṣya*.

## § 2. *Ṭaṅka the Vākyakāra and Dramiḍa the Bhāṣyakāra* :

Apart from the *Vṛttikāra* and rarely if ever in the same context Rāmānuja quotes regularly from the Vākya of an anonymous vākyakāra and

66. *Ātmasiddhi*, p. 8.

67. Similar confusions happen oftener: cf. TRIPATHI, *Tarkasamgraha*, p. XV "Saṅkarācārya styled his commentaries on Kātha and Bhṛhadāraṇyaka *vṛttis*, yet as they are really *bhāṣyas* it appears that in old times both words were interchangeable".

from a bhāṣya thereof by Dramiḍa. Both are also known elsewhere. The Vākyakāra is generally named Ṭaṅka, and he is identified by Sudarśanasūri and others with Brahmanandin. Ṭaṅka's name, which has the second place in Rāmānuja's list, does also occur in a list of Yāmuna, but here he has the distinction of being mentioned the first of a series of adversaries and is put on a par with Advaitins like Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara and with Dvaitādvaitins like Bhartṛprapañca and Bhāskara.<sup>68</sup> Whatever his persuasion, we have no reason to doubt that Yāmuna's Ṭaṅka is identical with Rāmānuja's. That Rāmānuja, who never introduces him as such, also regarded Ṭaṅka as the Vākyakāra is indicated by the place which his name holds between Bodhāyana the Vṛttikāra and Dramiḍa the Bhāṣyakāra. Dramiḍa, this is evident from the citations themselves, followed Ṭaṅka's vākya scrupulously. This is another argument against identifying Yāmuna's bhāṣyakṛt with Rāmānuja's bhāṣyakāra.

Besides, we can understand why Ṭaṅka was excluded by Yāmuna and included by Rāmānuja. Sarvajñātman, the author of the Samkṣepaśārīraka, quotes in 1,218 ff. a Vākyakāra by name of Ātreya who was commented upon by a Bhāṣyakāra: beyond any doubt the latter is Dramiḍa, for the quotation corresponds literally to one by Rāmānuja.<sup>69</sup> Nṛsiṃhāśramin<sup>70</sup> commenting on the Samkṣepaśārīraka identifies this Ātreya with Brahmanandin to remove the last doubt of his identity. Sarvajñātman's reference reads: "Ātreya's Vākya tells us also that all effect is merely phenomenal, not of ultimate reality (*saṃvṛtyavahāramātram*). The many defects inherent in the satkāryavāda cannot affect the māyāvāda because it is contradictory: thus, if the effect is merely phenomenal, the defects inherent in the Sāṃkhya view are

68. Ātmasiddhi p. 8: *tathāpy ācāryaṭaṅkabhartṛprapañcabhartṛmitrabhartṛhari-brahmadattaśaṅkarabhāskarādiviracitasitāsitavividhanibandhanāśraddhāviprabaddhabuddhāyo na yathāvad anyathā ca pratipadyante*; on Bhartṛprapañca cf. M. HIRIYANNA, *Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca* (Proc. & Tr. 3d Or. Conf., Madras 1924), p. 9; Bhartṛmitra is known as a commentator of the Karmamīmāṃsāsūtras and KUPPUSWAMI is inclined to see in him a precursor of Prabhākara (*The Prabhākara School of Karma Mīmāṃsā*, Proc. & Tr. 2nd Or. Conf. Calcutta 1922), pp. 410 f.; Brahmadatta is reputed to have written on Karmamīmāṃsā, cf. Prapañcahṛdaya, p. 39 *brahmakāṇḍasya bhagavatpādabrahmadattabhāskarādivibhir matabhedenāpi kṛtam*, i.e., Śaṅkara, Brahmadatta and Bhāskara, but there can be no question of it but Br. preceded S.: further material in HIRIYANNA's paper *Brahmadatta: an old Vedāntin* (J. Or. Res. Madras 1928), p. 1 ff.; on Bhartṛhari see V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI's papers, *Was Bhartṛhari a Bauddha?* and *Bhartṛhari as a pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin* (resp. All-India Or. Conf. Mysore 1935 and Trivandrum 1937), also *Bhartṛhari as a Mīmāṃsaka* (Deccan College Bulletin XIV, 1).

69. Fragment XIII.

70. Quoted by KUPPUSWAMI in the paper mentioned supra note 48; the Subodhinī (Ānandāśrama ed.) identifies the Vākyakāra with Brahmadatta; HIRIYANNA's first alternative (o.c. p. 7-8) that this is an error is certainly the right one.

completely avoided. Hence the sage of Atri's clan, who is well conversant with the stages of Vedānta, declares that the effect is merely phenomenal. The statement *tat satyam* in ChUp. 6, 8, 7 is based on the effect's dependence on *satya*. His example of the sea and the foam should be understood on the basis of phenomenality (i.e. the effect = foam is phenomenal, Brahman = sea is ultimately real). After the Vākyakāra has described the effect (*vikāra*-) he adopts immediately afterwards, and develops gradually, the view that all effect is merely phenomenal, and therefore he maintains non-duality (*advaita*-). The venerable Bhāṣyakāra declares likewise that "the Venerable Lord the Supreme Deity is *antarguṇa*, i.e. *pratyagguṇa* "intrinsically real".<sup>71</sup> And this agrees with our view of a Brahman without qualities, not with the view of a Brahman with qualities".

We understand that Sarvajñātman refers to the Vākya on ChUp. 6, 2 ff. and especially 6, 8, 7 *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā*, where Ātreya illustrates the relation between *idaṃ sarvaṃ* "this Universe" and its underlying principle by the example of the foam and the sea and explains it as *satyasamāśrayatva*: the Universe has its ontological basis in the 'Real' that is its cause (ChUp. 6, 2, 1). Sarvajñātman applies his doctrine, or exegetical method, of the "didactic stages" (*bhūmi*-),<sup>72</sup> pretending that Ātreya was "well-conversant with the stages of teaching of the Upaniṣads", and interprets the *drṣṭānta* as the first stage or *pariṇāmavāda* (*satkāryavāda*) and the comment corresponding to *satyasamāśrayatva* as the second stage or *vivartavāda* (*māyāvāda*), and so claims him a true-blue Advaitin. The Bhāṣyakāra's quotation is most probably taken from the commentary on *Daharavidyā* ChUp. 8, 1, 1 (*tasmin yad antas tad anveṣṭavyam*) and *antarguṇa*- "in whom qualities inhere" explained as "who is essentially interior". Sarvajñātman seems aware of diverging explications and emphasizes that it agrees with the *nirguṇavāda*. Foam-and-sea is a favourite example of the *bhedābhedavādins*, and I think it extremely probable that Yāmuna excluded Ṭaṅka by name and Dramiḍa by implication because they tended toward *dvaitādvaita*. For compare now a quotation by Bhāskara ad BrS. 1, 4, 25 (Ś. 26; R. 27) *ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt*, where *pariṇāma* is that of Brahman's creative power: Bhāskara proceeds to say that this is the traditional view taken by the authors of the Vākya and the Vṛtti on the Chāndogya, and quotes the Vākya: "There is an inner causal change (*pariṇāma*).

71. Madhusūdana comments: *guṇasabdah svarūpaparah, anyā devatāḥ parāgrūpāḥ paradevatā tu pratyagātmārūpāparokṣacidekarasety arthaḥ*.

72. On Sarvajñātman's "stages of Vedānta". Cf. HACKER, *Vivarta*, pp. 231 ff. See *Samkṣepasārīra* II, 60 ff.

as in the case of curds etc.”<sup>73</sup> We may trust this statement which goes unchallenged by Rāmānuja and fits in remarkably well with Sarvajñātman’s exposition.<sup>74</sup>

Rāmānuja, now, who addressed a larger audience of Vedāntins than Yāmuna, was no less a dialectician than Sarvajñātman and a far superior exegete. Though the expression *nirbhugnadaivatam* is difficult,<sup>75</sup> it is clear that Rāmānuja’s interpretation of the common citation is the more natural one. Moreover, in his zeal to show that his system of Vedānta was the one favoured by the ancient Masters, Rāmānuja was at pains to include both ancient commentators Ṭaṅka and Dramiḍa, who enjoyed great esteem. This is also proved by Śaṅkara’s references to Dramiḍa in his Bhāṣyas<sup>76</sup> and by Suresvara’s adoption of a story of his,<sup>77</sup> the well-known one of the prince who, suffering from amnesia, lived with hunters until his memory returned and he recognized himself for what he was. We may conclude that both commentators were ancient Vedāntins whose names were hallowed by tradition. Certainly Ṭaṅka was not identical with the Ṭaṅkācārya profusely quoted by Haṃsayogin in his Gītābhāṣya:<sup>78</sup> one glance at the style of both will prove this immediately.

73. *sūtrakārāḥ śrūtyanukārī parināmapakṣaṃ sūtrayāmbabhūva / ayam eva chāndogyē vākyakāravṛttikārābhīyaṃ saṃpradāyaḥ* [DIVYANAM’s text reads *saṃpradāyam*]/ *ataḥ samāsritāḥ/tathā ca vākyam parināmas tu syād dadhyādīvad iti vigītam*; the vṛttikāra must be the same as Rāmānuja’s bhāṣyakāra; for the synonymy of vṛtti and bhāṣya see above.

74. I take it that the quotation by Bhāskara explains the meaning of the word *vikāra*; according to Sarvajñātman, the Vākyakāra first describes *vikāra* still in terms of the first *bhūmi*, or *parināmavāda*, before developing the meaning in terms of the second *bhūmi*, or *vivartavāda*. The fact that three different authors tried to make use of the same passage of an ancient gloss is too remarkable to go uncommented. One would suggest that Sarvajñātman endeavoured to challenge Bhāskara’s claim and forced his own interpretation of two didactic stages on the Vākya text, while Rāmānuja again corrected Sarvajñātman by bringing out the full force of Dramiḍa’s comments. This is a guess, but there is nothing in the chronology to conflict with it; besides, tacit references by one author to another are far more numerous than one would suspect at a first glance.

75. See my translation and note ad Fr. XV; obscurity must have been the rule and may account for the divergency of interpretation.

76. ChUpBh. Intr. and 3, 8, 10; Ś. Maṇḍūkya KBh. 2, 32; cf. also Ānandagiri’s Tarkasamgraha and Tripāthi’s (not conclusive) remarks p. XVI; KUPPUSWAMI is certainly right to consider the Draviḍa of the Advaitins identical with the Dramiḍa of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins; Draviḍa and Dramiḍa are also in Viśiṣṭādvaita MSS. variants of the same name.

77. Vārttika on Śaṅkara’s BĀUpBh., 2, 1, 506, included in Appendix § 2 as Fragment XVI b.

78. Cf. F. O. SCHRAMER, *Neues über die Bhagavadgītā* (Fest-Gabe Garbe “Aus Indiens Kultur”), p. 179.

It cannot be doubted that both Vākya and Bhāṣya explained the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.<sup>78a</sup> This is not only borne out by the testimonies of Bhāskara, of Sarvajñātman's commentators and of Ānandagiri, but also by the internal evidence of the quotations themselves. All except three of the fragments can somehow be connected with Chāndogya texts and have been so connected by Rāmānuja. Apart from Yāmuna's dubious *bhāṣyakṛt*, there is no evidence at all to connect them with the Sūtras. I have collected all fragments known so far and shown against the corresponding ChUp. texts in Appendix I, § 2.

A final question might be asked. Is Ṭaṅka, who must have been a very ancient Master, known in the older literature? The language of his very concise Vākya displays an antique sūtra-like style; old-fashioned words and constructions are the rule. Ṭaṅka appears as the first in Yāmuna's list, of which the chronological arrangement is borne out by the other names mentioned. Although the date of the Sūtras is far from fixed, one would assign a date to the Vākya not too far removed from Bādarāyaṇa's. Of course we enter here the realm of speculation, but it may be pointed out that Bādarāyaṇa mentions an Ātreya by name as advocating a view to which an Auḍulomi is opposed. It would seem that the occasion of the cryptic difference is the interpretation of a Chāndogya passage.<sup>79</sup> Incidentally we have good reasons to believe that the Sūtrakāra, whoever he was or whoever they were, tended himself toward dvaitādvaita of a kind.<sup>80</sup> We may also remark that the Sūtrakāra's main concern was with the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. BELVALKAR on plausible grounds goes so far as to contend that the original Sūtras were Chāndogya Sūtras.<sup>81</sup> Though all this is not much evidence, yet it is not entirely out of the question that one of the several unknown sages<sup>82</sup> mentioned in the Sūtras may have left some vestiges in literature: and we would hardly expect these vestiges to be other than incidental and ambiguous citations by later successors on the same road.

It is impossible to fix a date for Brahmanandin Ṭaṅka Ātreya. Does it signify anything that in Yāmuna's list he precedes Bhartṛmītra, who accord-

78a. There is also a tradition that Damaḍa commented on the BĀUp.

79. BrS. 3, 4, 44-45, which according to R. refers to the ritual accompaniments of the *daharavidyā*, ChUp. 8, 1.

80. I refer to V. S. GHATE's important conclusions in *Les Brahma-Sūtras et leur cinq commentaires* (Thesis, Paris 1919), English translation, *The Vedānta, A study of the Brahma-Sūtras*, etc., Poona 1926; cf. also DASGUPTA, II.

81. S. K. BELVALKAR, *Lectures on Vedānta* I, p. 141: "There is nothing improbable in a 'Chāndogya' Brahmasūtra having in fact formed the nucleus of the present Sūtras, and been even incorporated therein;" for his arguments see pp. 142 ff.

82. Ātreya, Āsmarathya, Auḍulomi, Kāśakṛtsna, Kārṣṇājini, Jaimini and Bādari; note that all the names are patronymics and may refer to families rather than individuals; the Ātreya family belongs to Sāmaveda.



ing to the Prapañcahṛdaya would not seem far removed from Śabara? In any case it is significant that all Vākya quotations, not only Rāmānuja's but also Sarvajñātman's, Sudarśana's and Venkaṭanātha's, are accompanied by citations from Dramiḍa's bhāṣya, and Bhāskara refers to both simultaneously. We may take it that the Bhāṣya, which seems to have been the most authoritative commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad before Śaṅkara's eclipsed it, has preserved the Vākya. Dramiḍa's language is not only so much more archaic than Śaṅkara's but also than Bhartṛprapañca's that a lapse of at least three centuries may reasonably be presumed. Besides, whereas Śaṅkara attacks Bhartṛprapañca, he pays Dramiḍa the compliment, due to venerable age, of accepting his interpretation where he can safely do so and passing without comment the many passages which he must have found objectionable.

### §3. *The views of the ancient Masters :*

The few fragments of Bodhāyana's vṛtti are not very informative of his views. We may conclude from the way in which he stresses the continuity of Karma- and Brahmanmīmāṃsā that he accepted the great importance of ritual acts as preparatory to the liberating intuition of the Absolute—however he may have conceived of it—and adhered somehow to the *jñānakarmasamuccaya* view with its corollaries of the reality of the phenomenal world and the validity of the criteria of perception and reason in theology. To derive from the fact that Rāmānuja professes to follow him—or rather the ancient masters as commenting him—the probability that Bodhāyana anticipated in all points his late successor, would seem speculative. The most we can say is that the manner in which he was interpreted by his early commentators—possibly the mysterious Guhadeva, Kapardi and Bhāruci—was generally favourable to Rāmānuja's system of unity in difference.

On Ṭaṅka and Dramiḍa we are better informed. Though their antiquity made them venerable alike to such opposites as Sarvajñātman, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja, the last two certainly had better claims on them. Ṭaṅka rejects explicitly the doctrine that God's body is a mere pedagogic fiction and must therefore have affirmed to some extent the reality of the world. The relation between God and world—including the empirical soul—is expressed in terms reminiscent of dvaitādvaita: it is like that between sea and foam: the changing phenomena of the world are no more, but not less, than odd and useless products of an accidental commotion on the surface of a Being which, remaining undisturbed in its infinite profundity, reabsorbs them when calm returns. He adhered to the pariṇāmavāda according to which Brahman as cause changes into effect like curds change into butter. We may conveniently call this *dvaitādvaita* as long as we are aware of the falsification that is implied: the term belongs to a later period and a different universe of discourse.

The personal Deity, possessed of a suprasensible body to his soul, is the object of our knowledge. Interesting are Ṭaṅka's views on *upāsana*, those upaniṣadic meditations which, originally the mental accompaniments of the bodily ritual acts, in the end would supersede the acts themselves. For him they are propaedeutic to the beatific vision: *upāsana* is their constant rememorization or *anusmṛti*, not once and for all but repeatedly and habitually, until, fortified by the observance of cumulative restrictions—ranging from proper nourishment to the suppression of the last relicts of animal life-satisfaction and dissatisfaction—, the completely expurgated mind has penetrated the sense of *tat tvam asi* and attains God in identity.

Dramaḍa appears to have advanced beyond Ṭaṅka's pantheism to a more anthropomorphic theism. Akṣara and Brahman are for him *Bhagavān*. He quotes the *Bhagavadgītā*. He considers the *māyā* doctrine unscriptural. He is a realist and is fond of graphic comparisons—oceans jumping the shores like rutting rams—, parables and stories. His God is a merciful sovereign who, waving the fan of his omnipotence, rules all the worlds as a paramount king.

As they stand the Vākya and Bhāṣya quotations are the oldest instances of commentarial Vedānta texts; and it is important to note that on the whole—however much may escape us—they are more favourable to Rāmānuja's than to Śaṅkara's system of Vedānta.

### III. THE VEDĀRTHASAMGRAHA

#### 1. Its date :

There can, in my opinion, be no doubt that the *Vedārthasamgraha* was Rāmānuja's philosophical *début*. It was written prior to the *Śrībhāṣya* which refers to it twice,<sup>83</sup> not to speak now of innumerable tacit references. Elsewhere I have tried to demonstrate that the *Gītābhāṣya* presupposes the *Śrībhāṣya*<sup>84</sup> and no evidence has so far come up to correct this opinion. Another work ascribed to Rāmānuja, the *Vedāntadīpa*, is also later than the *Śrībhāṣya* to which it refers explicitly.<sup>85</sup>

83. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 58, where reference is made to the Ved. explication of the *Sadvidyā* (§13 ff.), and ib. p. 116, where reference is made to the Ved. discussion of God being denoted in *sāmānādhikarāṇya* sentences with objects of which he is the inner Ruler (§§17; 21).

84. See my *Rāmānuja on the Bhagavadgītā*, Ch. III.

85. Benares ed. p. 8 *śrūtīnyāyavirodhas tu teṣāṃ bhāṣye prapañcita iti neha pratyate / bhāṣyodito 'dhikarānārthaḥ saṁsūtravivaraṇaḥ sukhagrahaṇāya saṁkṣepanopanyasyate*.

There is, however, a curious problem created by still another abridgement of the Śrībhāṣya, known as Vedāntasāra 'essentials of Vedānta', not to be confused with Sadānanda's well-known *advaita* manual. SUDARSANACHARYA maintains<sup>86</sup> that the Vedāntasāra is prior to the Vedārthasamgraha, on grounds whose cogency I fail to see. In itself the very existence of a second and rather thorough-going abridgement of Rāmānuja's *magnum opus*, side by side with the useful Vedāntadīpa, is curious enough. That it was Rāmānuja's *début*, as SUDARSANACHARYA suggests, is extremely unlikely. To me it is unconceivable that Rāmānuja would have put forward his system of Viśiṣṭādvaita for the first time to a highly critical audience of contemporary vedāntins by merely indicating its barest outlines as it is done in the Vedāntasāra, which is nearer to being a vākya than a bhāṣya. In the most detailed explication to be found in the booklet, that of BrS. 1, 1, 2 *janmādy asya yataḥ*, to which the basic scriptural evidence of ŚBh. 1, 1, 1 is delegated as a more convenient place to deal with it, the bare essentials of Viśiṣṭādvaita are enumerated without the slightest attempt at convincing presentation and plausible argumentation. Read, for instance, toward the end: "all vedāntins agree that at the time of resorption there persists a subtle differentiation between, on the one hand, spirit and matter, and the Supreme Being on the other hand, a differentiation so subtle that it does not admit of phenomenality;<sup>87</sup> for they, too, (i.e., advaitavādins and aupādhikavādins) assume that the differentiation (between the three ontological orders), being brought about either by nescience or by limiting conditions, has no beginning. But our view differs peculiarly in this: whereas the others contradict all scripture and reason by maintaining either a brahman that is nescient or a brahman that is limited by conditions, we are guilty of no such contradictions on account of the absence (of such doctrines)." This is an extremely tendentious presentation of the rival views, which can only be understood when we have seen Rāmānuja's arguments either in Vedārthasamgraha or in Śrībhāṣya. We may also note that Rāmānuja nowhere uses the term *vedāntin*, nor indeed *vedānta* in the sense of Vedāntamīmāṃsā; nor is *vyavahāra* in the sense of "phenomenality" common with Rāmānuja; finally, the last sentence is clearly a recast of the second stanza of the Vedārthasamgraha.

Similar observations can be made on the majority of the comments in the Vedāntasāra by anyone well-read in Rāmānuja; and I think it extremely improbable that Rāmānuja presented his system to the thinkers of his age in such a poor form. If the text was at all composed during Rāmānuja's life-time, it will at most have been an authorized epitome by one of his

86. Upodghāta to his Vedārthasamgraha ed. p. 35.

87. *vyavahārānarhasūkṣmabhedah*; NARASIMHA Ayyangar (Adyar ed. 1953) translates 'subtle and indescribable difference'.

pupils. The Vedāntadīpa seems to be more authentic and its existence has indeed some justification in the length and difficulty of the Śrībhāṣya. Yet also in this case I find it hard to believe that Rāmānuja, who, after a traditional life of six score, left but few works in comparison with Śaṅkara, would have preferred the clerical and thankless task of abridging his own *chef-d'oeuvre* to the more congenial composition of, for example, commentaries on the Upaniṣads.

Among the more lyrical works ascribed to Rāmānuja, the Gadyatraya and Nityagrantha, only the former is found referred to sufficiently often by Indian authors to touch lightly upon it here. It may be described loosely as a prose-poem, consisting of three unequal parts, Śaraṇāgatigadya, Śrīraṅga-gadya and Vaikuṇṭhagadya. The text has been commented on by the Vedāntadeśika who ascribes it to *bhāṣyakāra* Rāmānuja, and tradition has it that Rāmānuja wrote it in his old age. The gadyas may be described more precisely as exercises in bhakti as taught by Rāmānuja, an endless and repetitious pondering over and memorizing of God's infinite perfections. Large portions are repeated over and over again and many passages are practically identical with such evocations as the introduction to the Gītābhāṣya and comments *ad* Gītā 9, 34; and they are also strongly reminiscent of Yāmuna's hymns. Remarkable is the oft-recurring expression *ekāntikātyantikapara-bhaktiparajñānaparamabhakti* in which the Vedāntadeśika reads an ascension from the desire of having an immediate intuition of a supreme kind to the actual attaining to such an intuition and finally the uninterrupted retaining of it.<sup>88</sup> The expression is not known to me from Rāmānuja's other works; possibly it is a restatement of the ascension *karman* → *jñāna* → *bhakti*, where *karman*, which is essentially *ārādhana* "propitiation" of God, combined with the knowledge of the nature of God, spirit and matter, gradually culminates in the conscious and loving adoration of God.<sup>89</sup> The later distinction between a lower bhakti of works and a higher bhakti of complete *abandon* (*prapatti*) does not seem to be known to, or at least accepted by, Rāmānuja, as we have tried to show elsewhere,<sup>90</sup> and it is significant that Vedāntadeśika does not explain it in these terms. Though formerly I hesitated, there is no valid reason to doubt the authenticity of this little devotional work: perhaps modern scholars are too apt to suspect lyrics that are ascribed to

88. In his Gadyabhāṣya (*Śrīmad-Vedāntadeśika-granthamālā*, part 4, ed. by Sri Kanchi P. B. ANNANGARACHARYAR, Conjeeveram 1940), p. 104: *atra parabhaktir uttarottarasākṣātkārecchātmakī dhīḥ, sā ca yā prītir ityādiṣu iva svabhāvajā, na tv iṣṭasādhana-tva-buddhijā / parajñānam uttarottarasākṣātkārah / sākṣātkṛte niranantarānubhūṣā parama-bhaktiḥ*; the quotation is VP. 1, 20, 19 *yā prītir avivekāṇām viṣayeṣu anapāyini / tvām anusmarataḥ sa me hṛdayān mēpasarpatu*.

89. See my *Rāmānuja*, etc., pp. 19 ff.

90. O. c. pp. 24 ff.

philosophers and to forget that these philosophers were theologians and officiating priests. The songs of St. Thomas Aquinas, whom nobody would suspect of lyrical aspirations on the basis of his philosophical works, furnish an interesting parallel.

## 2. Its Sources

### A. SMṚTI

#### §1. Function of Smṛti:

The scope and authority of smṛti texts have been fixed ever since Jaimini ruled: "Smṛti is to be disregarded whenever it militates against śruti."<sup>91</sup> A propos of this sūtra Rāmānuja, commenting on Brahmasūtra 2, 1, 1, defines the function of smṛti in the following terms: "The Vedānta texts aim at establishing complete objects on the basis of apodictical assumption, which is beyond the scope of all other pramāṇas, from perception onwards; therefore, those people whose knowledge of scriptural revelation falls short stand in need of corroboration of these objects; many smṛtis, promulgated by perfectly trustworthy personalities in harmony with the contents of the śruti, serve to corroborate them. This corroboration being equal to the elucidation of the truths set forth by the scriptures is impossible whenever smṛti militates against śruti in its primary meaning." In this connexion, where the authority of the traditional doctrine of Sāṃkhya is condemned, he mentions a number of smṛti texts which do fulfil this corroborative function: Mahābhārata, Bhagavadgītā, Manu, Viṣṇupurāṇa, Āpastambiyadharmasūtra, Dakṣasmṛti, etc., and which fail to do so, Kapilasmṛti and Bṛhaspatismṛti.

The same view is stated in the Vedārthasamgraha<sup>92</sup> with reference to the Rāmāyaṇa text: "Seeing that Kuśa and Lava were wise and firmly established in the Vedas, the Lord made them apprehend in order to corroborate the Vedas:" for this exactly is the function of epics and purāṇas.

Distinction is always made between the Mahābhārata and its celebrated episode the Bhagavadgītā. On the place of the latter text in Rāmānuja's system the present writer has commented elsewhere in great detail, and little need be added here. Noteworthy is that in our text the quotations from the Viṣṇupurāṇa outnumber those from the Bhagavadgītā, while in the Śrībhāṣya the latter text appears to play a far more important rôle. There is an ancient Vaiṣṇava tradition that Rāmānuja wrote his Gītābhāṣya

91. KMS. 1, 1, 3.

92. Ved. § 33.

in extreme old age, which may signify that the Gītā grew in importance for Rāmānuja in the course of his career.

Strictly epical citations are mainly from the Mahābhārata, especially from the Mokṣadharmā which Rāmānuja once styles the *jñānakāṇḍa* of the great epic, and rarely from the Rāmāyaṇa. Quotations from the smṛtis in the stricter sense of the word are chiefly from the cosmological and philosophical portions of Manusmṛti.

Generally, with the possible exception of the Gītā citations, the quoted stanzas from other smṛtis are incidental, supplementary rather than decisive, current quotations of a certain milieu rather than the significant fruits of a dedicated study. The references to the Viṣṇupurāṇa, however, play a more important rôle: it is to this text that Rāmānuja turns to enlarge upon topics most dear to his heart.

## §2. Viṣṇupurāṇa:

In comparison with the smṛtis that were generally accepted as authoritative, the epics among which the Bhagavadgītā has a privileged position, and Manu, the *smṛta* authority of the Purāṇas was not so widely and completely recognized before Rāmānuja's age. Śaṅkara, for instance, only makes sparingly use of corroborative evidence from the Purāṇas.<sup>93</sup>

Rāmānuja, however, quotes profusely from the Purāṇas, or rather from one of them, the Vaiṣṇavite Śrī-Viṣṇupurāṇa.<sup>94</sup> But even he does not do so without an attempt at justification. He introduces<sup>95</sup> a typically purāṇic classification of the purāṇas into four groups, those promulgated by Brahmā on a 'day'—that is one day of Brahmā's life—when his *sattva* constituent preponderated, those promulgated when *rajas* preponderated and when *tamas* preponderated, and those promulgated on a day when the guṇas were mixed. In accordance with the classification only the *sāttvika* purāṇas are fully authoritative, and in case there happen to be conflicts between different purāṇas, the teaching of the better qualified one is decisive.<sup>96</sup> The multiple authorship of the Purāṇas exists only in appearance: Brahmā himself is the *auctor intellectualis*, on his dictation the sages have compiled their Purāṇas.

By far the greater majority of the smṛti quotations in the Vedārtha-saṃgraha have been taken from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. It is worth noting how

93. Śaṅkara's Sūtrabhāṣya quotes the Purāṇas some 8 times (DEUSSEN, *System of Vedānta*, p. 31).

94. Ved. § 94.

95. § 94.

96. § 94.

Rāmānuja defines<sup>97</sup> the scope of its authority: "The Vaiṣṇava Purāṇa is accepted without dissension by all scholars from the East, North, South and West of India as being adequate (*pariṣṭāpta*-) in so far as it establishes all the dharmas and all the tattvas". We may assume that in Rāmānuja's age the Viṣṇupurāṇa had gained wide currency and popularity — not necessarily only in Vaiṣṇavite circles — as a religious and edifying book in all the Indian senses of the words. Interesting is the restriction to "all dharmas and all tattvas": the basic doctrines do not stand in need of corroboration by the Viṣṇupurāṇa, they are not *smṛta* but *śrauta*. The description of this Purāṇas as a *dharma*-book is possibly with reference to the huge appendix Viṣṇu-dharmottara — which, incidentally, is quoted only once in the Śrībhāṣya<sup>98</sup> and not at all in the Vedārtasamgraha —, whereas the *tattvas* refer either to the three ontological orders of Supreme Being, soul and matter, or to the categories of Sāṃkhya, the influence of which on this popular Purāṇa has been very great.

The strictly metaphysical object of the Viṣṇupurāṇa is described in the following terms:<sup>99</sup> it serves the special and exclusive purpose of setting forth a certain aspect of Brahman's essence, that is not a phenomenal projection of the Supreme Being, but a particular manifestation of Its *essence*. This aspect of Brahman or, personally, of Nārāyaṇa who is the Supreme Brahman, is Viṣṇu who represents Nārāyaṇa's character of omnipresent pervader and saviour-god of incarnations.

A *propos* of Rāmānuja's introduction of the Viṣṇupurāṇa a few general remarks may be made. Not infrequently Rāmānuja is opposed to Śaṅkara as the 'first sectarian commentator', by which is meant that he was the first to introduce into Vedāntamīmāṃsā, so far kept pure, external and deteriorating elements which made his system a parochial *manifesto* rather than a universally valid system of thought; or it is said that he fabricated scriptural evidence, that is to say, made room within Vedānta for a great many śrutis and smṛtis that Śaṅkara either ignored or delegated to the rank of relative truth. It is clear that those who pass these criticisms take Śaṅkara's selection and treatment of scriptures as normative, in other words, believe on speculative grounds that Śaṅkara is more right than Rāmānuja.

Rāmānuja's citations of the Viṣṇupurāṇa are only illustrative and corroborative. His justification of these citations shows clearly that he was anxious not to introduce any evidence that would be unacceptable to his fellow

97. § 110.

98. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 70 f. (104, 23-26).

99. § 110.

Vedāntins.<sup>100</sup> It is for all Vedānta that he claims to speak. I doubt whether his contemporary Vedāntins would have disputed the relevancy of any quotation he gives, though they might debate his interpretation. No doubt the results of his scriptural exegesis are at times picturesque. Yet remarks such as Rādhakrishnan—a sympathetic describer of Rāmānuja's thought—passes:<sup>101</sup> "Rāmānuja's beautiful stories of the other world, which he narrates with the confidence of one who had personally assisted at the origination of the world, carry no conviction," are not quite fair in many respects. Other-worldly stories never sound convincing to unbelieving ears; neither do Śaṅkara's. Besides, the example is ill chosen: Rāmānuja is not particularly interested in the circumstances of world origination beyond the fact that it is a causal process by which the qualified, subtly embodied God as the material cause evolves into the phenomenal world of soul and matter constituting a modus of God as the immanent guiding spirit. Finally, if ever he indulges in wondrous stories, he is forced to do so by his texts. This is exactly the point: he takes his texts seriously. A more comprehensive collection of śrutis and smṛtis could hardly be made. And he takes his texts literally. If these texts, the authority of which is the very foundation of orthodox metaphysical thought, happen to speak about the golden splendour of God, about the supreme immaterial heaven, about angelic beings eternally absorbed in the contemplation of God's essence, he accepts them in their literal sense. Only then he proceeds to illustrate and supplement them by quotations from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. If we criticize the results of his exegesis, we criticize the authority of his texts and the validity of his exegetical principles. We are free to do so; but if we do so in order to pass judgment on things metaphysical, we can claim faith, not proof.

### § 3. *The influence of Pañcarātra Āgama:*

It has often been suggested, and indeed taken for granted, that Rāmānuja attached great importance to the so-called Āgama or Tantra of the Pañcarātra, that is that class of multitudinous and voluminous texts which present themselves since 5th-7th centuries A.D. side by side with the Purāṇas with which they have much in common. They embody the ancient tradition

100. A comparison with the bhāṣya of Mādhva is instructive; this author, who cannot have lived much later than Rāmānuja, not only quotes Purāṇas and Tantras much more frequently than śruti, but treats their evidence as decisive for Vedānta; in the first adhyāya are quoted such texts as Āditya P. (1); Garuḍa (3); Naradiya (3); Pādma (6); Bhāg. Tantra (1); Bhāg. P. (3); Brhat Saṃhitā (4); Brahmavaivarta (5); Brahmāṇḍa (6); Mahākaurma (2); Vāmana (4); Vārāha (3); Vyoma Saṃhitā (1); Skandha (19); Harivaṃśa (1).

101. *Indian Philosophy II*, p. 720.



of Pañcarātra, combining a Sāṃkhyan or Sāṃkhya-inspired cosmogony with the devotion of Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. Although ideally treating of metaphysics as well, they are for the greater part manuals of Tantric ritual and mantra. Their metaphysical doctrines and speculations are, if at all, stated in a cosmogonical context.<sup>102</sup> A striking feature is the doctrine that the Supreme Personal God, quasi-independent of whom his personified śakti or creative potency operates as his active female counterpart, at the beginning of creation becomes differentiated into four *Vyūhas* or divisions, Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, over whom the perfections and functions of the God are distributed and who develop the new universe in several successive stages. Although most of the origin of Pañcarātra is obscure, it would in my opinion not be too speculative to regard this system, at least the cosmogonical-metaphysical side of it, as a continuous development of pre-systematized theistic Sāṃkhya as alluded to or expressed in Upaniṣads like the Chāndogya, Śvetāśvatara and Kaṭha and in philosophical portions of the epic. Extraneous elements may have been absorbed when the personality of Viṣṇu became increasingly complex. Esoteric speculations on hidden meanings in language, as old as the Brāhmaṇas, may always have formed part of it, even though the contents of these speculations—jealously kept secret, even now—have changed. The conspicuous ritualistic tendencies would also point to ancient associations. One is inclined to think of this comprehensive and syncretistic 'system' as one of the main channels by which the old Brāhmaṇistic spirit continued to flow through the wasteland of the Buddhist period, never quite running dry but receiving from underground tributaries that sprang from distant and unexplored sources. That this spirit was able to receive inspiration from the popular beliefs around the divine figure of Viṣṇu the *viśvarūpa* could find some explanation in the fact that of the Vedic gods who in Hinduistic times became prominent Viṣṇu was from of old intimately associated with the life-preserving ritual.

Āgama appears to have played an important rôle with Rāmānuja's precursors who attempted to emancipate their traditional Vaiṣṇavism and Bhāgavatism. No less a part did it play in post-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaita. Yāmuna composed a special prakaraṇa to defend its authority, the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*. Veṅkaṭanātha the Vedāntadeśika wrote a *Pañcarātraraksā*, and in the brief but authoritative manual *Yatīndramatadīpikā* the authority of Pañcarātra is stated without question.<sup>103</sup> This often emphatically expressed favour of ancient and modern Viśiṣṭādvaitins for Pañcarātra is the main reason for the prevailing view that this *corpus* of mythological, cosmogonical,

102. I refer to SCHRAMER'S *Introduction to Pañcarātra*, p. 27.

103. YID VII, p. 45... *śrīpañcarātrāgamasya kvacid api vedavirodhābhāvāt kārṭi-sneyena prāmāṇyam*.

ritualistic and occult speculations and practices occupied a privileged place in Rāmānuja's philosophical system.

We have already seen that Rāmānuja, far from being a "sectarian commentator fabricating śrutis" actually took the utmost care to avoid any parochialism and, when attacking his adversaries and erecting his own school on the ruins of their systems, used recognized weapons and tools. When he adduces evidence from so venerable a smṛti text as the Viṣṇupurāṇa he carefully proceeds to define and confine the scope of its authority. We would expect, and his adversaries demand, a similar *avant-propos* before he would introduce the Āgama in evidence.

It is however remarkable that neither in the Vedārthasaṃgraha nor in the Śrībhāṣya — except in the *utpattysaṃbhavādhikaraṇa* — Rāmānuja quotes a single pāda from the one and a half crore of śloka in which, according to the tradition, the Āgama consists.<sup>104</sup> Nor are any of the characteristic doctrines of this system as much as hinted at. It is true that Rāmānuja enlarges upon Pañcarātra in his comments on *Brahmasūtras* 2, 2, 39-42, but even there it should be noted that he does not confess himself a Bhāgavata or Sātvata and that he mainly repeats and restates the arguments adduced by Yāmuna against Śaṅkara's and Bhāskara's controversial explanations. As this section of the Śrībhāṣya is our only evidence that Rāmānuja admitted the Pañcarātra at all, we should not interpret its significance too pregnantly. We cannot conclude that he regarded those texts, three of which he quotes, as authoritative in any other sense than other smṛti texts like Manusmṛti, Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, each of which is quoted more often than all Āgamas together.

The main points of his commentary are 1. Pañcarātra does not hold that the soul has a beginning;<sup>105</sup> 2. The Vyūhas are the subtle or causal phase of the Supreme Being as the material and operative cause;<sup>106</sup> 3. Āgama embodies the Vedic doctrine in an easily comprehensible popular form; 4. Bādarāyaṇa the Sūtrakāra and Vyāsa the composer of the Mahābhārata are identical and therefore cannot deny in one place what they affirm in another;<sup>107</sup> 5. Pañcarātra, in contrast to Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pāsupata, is not founded by men but promulgated by God himself.<sup>108</sup>

Taking all positive and negative evidence of all his works together we may say that the Āgama, albeit recognized in passing as an orthodox system

104. SCHRAEDER, o.c. p. 14.

105. Corresponds to Āgamaprāmāṇya, p. 54, 1. 6 ff.

106. O.c. 55, 1. 10 ff.

107. O.c. 54.

108. O.c. 23 ff.; 42 ff.

of thought, is not at all utilized as a source of knowledge in its own right to corroborate Rāmānuja's system of Vedānta. One reason has been offered: Rāmānuja addresses himself to all Vedāntins and endeavours to support his original theses by scriptural evidence that is acceptable to all. Another reason is no doubt that he was very little interested in the mechanics of world creation and evolution and had no occasion to make use of a class of texts whose only contributions to metaphysics were inseparably linked up with cosmogonical speculations that are of small value in explaining God's relation to the world in harmony with śruti and reason. Rāmānuja's and indeed Vedānta's main concern is with ontology: only when the ontological relation between the supreme Cause and the phenomenal Effect has been established cosmology and cosmogony may proceed. Rāmānuja's evident indifference toward Pañcarātra should therefore not necessarily be regarded as typical of this Vaiṣṇavite philosopher.

## B. DARSANAS

### § 1. *Mīmāṃsā*:

That Rāmānuja was well-grounded in Pūrvamīmāṃsā need hardly be mentioned. For all Vedāntins, however differently they may ultimately conceive of the relation of the two mīmāṃsās, the First Exegesis is propaedeutic to the second.

Both schools of Karmamīmāṃsā on the basis of Śābarabhāṣya, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara, were known to Rāmānuja. But, apart from one occasional quotation of Kumārila, his principal, though antagonistic, interest is directed to the doctrines of Prabhākara's school. This is interesting in view of the fact that in later time the Viśiṣṭādvaitins have come to be associated with the Prābhākaras in the same way as the Advaitins were associated with the Bhāṭṭas, though perhaps not so exclusively.

#### a. *Śābarasvāmin*:

That Rāmānuja was familiar with Śābara's commentary on the Karmamīmāṃsāsūtras is—if proof were needed—evidenced by several passages dealing with fundamental Mīmāṃsaka concepts. Quotations from the Vedic scriptures of the karmakāṇḍa have generally the form—also abbreviated—in which they are cited by Śābara, and though I have taken some pains in my notes to identify them in śruti, it is certain that Rāmānuja himself knew them from or through Śābara. What Edgerton remarked<sup>109</sup> can be fully applied to the Vedāntins as well: "For the most part it is clear that the

later Mīmāṃsakas limited themselves to the passages used in Śabaraśvāmin's Bhāṣya as illustrations of the laws of Jaimini. These were the accepted stock in trade of the school and were discussed and worked over again and again, obviously with little reference to the original Vedic texts. This is the custom of scholasticism everywhere". This holds good for the stock-instances of the various schools, and also, but in a lesser degree, for the śruti quotations of the Vedānta schools separately.

b. *Kumārila*:

The founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā is once found quoted with approval. The citation is from the Nirālambanavāḍakāṇḍa of the Śloka-vārttika and fits in so neatly with Rāmānuja's exposure of the advaitin's ultimate nihilism that we are inclined to look for other verbal reminiscences. So it would seem probable that Rāmānuja's example of the real vision of an imaginary *gandharvanagara* has been inspired by Kumārila's mention of the same in st. 110 of this kāṇḍa.

c. *Prābhākara*:

It seems very likely that Rāmānuja's main source of the doctrines of Prābhākara was Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, though we cannot be sure before we have more Prābhākara works available. He quotes half a śloka which is found in Śālikanātha's section on *vākyārthamāṭṛkā* (p. 190) with a slight variant, and there introduced as usual with *āha*. That Rāmānuja may have quoted directly from Śālikanātha's eventual source is not entirely out of the question, but not probable in view of other correspondences: from the same section, p. 190, Rāmānuja borrows a casual example verbally—with the rare word *garbhadāsa* "born slave", misunderstood by many copyists—and develops it into a cosmic analogy. Other correspondences have been pointed out in my notes to the relative paragraphs of the translation.

§ 2. *Vedānta*

a. *Advaita*:

It would seem unquestionable that Rāmānuja knew Śaṅkara's works. For the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya this is evidenced clearly by the Śrībhāṣya where the pūrvapakṣa's that are set aside regularly conform to Śaṅkara's siddhāntas. More difficult is it to decide the same on the comparatively scanty evidence of the Vedārthasaṃgraha, but probably § 49-51 are a case in point: it is plausible to connect the argumentation of Rāmānuja à propos of two analogies, that of a person dreaming and the stock-instance of the snake in the rope, with Śaṅkara's comments on Brahmasūtras 2, 1, 14 (p. 198) *yathā*

*suptasya prākṛtasya janasya svapna uccāvacān bhāvān paśyato niścitam eva pratyakṣābhimatam vijñānam bhavati etc.*

Rāmānuja's refutation of the advaitin's interpretation of BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 *athāta ādeśo neti netīti* may have been evoked either by Śaṅkara's commentary ad BrS. 3, 2, 22 or by his comments on the passage in his upaniṣad-bhāṣya. The fact that Rāmānuja quotes BrS. 3, 2, 22 in favour of his own exegesis probably means that he refers to Śaṅkara's view as expressed in his sūtrabhāṣya.

There is at least one clear indication that Rāmānuja knew other works as well. His polemical explication of the meaning of *satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma* is no doubt directed against Śaṅkara's interpretation in his commentary on the Taittiriya Up. 2, 1, which will be discussed in another connexion; here the requisite terminological correspondences are clear enough. Less obvious is a possible reference to Śaṅkara's Chāndogya Up. Bhāṣya: commenting on the satkāryavāda of the sadvidyā (6, 2, 2), Rāmānuja introduces a rival theory that contends that the passage *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta* intends mainly to refute the Buddhist nihilist view by way of rejecting the asatkāryavāda, instead of refuting this last naiyāyika theory only. In fact, Śaṅkara in his Chāndogyabhāṣya formulates this precise view, but so does Maṇḍaṇamīśra in his Brahmasiddhi.<sup>110</sup> However, I have not been able to identify unequivocal references to the latter thinker in the Vedārthasamgraha;<sup>111</sup> besides, Rāmānuja's subsequent discussion of lakṣaṇā in *tat tvam asi* as assumed by the rival advaitin would point to Śaṅkara rather than to Maṇḍaṇa.

The question to whom Rāmānuja would here refer is of special interest, for the pūrvapakṣa is formulated in significant terms: *nanu niradhiṣṭhāna-bhramasambhavaajñāpanāyāsatkāryavādanirāsaḥ kriyate / tathā hy ekaṁ cid-rūpaṁ satyam evāvidyācchāditam jagadrūpeṇa vivartata ity avidyāśrayat-vāya mūlakāraṇam satyam ity upagantavyam ity asatkāryavādanirāsaḥ*. Variant readings for *avidyācchāditam* are °śābalaṁ and °śābalitaṁ. It is

110. BrSiddhi, p. 20: *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta* ca *svayam śūnyatāyā niṣedhāt / bhāvo hi yathāvad aprakāśamāno 'dhyastāvidyamānarūpaḥ prakāśate; śūnye tu kvādhya-saḥ, kim prakāśatām iti nirbijataiva*; the expression *nirbijatā* occurs also in Śaṅkara's ChUpBh.; *bīja* is what Rāmānuja calls in this connexion *mūlakāraṇa*; the terms are suggested by ChUp. 6, 8, 6.

111. HACKER, in his paper *Jayantabhaṭṭa and Vācaspatimīśra* (Schubring Festschrift, Hamburg 1951), p. 165, n. 4, remarks that ŚBh. 1, 1, 1 the confutation of advaita mainly concerns the monistic doctrine of pratyakṣa and may therefore have been inspired by Maṇḍaṇa; on closer inspection, however, it appears that R. investigates advaita theory on the basis of all three *pramāṇas*, and I for one am not convinced that in dealing with pratyakṣa R. had Maṇḍaṇa in mind.

difficult to decide whether *ācchāditam* is a *lectio facilior* or *śabalam* an hyper-correctness of a copyist inspired by *vivartate*. The fact that Rāmānuja does not use the term *śabalam* elsewhere and that the best MS. reads *ācchāditam* make the latter alternative the more probable one. Both *śabala-* (but rather *māyāśabala-*) and *vivarta-* would remind us of Sarvajñātman. On the other hand neither Maṇḍaṇa nor Śaṅkara use *vi-√vrt* and its derivatives in the sense of an *illusory* evolution or causation, which sense is clearly intended by Rāmānuja. His use of the term is in itself noteworthy: neither Bhāskara nor Yāmuna use or know it in this sense. Yāmuna employs it in an important description<sup>112</sup> of the advaita doctrine of God (= impersonal brahman): . . Its essence (viz. of pure consciousness) is subject to limiting conditions (*upādhis*): it obtains such perfect qualities as omniscience because it is conditioned by *māyā*, which undergoes a variety of evolutions that are dependent on itself (. . *svarūpam eva . . svādhīnavicitravivartasvabhāvamāyopahitatayā samāsādita-* [! not *adhyasta-* or *adhyāropita-*] *-sārvajñyādisampadam upahitam abhidadhati*). It is evident that for Yāmuna *vivarta* equals *parināma*, *vikāra*, etc.: *māyā*, not *brahman*, is *vicitravivartasvabhāva*. So, though there be occasion to connect Rāmānuja's *pūrvapakṣin* with Śaṅkara ad ChUp. 6, 2, other arguments, mainly Rāmānuja's special use of *vivarta* tell against direct connexion, so that at most we can say that if Rāmānuja referred to his august antagonist he already interpreted the later *vivartavāda* into Śaṅkara's doctrine. Besides, there are more associations: it would seem probable, as we saw, that Rāmānuja consulted the Śloka-vārttika here.

Unless certain authors are quoted verbally it is exceedingly difficult to identify them in *pūrvapakṣins*. Moreover, we have to consider the supreme probability that Rāmānuja addressed himself in the first place to living adversaries of his time and *milieu*, in whose teachings old advaita doctrines were being restated and developed. It will also happen that the references are just too vague: Vimuktātman, on clear terminological grounds identifiable in the Śrībhāṣya,<sup>113</sup> does not emerge in the Vedārthasaṃgraha, whereas Śālikanātha, so evidently referred to in the latter text, can only be guessed behind the corresponding portions of the Śrībhāṣya.

#### b. *Bhedābheda-vāda* :

Bhāskara's doctrine, as presented here by Rāmānuja, that Brahman is conditioned by *upādhis* into becoming the phenomenal world cannot be entirely derived from the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Though certain *drṣtāntas*

112. *Ātmasiddhi*, pp. 4-5.

113. For brevity's sake I refer to HIRIYANNA's introduction to the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (Baroda 1933), pp. XI-XII.

can be identified, they appear much more elaborate and may hail from followers. One instance is curious: Rāmānuja avails himself of the analogy of space and a space-unit enclosed in, that is conditioned by, a pitcher. This analogy had already been given by Śaṅkara and we note that Rāmānuja's terminology corresponds more closely to Śaṅkara's than to Bhāskara's: *tasmād yathā ghaṭakarakādyākāśānām mahākāśānanyaṭvam .. evam asya-bhogyabhoktrādiprapaṇcajātasya brahmavyatirekeṇābhāva iti draṣṭavyam* (BrSBh. 2, 1, 14, p. 197).

Rāmānuja's last argument against the aupādhikavādin's view that not God but his creative potency undergoes modification is no doubt to be connected with Bhāskara's commentary *ad* BrS. 1, 4, 25.

#### c. Yāmuna:

The doctrine of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja's predecessor and teacher's teacher, has not yet been made the subject of a monograph, in spite of the fact that his *Siddhitraya*, in which his doctrine is preserved fragmentarily, seems to be of great importance for the history not only of Viśiṣṭādvaita but also of Vedānta as a whole. This is not the place to go into great detail and we have to content ourselves for the time being with mentioning a few fundamental points.

His principal tenets can best be described in his own words, taken from the beginning of the *Ātmasiddhi*, where he enumerates a great many different views that were held by Indian schools of thought before him on the cardinal truths. Generally his own opinion concludes the series of theories as a preliminary thesis to be demonstrated later on.

On the nature of the ātman, the individual, 'empirical' soul, he concludes that it is not material and non-spiritual, is not identical with the body, or the vital breath, or the manas; nor yet is it unqualified consciousness upon which certain qualities are projected by nescience<sup>114</sup> or by limiting conditions,<sup>115</sup> but that it is a substance qualified by the essential property knowledge.<sup>116</sup> This special knowledge acquires the designation 'beatitude', 'bliss', etc., from the fact that its object is pleasurable, not because it would be pleasurable itself.<sup>117</sup> This ātman, though self-illuminating, can be the object of our knowledge by the *pramāṇas* of scriptural revelation, reasoning, introspective perception: by means of these instruments and sources of

114. Advaitavāda.

115. Bhāskara's aupādhikavāda.

116. *ātmaniṣaye ..... āśrayānukūlyapratilabdhānandasukhādivyapadeśabodhaviśeṣa evāśya svābhāvika ity anye*, pp. 2-3.

117. Cf. R.'s exposition, §§ 142-43.

knowledge we can come to an immediate apprehension of the ātman so as it is, in its essential and categorical difference from everything else, with a gradually increasing clarity of cognition which finally culminates in a perfect lucidity.<sup>118</sup> Although the ātman is in itself without magnitude, it is localized by the magnitude of the corporeal mass which it pervades in its totality, not merely by knowledge or consciousness.<sup>119</sup> It is unchanging and eternal.<sup>120</sup> In each of the fields of empirical experience, that is in each body, the ātman has a distinct individuality.<sup>121</sup>

The Supreme Spirit, the paramātmā, is described as a person, dependent on whom are the existence and the activity—in all its forms—of the three classes of spiritual beings, or ātmans, and of non-spiritual, material entities. This personal God is a mighty ocean of all perfections, primarily the six beautiful qualities of knowledge, strength, dominion, heroism, power and splendour, which are natural properties, limitless and absolute.<sup>122</sup>

DASGUPTA, describing Yāmuna's doctrine of the soul on the basis of the Ātmasiddhi,<sup>123</sup> comes to the conclusion that "Yāmuna's main contribution consists in establishing the self-consciousness of the soul" but "gives hardly any new ideas about Īśvara and His relation to the souls and world." As the manner in which Rāmānuja's vedāntic predecessors conceived of the relation between the absolute and the non-absolute is of importance to decide his own originality of contribution, we may inquire whether, and if so to what extent, Dasgupta's verdict is just.

In Ātmasiddhi p. 4-5, after summing up the advaitin's relation *brahman*—*avidyā* and the *bhedābhedavādin's* relation *brahman*—*upāhitabrahman*, Yāmuna states finally what, by exclusion, should be his own view or *siddhānta*: "granted that there is diversity, yet the relation itself is non-difference: it is an intimate connexion definable as that between *aṃśa* and *aṃśin*, or has the form of a *śeṣa-śeṣin*"<sup>124</sup> relation that is characterized by

118. *tathedṛśo* (sc. *svayaṃjyotiḥ*—) 'py āgamānumānayogajapratyakṣaiḥ svetarasa-kalavilakṣaṇasvābhāvyaena viśadaviśadataraviśadatamatayāntāto yathāvad aparokṣyata iti p. 3; cf. R.'s recurring expression *viśadatamapratyakṣatāpanna*—to describe the vividness of knowledge through bhakti.

119. *tathā svataḥ parimāṇārahito* 'pi vyāpyavastuparimitikṛtapariccheda iti, vyāptir...svarūpeneti, p. 3.

120. *tathā kūṭastho nitya iti*, p. 4.

121. *pratikṣetram nānābhūta iti*, p. 4.

122. *tathā paramātmaviśaye* 'pi .. anye tu svādhīnatrividhacetanācetanavarūpa-sthitipravṛttibhedam svābhāvikaniravadhikātisayaññānabalaiśvaryaaviryasaṅkṛtejahprabhṛti-sakalakalyāṇaguṇamahārṇavaṃ puruṣaviśeṣam īśvaram ātiṣṭhante, p. 5.

123. *Indian Philosophy*, III, p. 139 ff.

124. On *śeṣa* see trsl. notes 3.



dependence, or again is the relation between possession and possessor that is characterized by servant and master."<sup>125</sup>

Again, at the end of the *Īśvarasiddhi*, we have a notable reading: "the entire Universe in its three phases of past, present and future, is for its subsistence and resorption dependent on a Being that has a wealth of qualities, among which the capacity of sustaining and resorbing the Universe, because it is of an inconceivably varied and various composition: it may be compared to paintings and sculptures which we infer to be exclusively dependent for their existence, etc., on an extremely gifted person."<sup>126</sup>

The same reading continues: "The Universe, which is described by the word *vibhūti*, stands to the One Being in a relation of object supported, object governed and object accessory, because it is His body, comparable to the relation between the "I" and its body."<sup>127</sup> It is true that this reading is not found in the mss. that are mainly utilized by the different editors—whose critical principles, incidentally, remain completely mysterious<sup>128</sup>—yet a comparison with the first quoted passage, found in all mss., renders this variant acceptable.

We may also compare the final stanzas of the *Īśvarasiddhi*: "This Universe obeys the command of one person because it is not spiritual: like a body. All spiritual beings perform the task under the control of one person, as the senses—touch, etc.—, because the task requires the association of a body. The Universe, the topic of our polemic, has one Supreme Soul, because he is the soul of spiritual and non-spiritual beings: it forms as it were one country with one king."<sup>129</sup> In other words—which would

125. *nānāṭve saty evābhedo nāmānvayah / amśāmsibhāvalakṣaṇaḥ samavāyah / paratantratālakṣaṇaḥ śeṣaśeṣitvarūpaḥ / svasvāmibhāvobhṛtyasvāmīlakṣaṇa iti ca nānāvidhā vādāḥ*; RAMANUJACHARYA in his translation of the *Ātmasiddhi*, Journal, Annamalai University, connects *nānāvidhā vādāḥ* only with this paragraph, suggesting that these views are at variance mutually; but rather it sums up the entire section: .. iti kecit .. ityanye .. itare .. iti ca, *nānāvidhā vādāḥ*.

126. *traikālikam kṛtsnam jagat tadanugūṇasaktyādiguṇagāṇavādāyattasthitilayakam acintyavividhavicitraracanatvāt / atikuśalalākāyattasthityādīkatayā pramītatitrapratīmadīvat*, *Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 79-80 (Chaukh. ed.)

127. *vibhūtipadābhidheyam kṛtsnam ekādheyavidheyāśeṣabhāvam / taccharīratvān maccharīratvat*; RAMANUJACHARYA, o.c., renders "all things denoted by", which is not so apt.

128. Neither RAMA MISRA SASTRI, Chaukhambā Skt. Ser. ed., nor SRINIVASACHARI, Journal Annamalai University ed., give an account of their mss and critical methods; the Telugu ed. I have been unable to consult.

129. *ekēcchānuvidhāyidam acaitanyāt svadehavat // ekenādhiṣṭitāḥ kāryam kurvate sarvacetanāḥ / dehasambandhasāpekṣakāryatvāt tvagādivat // ekapradhānapuruṣam vivādāḥyasitam jagat / cetanācetanātmatvād ekarājakadeśavat //* RAMANUJACHARYA'S translation differs but is less plausible.

seem the most plausible explication of these lines: the material Universe is obedient to God's will, like a man's body to that of man; the personal entities, the *cetanas*, again perform God's work under God's control, work that requires bodily action which they provide: but their function is of a higher order than that of matter, and they may be likened to the senses of the body of God. So the composite Universe in its totality is governed by one Supreme Person or Soul who is comparable to the soul of the body constituted by spirit and matter.

DASGUPTA is certainly right in asserting that it "is almost certain that his (Yāmuna's) own attitude did not differ much from the Nyāya attitude". In *Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 75, the arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas against a Nyāya view are countered in a *kārikā* with *atra brūmaḥ*, which supports the Naiyāyikas; elsewhere, however, he attacks the Nyāya proofs for the existence of God.<sup>130</sup> But Dasgupta's statement that Yāmuna, too, "left the duality of the world and *Īśvara* absolutely unresolved" is, as we have seen, too sweeping. Not less sweeping is the pronouncement that "he is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring his salvation."

In *Ātmasiddhi*, p. 5, Yāmuna sums up the prevailing views of the way in which release is achieved and the final view or *siddhānta* is that it — *paramapurūṣārthabhūta brahmaprāptilakṣaṇamokṣa* "man's supreme goal release, which consists in attaining brahman" — can only be achieved by means of the *bhakti-yoga*, of an exclusive and absolute character, of one whose inner faculty has been prepared by both *jñāna-* and *karma-yoga*."

Similarly, in *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, st. 32, it reads *aikāntyātyantadāsyai-karatis tatpadam āpnuyāt* "he whose only joy is in perfect and absolute servitude will achieve that end (or God's place)", an expression patently utilized by Rāmānuja in his Introduction to *Gītābhāṣya*: *°aśeṣaśeṣataikaratirūpa°* and throughout the *Gadyatraya*.

Finally, in a special study, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, Yāmuna professes in emphatical terms his adherence to *Pañcarātra* which describes the relation between God and the Universe in terms of the farthest possible reduction of difference verging on, but never quite merging in, unity, and the method of salvation as that of a most humble and exclusive loving devotion or *bhakti*.

We have seen that, on account of the fundamental *problématique* of Vedānta itself, the basic conceptions of the various systems concern the relation between the Absolute and the Universe, and that these conceptions can best be studied from the commentaries on the *ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* which

130. *Ātmasiddhi*, pp. 75-78.

summarizes the import of the sadvidyā. So also Yāmuna's conception, though he did not comment on the Sūtras—a task he assigned to Rāmānuja. Yet he too had to deal with the sadvidyā, and he did so at some length in the Saṃvitsiddhi.

What is the meaning of *advitīya*? Is it a tatpuruṣa or a bahuvrīhi compound? In neither case the existence of the Universe is denied. Skipping his more ingenious than convincing remarks on a grammatically possible tatpuruṣa and concentrating on the term as a bahuvrīhi: he argues that *advitīya* is a *viśeṣaṇa*, a qualifying adjective, and that therefore it cannot be explained thus that nothing else exists but Brahman.<sup>131</sup> The non-existence of a second thing cannot qualify Brahman: because it does not exist it is not qualifying, unless Brahman be itself non-existent. Consequently the real existence of the phenomenal world—the *prapañca* that consists in spirit and non-spirit (*cidacinmaya*)—is not denied in this text of non-duality: proved by its own *pramāṇas* of perception and inference it is further corroborated by *śruti*.

For what does our text mean? Brahman has no second, that means that there is no one and nothing in past, present and future that can be counted his second, i.e., his equal or superior.<sup>132</sup> The world, consisting of a particle of a division of His manifestation,<sup>133</sup> can hardly be called a "second". "Matchless" is the true sense: just as in the phrase: "The king of the Colas is a universal monarch who does not find his match in the present world." The uncounted millions of existent beings are but drops in the ocean of the majestic manifestation of Viṣṇu, the Paramount Sovereign unaffected by suffering, action, evolution, etc., the treasury of the six divine qualities, Viṣṇu whose supernal manifestation is beyond imagination. Who, counting the seven seas by his fingers, could count their waves, foam-spots, bubbles and drops? If we say there is no second sun in the sky, do we deny by the sun its rays? The world with its animate and inanimate beings is just *vācārambhāṇa* and *vikāra*: sat is the unchanging radical cause.<sup>134</sup> The effect is not different from its cause: sparks are not different from the fire from

131. *dvitīyavastunāstitvaṃ na brahmaṇo* (Chaukh. ed. *brahma na*) *viśeṣaṇam* / *asattvān na hy asad brahma bhaven nāpi viśeṣaṇam* // *tasmāt prapañcasadbhāva nādvaitaśrutibādhitaḥ / svapramāṇabalāt siddhaḥ śrutyā cāpyanumoditaḥ* // Saṃvitsiddhi (Chaukh. ed. p. 82).

132. *sama-* and *abhyadhika-*, terms we find repeated by R., Ved. § 10; compare also Stotraratna, st. 16.

133. *vibhavavyūhakalāmātram*; *vyūha-* is in Pañcarātra is fourfold personified projection of the Supreme, over which the six divine qualities are "divided"; together the four Vyūhas form also part of God's vibhava "projection, manifestation".

134. *kūṭasthaṃ mūlakāraṇam*; the radical cause is of course the material cause; cf. also supra note 110.

which they shoot forth,<sup>135</sup> nor the pot from the clay, etc.<sup>136</sup> The element derives its power and force from its cause. So, by knowing the one material cause we know the Universe.<sup>137</sup>

In the light of all this DASGUPTA's judgment cannot well stand. On the contrary, in his, admittedly mainly polemical, works Yāmuna departed from a more or less clearly defined conception of Vedāntic cosmology and eschatology. The relation between the Personal God and the Universe is stated in various, mutually complementary ways: as that of *aṁśa* and *aṁśin* — so also sparks of fire —, of *śeṣa* and *śeṣin*, of body and soul: the Universe is God's manifestation, governed, supported and ensouled by Him. These terms recall immediately those in which Rāmānuja couches his central idea: so much so that we are justified in saying that Rāmānuja, developed and elaborated systematically what Yāmuna had already discovered. Yāmuna did not yet systematize his views nor exhaust the fertile concept of *śarīra-śarīribhāva*, but it is clear that his thoughts went in the direction of this analogy as the basic solution.

#### IV. OBSERVATIONS ON RAMANUJA'S EXEGETICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHOD

The increasing tendency among historians of Indian philosophy to study the systems of Indian thought, particularly Vedānta, with special reference to and in comparison and juxtaposition with Western philosophies has created an unfortunate misunderstanding of the typically theological character of Vedāntic speculation as a whole. The reasons are many and diverse. On the Indian side this tendency is an interesting cultural phenomenon which may well prove to be of the greatest importance for the future of Indian thought in the context of world philosophy. On the Western side there is often apparent a certain aversion to theology as such and an inability to keep in mind that the soteriology of Vedānta is not 'philosophic' in purpose, but religious, inspired and borne out by scripture and revelation. Vedānta is after all a positive theology based upon scripture. The fact that the results of scriptural exegesis do not conform to the conclusions of historical philological research does not mean that therefore scripture plays a subordinate rôle, as a handmaiden to the philosopher who cannot hope to put across his original views without the authority of revelation, and so makes it fit in with his own doctrine. This view fails to take into account the importance of the tradition of exegesis, of its method and rules.

135. From BAUp. 2, 1, 20.

136. The *dr̥ṣṭāntas* summed up in ChUp. 6, 1, 4-6.

137. *ekapradhānavijñānād vijñātam akhilaṁ bhavet*: the *pratijñā* or promissory assertion of ChUp. 6, 1, 3.

It is only recently that a studious attempt has been made to describe systematically the theological method of Śaṅkara.<sup>138</sup> Now that a serious beginning has been made, one realizes how far we are still removed from a complete and comprehensive study of the theological principles and hermeneutical methods of the great Indian commentators, without and within Vedānta, and generally of the rules of ancient Indian commentatorial industry. When studying the many bhāṣyas on scriptures and sūtras the student is surprised at the freedom, and often arbitrariness, with which the commentators thought fit to treat their texts. A just appreciation of these interpretations will remain difficult: not only are the presuppositions of theological exegesis far removed from, if not actually in conflict with, those of philological explication — and ultimately the profane scholar has no criterion to evaluate supra-rational significance —, but also the breach in the commentatorial tradition of the Vedānta before Śaṅkara prevents us to understand the why and wherefore of interpretations that are taken for granted later on.<sup>139</sup>

Especially in Rāmānuja's case the loss of ancient vākyas, vṛttis and bhāṣyas make themselves gravely felt. He more than Śaṅkara names and cites many precursors, of whom only a few are identifiable, and he claims that his system is nothing but a systematical elaboration of their views: "I have come to the conclusion that this is the central doctrine of the Vedānta texts after having made a painstaking study not only of the whole mass of all the various śrutis but also of the commentaries that have been composed and accepted by judicious thinkers".

But even less than Śaṅkara is Rāmānuja concerned with describing, or even alluding to his exegetical principles, which for him and his contemporaries were doubtless self-evident. We have to gather them from his works. In the following sections a few topics have been discussed, in so far as relevant to the Vedārthasamgraha, which may contribute a little to our understanding of his principles and method.

138. R.V. DE SMET, *The Theological Method of Śaṅkara* (thesis Rome, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1953), mimeographed edition with limited circulation; a revised edition is under preparation; excerpta and partial French translation *Langage et connaissance chez Śaṅkara* in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, tome 52 (3e série, no. 33), 1954, p. 31-74.

139. This is most clearly shown by the commentaries on the Brahmasūtras where there is nothing in the text to account alike for the agreement and the disagreement of the bhāṣyakāras.

### § 1. The authority of śabda :

The authoritative character of śabda "verbal testimony" is, within the pales of orthodox Indian philosophy, one of the fundamental assumptions; for those systems, moreover, which deal especially with metaphysics, śabda is the only valid instrument and criterion (pramāṇa) for supra-sensible knowledge. We should bear in mind that śabda is not only human and profane language, but also and even primarily, sacred language, the revelation of scripture, which, by its self-sufficiency,<sup>140</sup> is authoritative in its own right. The principle that śabda—i.e. sacred revelation—can give us reliable information about things which, by their very nature, fall outside the scope of the other two fundamental pramāṇas of sensual perception and rational inference, has been developed by the Mīmāṃsakas. The precise extent of this authoritativeness has, however, been disputed.

In order to understand the controversy we have to consider the suppositions of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and remember that the authority of śabda in the form of scriptural revelation had been taken for granted long before the necessary theories had been evolved to account for it and define it. Then the very trustworthiness of śruti, without which the whole fabric of ritual would crumble, necessitated the assumption that it did not derive from human agency with its implicit fallibility, but must be *apauruṣeya* "preterhuman".<sup>141</sup> This again led to the conclusion that the language of the scriptures, and by extension all language—which derives from the scriptures—,<sup>142</sup> has not a human but a preterhuman origin: if its trustworthiness be preterhuman, it must be preterhuman itself. In other words, it could never have come into being on the strength of a convention or agreement to which man was a party;<sup>143</sup> consequently, that peculiar power that makes language significative, the power by which words can denote meanings and refer to objects, could not be based upon an immemorial agreement of human beings that henceforth this word was to denote that meaning, but must have been eternally inherent in the words themselves, which were not created or invented by man but in their entirety of language given at the beginning of creation.<sup>144</sup>

140. *svataḥpramāṇatva-*.

141. I will gladly give up this rendering for a better one; the usual "impersonal" is wholly inadequate.

142. Cf. e.g. Ved. § 21.

143. The *prācīna-naiyāyikas* held that the relation word-object derives from a convention initiated by *Īśvara*; the *navya-naiyāyikas* simplified this formulation and stated that it derives from convention.

144. The description is, of course, a rationale; the doctrine of the hypostasized character of the revealed Word is no doubt a continuation of the ancient speculations on the divine progenitrix *Vāc*.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā was primarily concerned with studying and systematizing the principles governing the ritual with respect to its fruits as described in the karmakāṇḍa. Accordingly the whole mass of śruti was classified into three categories: 1. those portions which prescribe or enjoin the performance of certain rites to secure certain results, *vidhi* or *codanā* "injunction", comprising *niṣedha* "prohibition"; 2. those portions which explain, describe or generally add to the injunctions, *arthavāda*; 3. those portions which comprise the Vedic *mantras* that are used in the rite.<sup>145</sup> In this classification the order of importance is given: the injunction constitutes the principal element to which the others are accessory.

This principal importance of injunction, without which all the rest would be purposeless and hence meaningless, was generally recognized. Mīmāṃsā as a whole maintains that the non-*vidhi* portions derive their relevancy from their being accessory and supplementary to injunction. It follows that purposive signification of scriptural testimony abides, and its authoritative validity is vested, in injunction only.

Among the Mīmāṃsakas the school of Prabhākara went consistently a step further. Whereas the Bhāṭṭas admitted the authoritative character of speech that is *pauruṣeya*, i.e. human and profane speech, the Prābhākaras<sup>146</sup> contended that as a *pramāṇa* śabda is always śāstra, that is to say, only the sacred language of revelation is a source of valid knowledge. In profane language words refer to objects which generally do not stand in need of verbal testimony in order to be validly known and established; the objects are established by other *pramāṇas*, perception or inference. Validly established objects cannot be again validly established by language. Even in those cases where there are no other *pramāṇas* to establish an object and we have to resort to verbal testimony, in other words to rely on hear-say, we have not *invariably* reliable knowledge, because of the human factor. Profane speech does not fulfil the necessary condition of authority: to be *invariably* a source of valid knowledge. Consequently only śāstra is *pramāṇa stricto sensu*. Here śāstra is to be taken literally: scriptural injunction; for inasmuch as language cannot validly establish an object already completely established<sup>147</sup> (*pariniṣpannavastu*, *siddhavastu*), it must *invariably* bear on something yet to be established, a task yet to be undertaken, an act yet to be performed, *kārya*. The authority of śabda and therefore its exclusive significance as a source of valid knowledge, lies

145. This is Rāmānuja's classification; Mīmāṃsakas often make *niṣedha* into a separate category and add *nāmadheya* "proper name".

146. Jha, *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, p. 240.

147. Jha, *o.c.*, p. 237 ff.

in its enjoining a *kārya*. Another consequence is that the smallest significative unit of language is the sentence, that is ideally the injunctive sentence.

To illustrate this theory they described the way in which a child learns a language. In this description they departed, understandably, from the verbal character of language: the verb is the operative word in the sentence without which the rest is not effective and significative. As it bears on action, the sentence can only be understood by a child when it sees it acted upon by its elders.<sup>148</sup>

This theory that language is only significative when it is an injunction bearing on *kārya*—which does not mean that every significative and validly authoritative sentence has to be an injunctive one, but that it can be either construed as one or subordinated to one—leads to curious consequences when applied to that part of śruti whose purport is not to enjoin acts but to teach knowledge, the *jñānakāṇḍa*.

The Mimāṃsaka applying his categories, which had been developed and elaborated with exclusive reference to the karmakāṇḍa, to the descriptive *jñānakāṇḍa*, has only one way open: like all scriptural śabda it must derive its relevancy from the injunction. Accordingly the Bhāṭṭa subordinates the *jñānakāṇḍa* to the karmakāṇḍa as an arthavāda of the eternity of the soul which is fundamental to the eternal validity of the Vedic injunctions. The Prābhākara appears to have taken a different view: like all śabda the Vedānta—i.e. *jñānakāṇḍa*, comprising the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads—must bear on *kārya*. Brahman however, which is the object of the Vedānta texts, is not a *kārya* but a completely established entity. Consequently it was held that “those Vedānta texts that speak of Brahman must be regarded as speaking of Brahman as something on which one is enjoined to meditate or know (sic), in order to escape the meshes of metempsychosis”.<sup>149</sup>

This view we find discussed and refuted in Rāmānuja's complicated commentary on the *samanvayādhikaraṇa*, BrS. 1, 1, 4, where it is stated in these terms: “Although the Vedānta texts cannot be the means of valid knowledge about brahman's proper form which is completely established, yet brahman's proper form can be established (anew). How? Because the Vedānta texts can denote the injunction of meditation”.<sup>150</sup> In the same connexion we find another Prābhākara view discussed, not mentioned by

148. JHA, o.c., p. 228 ff.

149. JHA, o.c., p. 62.

150. ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.



Jha, which Sudarśanasūri styles *niṣprapañcīkaraṇanīyogavāda*: "Just because they bear on *kārya*, the Vedānta texts can bear validly on brahman itself. From where do they derive this authority? The object of these texts is an injunction by means of the annihilation of phenomenality: an injunction to this effect that "one is to render brahman—which, because of beginningless ignorance, is conceived as phenomenal—devoid of phenomenality, without second and essentially knowledge."<sup>150a</sup>

To sum up, whereas the Bhāṭṭas do not admit that the *jñānakāṇḍa* can deal authoritatively with its object brahman in its own right, the Prābhākara allows that it can do so, provided that it be construed as a *vidhi*—or in his terminology—as a *niyoga*. Leaving aside the second alternative of the injunction to "dephenomalize" brahman—this goes to say that the meditation on, and knowledge of, brahman can be the object of an injunction.

To this construction Śaṅkara took serious exception. In his view, brahmañjāna, in virtue of its nature, does not admit of being enjoined at all: it can only be evoked by a text:<sup>151</sup> it cannot initiate any action but only remove our consciousness from any other entity but brahman: when this consciousness has been removed, then there is no room for any action because that would be incompatible.<sup>152</sup> The knowledge of brahman puts an end to all activity.<sup>153</sup> Knowledge derives only from *pramāṇas* and the real existence of the object concerned; — not from man's volition, but simply from that which exists really and unchangeably.<sup>154</sup>

Rāmānuja, as far as I can judge, does not express himself so categorically, at least not in the Vedārtasamgraha. As a matter of fact, to know Brahman in Rāmānuja's sense, that is to ascend to knowing the personal God through constant loving adoration, is the final stage of one road to perfection, leading from the conscientious performance of ritual acts to the self-recognition of the individual soul and from there to the love-attainment of the Supreme God, whom to serve is the soul's sole purpose and essence. The ritual acts, whichever gods they are dedicated to, are essentially propitiations of the one God. To serve God would be imperative indeed, it is the *paramapuruṣārtha*, the supreme end to be achieved; there is noth-

150a. Same view refuted by Bhāskara ad BrS. 1, 1, 4; for a discussion cf. HIRIYANNA'S paper *Prapañca-vilaya-vāda—A doctrine of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta* (J. Or. Res. Madras, 1927, p. 109 ff).

151. ChUpBh. 6, 7, 7; in this paragraph I have made use of material collected by DE SMET, o.c., p. 202 f.

152. BĀUpBh. 1, 4, 7.

153. BĀUpBh. 1, 4, 7.

154. BrSBh. 2, 2, 21.

ing in this to militate against the supposedly injunctive character of all śruti.

Rāmānuja's objections are directed first against Prabhākara's high and mighty command<sup>155</sup> that language can only be significative in enjoining actions to be effected. By a few well-selected examples he shows this. A child does not learn a language by watching how his elders react to a series of words, but by having things named: it is nominal description rather than verbal motivation by which he learns how to speak and understand. A dumb adult, conversant with the language of gestures, can read the meaning of a person who instructs his servant, not by word of mouth, but by gestures, to convey a certain message to another. When the dumb man, watching the whole story, hears the servant translate the message into worded speech, he knows what the words of the message mean without seeing any action taken on it.<sup>156</sup> Which goes to prove that the signification of the words cannot lie in their relation to an action that is to be effected in consequence thereof. On this showing there is no ground whatever to deny that language has the power of denoting a completely established entity, about which nothing is to be effected.

Then Rāmānuja proceeds that the arthavāda *brahmavid āpnoti param* can indeed be construed as a vidhi. He compares this text with such śrutis as *pratiṣṭhanti ha vai ya etā (rātrīr) upayanti/brahmavarcaśvino 'nnādā bhavanti ya etā (rātrīr) upayanti* (Śabara ad KMS. 4, 3, 17 = Pañcaviṃśa Br. 23, 2, 4) which is an example of a text which, though being arthavāda, is yet vidhi and therefore significative:<sup>157</sup> with regard to the rite of rātrisattra it is an arthavāda, but it is significative for the reward, *pratiṣṭhā*, which is the *phala* that cannot be known by any other pramāṇa. Similarly *brahmavid āpnoti param* is informative of the fruit, i.e. *param*, the highest Brahman. Consequently the *phala* that is the Supreme Brahman is established and all the śrutis and arthavādas which contribute to our knowledge of Brahman's essence and qualities are therefore fully informative.

Another argument he borrows from Damaṇḍa,<sup>158</sup> who reasons: if the arthavādas have the purpose of praising an object that has a function in a vidhi, it can only praise this object *if it exists*. It follows that all arthavādas are really significative or informative of the real existence of qualities, so as to give rise to the knowledge that the object of the act is praiseworthy. Hence follows again that in this very manner all objects known through

155. *rājājñā*, Ved. § 116.

156. § 116.

157. § 117.

158. § 118.

mantras and arthavādas are proved to exist. To sum up, arthavādas are really significative themselves, not merely laudatory.

The same question is touched upon in another connexion<sup>159</sup> where the meaning of the śruti *tad Viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ* is discussed. This śruti can be read either that those *who are sūris* regard or that those *who regard* are sūris. Here a Mīmāṃsaka objects that in either case not more than one *guṇa* can be enjoined; either the quality of being sūris or the quality of regarding, not both, otherwise there would be *vākyabheda*.<sup>160</sup> Rāmānuja points out that the objection is not to the point and demonstrates that here there is question of a *viśiṣṭavidhi* where more than one quality can be enjoined. Here again he upholds that in themselves the mantras are informative of the objects or qualities which they describe and he concludes: As we have said before, even if we assume that mantras and arthavādas are significative only when bearing on an action to be effected their objects signified are established; *a fortiori* when etymological explication proves that in fact they bear on established objects in their own right. In this manner everything is sound.

From all this we can conclude that Rāmānuja did not want to supersede the principles of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, as Śaṅkara had done, but to modify them with respect to the uttarabhāga, where emphasis is not on vidhi but on arthavāda, and admit of a fully significative character of these arthavādas. He does not exclude the view that, after all, these arthavādas may find their significance and purpose in vidhi, but he is obliged to refute the extreme views of the Prabhākaras who are not less radical in upholding the autonomy of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā as Śaṅkara is in maintaining the self-sufficiency of Uttaramīmāṃsā. For Rāmānuja, however, both mīmāṃsās are not different śāstras, but constitute one continuous discipline. The substance and objective of both inquiries is fundamentally the same: both inquire into the way in which brahman is worshipped. But whereas the *pūrvabhāga* describes the ritual acts by which God, the Supreme Brahman, is worshipped indirectly in His multiple manifestations of the Vedic deities, the *uttarabhāga* describes the way in which God is directly worshipped by an immediate knowledge of perfect love. The former is ancillary and propaedeutic to the latter; both chapters of the same śāstra cannot, however, be in conflict.

The reservation which Rāmānuja makes—reluctantly enough—for the possibility of construing the jñānakāṇḍa as injunctive is, it would seem, peculiar to the Vedārthasamgraha and has been abandoned in the Śrībhāṣya.

159. § 128.

160. cf. MNPr., § 33.

161. *vyutpatti*—

In the *samanvayādhikaraṇa*<sup>162</sup> Rāmānuja states his view in a preliminary thesis: "these aggregates of words (sc. *śāstra*) which have the power of denoting completely established objects that have already been proved by the very etymology of the terms, can and do bear completely and harmoniously on the Brahman that is the cause of the origination, subsistence and annihilation of the entire universe, absolutely opposed to all imperfection, eminently possessed of unlimited perfections, and, in essence, boundless and incomparable bliss. Thus they serve no purpose conducive to activity or inactivity<sup>163</sup> and therefore do not bear on any other purport. For all *pramāṇas* terminate, not in a purpose, but in the knowledge of the objects with which they are concerned. Nor is the operation of any *pramāṇa* determined by a purpose: on the contrary, the purpose is determined by the knowledge resulting from the *pramāṇa*. Nor does the fact that the *pramāṇa* has no direct connexion with activity or inactivity mean that it is devoid of all purpose, for we see that it is related to anyone of the goals of human life."

This thesis is meant to reject Kumārila's definition: "*śāstra* is called that (verbal testimony) either eternal (sc. *vaidika*) or conventional (sc. *laukika*) which sets forth which actions man has to perform or is not to perform".<sup>164</sup> According to the Bhāṭṭa, the *jñānakāṇḍa* is *arthavāda*, setting forth the eternity of the *ātman* of man engaged in ritual acts, without which eternity the ritual acts themselves would lack permanence.

On Rāmānuja's Vedānta thesis follows the Mīmāṃsaka's (Bhāṭṭa's) *pūrvapakṣa*, in the course of which two apparently Prābhākara views are discussed and refuted, the *niṣprapañcīkaraṇanīyogavāda* or the view that the *jñānakāṇḍa* enjoins the establishing of a non-phenomenal Brahman, and the *dhyananīyogavāda*, the view that it enjoins the meditation on Brahman. In the course of the discussion of the latter view *advaitavāda* and *bhedābheda-vāda* are refuted. The Bhāṭṭa's *pūrvapakṣa* is then refuted again in the Vedāntin's *siddhānta*, that is to say, the entire argumentation which preceded in the course of the Mīmāṃsaka's discussion is accepted, except the thesis that, in as much as the *jñānakāṇḍa* does not terminate in direct purpose, i.e., describes what is to be done and what not, it has no purpose at all.

Consequently, Rāmānuja's provisional thesis and his *Siddhānta*, with in between the entire complicated argumentation, go to prove that he no longer made the reservation that the *jñānakāṇḍa* could possibly be construed as being injunctive.

162. ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.

163. *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*.

164. Śloka-vārttika, Śabdapariśeḍa st. 4; *pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā nityena kṛtakena ca / pūṣaṃ yenopadiśyate tac chāstram abhidhiyate /*

§ 2. *All śrutis are equally authoritative :*

We have seen that whereas Śaṅkara refuses to admit the Mīmāṃsā category of *vidhi* into Vedāntamīmāṃsā, Rāmānuja, in order to save the continuity of the First and the Second Inquiries, takes a more conciliatory view and, without denying the applicability of a typical Mīmāṃsā construction *vidhi* — *arthavāda* to the jñānakāṇḍa as well, yet urges the independent informativeness of the latter category.

One of the most striking features of Śaṅkara's exegetical method is the distinction that he introduces between the pure Vedānta texts, which set forth the *paramārthajñāna*, and the far more sizeable texts in which definite *upāsanas* are set forth describing the absolute in anthropomorphic terms and which consequently are *vyavahārika*. DE SMET attempts to show<sup>165</sup> that this distinction between major and minor texts corresponds to that which Pūrvamīmāṃsā makes between the injunctions, which are principal, and the *arthavādas*, etc., which are accessory to the principal texts; on the strength of this correspondence he suggests that Śaṅkara's distinction was inspired by Jaimini's. This correspondence, which at a first glance looks plausible, breaks however down when we scrutinize it more closely. For Śaṅkara the minor texts have a definite propaedeutic function, by preparing the mind of the pupil alike by describing magnificent projections of brahman, which are first to be contemplated upon, then to be abandoned, and by pointing out the underlying unity in the great variety of things with respect to their common cause, the Supreme Soul. Ultimately these texts cannot lead the student to the final truth by themselves. In other words, in the last analysis these minor texts are not at all accessory to the major texts. Actually the division between major and minor texts reflects that most general one between *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra*, a division far more fundamental than, and not at all related to, that of Pūrvamīmāṃsā between the principal texts and the accessory texts which are relevant with regard to the principal ones.

This division between *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra* is reflected in śruti on two different levels, first in śruti as a whole in the main division between major and minor statements, secondly in the major statements themselves, where the terms are distinguished as having their primary sense with regard to their empirical concepts and another sense by *lakṣaṇā* when they are referring to the non-qualified brahman. Rāmānuja who does not allow Śaṅkara's distinction between an 'ideal' and a 'practical' reality, rejects consequently its twofold reflection in śruti.

165. DE SMET, o.c., p. 199 ff.

To Rāmānuja, all śrutis are equally authoritative. This position is, as far as I can see, not expressly stated but throughout his works taken for granted. At one place,<sup>166</sup> for example, he maintains in passing the equal authority of the śruti ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *atha ya eṣo 'ntarāditye hiraṇmayāḥ puruṣo dṛśyate* — which according to Śaṅkara does not even refer to the paramātman but only to a highly qualified individual soul<sup>167</sup> — and of the 'mahāvākya' *satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma*: both śrutis predicate specific qualities of the personal God, who is the brahman.

Elsewhere he hints at the vicious circle implicit in the distinction between major and minor statements: we decide which texts are major and which are minor ultimately on the strength of an insight acquired by the study of those texts which later on we shall classify as major. Rāmānuja exposes the advaitin's scriptural eclecticism in §§86-87, after he has reconciled the various texts, propounding difference, difference-non-difference and non-difference, within the conception of a Supreme Being modified by distinct but dependent orders of matter and soul. The advaitin objects: *tat tvam asi*, etc., clearly declares identity and it follows that this knowledge of identity alone is conducive to release. Rāmānuja replies: no, for another śruti (Śvet.Up. 3, 9-11) declares that release is obtained in consequence of the knowledge of the distinct orders of Supreme Spirit, individual soul and matter. The advaitin then exclaims that, since this is obviously in conflict with the śruti he quoted, the other śruti can only refer to knowledge conducive of attaining, not the absolute non-differentiated brahman, but the relative qualified and not absolutely real brahman. Rāmānuja then raises the question: why should the former śruti be more authoritative than the latter one? We are not to ignore but to reconcile, as to do he proceeds.

Incidentally, for the so-called *mahāvākyas*, which set forth the sole reality of the absolute non-qualified brahman, Rāmānuja uses the term *śodhakavākyas*, which I have not been able to trace to an advaita source. It is plausible that it has been borrowed from the terminology of a milieu which used the term *śuddhabrahman* to describe the absolutely real non-qualified brahman, and we are reminded of this usage with Sarvajñātman, etc. For Rāmānuja, of course, these 'purificatory' statements are not privileged. They deny simply that God is affected by a number of specified imperfections and thereby assert that He possesses the opposite perfections. On this point he touches in connexion with his interpretation of *satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma*, to be discussed below.

166. Ved. § 136.

167. BrSBh. 1, 1, 21.

§3. *Lakṣaṇā* :

The second level on which the distinction 'ideal'—'practical' is reflected in śruti, viz., in the primary and secondary meanings of the terms employed with reference to the non-qualified brahman, comes in for a direct discussion in a polemical passage.

This polemic seems to be directed especially against Śaṅkara's interpretations ad Taittirīya Up. 2, 1. There it reads: *bhāvasādhano jñānaśabdo, na tu jñānakartṛ / brahmaviśeṣaṇatvāt satyānantābhyām saha / na hi satyātānantatā ca jñānakartṛtve saty upapadyate*. As this passage has been misunderstood before,<sup>168</sup> a short analysis is indicated. The above quotation means: "the term *jñāna* is a verbal noun with the sense of the root, not the agent of *jñāna* (in other words: *jñāna* "the knowing, knowledge", not "knowing, knower"), because it serves as an attribute of brahman, together with *satya* and *ananta*; for if brahman were the agent of knowledge, then it could be neither *satya* nor *ananta*." Śaṅkara develops the view that the *viśeṣaṇas satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* have here not an attributive but a definitive function<sup>169</sup> (*lakṣaṇārtha*). Since a specifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*-) serves only to specify members of a same class as distinct from one another (*samānajatibhya eva nivartakāni viśeṣaṇāni viśeṣyasya*), the terms cannot very well have this attributive function in this case, because brahman does not belong to any class: but they have a definitive function: definitives distinguish the object from all other objects (*lakṣaṇam tu sarvata eva [sc. nivartakam viśeṣyasya]*). On the other hand, Śaṅkara does not exclude the attributive function of the terms entirely: *viśeṣaṇārthavattve 'pi satyādinām svārthāparityāga eva / śūnyārthatve hi satyādisābdānām viśeṣyaniyantrtvā-nupapattiḥ / satyādyair arthavattve tu tadviparīṭadharmavadbhyo viśeṣyebhya brahmaṇo viśeṣyasya niyantrtvam upapadyate / .. tatrānantaśabdo 'ntavattvāpratiśedhadvāreṇa viśeṣaṇam / satyajñānaśabdau tu svārthasamarpaṇenaiva viśeṣeṇa bhavataḥ*: "even if the terms *satya*, etc., are taken as attributes (not as definitions), they do not lose their proper sense. In fact, if they had a non-existent object, they could not determine the object to be attributed at all. However, while retaining their meaning, they determine brahman as their object attributed by distinguishing it from all objects that possess properties opposite to those which they denote themselves. ... The term *ananta* is a *viśeṣaṇa* of brahman by denying that brahman has a limit; the terms *satya* and *jñāna* are *viśeṣaṇas* particularly in their own right, just by apply-

168. DE SMET, Langage et connaissance chez Śaṅkara, p. 47.

169. LACOMBE, who devotes a few pages to Ś.'s exposition ad TaittUp. 2, 1 (ASV. p. 79 ff), surprisingly mistakes *lakṣaṇa* (n) in *lakṣaṇārtha*- for *lakṣaṇā* (f) and translates and argues accordingly.

ing their own meanings to brahman." In other words, to the extent in which the terms are negative, i.e., deny properties of phenomenal objects rather than affirm properties of brahman, they are attributable to brahman. But how about terms like *satya* and *jñāna*? They cannot have the same significance for brahman as they have for the phenomenal objects or minds: from the point of view of brahman It alone is reality and knowledge and all other objects are unreality and nescience. Yet the terms are taken from phenomenal life where they have a definite meaning. So Śaṅkara replies: *tathāpi tadābhāsavācakena buddhidharmaviśayeṇa jñānaśabdena tal lakṣyate na tūcyate, śabdapravṛttihetuṃjātyādīdharmarahitatvāt / tathā satyaśābdenāpi / sarvaviśeṣapratyastamitasvarūpatvād brahmaṇo bāhyasattāsāmānyaviśayeṇa satyaśābdena lakṣyate satyaṃ brahmeti / na tu satyaśābdavācyaṃ eva brahma*: "yet the term *jñāna*, which (in phenomenal life) has reference to a property, sc. knowledge, and which expresses only a phenomenal projection of absolute knowledge, can only indicate brahman but not express it directly, because brahman is devoid of all properties—like generality, etc.—which are the basis of the operation of all speech. Similarly the term *satya*: this term denotes the general concept of external being, but brahman being essentially devoid of all differentiations can only indirectly be indicated in *satyaṃ brahma*, and cannot be expressed directly by the term *satya*." This view has been summarized by Sarvajñātman:<sup>170</sup>

*ākāśādaṃ satyatā tavad ekā pratyāñmātre satyatā kācid anyā /  
tatsamparkāt satyatātra cānyā vyutpanno 'yaṃ satyaśābdas tu //*

"the concept of *satya* when predicated of phenomenal entities—from space onwards—has another content than when predicated of that which is absolutely interior: in the latter case the concept of *satya* is analogously used, whereas the term has its proper meaning in the former." The question is resumed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī<sup>171</sup> who comments: *na ca — anṛtasvarūpe śābale satyatvāyogaḥ, yoge vā tato nānṛtavāvṛttir iti vācyaṃ; śābale hi satyatā eṣaiva yat paramārthasaṃsargeṇa pratiyamāne tasmin satyaśābdasamgatigrahaḥ / tad uktam Saṃkṣepaśārīrake — ākāśādaṃ etc., iti / evam ānandādīpadeṣu api draṣṭavyam / tathāca katham teṣāṃ nānṛtādivyāvartakatvam? etena — śuddhād anyatra satyatvādyasambhavātsatyatoādivākyaḥ / lakṣaṇayā akhaṇḍārthatve śuddhe satyatvāder abhānāt paryāyatvaṃ durvāram iti — parāstam / svarūpamātre 'pi na padāntaravaiyartham vyāvṛttibhedabodhanena sāphalyād iti coktaṃ ca*: (it is said that, when applied to the perfect brahman, the words *satya*, etc., which denote the imperfect brahman qualified by reality, etc., have to be taken with *lakṣaṇā*). Objection: no

170. Saṃkṣepaśārīraka 1, 121.

171. Advaitasiddhi, p. 692 (akhaṇḍārthalakṣaṇa).



reality, etc., can be predicated of the imperfect which is essentially unreal; or, if they are applied, it follows that they do not exclude, but imply, the unreal. *Reply*: You cannot say that: in fact, the reality in the imperfect is such that the applicability of the term *satya* "real" (to phenomenal objects) is grasped when the imperfect is understood in its relation to the ultimately real. This is stated in the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*: "...". The same can be noted in the case of the words like *ānanda*, etc. So how would these terms not exclude the unreal, etc.? This argument takes also care of the objection that, inasmuch as no reality, etc., is conceivable in anything but the perfect, the terms *satya*, etc., can only have their absolute sense by *lakṣaṇā*, but then, since *satyatva*, etc., are not apparent in the perfect, all such terms are necessarily synonymous. We may add another rejoinder: even when applied to the pure essential simplicity, other words do not lose their significance but retain their significance by conveying all the various aspects of exclusion."

This view is summed up by Rāmānuja (§11) as follows: *etacchodakāni prakaraṇāntaravākyaṇy api satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma* (etc.) *ityādini sarvaviśeṣapratyanīkaikākāratāṃ bodhayanti / na caikākāratābodhane 'pi padānāṃ paryāyatā / ekatve 'pi vastunaḥ sarvapratyanīkākāratavopasthāpanena sarvapadānāṃ arthavattvāt*: "the purifying statements in other contexts, like *satya*, etc., convey an object that is absolutely opposed to differentiations; yet, even though all words convey its perfect simplicity, they are not therefore synonymous: for they all are significant, even though referring to the simplicity of an entity, just by establishing its absolute opposition to everything else." But Rāmānuja refuses to admit that a number of words can refer to a non-differentiated object, even if they be merely apophatic: *śodhakavākyaṇy api niravadyaṃ sarvakalyāṇaguṇākaraṃ paraṃ brahma bodhayanti / sarvapratyanīkākāratābodhane'pi tattatpratyanīkākāratāyāṃ bhedasyāvharjanīyatvān na nirviśeṣatvasiddhiḥ*: "the purifying statements, too, convey that the supreme brahman is perfect and possessed of perfect qualities: for even if they convey that He is essentially opposed to everything else, yet necessarily they convey differentiation in that He is essentially opposed to each different quality separately."<sup>172</sup>

Further objections are raised against Śaṅkara's interpretation of *jñāna*, and these objections are fundamental. Knowledge is not an independent substance but a property.<sup>173</sup> Not only is it logically absurd to maintain an objectless and subjectless knowledge, but also grammatically the *advaitin* is at a loss to find a term which could convey a non-differentiated notion. *Jñāna* or its synonym *jñapti* are nouns of a certain gender and number and

172. Ved. § 23.

173. § 24.

take on certain functions, when used in a sentence, which are everything but non-differentiated. The occurrence of the substantive noun *jñāna* side by side with plain adjectives like *satya* and *ananta* is easily explained. More than "real" and "limitless", *jñāna* is an essential property of God and may be used to describe it, in a way comparable to our "his Majesty, Holiness", etc., which describe persons who are eminently possessed of majesty and holiness. Rāmānuja does not borrow Yāmuna's argument that the accent *jñāná* forbids us to take *jñāna* as a noun,<sup>173a</sup> but takes essentially the same position that in this particular connexion *jñāna* cannot mean anything but one eminently characterized by knowledge; aptly he refers to the next line of the Taittiriya Up. so 'śnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaściteti and BrS. 2, 3, 30-31 where the same problem is discussed with regard to the ātman.

The problem of *lakṣaṇā* is touched upon immediately afterwards, in a discussion of *tat tvam asi*. Although, as far I as know, Śaṅkara does nowhere commit himself explicitly on this point, his interpretation on this cele-

173a. Ātmasiddhi, p. 74: *satyaṃ jñānam ity atrāpi brahmalakṣaṇanirdeśe jñāna-śabdo na jñānamātravacanah / api tu tadvadvacanah, tadvacanatve liti ity ādyuddāttatva-prasakteḥ / antodāttas cāyam jñānaśabdah / matvarthiṃyācpratyayāntatve tathātvaṃ ghaṭate, nānyathā ity etat paramātmānirūpaṇe 'cinipunam upapādiṣydmah / aitareyakopaniṣad api prajñānam brahma ity uktvā sa etena prājñenātmanā iti prakṛṣṭajñānavantam evaśvaraṇ darśayati / tat siddham jñātaivāyam ātmā* "the word *jñāna* in the text *satyaṃ jñānam*, etc., with the function of defining brahman, does not mean 'only knowledge', but 'one who possesses knowledge': for if it were to mean 'only knowledge' it should have had the accent on the first syllable according to the rule *liti*, Pāṇini 6, 1, 193; but here the word *jñāna* has the accent on the final syllable. Now it can only be *jñāná* if the last syllable contains suffix *ac* in the sense of the possessive suffix *matu(p)*, and not otherwise. We shall demonstrate this point exhaustively when we discuss the Supreme Soul. Incidentally, the Aitareya Up., too, expounds that the Lord is indeed possessed of eminent knowledge (*prakṛṣṭa-* explaining *pra-*) in *prajñānam brahma*, continuing *sa etena prājñenātmanā*. So it is proved that the ātman is a knower." Yāmuna's point is an interesting one; it appears that *jñāna* in this śruti is recited at present as an oxytone: either this practice existed in Yāmuna's days already, or the practice then (and now) continues the original one: Yāmuna is about half-way the age of the text. His argument is less acceptable: Pāṇini 5, 2, 127 rules *arśāadibhyo 'c* in cases of certain bodily deficiencies and colours (and similar ones: *ākṛtiṅaṇo 'yam* adds *Siddhāntakāumudī*). Oxytonesis of *jñāná*, though as far as I know not attested, is not impossible and would point to an agent noun (WACKERNAGEL-DEBRUNNER II 2, § 81, a, B; § 82, c; WHITNEY, §1150, g. But as RENOÜ notes (*Gr. secte* § 26) "l'accent dans les textes classiques n'est pas noté, et rien ne permet d'indiquer avec précision la nature de l'accent dans la période post-védique." The most recent translation of our text (RENOÜ-LESIMPLE, Paris 1948) follows the traditional interpretation "Brahman est réalité, connaissance, infinitude." It should be remarked, however, that the line between personal and impersonal, concrete and abstract, was infinitely less sharp for the Upaniṣadic thinkers than it is for us, and either translation cannot help being too clear-cut.

brated *vākya* implies *lakṣaṇā*. Most explicit perhaps, is he in *Upadeśasāhasrī* II (*padyabhāga*), 18, stt. 177-183, where he declares that when we establish the sense of *tvam* by means of positive and negative formula-tion,<sup>174</sup> the sense of the judgment *tat tvam asi* becomes clear (183).

*vākyaṛtho vyajyate caivam kevalo 'hampadārthataḥ /  
duḥkḥity etadapohena pratyagātmaṇiścayāt //*

"thus it appears that the sentence is an identity judgment, for by abstracting the notion of empirical ego from the complete entity "I", we establish (for the words *aham* in *aham brahmāsmi* and *tvam* in *tat tvam asi*) the meaning of ātman."

And st. 197 :

*tacchabdaḥ pratyagātmārthas tacchabdārthas tvamas tathā /  
duḥkḥitvāpratyagātmatvaṃ vareyatām ubhāv api //*

"the word *tat* has the meaning of interior self, the word *tvam* has the meaning of the word *tat*; both words drop part of their meaning, *tvam* that of empirical ego, *tat* that of non-self."

This last stanza shows that the *lakṣaṇā* implied is that of *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā*. Sureśvara,<sup>175</sup> in his *Naīṣkarmyasiddhi* 2-3 follows Śaṅkara's view as expressed in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* very closely, without however enlarging on the particular significance of the implicit *lakṣaṇā*.<sup>175a</sup> Padma-pāda, in his *Pañcapādikā* 9, 21 (p. 307), is the first to compare the judgment *tat tvam asi* with so 'yam (*Vivaraṇa*: so 'yam *Devadattaḥ*), which is the stock-instance of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. Most explicit of all is *Sarvajñātman*,

174. i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, not further explained in the US., occur again in *Naīṣkarmyasiddhi* II, 8-9 in identical connexion. HIRIYANNA notes ad 2, 8 (p. 236) not very helpfully: "there are two methods of inquiry which may, perhaps, be described as 'method of agreement' and 'method of difference'." HACKER, *Untersuchungen*, p. 74, describes the terms as "Reflexion darüber, dass der Inhalt der Wörter und des Satzes wohl-begründet und das Gegenteil logisch unmöglich ist." More precisely: the proposition is first considered positively by *anvaya*, whereby the connexion is realised between that in *tat* which is in *tvam* and contrariwise; then it is considered negatively by *vyatireka*, whereby that in *tvam* which is not *tat* is excluded from *tvam* and contrariwise.

175. HACKER, *Untersuchungen*, p. 75 ff. has dealt extensively with Sureśvara's exegesis of *tat tvam asi* in the *Naīṣkarmyasiddhi*, but unfortunately has not gone into the question of its relation with the US. as quoted here.

175a. This *lakṣaṇā* is meant by Dharmarāja when he states: *tasmāt tat tvam asitī vākya ācāryānām* (honorific plural = Ś.) *lakṣaṇoktir abhyupagamavādēna* ("by way of hypothesis" leaving scope for diverging interpretations) *bodhyā*, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* IV.

Samkṣepasāhīraka stt. 1, 149 ff. and Pañcaprakriyā I, p. 10 sq. . . jahada-jahallakṣaṇā pāroḥṣyasadvitīyaśabale vyutpannayos tattvampadayor ekāṁśa-parityāgenāmśāntare vṛttisaṃbhavāt so'yam ityādivākyaṛthapadayor iva / tasmā jahadajahallakṣaṇayā pratyagātmā bodhyate, "the words tat and tvam, which have their proper sense respectively for remoteness and for the manifold and imperfect, are to be taken with partial lakṣaṇā, since, by dropping part of their meaning, they can function significantly in another part of their meaning, like the words in judgments of the type 'this is he (that)'. He also allows *guṇāvṛtti*, figurative use, of the type *siṃho devadattaḥ* "Devadatta is (like) a lion (in that he is cruel, brave)". This is the generally accepted advaita view until Dharmarāja suggests another solution (Vedānta-paribhāṣā IV).

Rāmānuja takes exception to assuming lakṣaṇā in "you are it". Not only is there no need at all to resort to lakṣaṇā in explaining the identity of "this here and now" (*ayam*) and "that there and then" (*tat*), because the differences between the two terms are accounted for by a lapse of time and do not as such militate against identity: "This is that Devadatta" means nothing but "Our Devadatta here was, at some previous time, somewhere else, he is the same person who was there at the time". This polemic, irrelevant though it may seem, touches again a fundamental difference of view: for the same *dṛṣṭānta* is an illustration of the so-called indeterminate perception, by which an object is perceived without any determinant properties, an analogy of the intuition of a non-differentiated brahman.

DE SMET has drawn a comparison between Śaṅkara's *lakṣaṇājñāna* and the knowledge by analogy of the scholastic theology;<sup>176</sup> with some caution we may also avail ourselves of the term analogy to explain Rāmānuja's method of interpreting the śruti. We have seen that Rāmānuja, by analogy of the microcosmic harmony between body and soul, conceived of a macrocosmic harmony between the phenomenal world of matter and spirit, and the Supreme God who is the soul that animates the world as his body. When we refer to a body, we refer simultaneously to the soul, on which the body is entirely dependent and apart from which it has no proper existence. Just because of this intimate relation between body and soul, judgments are possible of the type "I am stout", by which a property of a body is predicated of the self. What is actually said is this: "I, the individual ātman, who am empiricised by my descent into a body, am stout as far as this body is concerned". This type of judgment can be generalized to that of "I am my

176. R. V. DE SMET, *The correct interpretation of the definitions of the Absolute, according to Śaṅkarācārya and Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Philosophical Quarterly, 1955, XXVII, 4), p. 187 ff.

body" which means "I am the soul which has taken possession of this body and apart from which this body does not exist". Analogously we can understand the *sāmānādhikarāṇyas* of the śruti where the Absolute is described and defined by terms that express concepts which in profane linguistic usage are considered to be exclusively phenomenal. In *tat tvam asi*, where *tat* resumes the Deity called *sat* in the preceding section,<sup>177</sup> *tvam* has its full significance of "individual ātman within a body"; but this is not the complete significance of the term. Just as the body has no proper existence apart from serving the soul, similarly the soul has no proper existence apart from serving the Supreme Soul, God, who is immanent in it as the inner Ruler. Just as the body terminates in the soul, so the soul terminates in the inner Soul. Consequently all words which describe the body, ultimately refer to the soul, and all words which describe the soul ultimately refer to God. This reference of words is not due to any significative power in themselves, but to the very constitution of the objects which they express. By denoting the part they do not imply the whole, but the part itself implies the whole compositum of matter animated by individual souls that are internally guided by the Supreme Self.

From this discussion of Rāmānuja's polemics, which for all their abstrusity concern the most fundamental problems, a general idea of his realism emerges. He has been called all-too-literal; and so he is. But this literalness lies at the very root of his hermeneutics. His glorious vision of a God who includes the world like the soul includes the body would never allow him a method of interpretation by which any term is applicable to God, only when all worldly connotations have been carefully excluded from it. To his mind such a procedure would detract from God's glory. He realizes that in the end we would be left without any means of knowing Him at all. All Scripture is of necessity anthropomorphist; Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja represent diametrically opposed views of how to approximate the Absolute in its transcendence in spite of the anthropomorphism of Revelation. Whereas for Śaṅkara brahman is the *Other*, and he goes ever farther the way of excluding from its concept all that is related to the world, to the point of denying the reality of the world in the final analysis, Rāmānuja worships a God that is verily *Supreme* and includes in His concept all that is of this world, to the point of affirming this world just because it is related to God. Devout Vaiṣṇava if ever there was one, his vision can be understood. Viṣṇu, the god of incarnations *par excellence*, who in every age takes personally a hand in the direction of the world's affairs, god of preservation and maintenance, who pervades the Universe, the Viśvarūpa and omnipresent one, will lead

177. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

his devotee to a very different conception of Absolute and World from that to which Śiva would inspire, the god of annihilation, who represents yogic renunciation and systematic abnegation.

#### § 4. Context:

Rāmānuja's categorical rejection of the two methodological principles of Śaṅkara's exegesis, the distinction of major and minor statements and of primary and secondary sense,—a distinction which is ultimately purely human and therefore presumptuous to make in preterhuman revelation—naturally aggravates the difficulty of interpreting the kaleidoscopic and often contradictory teachings of the sacred texts in a satisfying and consistent sense.

In order to arrive at a consistent sense, which is of course given since śruti is not subject to human fallibility, Rāmānuja makes an ingenious and skillful use of the criterion of *prakaraṇa*, or context: "We have declared that the scriptural statements are no longer in conflict as soon as we have determined their true purport correctly."

How he applies this criterion of context may be illustrated by a few exemplary śrutis which are often quoted by advaitins to prove their own views.

The celebrated vākya of Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad (2, 3, 6): *athāta ādeśo neti neti* "thus the instruction that it is neither such nor such", which according to Śaṅkara denies all differentiation of brahman by negating that brahman has any form, either embodied or disembodied, takes, according to Rāmānuja, an entirely different sense when we consider the context to which it belongs. Does it really deny the initial statement of 2, 3, 1 *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca*, as Śaṅkara holds?<sup>179</sup> But then, what is the point of introducing this admitted falsehood at all, only to deny it in the same breath? This is unconceivable. Besides, in the immediate sequel the same text affirms that brahman has qualities like *satya* etc. Clearly *upakrama*, or initial statement, and *upasaṃhāra*, or concluding statement, are in agreement, so that the context is established.<sup>180</sup> Within this context *neti neti* cannot mean to deny differentiation. For the true explication he refers to the Brahmasūtras (3, 2, 22): *prakṛtāivattvaṃ pratiśedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ* "this expression denies that brahman is only so much as has been

178. Ved. 83 ff.

179. BrSBh. 3, 2, 22.

180. The most important of the indications of the coherence of a context.

set forth here, and affirms consequently that brahman is *more* than that alone".

Similarly, only a painstaking scrutiny of the entire sadvidyā will help us in understanding the true sense of the upasaṃhāra *tat tvam asi* within this context. The context opens with the *pratijñā* or thesis that when the *ādeśa*—i.e. the directing Person<sup>181</sup>—is known this all is known. This person, later on called *sat*, is described as the universal cause by which we can know the world its effect: in *sat* the world has its material cause (*sanmūla*) and its operative cause (*sadāyatana*). The effectuation of this world with all its variety of material objects and conscious spirits takes place by the descent of *sat* into this world by means of the individual *ātman* (*jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇāni*). Finally, all has been summed up in the complete statement *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā: tat tvam asi, Svetaketu* "the entire Universe is ensouled by Him who is *sat*, it is real, for He is the *ātman*: so you are He, Śvetaketu": which can only mean that you are ensouled by God, so that you are He in so far as you are the body to Him, your soul. There can be no question that the declaration *tat tvam asi* only means to say that *tvam* does not exist as the ensouled effect at all: this would militate against the obvious sense of the entire prakaraṇa. What is expressed here is not the identity of cause with cause, but the relation between God and creature as that between soul and body: *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ, sa ātmā*.

These interpretations are comparatively straightforward and simple. So to make good his challenge that all superficial contradictions between the many śrutis will disappear instantly as soon as we have discovered the true purport of them, Rāmānuja quotes a few apparently conflicting śrutis: "Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra have all been begotten, but not the cause: therefore we are to meditate on the cause: Śambhu, the Supreme One who enjoys universal paramouncy should be meditated upon in the middle of space."<sup>180a</sup> He combines this with a śruti from ŚvetUp 3, 9-11 where the Supremacy of the *great person* is declared. Here we have two claims to universal paramouncy which we are at a loss to reconcile within one being. Yet, replies Rāmānuja surprisingly, everything fits in perfectly when we bear in mind that Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Brahman, and he proceeds to substantiate this statement.

As he states elsewhere, we cannot understand the śruti properly unless we consider all the śākhās: they often help us to understand the full significance of certain statements. ChUp. 6 asserts that *sat* was here alone in the

180a. AtharvasikhUp.<sup>1</sup>

181. See trsl. n. 75.

beginning, in other words, is the universal cause. Elsewhere, this *sat* is called *brahman*, elsewhere *ātman*, all in the same connexion: *sat*, *brahman* and *ātman* are different designations of the same being. Who is this being? We turn to another śākhā: *Nārāyaṇa was here at the beginning*. *Sat*, *brahman* and *ātman* denote *Nārāyaṇa*: it is He who is the first and universal cause. We have specified the being who appears as the cause in the *AtharvaśikhUp.*

The same Upaniṣad describes the Sovereignty of the cause. Do we find a similar description of *Nārāyaṇa*? He refers to *TaittĀr.* 10, 13 where it is said of some personal deity that the sages weave him *in the middle of the sea* (we are reminded of the *AtharvaśikhUp.* where the cause is to be meditated upon *in the middle of space*) and that *no one is master to him*. Who is this deity? The text itself refers us further: it quotes as its context *adbhyaḥ sambhūtaḥ*, etc., *TaittĀr.* 3, 13, 2. Here we find that this deity is styled "Great Person" and that *Hṛī* and *Lakṣmī* are his consorts: from which it is clear that the Paramount Deity of 10, 13, 1 and the Great Person of 3, 13, 2 are no one but *Nārāyaṇa*.

The connexion with the *Nārāyaṇānūvāka*, *TaittĀr.* 10, 11, 1 is now given. This text, inspired by the *Puruṣasūkta*, concludes that *Nārāyaṇa* is *Brahmā*, *Śiva*, *Indra*, *Akṣara*, the supreme, self-sufficient Sovereign. Meanwhile it has been shown that *ŚvetUp.* must be understood within the *Mahā-puruṣaprakaraṇa* of *TaittĀr.* 3, 13, 2. Now it is clear that the originally totally unrelated statements between which we suspected contradiction have clarified each other and themselves: *Śambhu* and the Great Person are *Nārāyaṇa*, who is the first and universal cause and who enjoys paramount sovereignty. The description of the dissolution of *prāṇa* and senses into the *manas* and the *manas* into the supreme object of meditation in *AtharvaśikhUp.*, is compared with the description in *Mahānārāyaṇa Up.* of the dissolution of the *Veda* into *Oṃ* and of *Oṃ* into the *A* which is *Nārāyaṇa*, who, we may recall, was called *Brahmā*, *Śiva*, *Indra*, *Akṣara*, that is the ensouling principle and cause of them. Yet another statement of the *AtharvaśikhUp.*, that the cause is to be meditated upon *in the middle of space*, fits into the established context where *MahānārUp.* 10, 7 reads *dahraṃ vipṛkṣaṃ varam veśmabhūtam* etc., which without any doubt is inspired by the *Daharavidyā* of *ChUp.* 8; this will lead *Rāmānuja* to a further discussion of the true sense of this śruti. So we see how each śruti can and should be understood only when all the references, correspondences and parallels have been brought out by a subtle analysis. Only then we can pretend to interpret the śruti, without resorting to convenient but presumptuous distinctions between statements which suit our views and which do not.



But apart from these detailed interpretations, at what general conclusions does Rāmānuja arrive about the sense of the Scriptures? Can we explain them in the sense of a strict monism, denying all qualities of the Absolute and reality of the Universe, or of a radical dualism, separating God from world and matter from souls, or of difference-non-difference in a pantheistic harmony? To a certain extent all these senses are valid, but we have to harmonize them within a new conception of the relation between Absolute and World. When the śruti denies qualities of brahman, it denies imperfect ones; when the reality of the world is negated, it affirms the utter dependence of the World on God. When diversity is denied, the uniqueness of God as the unitive inner soul of the diverse Universe is affirmed. When diversity is asserted, the wonderful variety of God's manifestations in the Universe of matter and spirit is affirmed. All these senses find their place within the fundamental doctrine that the Personal God, who is possessed of perfect qualities, is modified by the world of prakṛti and puruṣa, whether in subtle or causal state, or gross or effectual state, which constitute the body to which He is the Soul.

The first of these is the fact that the
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 the necessary funds to carry out
 its policy. This is due to a
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## **PART II: TEXT**

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and the role of the accounting department in ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. It highlights the need for transparency and accountability in the reporting process.

2. The second part of the document focuses on the implementation of internal controls to prevent fraud and errors. It outlines the key components of a robust internal control system, including segregation of duties, authorization procedures, and regular monitoring.

3. The third part of the document addresses the challenges faced by the organization in managing its financial resources. It identifies the main areas of concern, such as budgeting, cash flow management, and debt servicing, and proposes strategies to address these challenges.

4. The fourth part of the document provides a detailed analysis of the organization's financial performance over the past year. It includes a comparison of actual results with budgeted figures and identifies the factors that contributed to the variances.

5. The fifth part of the document outlines the organization's financial goals for the upcoming year. It sets clear targets for revenue growth, cost reduction, and improved financial ratios, and describes the actions that will be taken to achieve these goals.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the organization's approach to risk management. It identifies the key risks that could impact the organization's financial health and describes the measures that will be taken to mitigate these risks.

7. The seventh part of the document provides a summary of the key findings and recommendations. It emphasizes the importance of continued monitoring and reporting, and encourages the organization to maintain a strong commitment to financial integrity and transparency.

[illegible]

## EDITORIAL NOTE

§ 1. The *editio princeps* of the Vedārthasaṃgraha was published by TIRUMULACHARYA and VIJAYARAGHAVACHARYA in Telugu character at the Sarasvatī Bhaṇḍār in Madras, in Kaliyuga 4984 = A.D. 1882. A new, but considerably less satisfactory and critical edition was published by S. Sum. P. S. RAMA MISRA Sastri in the issues of the Pandit (15) 1893, nos. 9-12; 16; and 17, and reprinted separately Benares 1924. Occasionally a few other editions are met with, which are published privately and distributed for devotional and charitable purposes and have only a limited circulation. As they are not critical, have in fact no claims to scholarly principles and are usually hard to obtain, we shall neglect them here. Quite recently another edition was brought out by T. K. V. N. SUDARSANACHARYA and published at Tirupati. All these editions are accompanied by Sudarśanasūri's commentary *Tātparyādīpikā*.

§ 2. Though the first to be published, over 70 years ago, the Telugu edition of Madras is the most, if not the only, critical one that has appeared so far. It is based on 13 MSS., 12 of which were privately owned. The variant readings are carefully noted and references are given to the numbers indicating the various manuscripts. MS. 13, from the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, appears to have served as the basis of the established text. 8 MSS. are in Grantha character: nos. 1 and 6, both from the Sarasvatī Bhaṇḍār at Triplicane; 2, of Samijachariar of Mysore; 3, of Ayyuvayyengar; 4, of Karappangadu Jiyar Swami; 5, of Tiruvali Ayyangar; 7, of Narasimhachariar; 13, from Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. 3 MSS. are in Telugu character: nos. 9, from the Sarasvatī Bhaṇḍār at Melkote; 10, of Aṣṭagotram Raghavachariar; 12, of Kunnapakkam Srinivasachari. Finally, 2 MSS. are in Devanāgarī character: nos. 8, of Milakalwar; 9, of Bhaṣyakar, Melkote. The edition, blessed by Yadugiri Jeer, is very well printed with few errors. Unfortunately no account is given of the critical criteria of the editors. I have gone through all the variants and tried to classify the MSS. utilized, while allowing for a reasonable margin of error by misprints and omissions. MS. 1 is almost certainly a copy of MS. 7, but very much conflated; moreover, the copyist has permitted himself a fair number of 'improvements' on the text. MSS. 4 and 5 belong together intimately: either one is a copy of the other, or both are extremely faithful copies of one prototype. MSS. 3 and 6 are more closely related to each other than to any other MS., but 3 shows a great number of individual variants and seems to be younger. Various relations can be detected between other MSS., notably between MSS. 8, 9 and 11, but the exact arrangement of the material has not become completely clear to me. Since the

Telugu text was based on other material than was at my disposal, I have made a point of noting its readings where they differ from those preferred by me.

§ 3. The Pandit edition is far from being an improvement on the *editio princeps*. In one line the Editor disposes of his MSS. material. He states that he has consulted three MSS., one in Grantha script from Madras — probably the Government Oriental MSS. Library —, and two in Devanāgarī: one from the *Satyasarasvatī* Library in Mysore, which is now the Mysore Oriental Research Institute, and another one from a Library called *Brahmāmṛtavarṣiṇī*. The Mysore MS. is no doubt the present manuscript D.G. 1776, which has also been collated for the present edition. Although the Editor does not state it, it appears from his notes that he has also consulted the Telugu edition. Only a very few variant readings are noted and no references are given. Misprints abound.

§ 4. The Tirupati edition, which dates itself 1953 on the title-page, was actually made available only towards the end of 1954, when my own text had already been established. A great number of variants are entered in notes, but one searches in vain for even a plain enumeration of the manuscripts utilized or consulted; the variant readings are simply noted *pāṭhāntarāṇi*. The references to quotations in text and commentary, esp. *śruti* quotations, are not always reliable. On the other hand, the book is very neatly printed with few errors, and it will be found very useful by those who want to consult the *Tātparyadīpikā*. In an extensive and erudite introduction the Editor, who is a *śāstrī* in both *Vedāntas*, treats of a number of relevant topics from the view-point of *Śrīvaiṣṇavasampradāya*, which deserves the interest of all who take the tradition of Śrīvaiṣṇavism into consideration.

§ 5. With text like the present one the difficulties of establishing a critical edition are usually not very great and concern mainly details. The text is not very old. It could, by its very character, never be subject to the vicissitudes of ancient, popular, devotional and literary texts. It is a technical scholastic treatise, whose readers have always been confined to comparatively small communities; when their own copies happened to be broken or spoiled, they had other copies at hand, or available in libraries of temple or monastery. Sudarśanasūri's excellent and extensive commentary, being generally transmitted along with the commented text, left hardly any scope for additional glosses that might find their way into the text. On the other hand, the constant repetition of a relatively small number of technical terms in consecutive lines led naturally to haplographies, whereas also the numerous quotations from *śruti* and *smṛti* could be added to or abbreviated without impairing the argument. Though there are a

considerable number of manuscripts extant, in the main they do not show important differences of reading. But, since conflation must have been going on constantly, it is often very difficult with texts like the present one to classify the manuscripts plausibly and set up an hypothetical *stemma codicum*, except — possibly — by collating painstakingly all manuscripts that are available: a procedure not always practicable and not always justified by the requirements of the individual texts. Therefore I have had to make a selection of manuscripts which would not only suffice to give a presentable text but also be representative enough to justify the claim to critical procedure. So 6 MSS. from different sources were collated in their entirety and another ten in part. Soon it became plain that one Mysore MS., indicated below  $M_2$ , gave the best text and it has therefore been made the basis of this edition

§ 6. The following MSS. have been collated completely :

i. a paper MS., deposited at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Poona, cat. no. 660 of 1884/87; Devanāgarī, 44 pages  $10'' \times 6''$ ; 13 lines per page, 38 akṣaras per line; well-written, but carelessly copied: errors and haplographies abound. On the first three pages the *śruti* etc. quotations are indicated by red marks; the colophon gives as the scribe's name Utkoli from Mathurā; the MS. is not dated.

Symbol : P.

ii. a paper MS. of the Mysore Oriental Research Institute, Mysore; cat. no. D.C. 1776; Devanāgarī; 56 pages  $11'' \times 5\frac{1}{2}''$ ; 10 lines per page, 86 letters per line; clearly and carefully written; it gives the impression of being a faithful copy of its *Vorlage*; no colophon, no date.

Symbol :  $M_1$ .

iii. a palm-leaf MS. of the Mysore Government Oriental Research Institute, cat. no. Gr. 878; Grantha script; 45 pages  $15\frac{1}{2}'' \times 1\frac{3}{4}''$ ; 9 lines per page, 86 letters per line; well-written, rather old; hardly any errors; no colophon, no date.

Symbol :  $M_2$ .

iv. a palm-leaf MS., of the Mysore Oriental Research Institute; cat. no. A 2409; Telugu character; 51 pages  $17'' \times 1\frac{1}{2}''$ ; 6 lines per page, 74 letters per line; beautifully written; young; careful copy, leaving blank space where the prototype was obscure; colophon gives as the scribe's name Nṛsiṃhatā-tadāsa; dated: Monday, in the bright fortnight of the month śrāvaṇa in the year Plava, probably 1841, but not impossibly 1901.

Symbol :  $M_3$ .

v. a palm-leaf MS. from the Adyar Library, Adyar; cat. no. 24. D. 32, Grantha script; 19 leaves,  $17\frac{3}{4}'' \times 1\frac{1}{2}''$ ; 14 lines per page; 85 letters per line; no colophon, no date.

Symbol :  $A_1$ .

vi. a palm-leaf MS. from Adyar Library, Adyar; cat. no. 28 H. 5; Grantha script; 27 leaves,  $19\frac{1}{4}'' \times 1\frac{1}{4}''$ ; 10 lines per page; 80 letters per line; no colophon, no date.

Symbol :  $A_3$ .

§ 7. After the above manuscripts had been collated completely, a number of other MSS. in Mysore, Adyar and Madras were consulted in addition. Since the material obtained from them does not contribute significant data on the text as established with the aid of the above manuscripts, their variant readings have not been included in the critical apparatus for reasons of economy except, at first, an Adyar Grantha MS. indicated  $A_2$ .

§ 8. I have noted the following relations between the six completely collated MSS. P and  $M_1$  derive from a common prototype, of which the latter is a more reliable representative; both belong together with MS no. 12 of the Telugu edition. The three of them constitute one group with  $M_2$ . Another group is constituted on the one hand by the two Adyar MSS.  $A_1$  and  $A_3$ , which are clearly but not too closely related, and on the other hand by  $M_3$ , which stands more apart. This last MS., incidentally, proved to be very closely related to Madras Government MSS. Library MS Do 5030, but since the testimony of  $M_3$  is not of great importance, this relation has not been followed up by a complete collation of the Madras manuscript. Both groups, which may be indicated as Group A and Group B, are frequently found to be interrelated, but members of each group have a sufficient number of variants between them to justify their grouping together. Generally the readings of the first group A have been preferred to those of B. In a few cases the exclusive testimony of  $M_2$  has been accepted. Sometimes Sudarśanasūri's glosses have helped to settle the reading.

§ 9. Acknowledgements are due to the following gentlemen : P. K. Gode, Curator, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; H. Devē-rappa, Director, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore and Paṇḍits Sri Nigamanthacharya and Palhada Thulasi Sreenivasacharya, Mysore; Alain Daniélou, Director, Adyar Library, Adyar; Dr. V. Raghavan, Professor of Sanskrit, University of Madras; T. Chandrasekharan, M.A., Curator, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library and Pandit T. A. K. Venkatachari, Madras. It is a pleasure here to express my gratitude for the help and cooperation which they have extended to me, officially and personally.



॥ श्रीः ॥

## ॥ वेदार्थसंग्रहः ॥



[१] \*अशेषचिदचिद्वस्तुशेषिणे शेषशायिने ।

<sup>१</sup> निर्मलानन्तकल्याणनिधये विष्णवे नमः ॥ १ ॥

[२] परं ब्रह्मैवाज्ञं भ्रमपरिगतं संसरति त-

त्परोपाध्यालीढं विवशमशुभस्यास्पदमिति ।

श्रुतिन्यायापेतं जगति विततं मोहनमिदं

तमो येनापारतं स हि विजयते यामुनमुनिः ॥ २ ॥

[३] अशेषजगद्धितानुशासनश्रुतिनिकरशिरसि समधिगतोऽयमर्थः जीवपरमात्म-  
याथात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वकवर्णाश्रमधर्मेतिकर्तव्यताकपरमपुरुषचरणयुगलध्यानार्चनप्रणामादिरित्यर्थ-  
प्रियस्तत्प्राप्तिफलः ।

[४] अस्य जीवात्मनोऽनाद्यविद्यासंचितपुण्यपापरूपकर्मप्रवाहहेतुकब्रह्मादिसुरनर-  
तिर्यक्स्थावरात्मकचतुर्विधदेहप्रवेशकृततत्तदभिमानजनितावर्जनीयभवभयविध्वंसनाय देहा-

\* A<sub>2</sub> begins [श्रीमते] रामानुजाचार्याय नमः परयोगिणे ।

यः श्रुतिस्मृतिसूत्राणामन्तज्वरमशीशमत ॥

1. A<sub>2</sub> adds before निर्मल°—श्रीमते निर्मलानन्दो धन्वते विष्णवे नमः ।

2. M<sub>1</sub> °शासनप्रवृत्तश्रुति°

3. M<sub>1</sub> °शिरस्तमधि°

4. T जीवपरयाया°

5. A °दिरित्यर्थ°

6. M<sub>3</sub> om. °अवर्जनीय°

तिरिक्तात्मस्वरूपतत्त्वभावतदन्तर्यामिपरमात्मस्वरूपतत्त्वभावतदुपासनतत्फलभूतात्मस्वरूपा विभावपूर्वकानवधिकातिशयानन्दब्रह्मानुभवज्ञापने प्रवृत्तं हि वेदान्तवाक्यजातम्, तत्त्व-  
मसि । अयमात्मा ब्रह्म । य आत्मानि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा  
शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः । एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहत-  
पाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः । तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन  
दानेन तपसानशकेन । ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् । तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति नान्यः  
पन्था अयनाय विद्यत इत्यादिकम् ।

[५] जीवात्मनः स्वरूपं देवमनुष्यादिप्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषरूपनानाविधभेद-  
रहितं ज्ञानानन्दैकगुणं, तस्यैतस्य कर्मकृतदेवादिभेदेऽप्यध्वस्ते स्वरूपभेदो वाचामगोचरः  
१० स्वसंवेद्यः, ज्ञानस्वरूपमित्येतावदेव निर्देश्यम् । तच्च सर्वेषामात्मनां समानम् ।

[ ६ ] एवंविधचिदचिदात्मैकप्रपञ्चस्योद्भवस्थितिप्रलयसंसारनिवर्तनैकहेतुभूतः  
संमस्तहेयप्रत्यनीकतयान्तकल्याणतया च स्वेतरसमस्तवस्तुविलक्षणस्वरूपोऽनवधिका-

1. A<sub>1</sub> om. °तत्°
2. A<sub>1</sub> om. °स्वरूप°
3. M<sub>1.8</sub>, A<sub>2</sub> om. तत्°
4. A<sub>2</sub> T जीवात्मस्वरूपं
5. M<sub>3</sub> °गुणकं
6. M<sub>8</sub> °विधदेवादिभेदरहितं—M<sub>8</sub> बध्वस्ते, M<sub>1.2</sub> विध्वस्ते—अपध्वस्ते is the reading of VP. 2, 14, 33 here referred to but note that S'Bh. 1, 1, 1, p. 81 the same quotation reads विध्वस्ते
7. M<sub>8</sub> ज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूपम्
8. M<sub>8</sub> °त्मकजगदुदय°
9. M<sub>1</sub> °प्रलयमहानन्दैककारणं and lacuna ending with स्वेतर°
10. M<sub>8</sub> स्वरूपं निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणगुणैकस्वभावमनवधि°
11. A<sub>1</sub> °प्रत्यनीककल्याणैक°
12. M<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub> om. °अनन्त°

तिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणः सर्वात्मपरब्रह्मपरज्योतिः परतत्त्वपरमात्मसदादिशब्दभेदै-  
निखिलवेदान्तवेद्यो भगवान्नारायणः पुरुषोत्तम इत्यन्तर्यामिस्वरूपम् । अस्य च वैभव-  
प्रतिपादनपराः श्रुतयः स्वेतरसमस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुजातान्तरात्मतया ° निखिलनियमनं तच्छक्ति-  
तदंशतद्विभूतितद्रूपतच्छरीरतत्तनुप्रभृतिभिः शब्दैस्तत्सामानाधिकरण्येन च प्रतिपादयन्ति ।

[७] तस्य वैभवप्रतिपादनपराणामेषां सामानाधिकरण्यादीनां विवरणे प्रवृत्ताः ५  
केचन निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रमेव ब्रह्म, तच्च नित्यमुक्तस्वप्रकाशस्वभावमपि तत्त्वमस्यादिसामा-  
नाधिकरण्यावगतजीवैक्यं, ब्रह्मैवाज्ञं बध्यते मुच्यते च, निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रातिरेकीश्वरेशि-  
तव्याद्यनन्तविकल्परूपं कृत्तनं जगन्मिथ्या, कश्चिद्ब्रह्मः कश्चिन्मुक्त इतीर्यमेवस्या न  
विद्यते । इतः पूर्वं केचन मुक्ता इत्ययमर्थो मिथ्या । एकमेव शरीरं जीवैर्वज्जिर्जी-

1. M<sub>1</sub> om. °गणः
2. M<sub>3</sub> lacuna °सर्वत्म°.....भगवान्
3. M<sub>3</sub> om. अन्तर्यामिस्वरूपम्
4. M<sub>1</sub> अस्यैव—T तस्य
5. M<sub>3</sub> निखिलं तन्नियमनं—M<sub>3</sub> सर्वस्य तन्नियाम्यत्वेन तच्छरीरत्वात्तद्वाचक-  
शब्दैः परमात्मैवाभिधीयत इति तन्नियमनं प्रतिपादयन्ति which looks  
like a gloss that was substituted for the original reading  
निखिलनियमनं.
6. M<sub>3</sub> अस्य
7. T प्रकाशमपि
8. M<sub>3</sub> om. °अवगत°
9. P °जीवब्रह्मैक्यं—M<sub>3</sub> °जीवादभिन्नं
10. M<sub>3</sub> om. एवाज्ञं—A<sub>1</sub> एवाज्ञानं
11. M<sub>3</sub> om. बध्यते मुच्यते च and reads instead स्वप्रकाशकत्वं
12. P<sub>1</sub> M<sub>2</sub> °ईशेशितव्य°
13. P<sub>1</sub>M<sub>2</sub>.s. विकल्पस्वरूपं
14. M<sub>3</sub> इयं चाव°
15. A<sub>1</sub> om. केचन मुक्ता इति
16. M<sub>3</sub> lacuna जीववन्....व्यवस्थितम्

वानीतराणि, तच्छरीरं किमिति न व्यवस्थितम्, आचार्यो ज्ञानस्योपदेष्टा मिथ्या शास्त्रं च मिथ्या शास्त्रप्रमाता च मिथ्या शास्त्रजन्यं ज्ञानं च मिथ्या—एतत्सर्वं मिथ्याभूतेनैव शास्त्रेणावगम्यत इति वर्णयन्ति ।

५ [८] अपरे त्वपहतपाप्मत्वादिर्समस्तकल्याणगुणोपेतमपि ब्रह्मैतेनैवैक्यावबोधेन केनचिदुपाधिविशेषेण संवर्द्धं बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाविधमलरूपपरिणामास्पदं चेति व्यवस्थिताः ।

[९] अन्ये पुनरैक्यावबोधयाथात्म्यं वर्णयन्तः स्वाभाविकनिरतिशयापरिमितो-दारगुणसागरं ब्रह्मैव सुरनरतिर्यक्स्थावरनारकिस्वर्गपवर्गिचेतनेषु स्वभावतो विलक्षण-मविलक्षणं च विद्यदादिनानाविधमलरूपपरिणामास्पदं चेति प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते ।

१० [१०] तत्र प्रथमपक्षस्य श्रुत्यर्थपर्यालोचनपरा दुष्परिहारान्दोषानुदाहरन्ति । प्रकृतपरामर्शितच्छब्दावर्गतस्वसंकल्पकृतजगदुदयविभवविलयादयस्तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजाये-

1. A<sub>1</sub> तच्च शरीरं
2. P M<sub>1</sub> ज्ञानोपदेष्टा
3. M<sub>8</sub> °प्रमा
4. M<sub>8</sub> °वगतमिति
5. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>2</sub> om. तु, P सप्य
6. M<sub>8</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. °समस्त°
7. A<sub>1</sub> lacuna वै [.....] शेषेण haplogr.
8. M<sub>8</sub> °बोधने
9. M<sub>1</sub> विशेषण
10. A<sub>2</sub> सम्बन्धं, M<sub>8</sub> सं[वर्द्धं] बध्यते
11. A<sub>1</sub> अपरे पुनरैक्यावबोधं वर्णयन्तं—M<sub>8</sub> °बोधपरयाथात्म्यं
12. M<sub>8</sub> inserts °स्वाभाविकानवधिकातिशयापरिमि°
13. T om. °निरतिशय°
14. M<sub>8</sub> om. °गुणसागरं ब्रह्मैव
15. T चाविलक्षणं
16. M<sub>1</sub> °गतस्य स्वसं°
17. A<sub>1</sub> विभवविलया°

येत्यारभ्य सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठा इत्यादिभिः पदैः प्रतिपादितास्तत्संबन्धितया प्रकरणान्तरनिर्दिष्टाः सर्वज्ञतासर्वशक्तित्वसर्वेश्वरत्व-सर्वप्रकारत्वसमाभ्यधिकनिवृत्तिसत्यकामत्वसत्यसंकल्पत्वसर्वावभासकत्वाद्यनवधिकातिशया-संस्लयेयकल्याणगुणगणा अपहृतपाप्मेत्याद्यनेकवाक्यावगतनिरस्तनिखिलदोषता च सर्वे तस्मिन्पक्षे विहन्यन्ते ।

[११] अथ स्यात्—उपक्रमेऽप्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुखेन कारणस्यैव सत्यतां प्रतिज्ञाय तस्य कारणभूतस्यैव ब्रह्मणः सत्यतां विकारजातस्यासत्यतां मृदूदृष्टान्तेन दर्शयित्वा सत्यभूतस्यैव ब्रह्मणः सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयमिति सजातीय-विजातीयनिखिलभेदनिरसनेन निर्विशेषतैव प्रतिपादिता । एतच्छोधकानि प्रकरणा-न्तरगतवाक्यान्यपि सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म, निष्कलं निष्क्रियं <sup>13</sup> निर्गुणं, विज्ञानमा-नन्दमित्यादीनि सर्वविशेषप्रत्यनीकैकाकारतां बोधयन्ति । न चैकार्कारताबोधने पदानां पर्यायता । एकत्वेऽपि वस्तुनः सर्वविशेषप्रत्यनीकैतोपस्थापनेन सर्वपदानामर्थवत्त्वादिति ।

1.  $M_3$  adds सत्प्रतिष्ठा ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् [ChUp.6, 8, 7]
2. P प्रकारसमा°
3.  $A_2$  °निवृत्तत्व°
4.  $M_3 A_2$  °कामसत्य°
5.  $A_1$  om. °गणा
6.  $M_{1-2}, A_{1-2}$  om. तस्मिन्पक्षे
7.  $A_1$  निहन्य°— $A_2$  व्याहन्य°
8.  $M_3$  विज्ञानप्रतिज्ञामुखेन
9.  $A_2$  चासत्यतां
10.  $M_{1-3}$  om. मृदू°
11.  $M_3$  inserts °स्वकीयनिखिल°
12.  $M_{1-3}$  एतद्वोधकानि
13. P  $M_1$  add निर्गुणं निरञ्जनं as according to ŚvetUp 6, 19
14.  $M_3$  °कारबोधने
15. P  $M_1 A_2$  °काप°

[१२] नैतदेवम् । एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे सर्वस्य ज्ञात-  
व्यस्याभावान्न सत्त्यति । सत्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोरेकताप्रसक्तिर्वा । अपि त्वेकविज्ञानेन  
सर्वविज्ञानं सर्वस्य तदात्मकत्वेनैव सत्यत्वे सिध्यति ।

- [१३] अयमर्थः—श्वेतकेतुं प्रत्याह स्तब्धोऽस्युत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्य इति परिपूर्णं  
५ इव लक्ष्यसे तानाचार्यान्प्रति तमप्यादेशं पृष्ठवानसीति । आदिश्यतेऽनेनेत्यादेशः ।  
आदेशः प्रशासनम् । एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठत  
इत्यादिभिरैकार्थ्यात् । तथा च मानवं वैचः—प्रशासितारं सर्वेषामित्यादि । अत्राप्ये-  
कमेवेति जगदुपादानतां प्रतिपाद्याद्वितीयपदेनाधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिवारणादस्यैवाधिष्ठातृत्वमपि  
प्रतिपाद्यते । अतस्तं प्रशासितारं जगदुपादानभूतमपि पृष्ठवानसि येन श्रुतेन मतेन  
१० विज्ञातेनाश्रुतप्रमत्तमविज्ञातं श्रुतं मतं विज्ञातं भवतीत्युक्तं स्यात् । निखिलजगदुदय-  
विर्भवविलयादिकारणभूतं सर्वज्ञत्वसत्यकामत्वसत्यसंकल्पत्वाद्यपरिमितोद्गारगुणसागरं किं  
ब्रह्मापि त्वया श्रुतमिति हार्दो भावः । तस्य निखिलकारणतया कारणमेव  
नानासंस्थानविशेषसंस्थितं कार्यमित्युच्यत इति कारणभूतसूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकब्रह्म-  
विज्ञानेन कार्यभूतमखिलं जगद्विज्ञातं भवतीति हृदि निधाय येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं

1. T inserts प्रतिज्ञानं सर्वस्य P M<sub>1</sub> सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञां
2. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. second आदेशः
3. M<sub>8</sub> वचनम्
4. A<sub>2</sub> adds सर्वेषामणीयांसमणीयसाम्. from Manu 12, 122.
5. A<sub>1-2</sub> विभवल्या°
6. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>2</sub> °जसत्य°—T °सर्वश्य°
7. M<sub>1</sub> °कामसत्य°
8. A<sub>2</sub> om. °उदार°
9. A<sub>1</sub> ब्रह्मापि किं—P M<sub>1-2</sub> om. अपि
10. M<sub>8</sub> ततो for तस्य
11. A<sub>1</sub> नानाविधसं°
12. M<sub>8</sub> °ब्रह्मज्ञानेन—निखिलजगद्विज्ञानं
13. M<sub>1</sub> श्रुतं भवतीत्य°

मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातं स्यादिति पुत्रं प्रति पृष्ठवान्पिता । तदेतत्सकलस्य वस्तुजातस्यैक-  
कारणत्वं पितृहृदि निहितमजानन्पुत्रः परस्परविलक्षणेण वस्तुष्वन्यस्य ज्ञानेन तदन्यविज्ञा-  
नस्याघटमानतां बुद्ध्वा परिचोदयति—कथं नु भगवः स आदेश इति ।

[१४] परिचोदितः पुनस्तदेव हृदि निहितं ज्ञानानन्दामलत्वैकस्वरूपमपरिच्छेद्य-  
माहात्म्यं सत्यसंकल्पत्वमिथैरनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणैर्जुष्टमविकारस्वरूपं ५  
परं ब्रह्मैव नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मचिद्वस्तुशरीरं खलीलायै स्वसंकल्पेनानन्तविचित्र-  
स्थिरत्रसस्वरूपजगत्संस्थानं स्वांशेनावस्थितमिति ।

[१५] तज्ज्ञानेनास्य निखिलस्य ज्ञाततां ब्रुवँल्लोकदृष्टं कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं  
दर्शयितुं दृष्टान्तमाह— यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं  
विकारो नामधेयं सृष्टिकेत्येव सत्यमिति । एकमेव मृद्व्यं स्वैकदेशेन नानाव्यवहारा- १०  
स्पदत्वाय घटशरावादिनानासंस्थानावस्थारूपविकारापन्नं नानानामधेयमपि सृष्टिकासंस्था-  
नविशेषत्वान्मृद्द्रव्यमेवेत्यमवस्थितं न वस्त्वन्तरमिति । यथा सृत्पिण्डविज्ञानेन तत्संस्थान-  
विशेषरूपं घटशरावादि सर्वं ज्ञातमेव भवतीत्यर्थः ।

1. A<sub>1</sub> om. स्याद्
2. M<sub>1</sub> पुत्रं परिपृष्ठवान्
3. A<sub>1</sub> lacuna—[वस्तु°.....तद]°
4. M<sub>8</sub> अन्यज्ञानेन
5. M<sub>8</sub> A<sub>1-2</sub>. °कल्पमिश्र°
6. P. om. °गण°
7. P. वैचित्र्यस्थिरचर°, M<sub>1</sub> विचित्रस्थिरचराचर°, M<sub>8</sub> वैचित्र्यस्थिरत्रसमान°  
A<sub>2</sub> वैचित्र्यस्थिरत्रसर°; probably चराचर as an early gloss on  
°स्थिरत्रस° has been interpolated.
8. M<sub>8</sub> A<sub>1</sub> [स्व]रूप°
9. M<sub>8</sub> स्वावस्थितम्
10. M<sub>1</sub> dittography of कार्य°
11. A<sub>2</sub> om. सृत्पिण्डेन
12. A<sub>1</sub> संस्थानरूप्यवस्था°
13. नामधेयोऽपि
14. P विज्ञातम्

[१६] ततः कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मैककारणतामजानन्पुत्रः पृच्छति—भगवां-  
स्त्वेवं मे तद्वचि विति । ततः सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं ब्रह्मैव सर्वकारणमित्युपदिशन्स होवाच  
सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयमिति । अत्रेदमिति जगन्निर्दिष्टम् । अग्र इति  
च सृष्टेः पूर्वकालः । तस्मिन्काले जगतः सदात्मकतां सदेवेति प्रतिपाद्य, तत्सृष्टि-  
५ कालेऽप्यविशिष्टमिति कृत्यैकमेवेति सदापन्नस्य जगतस्तदानीमविभक्तनामरूपतां प्रति-  
पाद्य तत्प्रतिपादनेनैव सतो जगदुपादानत्वं प्रतिपादितमिति स्वव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तकारण-  
मद्वितीयपदेन प्रतिषिद्धम् ।

[१७] तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवतीत्यादावेव प्रशसितैव जगदु-  
पादानमिति हृदि निहितमिदानीर्मन्विष्यक्तम् । स्वयमेव जगदुपादानं जगन्निमित्तं च  
१० सत्तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । तदेतत्तच्छब्दवाच्यं परं ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं सत्यसंकल्प-  
मवाससमस्तकाममपि लीलार्थं विचित्रानन्तचिदचिन्मिश्रजगद्रूपेणाहमेव बहु स्यां तदर्थं  
प्रजायेयेति स्वयमेव संकल्प्य स्वांशैकदेशादेव वियदादिभूतानि सृष्ट्वा पुनरपि सैव  
सच्छब्दामिहिता परा देवतैवमैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानु-  
प्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति । अनेन जीवेनात्मनेति—जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं  
१५ प्रतिपाद्य ब्रह्मात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशादेव कृत्स्नस्याचिद्वस्तुनः पदार्थत्वमेवंभूतस्यैव सर्वस्य  
वस्तुनो नामभाक्त्वमिति च दर्शयति । एतदुक्तं भवति—जीवात्मा तु ब्रह्मणः

1.  $M_1 A_1$  ततः परम्
2. T. त्वेवैतद्
3. P  $M_8$  om. अत्रे.....दिष्टम्
4.  $M_8$  drops—एकमेवेति
5.  $M_8$  अद्वितीयशब्देन
6.  $A_1 T$ . insert—सिद्धिमिति
7. P  $M_{1-8}$ , सुव्यक्तम्— $M_1$  adds °व्यक्तमेतदेवोपपादयति
8.  $M_{1-8}$  तच्छब्द°
9.  $M_1 A_1$  ब्रह्मैव
10. P एतस्यैव for स्वयंभूतस्यैव : haplography
11.  $M_1$  नामरूपभाक्त्वम्
12. T. om. च
13.  $M_2$  om. उक्तं भवति



शरीरतया प्रकारत्वाद्व्यात्मकः । यस्यात्मशरीरमिति श्रुत्यन्तरात् । एवंभूतस्य जीवस्य शरीरतया प्रकारभूतानि देवमनुष्यादिसंस्थानानि वैस्तूनीति ब्रह्मात्मकानि तानि सर्वाणि । अतो देवो मनुष्यो राक्षसः पशुर्मृगः पक्षी वृक्षो लता काष्ठं शिला तृणं घटः पट इत्यादयः सर्वे प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोगेनाभिधायकतया प्रसिद्धाः शब्दा लोके तत्तद्वाच्यतया प्रतीयमानतत्तत्संस्थानवस्तुमुखेन तदभिमानिजीवतदन्तर्यामिपरमात्मपर्यन्त-संघातस्यैव वाचका इति । ५

[१८] एवं समस्तचिदचिदात्मकप्रपञ्चस्य सदुपादानतासन्निमित्ततासदाधारता-सन्नियम्यतासच्छेषतादि सर्वं च (संन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्यतिष्ठा इत्यादिना) विस्तरेण प्रतिपाद्य कार्यकारणभावादिमुखेनैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यमिति कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मात्मकत्वंमेव सत्यमिति प्रतिपाद्य कृत्स्नस्य जगतः स एवात्मा १० कृत्स्नं जगत्तस्य शरीरं तस्मात्त्वंशब्दवाच्यमपि जीवप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवेति सर्वस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं प्रतिज्ञातं तत्त्वमसीति जीवविशेष उपसंहृतम् ।

[१९] एतदुक्तं भवति । ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वमिति चेतनाचेतनप्रपञ्चमिदं सर्वमिति निर्दिश्य तस्य प्रपञ्चस्यैव आत्मेति प्रतिपादितः, प्रपञ्चोद्देशेन ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं प्रतिपादितमित्यर्थः । तदिदं ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं किमात्मशरीरभावेनोत स्वरूपेणेति विवेचनी- १५

1. P om. जीवस्य
2. M<sub>8</sub> om. वस्तूनि—
3. M<sub>8</sub> om. शब्दा.....<sup>०</sup>तया
4. M<sub>8</sub> om. समस्त<sup>०</sup>
5. all MSS. consulted by me, except one Madras. MS. (R4949) om. this citation which may have been original.
6. M<sub>1</sub> completes the citation तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो
7. M<sub>1</sub> <sup>०</sup>त्मकमेव
8. M<sub>8</sub> जीवप्रकारकं
9. all MSS, except M<sub>4</sub>, omit जीवविशेषे
10. P प्रतिपाद्यते, M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> <sup>०</sup>पादितम्
11. M<sub>8</sub> om. अर्थः

यम् । स्वरूपेणेति चेद्ब्रह्मणः सत्यसंकल्पत्वादयः—तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेत्युपक्रमावगता  
 बाधिता भवन्ति । शरीरात्मभावेन च तदात्मकत्वं श्रुत्यन्तराद्विशेषतोऽवगतमन्तःप्रविष्टः  
 शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मेति प्रशासितृत्वरूपात्मत्वेन सर्वेषां जनानामन्तः प्रविष्टोऽतः सर्वात्मा  
 सर्वेषां जनानामात्मा सर्वं चास्य शरीरमिति विशेषतो ज्ञायते ब्रह्मात्मकत्वम् । य  
 ५ आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति  
 स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृत इति च । अत्राप्यनेन जीवेनात्मनेतीदमेव ज्ञायत इति  
 पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । अतः सर्वस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुनो ब्रह्मशरीरत्वात्सर्वशरीरं सर्वप्रकारं सर्वशब्दै-  
 ब्रह्मैवाभिधीयत इति तत्त्वमिति सामानाधिकरण्येन जीवशरीरतया जीवप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवा-  
 मिहितम् ।

- १० [२०] एवमभिहिते सत्ययमर्थो ज्ञायते—त्वमिति यः पूर्वं 'देहस्याधिष्ठातृतया  
 प्रतीतः स परमात्मशरीरतया परमात्मप्रकारभूतः परमात्मपर्यन्तः । अतस्त्वमिति शब्द-  
 स्त्वत्प्रकारविशिष्टं त्वदन्तर्यामिणमेवाचष्ट इति । अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे  
 व्याकरवाणीति ब्रह्मात्मकतयैव जीवस्य शरीरिणः स्वनामभाक्त्वात्तत्त्वमिति सामानाधि-  
 करण्यप्रवृत्तयोर्द्वयोरपि पदयोर्ब्रह्मैव वाच्यम् । तत्र च तत्पदं जगत्कारणभूतं संकलकल्याण-  
 १५ गुणगणाकरं निरवद्यं निर्विकारमाचष्टे । त्वमिति च तदेव ब्रह्म जीवान्तर्यामिरूपेण

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1. P M<sub>1</sub> °कल्पाद°
  2. M<sub>2,8</sub>. T om. प्रजायेय
  3. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> अन्तः
  4. M<sub>1</sub> °शब्देन—T सर्वैः शब्दैः
  5. P. M<sub>1,8</sub> देहाधि°
  6. P M<sub>1</sub> add पृथग्विस्थितिप्रवृत्त्यनर्हः
  7. T सामानाधिकरणप्रवृत्तयोर्
  8. M<sub>1</sub> °भूतसकल°
  9. M<sub>8</sub> om. °सकल° A<sub>2</sub> T. सर्वकल्या°
  10. M<sub>2</sub> °रूपे सर्वशरी° A<sub>1,2</sub> °रूपि सशरी°, T °रूपं सशरीर°—I prefer °रूपेण on textual grounds

सशरीरप्रकारविशिष्टमाचष्टे । तदेवं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदेनैकस्मिन्ब्रह्मण्येव तत्त्वमिति द्वयोः पदयोर्वृत्तिरुक्ता । ब्रह्मणो निरवद्यत्वं निर्विकारत्वं सैकलकल्याणगुणगणाकरत्वं जगत्कारणत्वं चाबाधितम् ।

[२१] अश्रुतवेदान्ताः पुरुषाः सर्वे पदार्थाः सर्वे जीवात्मानश्च ब्रह्मात्मका इति न पश्यन्ति सर्वशब्दानां च केवलेषु तत्तत्पदार्थेषु वाच्यैकदेशेषु वाच्यपर्यवसानं मन्यन्ते । इदानीं वेदान्तवाक्यश्रवणेन ब्रह्मकार्यतया तदन्तर्यामितया च सर्वस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं सर्वशब्दानां तत्तत्प्रकारसंस्थितब्रह्मवाचित्वं च जानन्ति ।

नन्वेवं गवादिशब्दानां तत्तत्पदार्थवाचितया व्युत्पत्तिर्वाधिता स्यात् । नैवं सर्वे शब्दा अचिज्जीवविशिष्टस्य परमात्मनो वाचका इत्युक्तम् । नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीत्यत्र । तत्र लौकिकाः पुरुषाः शब्दं व्याहरन्तः शब्दवाच्ये प्रधानांशस्य परमात्मनः प्रत्यक्षाद्यपरिच्छेद्यत्वाद्वाच्यैकदेशभूते वाच्यसमाप्तिं मन्यन्ते । वेदान्तश्रवणेन च व्युत्पत्तिः पूर्यते । एवमेव वैदिकाः सर्वे शब्दाः परमात्मपर्यन्तान्स्वार्थान्वोधयन्ति । वैदिका एव सर्वे शब्दा वेदादावुद्धृत्योद्धृत्य परेणैव ब्रह्मणा सर्वपदार्थान्पूर्ववत्तद्वा तेषु परमात्मपर्यन्तेषु पूर्ववत्नामतया प्रयुक्ताः । तदाह मनुः—

1. A<sub>2</sub> द्वयोरपि
2. M<sub>1</sub> प्रवृत्तिर्
3. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>1,2</sub>, सर्वकल्या<sup>०</sup> and om. °रण<sup>०</sup>
4. M<sub>3</sub> om. सर्वेप<sup>०</sup>.....जीव<sup>०</sup>
5. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>2</sub> T om. वाच्यैकदेशेषु
6. T °यामिकतया
7. P. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. तत्र
8. T तु पुरुषाः
9. A<sub>2</sub> om. शब्द<sup>०</sup>.....°अंशस्य
10. T °अंशस्यैव
11. A<sub>2</sub> वाचकसमाप्तिं
12. A<sub>2</sub> inserts वेदान्तवाक्य<sup>०</sup>
13. M<sub>3</sub> स्वार्थान् सर्वान्
14. A P M<sub>1</sub> वेदादेवोद्धृत्य

सर्वेषां तु स नामानि कर्माणि च पृथक्पृथक् ।

वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ पृथक्संस्थाश्च निर्ममे ॥

इति । संस्थाः संस्थानानि रूपाणीति यावत् । आह च भगवान्पराशरः—

नाम रूपं च भूतानां कृत्यानां च प्रपञ्चनम् ।

वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ देवादीनां चकार सः ॥

इति । श्रुतिश्च—सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयदिति । सूर्यादीन्पूर्ववत्परि-  
कल्प्य नामानि च पूर्ववच्चकारेत्यर्थः ।

[२२] एवं जगद्ब्रह्मणोरनन्यत्वं प्रपञ्चितम् । तेनैकेन ज्ञातेन सर्वस्य ज्ञाततो-  
पपादिता भवति । सर्वस्य ब्रह्मकार्यत्वं प्रतिपादनेन तदात्मकतयैव सत्यत्वं नान्यथेति  
१० तत्सत्यमित्युक्तम् । यथा दृष्टान्ते सर्वस्य सृष्टिकारस्य सृष्टात्मनैव सत्यत्वम् ।

[२३] शोधकवाक्यान्यपि निरवद्यं सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरं परं ब्रह्म बोधयन्ति ।  
सर्वप्रत्यनीकाकारताबोधनेऽपि तत्तत्प्रत्यनीकाकारतायां भेदस्यावर्जनीयत्वान्न निर्विशेष-  
वस्तुसिद्धिः ।

[२४] ननु च ज्ञानमात्रं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादिते निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रं ब्रह्मेति  
१५ निश्चीयते । नैवम् । स्वरूपनिर्लेपणधर्मशब्दा हि धर्ममुखेन स्वरूपमपि प्रतिपादयन्ति ।

1. T om. कर्माणि.....एवादौ—
2. A<sub>2</sub> शास्त्रेभ्य
3. A<sub>3</sub> सर्वं ब्रह्म°
4. A<sub>2</sub> °कार्यता°
5. M<sub>3</sub> सृष्टात्मकत्वे नैवं सर्वज्ञं, drops following up to सर्वकल्या°.
6. A<sub>1,2,3</sub> om. परं
7. A<sub>2,3</sub>. ब्रह्मैव
8. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>3</sub> °नीकताभेदस्य—A<sub>2</sub> °कारभेद°—T. नीकताभेदेन
9. T om. च
10. A<sub>2</sub> om. ब्रह्म
11. P M<sub>1</sub>° निरूपक°

गवादिशब्दवत् । तदाह सूत्रकारः—तद्गुणसारत्वात्तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् । यावदात्म-  
भावित्वाच्च न दोष इति । ज्ञानेन धर्मेण स्वरूपमपि निरूपितं न ज्ञानमात्रं ब्रह्मेति ।

कथमिदमवगम्यत इति चेद्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविदित्यादिज्ञातृत्वश्रुतेः परास्य शक्ति-  
र्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । विज्ञातारमरे केन विज्ञानीयादित्यादि-  
श्रुतिशतसमधिगतमिदम् । ज्ञानस्य धर्ममात्रत्वाद्धर्ममात्रस्यैकस्य वस्तुत्वप्रतिपादनानुप-  
पत्तेश्च । अतः सत्यज्ञानादिपदानि स्वार्थभूतज्ञानादिविशिष्टमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति ।  
तत्त्वमिति द्वयोरपि पदयोः स्वार्थप्रहाणेन निर्विशेषवस्तुस्वरूपोपस्थापनपरत्वे मुख्यार्थपरि-  
त्यागश्च ।

[२५] नन्वैक्ये तात्पर्यनिश्चयाच्च लक्षणादोषः । सोऽयं देवदत्त इतिवत् ।  
यथा सोऽयमित्यत्र स इति शब्देन देशान्तरकालान्तरसंबन्धी पुरुषः प्रतीयत अयमिति  
च संनिहितदेशवर्तमानकालसंबन्धी, तयोः सामानाधिकरण्येनैक्यं प्रतीयते । तत्रैकस्य  
युगपद्विरुद्धदेशकालसंबन्धितया प्रतीतिर्न घटत इति द्वयोरपि पदयोः स्वरूपमात्रोपस्था-  
पनपरत्वं स्वरूपस्य चैक्यं प्रतिपद्यत इति चेन्नैतदेवम् । सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्यत्रापि  
लक्षणागन्धो न विद्यते । विरोधाभावात् । एकस्य भूतवर्तमानक्रियाद्वयसंबन्धो न

1. P M<sub>1</sub> interpolate the following passage taken from Rāmānuja's Vedāntadīpa on Brahmasūtra 2, 3, 30. ज्ञानगुणसारत्वादात्मनो ज्ञानमिति व्यपदेशः । यथा ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्—इति सर्वज्ञ एव ज्ञानगुणसारत्वात् सस्य ज्ञानम् इति व्यपदिश्यते ।
2. M<sub>3</sub> निरूपितं भवति
3. A<sub>1</sub> drops न—T inserts न तु
4. A<sub>1</sub> om. सर्वविद्
5. T om. °आदि°
6. A<sub>2</sub> om. °ज्ञातृत्व°
7. M<sub>1</sub> श्रुतेश्च
8. A<sub>3</sub> om. स्वार्थभूत°
9. A<sub>3</sub> om. ननु
10. P M<sub>1,2</sub> तच्छब्देन

विरुद्धः । देशान्तरस्थितिर्भूता संनिहितदेशस्थितिर्वर्तते । अतो भूतवर्तमानक्रियाद्वय-  
संबन्धितवैक्यप्रतिपादनमविरुद्धम् । देशद्वयविरोधश्च कालभेदेन परिहृतः । लक्षणाया-  
मपि न द्वयोरपि पदयोर्लक्षणासमाश्रयणम् । एकेनैवं लक्षितेन विरोधपरिहारात् ।  
लक्षणाभाव एवोक्तः । देशान्तरसंबन्धितया भूतस्यैवान्यदेशसंबन्धितया वर्तमानत्वा-  
५ विरोधात् ।

[२६] एवमत्रापि जगत्कारणभूतस्यैव परस्य ब्रह्मणो जीवान्तर्यामितया जीवा-  
त्मत्वमविरुद्धमिति प्रतिपादितम् । यथा भूतयोरेव 'हि द्वयोरैक्यं सामानाधिकरण्येन  
प्रतीयते । तत्परित्यागेन स्वरूपमात्रैक्यं न सामानाधिकरण्यार्थः—मिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां  
शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यमिति हि तद्विदः । तथाभूतयोरेवैक्यमुप-  
१० पादितमस्माभिः । उपक्रमविरोध्युपसंहारपदेन वाक्यतात्पर्यनिश्चयश्च न घटते । उपक्रमे  
हि तदैक्षत बहु स्यामित्यादिना सत्यसंकल्पत्वं जगदेककारणत्वमप्युक्तम् । तद्विरोधि  
चाविद्याश्रयत्वादि ब्रह्मणः ।

[२७] अपि चार्थभेदतत्संसर्गविशेषबोधनकृतपदवाक्यस्य स्वरूपतालब्ध-  
प्रमाणभावस्य शब्दस्य निर्विशेषवस्तुबोधनासामर्थ्यान्न निर्विशेषवस्तुनि शब्दः प्रमाणम् ।  
१५ निर्विशेष इत्यादिशब्दास्तु केनचिद्विशेषेण विशिष्टतयावगतस्य वस्तुनो वस्त्वन्तरगत-

1.  $M_3 A_3$  insert पदेन लक्षि°
2.  $A_3$  लक्षिते
3. T om. °संबन्धितया
4.  $A_1$  अन्यभूतस्यै°
5. M जीवात्मकत्वम्
6. P  $M_{1,3}$   $A_1$  om. हि
7. T °करण्यत्वार्थस्य
8.  $M_2$  संपादितम्
9.  $M_2$  °हारवाक्यतात्प°
10. T completes प्रजायेय
11.  $M_1$  अपि तु
12. P  $M_1$  om. न and read न प्रमाणं

विशेषनिषेधपरतया बोधकाः । इतरथा तेषामप्यनवबोधकत्वमेव । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययरूपेण पदस्यैवानेकविशेषगर्भत्वादनेकपदार्थसंसर्गबोधकत्वाच्च वाक्यस्य ।

[२८] अथ स्यात्—नास्माभिर्निर्विशेषे स्वयंप्रकाशे वस्तुनि शब्दः प्रमाण-  
मित्युच्यते । स्वतःसिद्धस्य प्रमाणानपेक्षत्वात् । सर्वैः शब्दैस्तदुपरागविशेषा ज्ञातृत्वादयः  
सर्वे निरस्यन्ते । सर्वेषु विशेषेषु निवृत्तेषु वस्तुमात्रमनवच्छिन्नं स्वयंप्रकाशं स्वत एवाव- ५  
तिष्ठत इति । नैतदेवम् । केन शब्देन तद्वस्तु निर्दिश्य तद्वत्विशेषा निरस्यन्ते । ज्ञप्ति-  
मात्रशब्देनेति चेन्न । सोऽपि सविशेषमेव वस्त्ववलम्बते । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययरूपेण 'विशेष-  
गर्भत्वात् । ज्ञा अवबोधन इति सकर्मकः सकर्तृकः क्रियाविशेषः क्रियान्तरव्यावर्तकस्वभा-  
वविशेषश्च प्रकृत्यावगम्यते । प्रत्ययेन च लिङ्गसंख्यादयः । स्वतःसिद्धावप्येतत्स्वभाव-  
विशेषविरहे सिद्धिरेव न स्यात् । अन्यसाधनस्वभावतया हि ज्ञप्तेः स्वतःसिद्धिरुच्यते । १०

[२९] ब्रह्मस्वरूपं कृत्स्नं सर्वदा स्वयमेव प्रकाशते चेन्न तस्मिन्नन्यधर्माध्यासः  
संभवति । न हि रज्जुस्वरूपेऽवभासमाने सर्पत्वादिरध्यस्यते । अत एव <sup>११</sup>हि भवद्विरा-

1. P M<sub>1</sub> °गर्भितत्वाद्
2. P वेदः for शब्दः
3. P M<sub>1</sub> °नपेक्षितत्वात्
4. M<sub>8</sub> A<sub>1.8</sub> T निवर्त्यन्ते
5. M<sub>8</sub> om. तद्
6. A<sub>1</sub> om. विशेषगर्भत्वात्
7. P M<sub>1</sub> °गर्भितत्वात्
8. A<sub>1</sub> °कर्तृक्रिया°
9. M<sub>1</sub> °वार्तिक°
10. A<sub>1</sub> om. °विशेष°
11. P M<sub>1.2.8</sub> अनन्य°
12. M<sub>1</sub> प्रकाशयति
13. M<sub>8</sub> om. हि

च्छादिकाविद्याभ्युपगम्यते । ततश्च शास्त्रीयनिर्वर्तकज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मणि तिरोहितांशो विषयः । अन्यथा तस्य निर्वर्तकत्वं च न स्यात् । अधिष्ठानातिरेकिरज्जुत्वप्रकाशनेन हि सर्पत्वं बाध्यते । एकश्चेद्विशेषो ज्ञानमात्रे वस्तुनि शब्देनाभिधीयते स च ब्रह्मविशेषणं भवतीति सर्वश्रुतिप्रतिपादितसर्वविशेषणविशिष्टं ब्रह्म भवति ।

- ५ [३०] अतः प्रामाणिकानां न केनापि प्रमाणेन निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः । निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षेऽपि सविशेषमेव वस्तु प्रतीयते । अन्यथा सविकल्पके सोऽयमिति पूर्वावगतप्रकारविशिष्टप्रत्ययानुपपत्तेः । वस्तुसंस्थानविशेषरूपत्वाद्वात्वादेर्निर्विकल्पकदशायामपि ससंस्थानमेव वस्त्वित्यमिति प्रतीयते । द्वितीयादिप्रत्ययेषु तस्य संस्थानविशेषस्यानेकवस्तुनिष्ठतामात्रं प्रतीयते । संस्थानरूपप्रकाराख्यस्य पदार्थस्यानेकवस्तुनिष्ठतयानेकवस्तुविशेषणत्वं द्वितीयादिप्रत्ययावर्गम्यमिति द्वितीयादिप्रत्ययाः सविकल्पका इत्युच्यन्ते । अत एवैकस्य पदार्थस्य भिन्नाभिन्नैत्वरूपेण द्वात्मकत्वं विरुद्धं प्रत्युक्तम् । संस्थानस्य संस्थानिनः प्रकारतया पदार्थान्तरत्वम् । प्रकारत्वादेव पृथक्सिद्धघनहृत्वं पृथगनुपलम्भश्चेति न द्वात्मकत्वसिद्धिः ।

1.  $M_2$  शास्त्रीयस्य
2.  $M_2$  तन्निर्वर्तकं
3.  $M_3$  om. इति—
4.  $M_1$  om. प्रामाणिकानां
5. P reads प्रकारेण
6. T प्रतीयानुपपत्तेः
7.  $A_1$  om. °रूप°
8.  $M_3 A_1$  तस्यैव
9. T om. °वस्तु°
10. P  $M_1$  °अवगतम्
11. P  $M_1$  &  $A_1$  °भिन्नरूपेण
12.  $M_3 A_1$  विरुद्धं द्वात्म°
13. P पदार्थत्वात्— $M_1$  पदार्थत्वम्
14.  $M_2$  पृथक्सिद्धज्ञानहृत्°—



[३१] अपि च निर्विशेषवस्तुवादिना स्वयंप्रकाशे वस्तुनि तदुपरागविशेषाः सर्वैः शब्दैर्निरस्यन्त इति वदता के 'ते' शब्दा निषेधका इति वक्तव्यम्। वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति विकारनामधेययोर्वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वात्। यत्तत्र कारणतयोपलक्ष्यते वस्तुमात्रं तदेव सत्यमन्यदसत्यमितीयं श्रुतिर्वदतीति चेन्नैतदुपपद्यते। एकस्मिन्विज्ञाते सर्वं विज्ञातं भवतीति प्रैतिज्ञातेऽन्यज्ञानेनान्यज्ञानासंभवं मन्वानस्यैकमेव वस्तु विकाराद्यवस्थाविशेषेण पारमार्थिकेनैव नामरूपमवस्थितं चेत्तत्रैकस्मिन्विज्ञाते तस्माद्विलक्षणसंस्थानान्तरमपि तदेवेति तत्र दृष्टान्तोऽयं निदर्शितः। नात्र कस्यचिद्विशेषस्य निषेधकः कोऽपि शब्दो दृश्यते। वाचारम्भणमिति वाचा व्यवहारेणारभ्यत इत्यारम्भणम्। पिण्डरूपेणावस्थितायाः मृत्तिकाया नाम चान्यद्व्यवहारश्चान्यः। घटशरावादिरूपेणावस्थितायास्तस्या एव मृत्तिकाया अन्यानि नामधेयानि व्यवहाराश्चान्यादृशाः। तथापि सर्वत्र मृत्तिकाद्रव्यमेकमेव नानासंस्थाननानां नामधेयाभ्यां नानाव्यवहारेण चारभ्यत इत्येतदेव सत्यमित्यनेनान्यज्ञानेनान्यज्ञानसंभवो निदर्शितः। नात्र किञ्चिद्वस्तु निषिध्यत इति पूर्वमेवायमर्थः प्रपञ्चितः।

[३२] अपि च येनाश्रुतं श्रुतमित्यादिना ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वं प्रतिज्ञातं चेद्यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेनेत्यादिदृष्टान्तः साध्यविकलः स्यात्। रज्जुसर्पा-

1. PM<sub>1</sub> शब्दैः सर्वैः
2. M<sub>3</sub> om. ते
3. P प्रतिज्ञायते
4. M<sub>2</sub> विलक्षणविज्ञानसंस्थाना°
5. P M<sub>1</sub> तदेव वस्त्विति
6. P निषेधः
7. P om. वाचारम्भणमिति
8. M<sub>2</sub> संस्थितस्य—M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>8</sub> संस्थितायां मृत्तिकायां
9. A<sub>8</sub> नामानि
10. A<sub>3</sub> om. सर्वत्र
11. P om. °नाना°—A<sub>8</sub> °स्थानेन नामधेयेन corrected into °धेयाभ्यां—
12. P M<sub>1</sub> om. च
13. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> °दृष्टान्तोपन्याससाध्य°

दिवन्मृत्तिकाविकारस्य घटशरावादेरसत्यत्वं श्वेतकेतोः शुश्रूषोः प्रमाणान्तरेण युक्त्या चासिद्धमित्येतदपि सिषाधयिषितमिति चेत् । यथेति दृष्टान्ततयोपादानं न घटते ।

- [३३] सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यत्र सदेवैकमेवेत्यवधारण-  
 द्वयेनाद्वितीयमित्यनेन च सन्मात्रातिरेकिसजातीयविजातीयाः सर्वे विशेषा निषिद्धा  
 ५ इति प्रतीयत इति चेन्नैतदेवम् । कार्यकारणभावावस्थाद्वयावस्थितस्यैकस्य वस्तुन  
 एकावस्थावस्थितस्य ज्ञानेनावस्थान्तरावस्थितस्यापि वस्तुवैक्येन ज्ञाततां दृष्टान्तेन दर्शयित्वा  
 श्वेतकेतोरप्रज्ञातं सर्वस्य ब्रह्मकारणत्वं च वक्तुं सदेव सोम्येदमित्यारब्धम् । इदमग्रे सदेवासी-  
 दिति । अग्र इति कालविशेषः । इदंशब्दवाच्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य सदार्पितरूपां क्रियां सद्रव्यतां  
 च वदति । एकमेवेति चास्य नानानामरूपविकारग्रहणम् । एतस्मिन्प्रतिपादितेऽस्त्यै  
 १० जगतः सदुपादानता प्रतिपादिता भवति । अन्यत्रोपादानकारणस्य स्वव्यतिरिक्ताधिष्ठात्रपेक्षा-  
 दर्शनेऽपि सर्वविलक्षणत्वादस्य सर्वज्ञस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगो न विरुद्ध इत्यद्वितीयपद-  
 मधिष्ठात्रन्तरं निवारयति । सर्वशक्तियुक्तत्वादेव ब्रह्मणः । काश्चन श्रुतयः प्रथममुपा-  
 दानकारणत्वं प्रतिपाद्य निमित्तकारणमपि तदेवेति प्रतिपादयन्ति । यथेयं श्रुतिः ।  
 अन्याश्च श्रुतयो ब्रह्मणो निमित्तकारणत्वमनुज्ञायास्यैवोपादानतादि कथमिति परिचोद्य,

1. P om. °आदि
2. P M<sub>2</sub> वासि°
3. M<sub>3</sub> om. प्रतीयत इति
4. T एकावस्थस्य
5. A<sub>1</sub> ब्रह्मप्रकारत्वं—
6. A<sub>1</sub> T om. च
7. M<sub>2</sub> °पत्तिनिरूपितां
8. A<sub>1</sub> om. नाना°—
9. M<sub>1</sub> °विकारण°—
10. M<sub>3</sub> एकस्मिन्—
11. P M<sub>1</sub> उपपादिते—
12. A<sub>3</sub> तस्य
13. M<sub>1</sub> °ष्ठानान्त°
14. M<sub>3</sub> °कारणताम्

सर्वशक्त्युक्तत्वादुपादानकारणं तदितराशेषोपकरणं च ब्रह्मैवेति परिहरन्ति—किं  
स्विद्वन्नं क उ स वृक्ष आसीद्यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुर्मनीषिणो मनसा पृच्छतेदु  
तद्यदध्यतिष्ठद्भवानानि धारयन् । ब्रह्म वनं ब्रह्म स वृक्ष आसीद्यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुर्म-  
नीषिणो मनसा विब्रवीमि वः ब्रह्माध्यतिष्ठद्भवानानि धारयन्निति सामान्यतो दृष्टेन  
विरोधमाशङ्क्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वविलक्षणत्वेन परिहार उक्तः । अतः सदेव सोम्येदमग्रं ५  
आसीदित्यत्राप्यग्र इत्याद्यनेकविशेषा ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादिताः । भवदभिमतविशेषनिषेधवाची  
कोऽपि शब्दो न दृश्यते । प्रत्युत जगद्ब्रह्मणोः कार्यकारणभावज्ञापनायाग्र इति काल-  
विशेषसद्भावः । आसीदिति क्रियाविशेषो, जगदुपादानता जगन्निमित्तता च, निमित्तो-  
पादानयोर्भेदनिरसनेन तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगश्चेत्यप्रज्ञाताः सहस्रशो विशेषा एव  
प्रतिपादिताः । १०

[३४] यतो वास्तवकार्यकारणभावादिज्ञापने प्रवृत्तम् अत एवासदेवेदमग्र  
आसीदित्यारभ्यासत्कार्यवादनिषेधश्च क्रियते—कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति ।  
प्रागसत उत्पत्तिरहेतुकेत्यर्थः । तदेवोपपादयति—कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । असत  
उत्पन्नमसदात्मकमेव भवतीत्यर्थः । यथा मृद उत्पन्नं घटादिकं मृदात्मकम् । सत  
उत्पत्तिर्नाम व्यवहारविशेषहेतुभूतोऽवस्थाविशेषयोगः । १५

[३५] एतदुक्तं भवति । एकमेव कारणभूतं द्रव्यमवस्थान्तरयोगेन कार्य-  
मित्युच्यत इत्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिपिपादयिषितम् । तदसत्कार्यवादे न

1. A<sub>1</sub> om. °युक्त°
2. A<sub>1</sub> adds तथाहि
3. M<sub>1</sub> om. पृच्छतेद्—upto.....विब्रवीमि (haplography)
4. P. om. ब्रह्म वनं—upto.....वः (haplography)
5. M<sub>1</sub> ब्रह्मण एव
6. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. अग्र आसीद्
7. P प्रवृत्तमिदम्
8. M<sub>2</sub> अतस्
9. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> घटादिमृद°—A<sub>2</sub> घटशरावादिकं
10. T भूतद्रव्यम् A<sub>2</sub> °योगे—
11. M<sub>2</sub> °ज्ञाने

- सेत्स्यति । तथा हि निमित्तसमवाय्यसमवायिप्रभृतिभिः कारणैरवयवव्याख्यं कार्यं द्रव्या-  
न्तरमेवोत्पद्यत इति कारणभूताद्वैस्तुनः कार्यस्य वस्त्वन्तरत्वात् तज्ज्ञानेनास्य ज्ञातता  
कथमपि संभवतीति । कथमवयवि द्रव्यान्तरं निरस्यत इति चेत् । कारणगतावस्था-  
न्तरयोगस्य द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिवादिनः संप्रतिपन्नस्यैकत्वनामान्तरव्यवहारान्तरादेरुपपाद-  
५ कत्वाद्द्रव्यान्तरादर्शनाच्चेति कारणमेवावस्थान्तरापन्नं कार्यमित्युच्यत इत्युक्तम् ।

- [३६] ननु निरधिष्ठानभ्रमासंभवज्ञापनायासत्कार्यवादनिरासः क्रियते । तथा  
हेतुकं चिद्रूपं सत्यमेवाविद्याच्छादितं जगद्रूपेण विवर्तत इत्यविद्याश्रयत्वाय मूलकारणं  
सत्यमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्यसत्कार्यवादनिरासः । नैतदेवम् । एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रति-  
ज्ञादृष्टान्तमुखेन सत्कार्यवादस्यैव प्रसक्तत्वादित्युक्तम् । भवर्तृपक्षे निरधिष्ठानभ्रमासंभवस्य  
१० दुरूपपादत्वाच्च । यस्य हि चेतनगतदोषः पारमार्थिको दोषाश्रयत्वं च पारमार्थिकं तस्य  
पारमार्थिकदोषेण युक्तस्यापारमार्थिकगन्धर्वनगरादिदर्शनमुपपन्नं, यस्य तु दोषश्चा-

1. A, द्रव्यं for कार्यं
2. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>1</sub> T आरभ्यत for उत्पद्यते
3. M<sub>2</sub> °भूतवस्तु°
4. M<sub>2</sub> तत्कार्य°
5. PM<sub>1</sub> om. न and insert न after अपि
6. M<sub>2</sub> इति चेन्न
7. T °हारादेर
8. P उपपादत्वात्
9. M<sub>1</sub> नदुरधि° haplography
10. M<sub>2</sub> °विज्ञाप°
11. M<sub>2</sub> °विद्याशबलितं—T °विद्याशबलं
12. P. om. अभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति
13. M<sub>2</sub> °पक्षि तु
14. P M<sub>1</sub> °भ्रमस्या°
15. M<sub>2</sub> om. तु

पारमार्थिको दोषाश्रयत्वं चापारमार्थिकं तस्यापारमार्थिकेनाप्याश्रयेण तदुपपन्नमिति भवत्पक्षे न निरधिष्ठानभ्रमासंभवः ।

[३७] शोधकेष्वपि सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म, आनन्दो ब्रह्मेत्यादिषु वाक्येषु सामानाधिकरण्यव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धानेकगुणविशिष्टैकार्थावबोधनमविरुद्धमिति सर्वगुण-  
विशिष्टं ब्रह्माभिधीयत इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् ।

[३८] अथात आदेशो नेति नेतीति बहुधा निषेधो दृश्यत इति चेत् । किमत्र निषिध्यत इति वक्तव्यम् । द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्ते चैवामूर्ते चेति मूर्तामूर्ता-  
त्मकः प्रपञ्चः सर्वोऽपि निषिध्यत इति चेन्नैवम् । ब्रह्मणो रूपतयाप्रज्ञातं सर्वं रूपतयो-  
पदिश्य पुनस्तदेव निषेद्धुमयुक्तम् । प्रक्षालनाद्धि पङ्क्तस्य दूरादस्पर्शनं वरमिति न्यायात् ।  
कस्तर्हि निषेधवाक्यार्थः । सूत्रकारः स्वयमेव वदति—प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति १०  
ततो ब्रवीति च भूय इति । उत्तरत्र अथ नामधेयं सत्यस्य सत्यं प्राणा वै सत्यं  
तेषामेष सत्यमिति सत्यादिगुणगणस्य प्रतिपादितत्वात्पूर्वप्रकृतैतावन्मात्रं न भवति  
ब्रह्मेति, ब्रह्मण एतावन्मात्रता प्रतिषिध्यत इति सूत्रार्थः ।

1. M<sub>2</sub> om. चापारमार्थिकम्
2. M<sub>2</sub> एतच्छोधकवाक्येषु
3. T °विशिष्टार्थविधानम्
4. M<sub>2</sub> om. इति बहुधा
5. T om. बहुधा
6. M<sub>2</sub> श्रुत for दृश्यत
7. M<sub>2</sub> om. किमत्र
8. P A<sub>1</sub> निषेध्यते
9. P निषेधम्—M<sub>1</sub> निषिद्धम्
10. P. M<sub>1,2</sub> om. न्यायात्
11. A<sub>1</sub> तत्र सूत्र°
12. P om. भूय इति
13. M<sub>2</sub> om. सत्यादिगुणगणस्य
14. M<sub>1</sub> °सूत्रार्थ एव—T सूत्रस्यार्थः

- [३९] नेह नानास्ति किञ्चनेत्यादिना नानात्वप्रतिषेध एव दृश्यत इति चेत् । अत्राप्युत्तरत्र सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान इति सत्यसंकल्पत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वप्रतिपादनाच्चेतनाचेतनवस्तुशरीर ईश्वर इति सर्वप्रकारसंस्थितः स एक एवेति तत्त्वैत्यनीका-  
 ५ ब्रह्मात्मकनानात्वं प्रतिषिद्धं न भवदभिमतम् । सर्वास्वेवंप्रकारासु श्रुतिष्वियमेव स्थिति-  
 रिति न कचिदपि ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वंनिषेधकवाची कोऽपि शब्दो दृश्यते ।

- [४०] अपि च निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रं ब्रह्म तच्चाच्छादिकाविद्यातिरोहितस्वरूपं स्वगतनानात्वं पश्यतीत्ययमर्थो न घटते । तिरोधानं नाम प्रकाशनिवारणम् । स्वरूपातिरेकिप्रकाशधर्मानभ्युपगमेन प्रकाशस्यैव स्वरूपत्वात्स्वरूपनाश एव स्यात् । प्रकाशपर्यायं ज्ञानं नित्यं स च प्रकाशोऽविद्यातिरोहित इति बालिशभाषितमिदम् । अविद्यया  
 १० प्रकाशितस्तिरोहित इति प्रकाशोत्पत्तिर्प्रतिबन्धो विद्यमानस्य विनाशो वा । प्रकाशस्यानुत्पाद्यत्वाद्भिन्ननाश एव स्यात् । प्रकाशो नित्यो निर्विकारस्तिष्ठतीति चेत् । सत्यामप्यविद्यायां ब्रह्मणि न किञ्चित्तिरोहितमिति नानात्वं पश्यतीति भवतामयं व्यवहारः सत्त्वनिर्वचनीय एव ।

1.  $M_2$  T om. ईश्वर इति
2.  $M_1$  adds °संस्थितः सर्वेश्वरः
3.  $M_2$  om. °प्रकारासु
4.  $M_2$  तिरोहितं for स्थितिर्—T रीतिर्
5. P  $M_1$  निषेधकः कोऽपि
6.  $M_2$  T °कवाचकोऽपि
7. P adds °स्वस्वरूप°
8. P. om. एव
9. P  $M_1$  °निवारित for तिरोहित
10. P °तिबन्धो—
11. T adds °बन्धो वा
12.  $M_2$  उत्पाद्यमानत्वाद्
13. A, T स्वरूपनाश

[४१] ननु च भवतोऽपि विज्ञानस्वरूप आत्माभ्युपगन्तव्यः । स च स्वयं-  
प्रकाशः । तस्य च देवादिवस्वरूपात्माभिमाने स्वरूपप्रकाशतिरोधानमवश्यमाश्रयणीयम् ।  
स्वरूपप्रकाशे सति स्वात्मन्याकारान्तराध्यासायोगात् । अतो भवतश्चायं समानो  
दोषः । किंचास्माकमेकस्मिन्नेवात्मनि भवदुदीरितं दुर्घटं भवतामात्मानन्त्याभ्युपग-  
मात्सर्वेष्वयं दोषः परिहरणीयः ।

[४२] अत्रोच्यते—स्वभावतो मलप्रत्यनीकातिशयापरिमितोदारगुणसागरं  
निमेषकाष्ठाकलामुहूर्तादिपरार्धपर्यन्तापरिमितव्यवच्छेदस्वरूपसर्वोत्पत्तिस्थितिबिनाशादि -  
सर्वपरिणामनिमित्तभूतकालकृतपरिणामास्पृष्टानन्तमहाविभूति स्खलीलापरिकरस्वांशभूता-  
नन्तबद्धमुक्तनानाविधचेतनतद्भोग्यभूतानन्तविचित्रपरिणामशक्तिचेतनेतरवस्तुजातान्तर्या -  
मित्वकृतसर्वशरीरत्वसर्वप्रकारावस्थानावस्थितं परं ब्रह्मैव वेद्यं, तत्साक्षात्कारक्षमभगवद्ब्रह्मा-  
यनपराशरवाल्मीकिमनुयाज्ञवल्क्यगौतमापस्तम्बप्रभृतिमुनिगणप्रणीतविध्यर्थवादमन्त्रस्वरूप-

1. A<sub>2</sub> om. च—
2. P M<sub>2</sub> ज्ञात°
3. M<sub>2</sub> om. स्व°
4. M<sub>2</sub> om. रोधानमवश्यमाश्रयणीयं—A<sub>1</sub> अवश्यमाश्रयणीयम्
5. A<sub>1</sub> समानोऽयम्
6. P. M<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>2</sub> कलाकाष्ठ°
7. M<sub>2</sub> inserts °णामहितपरमार्थ°
8. P inserts °तत्कृत°
9. all except M<sub>2</sub> ब्रह्म च—
10. M<sub>2</sub> om. वाल्मीकि
11. M<sub>2</sub> om. गौतमापस्तम्बप्रभृति°
12. A<sub>1</sub> om. °स्वरूपवेद°

वेदमूलेतिहासपुराणधर्मशास्त्रोपबृंहितपरमार्थभूतानादिनिधनां विच्छिन्नपाठसंप्रदायग्यजुःसा-  
मार्थर्वरूपानन्तर्शाखं "वेदं चाभ्युपगच्छतामस्माकं किं न सेत्स्यति ।

यथोक्तं भगवता द्वैपायनेन महाभारते—

यो मामजमनादिं च वेत्ति लोकमहेश्वरम् ।

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द्वाविमौ पुरषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।

क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥

उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।

यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य विभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥

कालं च पचते तत्र न कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुः ।

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एते वै निरयास्तात स्थानस्य परमात्मनः ॥

अव्यक्तादिविशेषान्तं परिणामद्विसंयुतम् ।

क्रीडा हरेरिदं सर्वं क्षरमित्यवधार्यताम् ॥

कृष्ण एव हि लोकानामुत्पत्तिरपि चाप्ययः ।

कृष्णस्य हि कृते भूतमिदं विश्वं चराचरम् ॥

१५ इति । कृष्णस्य °हि कृत इति कृष्णस्य शेषभूतं सर्वमित्यर्थः ।

1. T °अविभिन्न°
2. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>3</sub> T om. °पाठ°—
3. M<sub>1</sub> अथर्वण°—
4. M<sub>3</sub> °शास्त्रवेदभाष्यानभ्य°
5. A<sub>1</sub> °वेदवेदान्तम्
6. P.M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>2</sub> उपधार्यताम्
7. P.M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1,2</sub> om. इति—
8. P om. कृष्णस्य.....इति कृष्णस्य—
9. M<sub>1,2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. हि



भगवता पराशरेणाप्युक्तम्—

शुद्धे महाविभूत्याख्ये परे ब्रह्मणि शब्ध्यते ।

मैत्रेय भगवच्छब्दः सर्वकारणकारणे ॥

ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजांस्यशेषतः ।

भगवच्छब्दवाच्यानि विना हेयैर्गुणादिभिः ॥

एवमेष महाशब्दो मैत्रेय भगवानिति ।

परमब्रह्मभूतस्य वासुदेवस्य नान्यगः ॥

तत्र पूज्यपदार्थोक्तिपरिभाषासमन्वितः ।

शब्दोऽयं नोपचारेण त्वन्यत्र ह्युपचारतः ॥

एवंप्रकारममलं सैत्यं व्यापकमक्षयम् ।

समस्तहेयरहितं विष्ण्वाख्यं परमं पदम् ॥

कलामुहूर्तादिमयश्च कालो न यद्विभूतेः परिणामहेतुः ॥

क्रीडतो बालकस्येव चेष्टास्तस्य निशामय ॥

इत्यादि । मनुनापि—

प्रशासितारं सर्वैर्धार्मणीयांसमणीयसाम् ।

इत्युक्तम् । याज्ञवल्क्येनापि—

क्षेत्रज्ञस्येश्वरज्ञानाद्विशुद्धिः परमा मता ।

1. M<sub>1</sub> शब्दिते
2. T नित्यं for सत्यं
3. M<sub>2</sub> om. सर्वेषाम्.....यसाम्—
4. M<sub>3</sub> om. धर्मीयांसमणीयसाम्—
5. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. विशुद्धिः परमा मता—
6. A<sub>2</sub> M<sub>2</sub> om. परमा मता

इति । आपस्तम्बेनापि—पूर्वः प्राणिनः सर्व एव गुहाशयस्येति । सर्वे प्राणिनो गुहाश-  
यस्य परमात्मनः पूः- पुरं शरीरमित्यर्थः । प्राणिन इति सँजीवात्मभूतसंघाताः ।

[४३] ननु च किमनेनाडम्बरेण । चोद्यं तु न परिहृतम् । उच्यते । एवम-  
भ्युपगच्छतामस्माकमात्मधर्मभूतस्य चैतन्यस्य स्वाभाविकस्यापि कर्मणा पारमार्थिकं संकोचं  
५ विकासं च ब्रुवतां सर्वमिदं परिहृतम् । भवतस्तु प्रकाश एव स्वरूपमिति प्रकाशो न  
धर्मभूतस्तस्य संकोचविकासौ वा नाभ्युपगम्येते । प्रकाशप्रसारानुत्पत्तिमेव तिरोधानभूताः  
कर्मादयः कुर्वन्ति । अविद्या चेतिरोधानं तिरोधानभूतयाऽविद्यया स्वरूपभूतप्रकाश-  
नाश इति पूर्वमेवोक्तः । अस्माकं त्वविद्यारूपेण कर्मणा स्वरूपनित्यधर्मभूतप्रकाशः  
संकुचितः । तेन देवादिस्वरूपात्माभिमानो भवतीति विशेषः । यथोक्तम्—

१० अविद्या कर्मसंज्ञान्या तृतीया शक्तिरिष्यते ॥  
यया क्षेत्रज्ञशक्तिः सा वेष्टिता नृप सर्वगा ।  
संसारतापानखिलानवाप्नोत्यँतिसंततान् ॥  
तया तिरोहितत्वाच्च शक्तिः क्षेत्रज्ञसंज्ञिता ।  
सर्वभूतेषु भूपाल तारतम्येन वर्तते ॥

१५ इति । क्षेत्रज्ञानां स्वधर्मभूतस्य ज्ञानस्य कर्मसंज्ञाविद्यया संकोचं विकासं च दर्शयति ।

[४४] अपि चाच्छादिकाविद्या श्रुतिभिश्चैक्योपदेशबलाच्च ब्रह्मस्वरूपतिरोधान-  
हेतुदोषरूपाश्रीयते तस्याश्च मिथ्यारूपत्वेन प्रपञ्चवत्त्वदर्शनमूलदोषापेक्षत्वात् । न सा

1.  $M_1$  om. पूः

2. all except  $A_1$  सर्वगुहा° P om. सर्व.....गुहाशयस्य

3. P जीवात्मक°

4. P  $M_1$  om. प्रकाश.....इति

5. T च for तु

6.  $M_2$  om. °स्व°

7. P  $M_1$  add °ज्ञानप्रकाशः—

8. P drops अति

9.  $M_2$  om. ज्ञानस्य

मिथ्या दर्शनमूलदोषः स्यादिति ब्रह्मैव मिथ्यादर्शनमूलं स्यात् । तस्याश्चानादित्वेऽपि मिथ्यारूपत्वादेव ब्रह्मदृश्यत्वेनैवानादित्वात्तद्दर्शनमूलपरमार्थदोषानभ्युपगमाच्च ब्रह्मैव तद्दर्शनमूलं स्यात् । तस्य नित्यत्वादनिर्मोक्ष एव ।

[४५] अत एवेदमपि निरस्तम्—एकमेव शरीरं जीववत्, निर्जीवानितराणि शरीराणि स्वप्नदृष्टनानाविधानन्तशरीराणां यथा निर्जीवत्वम् । तत्र स्वप्ने द्रष्टुः शरीर- ५  
मेकमेव जीववत् । तस्य स्वप्नवेलायां दृश्यभूतनानाविधशरीराणां निर्जीवत्वमेव । अनेनैकेनैव परिकल्पितत्वाज्जीवा मिथ्याभूता इति ब्रह्मणा स्वस्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तस्य जीवभावस्य सर्व-  
शरीराणां च कल्पितत्वादेकस्मिन्नपि शरीरे शरीरवज्जीवभावस्य च मिथ्यारूपत्वात्स-  
र्वाणि शरीराणि मिथ्यारूपाणि, तत्र जीवभावश्च मिथ्यारूप इत्येकस्य शरीरस्य तत्र १०  
जीवभावस्य च न कश्चिद्विशेषः । अस्माकं तु स्वप्ने द्रष्टुः स्वशरीरस्य तस्मिन्नात्मसद्भावस्य च प्रबोधवेलायामबाधितत्वादन्येषां शरीराणां तद्गतजीवानां च बाधितत्वात्ते सर्वे  
मिथ्याभूताः स्वशरीरमेकं तस्मिन्जीवभावश्च परमार्थ इति विशेषः ।

[४६] अपि च केन वा विद्यानिवृत्तिः सा च कीदृशीति विवेचनीयम् । ऐक्यज्ञानं निवर्तकं निवृत्तिश्चानिर्वचनीयप्रत्यनीकाकारेति चेत् । अनिर्वचनीयप्रत्यनीकं १५  
निर्वचनीयं तच्च सद्वासद्वा द्विरूपं वा कोट्यन्तरं न विद्यते । ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणैतदभ्युपगमे

1. P om. मिथ्या
2. M<sub>1</sub> om. मूलदोषः ..... मिथ्या [दर्शनं°
3. A<sub>2</sub> इतरशरीराणि
4. A<sub>2</sub> तत्र for तस्य—
5. P inserts यथा निर्जीव°
6. M<sub>2</sub> जीवसद्भावस्य for आत्म°—
7. A<sub>2</sub> om. च
8. M<sub>2</sub> adds °जीवानामसद्भावानां
9. P M<sub>1</sub> om. ते
10. P om. वा—M<sub>2</sub> reads सा वा
11. P कल्पान्तरं

पुनरविद्या न निवृत्ता स्यात् । ब्रह्मैव चेन्निवृत्तिस्तत्प्रागप्यविशिष्टमिति वेदान्तज्ञानात्पूर्वमेव निवृत्तिः स्यात् । ऐक्यज्ञानं निवर्तकं तदभावात्संसार इति भवदर्शनं विहन्यते ।

[४७] किञ्च निवर्तकज्ञानस्याप्यविद्यारूपत्वात्तन्निवर्तनं केनेति वक्तव्यम् । निवर्तकज्ञानं स्वेतरसमस्तभेदं निर्धर्त्य क्षणिकत्वादेव स्वयमेव विनश्यति दावानलविष-  
५ नाशनविषान्तरवदिति चेन्न । निवर्तकज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तत्वेन तत्स्वरूपतदुत्पत्तिविना-  
शानां मिथ्यारूपत्वात्तद्विनाशरूपा विद्या तिष्ठत्येवेति तद्विनाशदर्शनस्य निवर्तकं वक्तव्य-  
मेव । दावाग्न्यादीनामपि पूर्वावस्थाविरोधिपरिणामपरंपरावर्जनीयैव ।

[४८] अपि च चिन्मात्रब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तकृत्स्ननिषेधविषयज्ञानस्य कोऽयं ज्ञाता ।  
अध्यासरूप इति चेन्न । तस्य निषेध्यतया निवर्तकज्ञानकर्मत्वात्तत्कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।  
१० ब्रह्मस्वरूप एवेति चेन्न । ब्रह्मणो निवर्तकज्ञानं प्रति ज्ञातृत्वं किं स्वरूपमुताध्यस्तम् ।  
अध्यस्तं चेदयमध्यासस्तन्मूर्त्तविद्यान्तरं च निवर्तकज्ञानविषयतया तिष्ठत्येव । तन्निवर्त-  
कान्तराभ्युपगमे तस्यापि त्रिरूपतयानवस्थैव । सर्वस्य हि ज्ञानस्य त्रिरूपकत्वविरहे ज्ञान-  
त्वमेव हीयते । कस्यचित्कचनार्थविशेषं प्रति सिद्धिरूपत्वात् । ज्ञानस्य त्रिरूपत्वविरहे  
भवतां स्वरूपभूतज्ञानवन्निवर्तकज्ञानमप्यनिवर्तकं स्यात् । ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव ज्ञातृत्वाभ्युपगमेऽ  
१५ स्मदीय एव पक्षः परिगृहीतः स्यात् । निवर्तकज्ञानस्वरूपज्ञातृत्वं च खनिवर्त्यान्तर्गतमिति

1. M<sub>1</sub> om. निवृत्ता स्यात्.....पूर्वमेव न haplography
2. A<sub>1</sub> विनिवर्त्य°—
3. P M<sub>1</sub> मन्तव्यम्
4. P °विरोध°
5. M<sub>1</sub> om. न
6. P M<sub>1</sub> तस्य for तत्—
7. A<sub>2</sub> कर्मत्वात्मककर्तृ°—
8. P °रूपम्—
9. P om. न
10. P M<sub>1</sub> तन्मूलमविद्या°
11. P M<sub>1</sub> °रूपत्वाद्—
12. P M<sub>1,2</sub> A<sub>3</sub> om. एव

वचनं भूतलव्यतिरिक्तं कृत्स्नं छिन्नं देवदत्तेनेत्यस्यामेव छेदनक्रियायामस्याश्छेदनक्रियाया-  
श्छेत्तृत्वस्य च छेद्यान्तर्भाववचनवदुपहास्यम् ।

[४९] अपि च "निखिलभेदनिवर्तकमिदमैक्यज्ञानं केन जातमिति विमर्शनी-  
यम् । श्रुत्यैवेति चेन्न । तस्या ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्ताया अविद्यापरिकल्पितत्वात्मपञ्चबाधकज्ञान-  
स्योत्पादकत्वं न संभवति । तथा हि दुष्टकारणजातमपि रज्जुसर्पज्ञानं न दुष्टकारणजन्येन ५  
रज्जुरियं न सर्प इति ज्ञानेन बाध्यते । रज्जुसर्पज्ञानभये वर्तमाने केनचिद्भ्रान्तेन  
पुरुषेण रज्जुरियं न सर्प इत्युक्तेऽप्ययं भ्रान्त इति ज्ञाते सति तद्वचनं रज्जुसर्पज्ञानस्य  
बाधकं न भवति भयं च न निवर्तते । प्रयोजकज्ञानवतः श्रवणवेलायामेव हि भ्रमव्यति-  
रिक्तत्वेन श्रुतेरपि भ्रान्तिमूलत्वं जातमिति । निवर्तकज्ञानस्य ज्ञातुस्तत्सामग्रीभूत-  
शास्त्रस्य च ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्ततया यदि बाध्यत्वमुच्यते हन्त तर्हि प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तेर्मिथ्यात्वमा- १०

1. A<sub>1,3</sub> देवदत्तेन छिन्नम्
2. P M<sub>1,3</sub> °क्रियाया—
3. P om. अस्याच्छेदेनक्रियायाश्
4. M<sub>3</sub> अप°
5. M<sub>3</sub> निखिलच्छेद°—
6. P. M<sub>1</sub> विवेचनीयम्
7. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> ज्ञानोत्प°—
8. P M<sub>1</sub> °कारणजन्यम्
9. T om. न, adds न before बाध्यते
10. M<sub>3</sub> om. °ज्ञान°—T ज्ञाने सति
11. M<sub>2</sub> प्रयोजज्ञान°
12. P T किंच निवर्त°—
13. P M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>3</sub> ज्ञातुश्च—
14. M<sub>3</sub> °भूतस्य
15. A<sub>3</sub> उच्येत—
16. A<sub>3</sub> om. हन्त

पततीति प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यता स्यात् । स्वप्नदृष्टपुरुषवाक्यावगतपित्रादिर्मरणस्य मिथ्यात्वेन पित्रादिसत्यतावत् । किंच तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं न प्रपञ्चस्य बाधकम् । भ्रान्तिमूलत्वाद्भ्रान्त-  
प्रयुक्तरज्जुसर्पबाधकवाक्यवत् ।

[५०] ननु च स्वप्ने कस्मिंश्चिद्भये वर्तमाने स्वप्नदशायामेवायं स्वप्न इति  
५ ज्ञाते सति पूर्वभयनिवृत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्वदत्रापि संभवतीति । नैवम् । स्वप्नवेलायामेव  
सोऽपि स्वप्न इति ज्ञाते सति पुनर्भयानिवृत्तिरेव दृष्टेति न कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

[५१] श्रवणवेलायामेव सोऽपि स्वप्न इति ज्ञातमेवेत्युक्तम् । यदपि  
चेदमुक्तं भ्रान्तिपरिकल्पितत्वेन मिथ्यारूपमपि शास्त्रमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति बोधयति तस्य सतो  
ब्रह्मणो विषयस्य पश्चात्तनवाधादर्शनाद्ब्रह्म सुस्थितमेवेति । तदयुक्तम् । शून्यमेव तत्त्व-  
१० मिति वाक्येन तस्यापि बाधितत्वात् । इदं भ्रान्तिमूलवाक्यमिति चेत् । सदद्वितीयं  
ब्रह्मेति वाक्यमपि भ्रान्तिमूलमिति त्वयैवोक्तम् । पश्चात्तनवाधादर्शनं तु सर्वशून्यवाक्य-  
स्यैवेति विशेषः । सर्वशून्यवादिनो ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुमिथ्यात्ववादिनश्च स्वपक्षसाधन-  
प्रमाणपारमार्थ्यानभ्युपगमेनाभियुक्तैर्वादानधिकार एव प्रतिपादितः ।

अधिकारोऽनुपायत्वान्न वादे शून्यवादिनः । इति ।

१५ [५२] अपि च प्रत्यक्षदृष्टस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वं केन प्रमाणेन साध्यते ।  
प्रत्यक्षस्य दोषमूलत्वेनान्यथासिद्धिसंभवान्निर्दोषं शास्त्रमनन्यथासिद्धं प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधक-  
मिति चेत् । केन दोषेण जातं प्रत्यक्षमनन्तमेदविषयमिति वैक्तव्यम् । अनादिभेद-

1. P आपतेद्—

2. T both times पुत्रादि°—

3. M, A<sub>1</sub> °मरणमि°

4. M<sub>1,2,3</sub> om. इति—M<sub>2</sub> इतिवजातम्°

5. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1,2</sub> सदद्वितीयं

6. P तदुक्तम्—A<sub>3</sub> तदप्युक्तम्

7. A<sub>2</sub> om. इति

8. PM<sub>1</sub> A<sub>2</sub> दृष्टप्रपञ्चस्य

9. A<sub>2</sub> प्रत्यक्षबाधकम्

10. A<sub>2</sub> विवेचनीयम्

वासनाख्यदोषजातं प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् । हन्त तर्ह्येनेनैव दोषेण जातं शास्त्रमपीत्येकदोष-  
मूलत्वाच्छास्त्रप्रत्यक्षयोर्न बाध्यबाधकभावसिद्धिः ।

[५३] आकाशवाय्वादिभूततदारब्धशब्दस्पर्शादियुक्तमनुप्यत्वादिसंस्थानसंस्थित-  
पदार्थग्राहि प्रत्यक्षम् । शास्त्रं तु प्रत्यक्षाद्यपरिच्छेद्यसर्वान्तरात्मत्वसंत्यत्वाद्यनन्तविशेषण-  
विशिष्टब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनाधाराधनप्रकारतत्प्राप्तिपूर्वकतत्पसादलभ्यफलविशेषतदनिष्ट - ५  
करणमूलनिग्रहविशेषविषयमिति न शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षयोर्विरोधः । अनादिनिधनाविच्छिन्नपाठ-  
संप्रदायताद्यनेकगुणविशिष्टस्य शास्त्रस्य बलीयस्त्वं वदता प्रत्यक्षपारमार्थ्यमवश्यमभ्युप-  
गन्तव्यमित्यलमनेन श्रुतिशतविततिवातवेगपराहतकुट्टिदुष्टयुक्तिजालतूलनिरसनेनेत्यु-  
परम्यते ।

[५४] द्वितीये तु पक्ष उपाधिब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तरानभ्युपगमाद्ब्रह्मण्येवो- १०  
पाधिसंसर्गादौपाधिकाः सर्वे दोषा ब्रह्मण्येव भवेयुः । ततश्चापहतपाप्मत्वादिनिर्दोषत्व-  
श्रुतयः सर्वे विहन्यन्ते ।

[५५] यथा घटाकाशादेः परिच्छिन्नतया महाकाशाद्वैलक्षण्यं परस्परभेदश्च  
दृश्यते - तत्रस्या गुणा वा दोषा वाऽनवच्छिन्ने महाकाशे न संबध्यन्ते एवमुपाधिकृतभेद-  
व्यवस्थितजीवगता दोषा अनुपहिते परे ब्रह्मणि न संबध्यन्त इति चेत् । नैतदुपपद्यते । १५  
निरवयवस्याकाशस्यानवच्छेद्यस्य घटादिभिश्छेदासंभवात्तेनैवाकाशेन घटादयः संयुक्ता इति  
ब्रह्मणोऽप्यच्छेद्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मैवोपाधिसंयुक्तं स्यात् । घटसंयुक्ताकाशप्रदेशोऽन्यस्मादाकाश-

1. P M<sub>1,2</sub> om. °शब्द°
2. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>1,2</sub> T om. °सत्यत्व°
3. P M<sub>1,2</sub> place न before विरोधः
4. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>1,2</sub> T वक्तव्यम्
5. M<sub>3</sub> A<sub>3</sub> T दोषा वा गुणा
6. P M<sub>3</sub> °स्याच्छेद्यस्य—
7. M<sub>1,2</sub> घटादिभिः परिच्छे°—
8. M<sub>1</sub> om. तेनैव, reads °काशेनैव
9. M<sub>1,2</sub> °प्यपरिच्छे°
10. A<sub>3</sub> °काशाद्—

प्रदेशाद्विद्यत इति चेत् । आकाशस्यैकस्यैव प्रदेशभेदेन घटादिसंयोगाद्घटादौ गच्छति तस्य च प्रदेशभेदस्यानियम इति तद्ब्रह्मण्येव प्रदेशभेदानियमेनोपाधिसंसर्गादुपाधौ गच्छति संयुक्तवियुक्तब्रह्मप्रदेशभेदाच्च ब्रह्मण्येवोपाधिसंसर्गः क्षणे क्षणे बन्धमोक्षौ स्यातामिति सन्तः परिहसन्ति ।

- ५ [५६] निरवयवस्यैवाकाशस्य श्रोत्रेन्द्रियत्वेऽपीन्द्रियव्यवस्थावद्ब्रह्मण्यपि व्यवस्थोपपद्यत इति चेत् । न वायुविशेषसंस्कृतकर्णप्रदेशसंयुक्तस्यैवाकाशप्रदेशस्येन्द्रियत्वात्तस्य च प्रदेशान्तराभेदानियमेऽपीन्द्रियव्यवस्थोपपद्यते । आकाशस्य तु सर्वेषां शरीरेषु गच्छत्वनियमेन सत्त्वप्रदेशसंयोग इति ब्रह्मण्युपाधिसंयोगप्रदेशानियम एव ।

[५७] आकाशस्य स्वरूपेणैव श्रोत्रेन्द्रियत्वमभ्युपगम्यापीन्द्रियव्यवस्थोक्ता ।

- १० परमार्थतत्त्वाकाशो न श्रोत्रेन्द्रियम् । वैकारिकादहंकारादेकादशेन्द्रियाणि जायन्त इति हि वैदिकाः । यथोक्तं भगवता पराशरेण —

तैजसानीन्द्रियाण्याहुर्देवा वैकारिका दश ।

एकादशं मनश्चात्र देवा वैकारिकाः स्मृताः ॥ इति ।

अयमर्थः । वैकारिकस्तैजसो भूतादिरिति त्रिविधोऽहंकारः । स च क्रमात्सा-

- १५ त्विको राजसस्तामसश्च । तत्र तामसाद्भूतादेराकाशादीनि भूतानि जायन्त इति

1. M<sub>1</sub> चेन्न

2. P om. च, reads प्रदेशभेदेन भेदस्यानियम

3. M<sub>1,2</sub> T बन्धो मोक्षश्च भवतीति

4. A<sub>1</sub> om. एव, reads °काशस्यैव—

5. M<sub>1</sub> °न्द्रियस्य व्य°

6. P M<sub>2</sub> °काशस्यैन्द्रिय°

7. M<sub>2</sub> °भेदादनियमे—

8. M<sub>2</sub> °द्रियस्य व्य°

9. P अभ्युपगमादिन्द्रिय°

10. P om. भगवता

11. P M<sub>1</sub> om. भूतानि

12. T prints जायन्त इति [देवा वैकारिकाः स्मृताः] इति [इति—स्वमतमुच्यते देवाः] इन्द्रियाणि etc.



सृष्टिक्रममुक्त्वा तैजसाद्राजसादहंकारादेकादशेन्द्रियाणि जायन्त इति परमतमुपन्यस्य सात्त्विकाहंकाराद्वैकारिकानीन्द्रियाणि जायन्त इति स्वमतमुच्यते - देवा वैकारिकाः स्मृता इति । देवा इन्द्रियाणि । एवमिन्द्रियाणामाहंकारिकाणां भूतैश्चाप्यायनं महाभारत उच्यते । भौतिकत्वेऽपीन्द्रियाणामाकाशादिभूतविकारत्वादेवाकाशादिभूतपरिणामविशेषा व्यवस्थिता एव शरीरवत्पुरुषाणामिन्द्रियाणि भवन्तीति ब्रह्मण्यच्छेद्ये निरवयवे निर्विकारे ५ त्वनियमेनानन्तहेयोपाधिसंसर्गदोषो दुष्परिहर एवेति श्रद्धधानानामेवायं पक्ष इति शास्त्रविदो न बहु मन्यन्ते । स्वरूपपरिणामाभ्युपगमादविकारत्वश्रुतिर्वाच्यते । निरवयवता च ब्रह्मणः शक्तिपरिणाम इति चेत् । केयं शक्तिरुच्यते । किं ब्रह्मपरिणामरूपा । उत ब्रह्मणोऽनन्या कापीति । उभयपक्षेऽपि स्वरूपपरिणामोऽवर्जनीय एव ।

[५८] तृतीयेऽपि पक्षे जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदवदभेदस्य चाभ्युपगमात्तस्य च तद्भावा- १०  
त्सौभरिभेदवच्च स्वावतारभेदवच्च सर्वस्येश्वरभेदत्वात्सर्वे जीवगता दोषास्तस्यैव स्युः । एतदुक्तं भवति । ईश्वरः स्वरूपेणैव सुरनरतिर्यक्स्थावरादिभेदेनावस्थित इति हि तदात्मकत्ववर्णनं क्रियते । तथा सत्येकमृत्पिण्डारब्धघटशरावादिगतान्युदकाहरणादीनि सर्वकार्याणि यथा तस्यैव भवन्ति, एवं सर्वजीवगतसुखदुःखादि सर्वमीश्वरगतमेव स्यात् ।

[५९] घटशरावादिसंस्थानानुपयुक्तमृद्द्रव्यं यथा कारणान्तरान्वितमेवमेव सुर- १५  
पशुमनुजादिजीवत्वानुपयुक्तेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सत्यसंकल्पत्वादिकल्याणगुणाकर इति चेत् ।

1.  $M_1$  °कारिकभूतैश्च
2.  $M_{2,3}$ ,  $A$ , om. तु
3.  $M_1$  अश्रद्धधानानां
4. P मतम्—for पक्ष.
5. P  $M_{1,2}$  अविकारश्रुतिर्
6.  $A$ , ३न्या
7.  $M_2$  सा कापीति
8.  $M_1$  om. जीवब्रह्मणोर्
9. P °श्वराभेदत्वात् सर्वजीवगता
10.  $M_2$  °शरावगत°
11. P °दिसर्व°
12.  $M_2$ , T °करका°
13. P  $M_1$  सुरनरपशुमनुज°— $A$ , सुरपक्षपशु°

सत्यं स एवेश्वर एकेनांशेन कल्याणगुणाकरः स एवान्येनांशेन हेयगुणाकर इत्युक्तम् । द्वयोरंशयोरीश्वराविशेषात् । द्वावंशौ व्यवस्थिताविति चेत् । कस्तेन लाभः । एकस्यैवैकेनांशेन नित्यदुःखित्वादंशान्तरेण सुखित्वमपि नेश्वरत्वाय कल्पते । यथा देवदत्तस्यैकस्मिन्हस्ते चन्दनपङ्कानुलेपकेयूरकटकाङ्गुलीयालंकारस्तस्यैवान्यस्मिन्हस्ते मुद्राभि-  
 ५ घातः कालानलज्वालानुप्रवेशश्च तद्वदेवेश्वरस्य स्यादिति ब्रह्माज्ञानपक्षादपि पापीयानयं भेदाभेदपक्षः । अपरिमितदुःखस्य पारमार्थिकत्वात्संसारिणामनन्तत्वेन दुस्तरत्वाच्च ।

[६०] तस्माद्विलक्षणोऽयं जीवांश इति चेत् । आगतोऽसि तर्हि मदीयं पन्थानम् । ईश्वरस्य स्वरूपेण तादात्म्यवर्णने स्यादयं दोषः । आत्मशरीरभावेन तु तादात्म्यप्रतिपादने न कश्चिदोषः । प्रत्युत निखिलभुवननियमनादिर्महानयं गुणगणः

१० प्रतिपादितो भवति । सामानाधिकरण्यं च मुख्यवृत्तम् ।

[६१] अपि चैकस्य वस्तुनो भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं विरुद्धत्वाच्च संभवतीत्युक्तम् । घटस्य पटाद्विन्नत्वे सति तस्य तस्मिन्नभावः । अभिन्नत्वे सति तस्य च भाव इति । एकस्मिन्काले चैकस्मिन्देसे चैकस्य हि पदार्थस्य युगपत्सद्भावोऽसद्भावश्च विरुद्धः ।

1. P M<sub>3</sub> °श्वरांशः
2. M<sub>1</sub> °कल्पकल्या°
3. M<sub>1</sub> स्वेनांशेन—A<sub>3</sub> °तेनांशेन
4. P M<sub>3</sub> °दुःखित्वम्
5. M<sub>1</sub> om. अपि
6. P °अङ्गुलीयका°
7. T एतस्यैव
8. M<sub>2</sub> °अभिभूतः
9. PM<sub>1</sub> °वादाद्
10. P. om. जीवांश.....स्यादयं [दोषः]
11. P M<sub>1</sub> °चेतन° for °भुवन°
12. T अयं महागुणगणः
13. A<sub>1</sub> T. insert वस्तुनो हि
14. P घटाद् for पटाद्
15. M<sub>1,2</sub>. add तस्य तादात्म्यतया तस्मिन् and तस्य तादात्म्यतया भावः
16. M<sub>3</sub> om. काले चैकस्मिन्—P om. च

[६२] जात्यात्मना भावो व्यक्त्यात्मना चाभाव इति चेत् । जातेर्मुण्डेन चाभेदे सति खण्डे मुण्डस्यापि सद्भावप्रसङ्गः । खण्डेन च जातेरभिन्नत्वे सद्भावो भिन्नत्वे चासद्भावः अथे महिषत्वस्यैवेति विरोधो दुष्परिहर एव । जात्यादेर्वस्तुसंस्थान-  
तया वस्तुनः प्रकारत्वात्प्रकारप्रकारिणोश्च पदार्थान्तरत्वं प्रकारस्य पृथक्सिद्धयनर्हत्वं  
पृथगनुपलम्भश्च तस्य च संस्थानस्य चानेकवस्तुषु प्रकारतयावस्थितिश्चेत्यादि पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । ५

[६३] सोऽयमिति बुद्धिः प्रकारैक्यादयमपि दण्डीति बुद्धिवत् । अयमेव च जात्यादिप्रकारो वस्तुनो भेद इत्युच्यते । तद्योग एव वस्तुनो भिन्नमिति व्यवहारहेतुरित्यर्थः । स च वस्तुनो भेदव्यवहारहेतुः स्वस्य च संवेदनवत् । यथा संवेदनं वस्तुनो व्यवहारहेतुः स्वस्य व्यवहारहेतुश्च भवति ।

[६४] अत एव सन्मात्रग्राहि प्रत्यक्षं न भेदग्राहीत्यादिविवादा निरस्ताः । १०  
जात्यादिसंस्थानसंस्थितस्यैव वस्तुनः प्रत्यक्षेण गृहीतत्वात्तस्यैव संस्थानरूपजात्यादेः  
प्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदव्यवहारहेतुत्वाच्च । स्वरूपपरिणामदोषश्च पूर्वमेवोक्तः ।

[६५] यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः । ११  
य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्म-

1. P वा° for चा°
2. P M<sub>1</sub> add व्यक्त्या चाभेदे—P<sub>1</sub> च भेदे—M<sub>1</sub> om. च
3. M<sub>1</sub> adds तर्हि तथा खण्डेन, om. च
4. P वासद्भावः—T ऽसद्भावः
5. P M<sub>1</sub> om. एव
6. M<sub>1</sub> °संस्थानरूपतया
7. P M<sub>1</sub>, T om. च
8. A<sub>1</sub> °हेतुश्च भवति
9. P स्वयं च
10. P M<sub>1</sub> add अत एव च
11. M<sub>1</sub> om. वादाः
12. P om. एष त—
13. M<sub>1</sub> om. य आत्मनि.....अमृतः

- नोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति एष त आत्मान्त-  
र्याम्यमृतः । यः पृथिवीमन्तरे संचरन्त्यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यं पृथिवी न वेदेत्यादि—योऽ-  
क्षरमन्तरे संचरन्त्यस्याक्षरं शरीरं यमक्षरं न वेद—यो मृत्युमन्तरे संचरन्त्यस्य मृत्युः  
शरीरं यं मृत्युर्न वेद - एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः ।
- ५ द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यन-  
श्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति । अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा । तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानु-  
प्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यच्च सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत् । अनेन जीवेनात्म-  
नेत्यादि । पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं मत्वा जुष्टस्तस्तेनामृतत्वमेति । भोक्ता भोग्यं  
प्रेरितारं च मत्वा सर्वं भोक्तं त्रिविधं ब्रह्ममेतत् । नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां
- १० यो विदधाति कामान् । प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः । ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीर्शनीशवित्यादि-  
श्रुतिशतैस्तदुपबृंहणैः—

जगत्सर्वं शरीरं ते स्थैर्यं ते वसुधातलम् ॥

यत्किञ्चित्सृज्यते येन सत्त्वजातेन वै द्विज ।

तस्य सृज्यस्य संभूतौ तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः ॥

१५ अहमात्मा गुडाकेश सर्वभूताशयस्थितः ॥

सर्वस्य चाहं हृदि संनिविष्टो

मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च ॥

- इत्यादिवेदविदग्नेसरवाल्मीकिपराशरद्वैपायनवचोभिश्च परस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वस्यात्म-  
त्वावगमाच्चिदचिदात्मकस्य वस्तुनस्तच्छरीरत्वावगमाच्च शरीरस्य शरीरिणं प्रति प्रकार-
- २० तयैव पदार्थत्वात् शरीरशरीरिणोश्च धर्मभेदेऽपि तयोरसंकरात्सर्वशरीरं ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मणो

1. M<sub>1</sub> om. ईशनीशौ

2. M<sub>2</sub> सर्वात्मत्वा°

3. P A<sub>1</sub> °रीरत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च

4. A<sub>2</sub> शरीरस्य च

5. M<sub>2</sub> तत्पदार्थ°

6. M<sub>2</sub> धर्मभेदेन तयोर्

वैभवं प्रतिपादयद्भिः सामानाधिकरण्यादिभिर्मुख्यवृत्तैः सर्वचेतनाचेतनप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवाभिधीयते । सामानाधिकरण्यं हि द्वयोः पदयोः प्रकारद्वयमुखेनैकार्थनिष्ठत्वम् । तस्य चैतस्मिन्पक्षे मुख्यता । तथा हि तत्त्वमिति सामानाधिकरण्ये तदित्यनेन जगत्कारणं सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरं निरवयं ब्रह्मोच्यते । त्वमिति च चेतनसमानाधिकरणवृत्तेन जीवान्तर्यामिरूपि तच्छरीरं तदात्मतयावस्थितं तत्प्रकारं ब्रह्मोच्यते । इतरेषु पक्षेषु सामानाधिकरण्यहानिर्ब्रह्मणः सौदोषता च स्यात् । ५

[६६] एतदुक्तं भवति । ब्रह्मैवमवस्थितमित्यत्रैवंशब्दार्थभूतप्रकारतयैव विचित्रचेतनाचेतनात्मकप्रपञ्चस्य स्थूलस्य सूक्ष्मस्य च सद्भावः । तथा च बहु स्यां प्रजायेत्येयमर्थः संपन्नो भवति । तस्यैवेश्वरस्य कार्यतया कारणतया च नानासंस्थानसंस्थितस्य संस्थानतया चिदचिद्वस्तुजातमवस्थितमिति । १०

[६७] ननु च संस्थानरूपेण प्रकारतयैवंशब्दार्थत्वं जातिगुणयोरेव दृष्टं न द्रव्यस्य । स्वतन्त्रसिद्धियोग्यस्य पदार्थस्यैवंशब्दार्थतयेश्वरस्य प्रकारमात्रत्वमयुक्तम् । उच्यते—द्रव्यस्यापि दण्डकुण्डलादेर्द्रव्यान्तरप्रकारत्वं दृष्टमेव । ननु च दण्डादेः स्वतन्त्रस्य द्रव्यान्तरप्रकारत्वे मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययो दृष्टः । यथा दण्डी कुण्डलीति । अतो गोत्वादितुल्यतया चेतनाचेतनस्य द्रव्यभूतस्य वस्तुन ईश्वरप्रकारतया सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिपादनं न युज्यते । १५

1. M<sub>1</sub> om. हि
2. P om. पदयोः
3. P इत्यनेन समा<sup>०</sup>—M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. च—A<sub>1</sub> इति चेत् तत्समान<sup>०</sup>
4. P M<sub>1</sub> रूपेण
5. M<sub>2</sub> तद्दोषता
6. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub>, add इति चेत् before उच्यते
7. M<sub>1</sub> चेतनद्रव्य<sup>०</sup>

अत्रोच्यते-गौरश्चो मनुष्यो देव इति भूतसंघातरूपाणां द्रव्याणामेव देवदत्तो मनुष्यो जातः पुण्यविशेषेण यज्ञदत्तो गौर्जातः पापेन कर्मणा, अन्यश्चेतनः पुण्यातिरेकेण देवो जात इत्यादिदेवादिशरीराणां चेतनप्रकारतया लोकवेदयोः सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिपादनं दृष्टम् ।

- ५ [६८] अयमर्थः—जातिर्वा गुणो वा द्रव्यं वा न तत्रादरः । कंचन द्रव्यविशेषं प्रति विशेषणतयैव यस्य सद्भावस्तस्य तदपृथक्सिद्धेस्तत्प्रकारतया तत्सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिपादनं युक्तम् । यस्य पुनर्द्रव्यस्य पृथक्सिद्धस्यैव कदाचित्कंचिद्द्रव्यान्तरप्रकारत्वमिष्यते तत्र मत्वर्थीयप्रत्यय इति विशेषः । एवमेव स्थावरजङ्गमात्मकस्य सर्वस्य वस्तुन ईश्वरशरीरत्वेन तत्प्रकारतयैव स्वरूपसद्भाव इति । तत्प्रकारीश्वर एव १० तत्तच्छब्देनाभिधीयत इति तत्सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिपादनं युक्तम् । तदेवैतत्सर्वं पूर्वमेव नामरूपव्याकरणश्रुतिविवरणे प्रपञ्चितम् ।

[६९] अतः प्रकृतिपुरुषमहदहंकारतन्मात्रभूतेन्द्रियतदारब्धचतुर्दशभुवनात्मकब्रह्माण्डतदन्तर्वर्तिदेवतिर्यग्भर्तुण्येस्थावरादिसर्वप्रकारसंस्थानसंस्थितं कार्यमपि सर्वं ब्रह्मैवेति

1. M<sub>1</sub> तत्र
2. P. om. देव इति..... एव
3. M<sub>1</sub> इति महाभूत°
4. M<sub>1</sub> देवो जातो for देवदत्तो
5. P M<sub>1</sub> देवदत्तो for यज्ञदत्तो
6. M<sub>1</sub> अन्यचेतनातिरेकेण—M<sub>2</sub> पुण्येन कर्मणा for पुण्यातिरेकेण
7. P इत्यादिभूतेसंघातरूपाणां द्रव्याणामेव देवादि°—M<sub>2</sub> इत्यादि द्रव्यादिशरीराणां द्रव्यानां चेतन°
8. T द्रव्यं वा गुणो वा
9. M<sub>1</sub> किंचित् for क्वचित्
10. all except M<sub>2</sub>, T read तच्छब्देन
11. M<sub>2</sub> T नामरूपश्रुति°
12. P °न्द्रियाधारब्ध°
13. M<sub>2</sub> °मनुष्यादि°
14. P सर्वं कार्यम्—P M<sub>1</sub> om. अपि

कारणभूतब्रह्मविज्ञानादेव सर्वं विज्ञातं भवतीत्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुपपन्नतरम् । तदेवं कार्यकारणभावादियुक्तेन कृत्स्नस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुनः परब्रह्मप्रकारतया तदात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ।

[७०] ननु च परस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपेण परिणामास्पदत्वं 'निर्विकारत्वनिरवद्यत्व-श्रुतिव्याकोपप्रसङ्गेन निवारितम् । प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधादित्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञामृतत्कार्यदृष्टान्ताभ्यां परमपुरुषस्य जगदुपादानकारणत्वं च प्रतिपादितम् । उपादानकारणत्वं च परिणामास्पदत्वमेव । कथमिदमुपपद्यते ।

[७१] अत्रोच्यते—सजीवस्य प्रपञ्चस्याविशेषेण कारणत्वमुक्तम् । तत्रेश्वरस्य जीवरूपपरिणामाभ्युपगमेन नात्मा श्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्य इति विरुध्यते । वैषम्यनैर्घृण्य-परिहारश्च जीवानामनादित्वाभ्युपगमेन तत्कर्मनिमित्ततया प्रतिपादितः—वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वान्न कर्मविभागादिति चेन्न—अनादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते चेत्यकृताभ्यागम-कृतविप्रणाशप्रसङ्गश्चानित्यत्वेऽभिहितः ।

[७२] तथा प्रकृतेरप्यनादिता श्रुतिभिः प्रतिपादिता—

अजामेकां <sup>११</sup>लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां वर्णां प्रजां जनयन्तीं सरूपाम् ।

अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

1. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1.1</sub>. ब्रह्मज्ञानाद्
2. P परब्रह्म°
3. M<sub>1</sub> स्वस्वरूपेण
4. M<sub>1</sub> T निर्विकारनिरवद्यश्रुति°—T°श्रुतिकोप°
5. P °प्रतिज्ञान°
6. A<sub>1</sub> प्रतिज्ञावृत्तात्कार्य°—A<sub>2</sub> °ज्ञातृदृष्टान्ताभ्यां
7. P. om. परिणामास्पदत्वम्.....रूप[°परिणामा°
8. M<sub>1.2</sub> °गमे—P. om. नात्म.....°गमेन
9. P M<sub>1</sub> तत्कार्य°
10. A<sub>1</sub> अकृताभ्युपगम°
11. A<sub>1</sub> °श्रुतिप्रतिपादिता—
12. P M<sub>1</sub>-om. लोहित°.....अजोऽन्यः

इति प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरजत्वं दर्शयति । अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिन्श्चान्यो  
मायया संनिरुद्धः—मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरमिति प्रकृतिरेव स्वरूपेण  
विकारास्पदमिति च दर्शयति । गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतभाविनीति च ।  
स्मृतिश्च भवति—

- ५ प्रकृतिं पुरुषं 'चैव विद्वद्यनादी उभावपि ।  
विकारांश्च गुणांश्चैव विद्धि प्रकृतिसंभवान् ॥  
भूमिरापोऽनलो वायुः खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च ।  
अहंकार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥  
अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।  
जीवभूतां महाबाहो यथेदं धार्यते जगत् ॥  
१० प्रकृतिं स्वामवष्टभ्य विसृजामि पुनः पुनः ।  
मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सृजते सचराचरम् ॥

इत्यादिका ।

- [७३] एवं च प्रकृतेरधीश्वरशरीरत्वात्प्रकृतिशब्दोऽपि तदात्मभूतस्येश्वरस्य  
१५ तत्प्रकारसंस्थितस्य वाचकः । पुरुषशब्दोऽपि तदात्मभूतस्येश्वरस्य पुरुषप्रकारसंस्थितस्य  
वाचकः । अतस्तद्विकाराणामपि तथैश्वर एवात्मा । तदाह—

- 
1. P M<sub>1</sub> add इत्यादिना—A<sub>1</sub>, add गौरनाद्यन्तवतीति च
  2. P M<sub>1</sub> दर्शितम्
  3. M<sub>1</sub> om. अस्मान्.....दर्शयति
  4. M<sub>1</sub> om. इति च—M<sub>1</sub> om. इति
  5. M<sub>1</sub> T om. भवति
  6. M<sub>2</sub> om. चैव
  7. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> T om. line 12.
  8. M<sub>1</sub> इत्यादिना
  9. P A<sub>1</sub>, एवं च सति
  10. T prints [प्रकृति] शब्दोऽपि [पुरुषः]
  11. P M<sub>1</sub> add 'श्वर आत्मैव—A<sub>1</sub> 'श्वरत्व इत्यत्र—M<sub>1</sub>, तदाह



व्यक्तं विष्णुस्तथाव्यक्तं पुरुषः काल एव च ।

स एव क्षोभको ब्रह्मन्क्षोभ्यश्च परमेश्वरः ॥

इति । अतः प्रकृतिप्रकारसंस्थिते परमात्मनि प्रकारभूतप्रकृत्यंशे विकारः प्रकायंशे चाविकारः । एवमेव जीवप्रकारसंस्थिते परमात्मनि च प्रकारभूतजीवांशे सर्वे चापुरुषार्थाः प्रकायंशो नियन्ता निरवद्यः सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरः सत्यसंकल्प एव ।

[७४] तथा च सति कारणवस्थ ईश्वर एवेति तदुपादानकजगत्कार्यावस्थोऽपि स एवेति कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं सर्वश्रुत्यविरोधश्च भवति । तदेवं नामरूपविभागानर्ह-सूक्ष्मदशापन्नप्रकृतिपुरुषशरीरं ब्रह्म कारणावस्थं, जगतस्तदापत्तिरेव च प्रलयः । नाम-रूपविभागविभक्तस्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कार्यावस्थं, ब्रह्मणस्तथाविधस्थूलभाव एव जगतः सृष्टिरित्युच्यते । यथोक्तं भगवता पराशरेण—

प्रधानपुंसोरजयोः कारणं कार्यभूतयोः । इति ।

[७५] तस्मादीश्वरप्रकारभूतसर्वावस्थप्रकृतिपुरुषवाचिनः शब्दास्तत्प्रकार-विशिष्टतयावस्थिते परमात्मनि मुख्यतया वर्तन्ते । जीवात्मवाचिदेवमनुष्यशब्दवत् । यथा देवमनुष्यादिशब्दा देवमनुष्यादिप्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषाणां जीवात्मप्रकारतयैव पदार्थत्वात्प्रकारिणि जीवात्मनि मुख्यतया वर्तन्ते । तस्मात्सर्वस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुनः परमात्म-शरीरतया तत्प्रकारत्वात्परमात्मनि मुख्यतया वर्तन्ते सर्वे वाचकाः शब्दाः ।

1. M<sub>2</sub> om. °प्रकृति°
2. P M<sub>1</sub> om. एव—A<sub>1</sub> एवमेव
3. P M<sub>1</sub> om. च
4. T °गुणाश्रयः
5. P M<sub>1,2</sub> °वस्थोऽपि
6. P M<sub>1,2</sub> तदुपादानं जगत्
7. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1,2</sub> om. स्थूल°.....ब्रह्मणस्
8. A<sub>1</sub> जगतस् for ब्रह्मणस्.....
9. M<sub>2</sub> °स्थितपरमात्मनि
10. M<sub>2</sub> om. °मनुष्य°—M<sub>1</sub> °मनुष्यादि°
11. T. om. देवमनुष्यादि
12. M<sub>2</sub> om. सर्वस्य
13. P M<sub>1</sub> तद्वाचकाः

[७६] अयमेव चात्मशरीरभावः पृथक्सिद्धचनर्हाधाराधेयभावो नियन्तृनियाम्यभावः शेषशेषिभावश्च । सर्वात्मनाधारतया नियन्तृतया शेषितया च—आप्नोतीत्यात्मा सर्वस्वात्मनाधेयतया, नियाम्यतया, शेषितया च - अपृथक्सिद्धं प्रकारभूतमित्याकारः शरीरमिति चोच्यते । एवमेव हि जीवात्मनः स्वशरीरसंबन्धः । एवमेव परमात्मनः सर्वशरीरत्वेन सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वम् ।

[७७] तदाह श्रुतिगणः - सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति सर्वे वेदा यत्रैकं भवन्तीति । तस्यैकस्य वाच्यत्वादेकार्थवाचिनो भवन्तीत्यर्थः । एको देवो बहुधा निविष्टः, सहैव सन्तं न विजानन्ति देवा इत्यादि । देवा इन्द्रियाणि । देवमनुष्यादीनामन्तर्यामितयात्मत्वेन निविश्य सहैव सन्तं तेषामिन्द्रियाणि मनःपर्यन्तानि न विजानन्तीत्यर्थः । तथा च पौराणिकानि वचांसि—

नताः स्म सर्ववचसां प्रतिष्ठा यत्र शाश्वती ।

वाच्ये हि वचसः प्रतिष्ठा ।

कार्याणां कारणं पूर्वं वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम् ।

वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः ।

1.  $M_2 A_1$  om. च
2.  $M_2$  विशेषणविशेषभावः for नियन्तृनियाम्यभावः
3.  $P M_1$  cm. च
4.  $P M_1$  dittography of शेषतया— $P M_{2,3}$  om. च, after शेषतया
5.  $M_1$  प्रकारः for आकारः
6.  $M_1$  तथाह
7. all om. इति
8.  $A_1$  अन्वयः for अर्थः
9.  $P$  om. न विजानन्ति.....तेषां
10.  $M_1$  निविष्टस्य for निविश्य

इत्यादीनि सर्वाणि <sup>२</sup>हि वचांसि संशरीरात्मविशिष्टमन्तर्यामिणमेवाचक्षते । हन्ता-  
हमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति हि श्रुतिः ।  
तथा च मानवं वचः—

प्रशासितारं सर्वेषामणीयांसमणीयसाम् ।

रूक्माभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं विद्यात्तं पुरुषं परम् ॥

अन्तः प्रविश्यान्तर्यामितया सर्वेषां प्रशासितारं निर्यन्तारम्—अणीयांस आत्मानः  
कृत्स्नस्याचेतनस्य व्यापकतया सूक्ष्मभूतास्ते तेषामपि व्यापकत्वात्तेभ्योऽपि सूक्ष्मतर  
इत्यर्थः—रूक्माभः आदित्यवर्णः—स्वप्नधीगम्यः स्वप्नकल्पबुद्धिप्राप्यः, विशदतमप्रत्यक्ष-  
तापन्नानुध्यानैकलभ्य इत्यर्थः ।

एनमेके वैदन्त्यमिं मारुतोऽन्ये प्रजापतिम् ।

इन्द्रमेके वरे प्राणमपरे ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ॥

इति । एके—वेदा इत्यर्थः । उक्तरीत्या परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः सर्वस्य प्रशासितृत्वेन सर्वा-  
न्तरात्मतया प्रविश्यावस्थितत्वादग्न्यादयः शब्दा अपि शाश्वतब्रह्मशब्दवत्तस्यैव वाचका  
भवन्तीत्यर्थः । तथा च स्मृत्यन्तरम्—

1. M<sub>2</sub> om. हि—A<sub>2</sub> च for हि
2. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> सर्वशरीर°
3. P M<sub>1</sub> om. एवाचक्षते
4. P M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub>, T. om. हन्ताहं
5. M<sub>2</sub> om. रूक्माभं.....अणीयांस
6. P om. प्रशासितारं
7. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. निर्यन्तारं
8. M<sub>2</sub> °भम्.....°वर्ण.....°गम्य.....°प्राप्य.....°लभ्यं
9. M<sub>2</sub> om. वैदन्त्यमिं
10. M<sub>2</sub> प्रशासितृत्वे
11. P M<sub>1</sub> अपि शब्दाः—T. om. अपि

ये यजन्ति पितृन्देवान्ब्राह्मणान्सहुताशनान् ।

सर्वभूतान्तरात्मानं विष्णुमेव यजन्ति ते ॥

इति । पितृदेवब्राह्मणहुताशनादिशब्दास्तन्मुखेन तदन्तरात्मभूतस्य विष्णोरेव वाचका इत्युक्तं भवति ।

- ५ [७८] अत्रेदं सर्वशास्त्रहृदयम् — जीवात्मानः स्वयमसंकुचितापरिच्छिन्न-निर्मलज्ञानस्वरूपाः सन्तः कर्मरूपाविद्यावेष्टितास्तत्तत्कर्मानुरूपज्ञानसंकोचमापन्नाः, ब्रह्मादि-स्तम्बपर्यन्तविविधविचित्रदेहेषु प्रविष्टास्तत्तद्देहोचितलब्धज्ञानप्रसारास्तत्तद्देहात्माभिमानिनस्तदुचितकर्माणि कुर्वाणास्तदनुगुणसुखदुःखोपभोगरूपसंसारप्रवाहं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । एतेषां संसारमोचनं भगवत्प्रपत्तिमन्तरेण नोपपद्यत इति तदर्थं प्रथममेषां देवादिभेद-  
१० रहितज्ञानैकाकारतया सर्वेषां साम्यं प्रतिपाद्य, तस्यापि स्वरूपस्य भगवच्छेषतैकरसतया भगवदालम्बकतामपि प्रतिपाद्य, भगवत्स्वरूपं च हेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणैकतानतया सकलेतर-विसर्जातीयमनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणांश्रयं स्वसंकल्पप्रवृत्तसमस्तचिदचिद्वस्तु-जाततया सर्वस्यात्मभूतं प्रतिपाद्य, तदुपासनं साङ्गं तत्प्रापकं प्रतिपादयन्ति शास्त्राणीति ।

[७९] यथोक्तम्—

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निर्वाणमय एवायमात्मा ज्ञानमयोऽमलः ।

दुःखाज्ञानमला धर्मा प्रकृतेस्ते न चाल्मनः ।

इति प्रकृतिसंसर्गकृतकर्ममूलत्वान्नात्मस्वरूपप्रयुक्ता धर्मा इत्यर्थः । प्राप्ताप्राप्तविवेकेन प्रकृतेरेव धर्मा इत्युक्तम् ।

1. A, om. भवति

2. M, om. °स्तम्ब°

3. M, °मेदेषु for °देहेषु

4. P om. प्रसारास्.....°संसार

5. A, एषां for एतेषां

6. M, भगवत्प्रपत्तिम् A, भगवत्प्राप्तिम्

7. P °विसर्जातीय [मनव°.....°वस्तुजात] तथा

8. M, A, °आलयं for आश्रयं—M, om. °गण°

9. M, °प्रवर्त्य° for °प्रवृत्त°

विद्याविनयसंपन्ने ब्राह्मणे गवि हस्तिनि ।

शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः ।

इति । देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्यावरूपप्रकृतिसंसृष्टस्यात्मनः स्वरूपविवेचनी बुद्धिर्येषां ते पण्डिताः । तत्तत्प्रकृतिविशेषवियुक्तात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानवन्तस्तत्र तत्रात्यन्तविषमाकारे वर्तमान-  
मात्मानं समानाकारं पश्यन्तीति समदर्शिन इत्युक्तम् । तदिदमाह—

इहैव तैर्जितः सर्गो येषां साम्ये स्थितं मनः ।

निर्दोषं हि समं ब्रह्म तस्माद्ब्रह्मणि ते स्थिताः ॥

इति । निर्दोषं—देवादिप्रकृतिविशेषसंसर्गरूपदोषरहितं स्वरूपेणावस्थितं सर्वमात्म-  
वस्तु निर्वाणरूपज्ञानैकाकारतया सममित्यर्थः ।

[८०] तस्यैवंभूतस्यात्मनो भगवच्छेषतैकरसता तन्नियाम्यता तदेकाधारता १०  
च तच्छरीरतत्तनुप्रभृतिभिः शब्दैस्तत्सामानाधिकरण्येन च श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुंराणेषु  
प्रतिपाद्यत इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् ।

[८१] दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।

मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥

1. all except P A<sub>1</sub> om. इति
2. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub>, om. this line.
3. P M<sub>1</sub> om. इति
4. P adds °प्रकृतिविकृति°—M<sub>2</sub> adds °प्रकृतिपरिणामविशेष°
5. P M<sub>1</sub>, सर्वात्म°
6. P °रसतया.....°याम्यतया.....°धारतया
7. P M<sub>1</sub> add तदात्मकत्वं तच्छ°—A<sub>2</sub> om. तच्छरीर°
8. P °तिहासाः [पुरा°.....एव ये] प्रपद्यन्ते—
9. T °पुराणादिषु

इति तस्यात्मनः कर्मकृतविचित्रगुणमयप्रकृतिसंसर्गरूपात्संसारान्मोक्षो भगवत्प्रपत्तिमन्तरेण  
नोपपद्यत इत्युक्तं भवति । नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यत ईत्यादिश्रुतिभिश्च ।

मया ततमिदं सर्वं जगदव्यक्तमूर्तिना ।

मत्स्थानि सर्वभूतानि न चाहं 'तेष्ववस्थितः ।

नै च मत्स्थानि भूतानि पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् ॥

इति सर्वशक्तियोगात्सर्वैश्वर्यवैचित्र्यमुक्तम् । तदाह—

विष्टभ्याहमिदं कृत्स्नमेकांशेन स्थितो जगत् ।

इति—अनन्तविचित्रमहाश्चर्यरूपं जगन्ममायुतांशेनात्मतया प्रविश्य सर्वं मत्संकल्पेन  
विष्टभ्यानेन रूपेणानन्तमहाविभूतिरपरिमितोदारगुणसागरो निरतिशयाश्चर्यभूतः स्थितो-

१० ऽहमित्यर्थः । तदिदमाह—

एकत्वे सति नानात्वं नानात्वे सति चैकता ।

अचिन्त्यं ब्रह्मणो रूपं कस्तद्वेदितुमर्हति ॥

इति\* । प्रशासितृत्वेनैक एव सन्निविचित्रचिदचिद्वस्तुष्वन्तरात्मतया प्रविश्य तत्तद्रूपेण  
विचित्रप्रकारो विचित्रकर्म कारयन्नानारूपतां भजते । एवं स्वर्पांस्पांशेन तु सर्वाश्चर्यभयं

1. M<sub>1</sub> भगवत्प्रपत्तिम्—

2. P om. उक्तं—M<sub>1</sub> om. भवति

3. A<sub>1</sub> om. °आदि°—T इत्यादिभिः

4. P तेषु वाप्यहम्

5. P om. न.....भूतानि

6. P तथाहि for तदाह

7. M<sub>1</sub> एवांशेन

8. M<sub>1</sub> om. आत्मतया

9. P °ष्टभ्य येन—M<sub>1</sub> ष्टभ्यान्येन

10. P M<sub>1</sub> om. इति

11. M<sub>2</sub> °कर्मकारी सन्

12. P एवं सत्तु बोध्या—M<sub>1</sub> स्वस्वदृष्ट्यांशेन—

13. M<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>1</sub> om. तु

नानारूपः जगत्तदन्तरात्मतया प्रविश्य विष्टभ्य नानात्वेनावस्थितोऽपि सन्ननवधिकातिशया-  
संख्येयकल्याणगुणगणः सर्वेश्वरेश्वरः परब्रह्मभूतः पुरुषोत्तमो नारायणो निरतिशयश्चर्य-  
भूतो नीलतोयदसंकाशः पुण्डरीकदलमलायतेक्षणः सहस्रांशुसहस्रकिरणः परमे व्योम्नि  
यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमस्तदक्षरे परमे व्योमन्त्रित्यादिश्रुतिसिद्ध एक  
एवातिष्ठते ।

५

[८२] ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य कस्यचिदपि वस्तुन एकत्वभावस्यैककार्यशक्तियुक्त-  
स्यैकरूपस्य रूपान्तरयोगः स्वभावान्तरयोगः शक्त्यन्तरयोगश्च न घटते । तस्यैतस्य  
परब्रह्मणः सर्ववस्तुविजातीयतया सर्वस्वभावत्वं सर्वशक्तियोगश्चेत्येकस्यैव विचित्रानन्त-  
रूपता च पुनरप्यनन्तापरिमिताश्चर्ययोगेनैकरूपता च न विरुद्धेति वस्तुमात्रसाम्याद्विरोध-  
चिन्ता न युक्तेत्यर्थः । यथोक्तं—

१०

शक्तयः सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः ।

यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाद्या भावशक्तयः ॥

भवन्ति तपसां श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता ॥ इति ।

एतदुक्तं भवति—सर्वेषामग्निजलादीनां भावानामेकस्मिन्नपि भावे दृष्टैव शक्ति-  
स्तद्विसजातीयभावांन्तरेऽपीति<sup>११</sup> न चिन्तयितुं युक्ता जलादावदृष्टापि तद्विसजातीयपावके, १५

1. M<sub>1</sub> प्रविश्य.
2. M<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>2</sub> om. °गणः
3. P M<sub>1</sub>, नीलजीमूत°
4. A<sub>2</sub> om. सहस्रांशु°.....गुहायां
5. P M<sub>1</sub> om. स्वभावान्तरयोगः—M<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>2</sub> °योगश्च
6. P नोपपद्यते for न घटते
7. T तस्यैकस्य
8. M<sub>1</sub> अचिन्त्यनयगोचराः
9. A<sub>2</sub> अग्निकल्पादीनां
10. A<sub>1</sub> °इतरे for °अन्तरे
11. M<sub>1</sub> om. इति—
12. M<sub>1</sub> om. पावके—M<sub>2</sub> पावकेऽपि भासकस्य°

भास्वरत्वोष्णतादिशक्तिर्यथा दृश्यते, एवमेव सर्ववस्तुविसजातीये ब्रह्मणि सर्वसाम्यं नानुमातुं युक्तमिति । अतो विचित्रानन्तशक्तियुक्तं ब्रह्मैवेत्यर्थः । तदाह—

जगदेतन्महाश्रयं रूपं यस्य महात्मनः ।

तेनाश्रयवरेणाहं भवता कृष्ण संगतः ॥

इति ।

[८३] तदेतन्नानाविधानन्तश्रुतिनिकरशिष्टपरिगृहीततद्व्याख्यानपरिश्रमादवधारितम् । तथा हि—प्रमाणान्तरापरिदृष्टापरिमितपरिणामानेकतत्त्वनियतक्रमविशिष्टौ सृष्टि-प्रलयौ ब्रह्मणोऽनेकविधाः श्रुतयो वदन्ति—निरवद्यं निरञ्जनं विज्ञानमानन्दं निर्विकारं निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निर्गुणमित्यादिकाः । निर्गुणं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति काश्चन श्रुतयो-

१० ऽभिदधति । नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन—मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति—यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्—तत्त्वेन कं पश्येत्तत्त्वेन कं विजानीयादित्यादिका नानात्व-निषेधवादिन्यः सन्ति काश्चन श्रुतयः । यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्—यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः—सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरो नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन्त्यदास्ते—सर्वे निमेषा जज्ञिरे विद्युतः पुरुषादधि—अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः

१५ सत्यसंकल्प इति सर्वस्मिञ्जगति हेयतयावगतं सर्वगुणं प्रतिषिध्य निरतिशयकल्याण-गुणानन्त्यं सर्वज्ञतां सर्वशक्तियोगं सर्वनामरूपव्याकरणं सर्वस्याधारतां च काश्चन श्रुतयो ब्रुवते । सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति—ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं—एकः सन्बहुधा

1.  $M_1 A_{1,2}$  om. एव

2.  $M_1$  om. सर्वं

3.  $M_{1,2}$  °श्रयवरेण

4. P °व्याख्यात°

5.  $PM_1 A_{1,2}$  om. तत्त्वेन.....विजानीयाद्

6. P om. वादिन्यः.....रूपाणि

7.  $M_2$  शक्तिरूपतां

8.  $M_{1,2}$ , T. om. श्रुतयो



विचार इत्यादिका ब्रह्मसृष्टं जगन्नानाकारं प्रतिपाद्य तदैक्यं च प्रतिपादयन्ति काश्चन । पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा-भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा—प्रजापतिरकामयत प्रजाः सृजेयेति—पतिं विश्वस्यात्मेश्वरं—शाश्वतं शिवमच्युतं—तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं तं देवतानां परमं च दैवतं—सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान इत्यादिका ब्रह्मणः सर्वस्मादन्यत्वं सर्वस्येशितव्यमीश्वरत्वं च ब्रह्मणः सर्वस्य शेषतां पतित्वं चेश्वरस्य काश्चन । अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा—एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः—यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं—यस्यापः शरीरं—यस्य तेजः शरीरमित्यादि यस्यान्यक्तं शरीरं—यस्याक्षरं शरीरं—यस्य मृत्युः शरीरं—यस्यात्मा शरीरमिति ब्रह्मण्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य वस्तुनो ब्रह्मणश्च शरीरात्मभावं दर्शयन्ति काश्चनेति ।

[८४] नानारूपाणां वाक्यानामविरोधो मुख्यार्थपरित्यागश्च यथा संभवति १०  
तथा वर्णनीयम् । वर्णितं च—अविकारश्रुतयः स्वरूपपरिणामपरिहारादेव मुख्यार्थाः । निर्गुणवादाश्च प्राकृतहेयगुणनिषेधपरतया व्यवस्थिताः । नानात्वनिषेधवादाश्चैकस्य ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया प्रकारभूतं सर्वं चेतनाचेतनं वस्त्विति सर्वस्यात्मतया सर्वप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवावस्थितमिति सुरक्षिताः । सर्वप्रकारविलक्षणत्वपतित्वेश्वरत्वं सर्वकल्याणगुणगणाकारत्वसंय-

1. A, T add काश्चन श्रुतयः
2. all except A, T om. शाश्वतं शिवमच्युतम्
3. P om. महेश्वरं.....परमं
4. P om. यस्य तेजः शरीरमित्यादि
5. M, A, om. इत्यादि
6. M, om. यस्यात्मा शरीरं,—adds इत्यादि
7. T काश्चिद्
8. A, T तयैव
9. M, T °निषेधतया
10. T एकस्यैव
11. M, चेतनात्मकं वस्तु
12. P M, A, om. सर्व° before कल्याण°—P A, om. °गण°
13. P om. °सत्यकामत्व°

कामत्वसत्यसंकल्पत्वादिवाक्यं तदभ्युपगमादेव सुरक्षितम् । ज्ञानानन्दमात्रवादि च सर्वस्मादन्यस्य सर्वकल्याणगुणाश्रयस्य सर्वेश्वरस्य सर्वशेषिणः सर्वाधारस्य सर्वोत्पत्तिस्थिति-  
प्रलयहेतुभूतस्य निरवद्यस्य निर्विकारस्य सर्वात्मभूतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपनिरूपकधर्मो  
मूलप्रत्यनीकानन्दरूपज्ञानमेवेति स्वप्रकाशतया स्वरूपमपि ज्ञानमेवेति च प्रतिपादनादनुपा-  
लितम् । ऐक्यवादाश्च शरीरात्मभावेन सामानाधिकरण्यमुख्यार्थतोपपादनादेव सुस्थिताः ।

[८५] एवं च सत्यभेदो वा भेदो वा ध्यात्मकता वा वेदान्तवेद्यः कोऽयमर्थः  
समर्थितो भवति । सर्वस्य 'वेदवेद्यत्वात्सर्वं समर्थितम् । सर्वशरीरतया सर्वप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवा-  
वस्थितमित्यभेदः समर्थितः । एकमेव ब्रह्म नानाभूतचिदचिद्वस्तुप्रकारं नानात्वेनावस्थित-  
मिति 'भेदाभेदौ । अचिद्वस्तुनश्चिद्वस्तुनश्चेश्वरस्य च स्वरूपस्वभाववैलक्षण्यादसंकराच्च  
भेदः समर्थितः ।

[८६] ननु च तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो तस्य तावदेव चिरमित्यैक्यज्ञानमेव परम-  
पुरुषार्थलक्षणमोक्षसाधनमिति गम्यते । नैतदेवम् । पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्ट-  
स्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेतीत्यात्मानं प्रेरितारं चान्तर्यामिणं पृथग्मत्वा ततः पृथक्त्वज्ञानाद्धेतो-

1. P °वाची—om. च सर्वस्मादन्यस्य
2. M<sub>1</sub> स्वस्वरूपं विज्ञानम्
3. P M<sub>1</sub> उपपादितम् for अनुपादितम्
4. M<sub>1</sub> om. वेद°
5. P M<sub>1</sub> °प्रकारक°
6. P om. अभदः.....°वस्थितम्
7. M<sub>1</sub> om. एकम्.....°वस्थितम्
8. M<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>2</sub> om. °वस्तु°
9. M<sub>2</sub> adds भेदाभेदौ समर्थितौ
10. M<sub>1</sub> om. °स्वभाव°
11. M<sub>1</sub> adds चिरं यावन्न विमोक्षे अथ संप्रत्येदिति [sic]
12. P om. ज्ञानम् upto पृथक्त्व°
13. M<sub>2</sub> प्रेरकं for प्रेरितारं—ज्ञात्वा for मत्वा
14. M<sub>2</sub> पृथक्त्वभाव°

स्तेन परमात्मना जुष्टोऽमृतत्वमेतीति साक्षादमृतत्वप्राप्तिसाधनमात्मनो नियन्तुश्च पृथ-  
म्भावज्ञानमेवेत्यवगम्यते ।

[८७] ऐक्यवाक्यविरोधादेतदपरमार्थसगुणब्रह्मप्राप्तिविषयमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति  
चेत् । पृथक्त्वज्ञानस्यैव साक्षादमृतत्वप्राप्तिसाधनत्वश्रवणाद्विपरीतं कस्मान्न भवति ।

एतदुक्तं भवति । द्वयोस्तुल्ययोर्विरोधे<sup>१</sup> सत्यविरोधेन तयोर्विषयो विवेचनीय  
इति । कथमविरोध इति चेत् । अन्तर्यामिरूपेणावस्थितस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया  
प्रकारत्वाज्जीवात्मनस्तत्प्रकारं ब्रह्मैव त्वमिति शब्देनाभिधीयते । तथैव ज्ञातव्यमिति  
तस्य वाक्यस्य विषयः । एवंभूताज्जीवात्तदात्मतयावस्थितस्य परमात्मनो निखिलदोष-  
रहिततया सत्यसंकल्पत्वाद्यनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरत्वेन च यः पृथग्भावः  
सोऽनुसंधेय इत्यस्य वाक्यस्य विषय इत्ययमर्थः पूर्वमसकृदुक्तः । भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं  
च मत्वेति भोग्यरूपस्य वस्तुनोऽचेतनत्वं परमार्थत्वं सततं विकारास्पदत्वमित्यादयः  
स्वभावाः, भोक्तुर्जीवात्मनश्चामलापरिच्छिन्नज्ञानानन्दस्वभावस्यैवानादिकर्मरूपाविद्याकृत-  
नानाविधज्ञानसंकोचविकासौ भोग्यंभूताचिद्वस्तुसंसर्गश्च परमात्मोपासनान्मोक्षश्चेत्यादयः

1.  $M_2$  इत्यर्थोऽवगम्यते
2.  $M_1$  adds इति ऐक्यज्ञानस्यैव मोक्षसाधनत्वं चेत्
3. P om. विरोधे सति
4.  $M_1$  °स्थितपरम्<sup>०</sup>
5.  $A_2$  जीवात्मनः प्रकारत्वात्
6.  $M_1$  तत्त्वमिति
7.  $M_1, A_2$  T अर्थः for विषयः
8.  $M_1$  °भूतजी°—°तया व्यवस्थितपरम्<sup>०</sup>
9.  $M_1$  °हेय° for °दोष°
10.  $M_1$  अनुसंधीयत
11. P  $M_1$  add वाक्यस्य च—P om. अयम्
12.  $A_2$  °भूतस्य for °रूपस्य
13. T भोग्यभूतस्य

स्वभावाः, एवंभूतभोक्तृभोग्ययोरन्तर्यामिरूपेणावस्थानं स्वरूपेण चापरिमितगुणौघा-  
श्रयत्वेनावस्थानमिति परस्य ब्रह्मणसिविधावस्थानं ज्ञातव्यमित्यर्थः ॥

- [८८] तत्त्वमसीति सद्विद्यायामुपास्यं ब्रह्म सगुणं सगुणब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्चः फलमित्य-  
भियुक्तैः पूर्वाचार्यैर्व्याख्यातम् । यथोक्तं वाक्यकारेण—युक्तं तद्गुणकोपासनादिति । व्याख्यातं  
च द्रमिडाचार्येण विद्याविकल्पं वदता—यद्यपि सच्चित्तो न निर्भुग्नदैवतं गुणगणं मनसानुधा-  
वेत्तथाप्यन्तर्गुणामेव देवतां भजत इति तत्रापि सगुणैव देवता प्राप्यत इति । सच्चित्तः  
सद्विद्यानिष्ठः । न निर्भुग्नदैवतं गुणगणं मनसानुधावेत्—अपहृतपाम्पत्वादिर्कल्याण-  
गुणगणं दैवताद्विभक्तं यद्यपि दहरविद्यानिष्ठ इव सच्चित्तो न सरेत् । तथाप्यन्तर्गुणामेव  
देवतां भजते—देवतास्वरूपानुबन्धित्वात्सर्वकलकल्याणगुणगणस्य केनचित्परदेवतासाधारणेन  
निखिलजगत्कारणत्वादिना गुणेनोपास्यमानापि देवता वस्तुतः स्वरूपानुबन्धि सर्वकल्याण-  
गुणविशिष्टैवोपास्यते । अतः सगुणमेव ब्रह्म तत्रापि प्राप्यमिति सद्विद्यादहरविद्ययो-  
र्विकल्प इत्यर्थः ।

1. P स्वभावा एव
2. P M<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>1</sub> गुणाश्रय°
3. P A<sub>1</sub> om. अभियुक्तैः
4. P M<sub>1</sub> दविडा°
5. M<sub>1</sub> interpolates सद्विद्यानिष्ठः सच्चित्तो—P M<sub>1</sub> निर्भुग्नगुणगणं दैवतं  
[अप° in 7.]
6. P om. तथा up to °धवेत्
7. M<sub>1</sub> भजेत—M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. इति
8. P M<sub>1</sub> om. °कल्याण°
9. M<sub>1</sub> भजेत
10. M<sub>1</sub> सकलस्य
11. T °गुणगणेन
12. P M<sub>1</sub> वस्तुत्व°
13. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> °गुणगण°

[८९] ननु च सर्वस्य जन्तोः परमात्मान्तर्यामी तन्नियाम्यं च सर्वमेवेत्युक्तम् । एवं च सति विधिनिषेधशास्त्राणामधिकारी न दृश्यते । यः स्वबुद्धयैव प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिशक्तः स एवं कुर्यान्न कुर्यादिति विधिनिषेधयोग्यः । न चैष दृश्यते । सर्वस्मिन्प्रवृत्तिजाते सर्वस्य प्रेरकः परमात्मा कारयितेति तस्य सर्वनियमनं प्रतिपादितम् । तंथाच श्रूयते-एष एव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उचिनीषति । एष एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषतीति । साध्वसाधुकर्मकारयितृत्वान्नैर्घृण्यं च ।

[९०] अत्रोच्यते - सर्वेषामेव चेतनानां चिच्छक्तियोगः प्रवृत्तिशक्तियोगं इत्यादि सर्वं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरिकरं सामान्येन संविधाय तन्निर्वहणाय तदाधारो भूत्वान्तः प्रविश्यानुमन्तृतया च नियमनं कुर्वन्शेषित्वेनावस्थितः परमात्मैतदाहित-शक्तिः संप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यादि स्वयमेव कुरुते । एवं कुर्वाणमीक्षमाणः परमात्मोदासीन आस्ते । अतः सर्वमुपपन्नम् । साध्वसाधुकर्मणोः कारयितृत्वं तु व्यवस्थितविषयं न सर्वसाधारणम् । यस्तु पूर्वं स्वयमेवातिमात्रमानुकूल्ये प्रवृत्तस्तं प्रति प्रीतः स्वयमेव भगवान्कल्याणबुद्धियोगदानं कुर्वन्कल्याणे प्रवर्तयति । यः पुनरतिमात्रं प्रीतिकूल्ये प्रवृत्तस्तस्य कुरां बुद्धिं ददन्स्वयमेव शूरेणैव कर्मसु प्रेरयति भगवान् । यथोक्तं भगवता—

तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।

ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥

1. P यामीति निया°
2. M<sub>2</sub>, A, T om. तथा, read श्रूयते च
3. P °योगतादिसर्व°
4. M<sub>1</sub> om. निवृत्ति°
5. M<sub>2</sub> परमात्मैव तद्°
6. M<sub>1</sub> om. सन्—M<sub>2</sub> जीवात्मा सर्वप्र°
7. M<sub>2</sub> अपीक्षमाणः
8. T °कर्मकार°
9. M<sub>1</sub> om. °विषयं—P °धारणविषयम्
10. T अतिमात्रानु°
11. T अतिमात्रप्राप्ति°

तेषामेवानुकम्पार्थमहमज्ञानजं तमः ।

नाशयाम्यात्मभावस्थो ज्ञानदीपेन भास्वता ॥

तानहं द्विषतः क्रान्त्संसारेषु नराधमान् ।

क्षिपाम्यजस्रमशुभानासुरीप्सु योनिषु ॥ इति ।

- ५ [९१] सोऽयं परब्रह्मभूतः पुरुषोत्तमो निरतिशयपुण्यसंचयक्षीणाशेषजन्मो-  
पचितपापराशेः परमपुरुषचरणारविन्दशरणागतिजनिततदाभिमुख्यस्य सदाचार्योपदेशो-  
पबृंहितशास्त्राधिगततत्त्वयाथात्म्यावबोधपूर्वकाहरहरूपचीयमानशमदमतपःशौचक्षमार्जव -  
भयाभयस्थानविवेकदयार्हिसाद्यात्मगुणोपेतस्य वर्णाश्रमोचितपरमपुरुषाराधनवेषनित्यनैमि-  
त्तिककर्मोपसंहृतिनिषिद्धपरिहारनिष्ठस्य परमपुरुषचरणारविन्दयुगलन्यस्तार्हमात्मीयस्य
- १० तद्भक्तिकारितानवरतस्तु तिसृष्टितनमस्कृतिवन्दनयतनकीर्तनगुणश्रवणवचनध्यानार्चनप्रणा -  
मादिप्रीतपरमकारुणिकपुरुषोत्तमप्रसादविध्यस्तत्त्वान्तध्वान्तस्थानन्यप्रयोजनानवरतनिरतिश-  
यप्रियविशदतमप्रत्यक्षतापन्नानुध्यानरूपभक्त्येकलभ्यः । तदुक्तं परमशुरुभिर्मर्गवद्यामुना-  
चार्यपादैः—उभयपरिकर्मितत्त्वान्तस्थैकान्तिकात्यन्तिकभक्तियोगलभ्य इति । ज्ञानयोग-  
कर्मयोगसंस्कृतान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः । तथा च श्रुतिः ।

१५

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।

अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥

1. A, पूर्वस्य
2. M, अनुस्थीयमान°
3. M, A, °पेतवर्ण°
4. M, om. °पुरुष°—P M, A, om. °अरविन्द°
5. M, °लीयतद्°
6. PM, A, T om. °वन्दन°
7. P A, om. °प्रिय°
8. M, om. °भगवद्°
9. P M, om. °पादैः
10. M, A, ज्ञानकर्मयोग°

इति । अत्राविद्याशब्देन विद्येतरत्वाद्वर्णाश्रमाचारादि पूर्वोक्तं कर्मोच्यते विद्याशब्देन च भक्तिरूपार्पणं ध्यानमुच्यते । यथोक्तम्—

इयाज सोऽपि सुबहून्यज्ञाञ्ज्ञानव्यपाश्रयः ।

ब्रह्मविद्यामधिष्ठाय तर्तुं मृत्युमविद्यया ॥

इति । तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते । य एनं विदुर- ५  
मृतास्ते भवन्ति । ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् । सो यो ह वै तत्परं वेद ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव  
भवतीत्यादि । वेदनशब्देन ध्यानमेवाभिहितम् । निदिध्यासितव्य इत्यादिनैकार्थात् ।  
तदेव ध्यानं पुनरपि विशिनष्टि—नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुधा  
श्रुतेन । यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वामिति । भक्ति-  
रूपापन्नानुष्ठानेनैव लभ्यते न केवलं वेदनामात्रेण न मेधयेति केवलस्य निषिद्धत्वात् । १०

[९२] एवदुक्तं भवति - योऽयं मुमुक्षुर्वेदान्तविहितवेदनरूपध्यानादिनिष्ठो  
यदा तस्य तस्मिन्नेवानुष्ठाने 'निरवधिकातिशया प्रीतिर्जायते तदैव तेन लभ्यते परः  
पुरुष इति । यथोक्तं भगवता —

पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया ।

भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्योऽहमेवंविधोऽर्जुन ।

ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परंतप ॥

भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यावान्यश्चास्मि तत्त्वतः ।

ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम् ॥

1. T °पञ्चम्या°
2. M, A, T om. सो यो.....परं वेद
3. P om. °शब्देन
4. T तेन च
5. M, प्रीतिरूपा°
6. T अनवधिका°
7. T परमपुरुषः

इति । तदनन्तरं मां तत् एव भक्तितो विशत इत्यर्थः । भक्तिरपि निरतिशय-  
प्रियानन्यप्रयोजनसकलेतरवैतृष्ण्यावहज्ञानविशेष एवेति । तद्युक्त एव तेन परेणात्मना  
वरणीयो भवतीति तेन लभ्यत इति श्रुत्यर्थः । एवंविधपरभक्तिरूपज्ञानविशेषस्योत्पादकः  
पूर्वोक्ताहरहरूपचीयमानज्ञानपूर्वककर्मानुगृहीतभक्तियोग एव । यथोक्तं भगवता

५ पराशरेण—

वर्णाश्रमाचारवता पुरुषेण परः पुमान् ।

विष्णुराराध्यते पन्था नान्यस्ततोषकारकः ॥

इति । निखिलजगद्वाराणायावनितलेऽवतीर्णः परब्रह्मभूतः पुरुषोत्तमः स्वयमेवैतदुक्तवान्—

स्वकर्मनिरतः सिद्धिं यथा विन्दति तच्छृणु ॥

१० यतः प्रवृत्तिर्भूतानां येन सर्वमिदं ततम् ।

स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ॥

इति । यथोदितक्रमपरिणतभक्त्येकलभ्य एव ।

[९३] 'बोधायनटङ्कद्रमिडगुहदेवकपर्दिभारुचिप्रभृत्यविगीतशिष्टपरिगृहीतपुरा-  
तनवेदवेदान्तव्याख्यानसुव्यक्तार्थश्रुतिनिकरनिदर्शितोऽयं पन्थाः । अनेन चार्वाकशाक्यौल-

१५ क्याक्षपादक्षपणककपिलपतञ्जलिमतानुसारिणो वेदवाद्या वेदावलम्बिकुहद्विभिः सह  
निरस्ताः । वेदावलम्बिनामपि यथावस्थितवस्तुविपर्ययस्तादृशां बाह्यसाम्यं मनुनैवोक्तम्—

1. M<sub>1</sub> om. तदनन्तरं

2. T भक्तेः

3. M<sub>1</sub>A<sub>1</sub> T स्वेतर° for °सकलेतर°

4. P °भक्त्यैकावस्थित—M<sub>1</sub> °क्त्यालभ्य

5. P भगवद्भो°—M<sub>1</sub> भगवान्भो°—T बोधायन°

6. P M<sub>1</sub> °ब्रविड°

7. M<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>1</sub> °प्रभृत्यविगानशिष्ट°

8. P M<sub>1</sub> om. °वेद°

9. M<sub>1</sub> om. °अर्थ°

10. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub>, °निकरदर्शितो



या वेदवाङ्माः स्मृतयो याश्च काश्च कुदृष्टयः ।

सर्वास्ता निष्फलाः प्रेत्य तमोनिष्ठा हि ताः स्मृताः ॥

इति । रजस्तमोभ्यामस्पृष्टमुत्तमं सत्त्वमेव येषां स्वाभाविको गुणस्तेषामेव वैदिकी रुचिर्वेदार्थयाथात्म्यावबोधश्चेत्यर्थः ।

[९४] यथोक्तं मात्स्ये—

संकीर्णाः सात्त्विकाश्चैव राजसास्तामसास्तथा ।

इति । केचिद्ब्रह्मकल्पाः संकीर्णाः केचित्सत्त्वप्रायाः केचिद्रजःप्रायाः केचित्तमःप्राया इति कल्पविभागमुक्त्वा सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयानां तत्त्वानां माहात्म्यवर्णनं च तत्तत्कल्पप्रोक्त-पुराणेषु सत्त्वादिगुणमयेन ब्रह्मणा क्रियत इति चोक्तम्—

यस्मिन्कल्पे तु यत्प्रोक्तं पुराणं ब्रह्मणा पुरा ।

तस्य तस्य तु माहात्म्यं तत्त्वरूपेण वर्ण्यते ॥

इति । विशेषतश्चोक्तम्—

अग्नेः शिवस्य माहात्म्यं तामसेषु प्रकीर्त्यते ।

राजसेषु च माहात्म्यमधिकं ब्रह्मणो विदुः ॥

सात्त्विकेषु च कल्पेषु माहात्म्यमधिकं हरेः ।

तेष्वेव योगसंसिद्धा गमिष्यन्ति परां गतिम् ॥

संकीर्णेषु सरस्वत्याः ..... ॥

1. T वेदैकवचिर्

2. P adds अग्रमर्थः

3. M<sub>1</sub> om. प्रायाः

4. M<sub>2</sub> om. ब्रह्मणा

5. M<sub>3</sub> om. च

6. T सात्त्विकेष्वथ

7. M<sub>3</sub> सिद्धास्ते for संसिद्धा

8. A<sub>3</sub> T add पितृणाम् तदितरेषु च

इत्यादि । एतदुक्तं भवति - आदिक्षेत्रज्ञत्वाद्ब्रह्मणस्तस्यापि केषुचिदहस्तु सत्त्वमुद्रिक्तं केषुचिद्रजः केषुचित्तमः । यथोक्तं भगवता—

न तदस्ति पृथिव्यां वा दिवि देवेषु वा पुनः ।

सत्त्वं प्रकृतिर्जैर्मुक्तं यदेभिः स्यात्त्रिभिर्गुणैः ॥

५ इति । यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मा इति श्रुतेः । ब्रह्मणोऽपि सृज्यत्वेन शास्त्रवश्यत्वेन च क्षेत्रज्ञत्वं गम्यते । सत्त्वप्रायेष्वहस्तु तदितरेषु यानि पुराणानि ब्रह्मणा प्रोक्तानि तेषां परस्परविरोधे सति सात्त्विकाहः प्रोक्तमेव पुराणं यथार्थं तद्विरोध्यन्यदयथार्थमिति पुराणनिर्णयार्थैवेदं सत्त्वनिष्ठेन ब्रह्मणाभिहितमिति विज्ञायत इति ।

१० सत्त्वादीनां कार्यं च भगवतैवोक्तम्—

सत्त्वात्संजायते ज्ञानं रजसो लोभ एव च ।

प्रमादमोहौ तमसो भवतोऽज्ञानमेव च ॥

प्रवृत्तिं च निवृत्तिं च कार्याकार्ये भयाभये ।

बैन्धं मोक्षं च या वेत्ति बुद्धिः सा पार्थ सात्त्विकी ॥

१५ यथा धर्ममधर्मं च कार्यं चाकार्यमेव च ।

अयथावत्प्रजानाति बुद्धिः सा पार्थ राजसी ॥

अधर्मं धर्ममिति या मन्यते तमसावृता ।

सर्वार्थान्विपरीतांश्च बुद्धिः सा पार्थ तामसी ॥

इति ।

२० सर्वान्पुराणार्थान्ब्रह्मणः सकाशादधिगम्यैव सर्वाणि पुराणानि पुराणकाराश्चक्रुः ।

यथोक्तम्—

कथयामि यथा पूर्वं दक्षाद्यैर्मुनिसत्तमैः ।

पृष्टः प्रोवाच भगवानब्जयोनिः पितामहः ॥

इति ।

[९५] अपौरुषेयेषु वेदवाक्येषु परस्परविरुद्धेषु कथमिति चेत् । तात्पर्य-  
निश्चयादविरोधः पूर्वमेवोक्तः । यदपि चेदं विरुद्धवद्दृश्यते-प्राणं मनसि सह कारणैर्न-  
दान्ते परात्मनि संप्रतिष्ठाप्य ध्यायीतेशानं प्रध्यायीतव्यं सर्वमिदं, ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रेन्द्रास्ते सर्वे  
संप्रसूयन्ते, न कारणं, कारणं तु ध्येयः, सर्वैर्ध्यसंपन्नः सर्वेश्वरः शंभुराकाशमध्ये ध्येयः—  
यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किञ्चिद्यस्मान्नाणीयो न ज्ञायोऽस्ति कश्चित् - वृक्ष इव स्तब्धो दिवि ।  
तिष्ठत्येकस्तेनेदं पूर्णं पुरुषेण सर्वम् - ततो यदुत्तरतरं तदरूपमनामयं य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते  
भवन्ति, अथेतरे दुःखमेवापियन्ति—

सर्वाननशिरोग्रीवः सर्वभूतगुहाशयः ।

सर्वव्यापी च भगवांस्तस्मात्सर्वगतः शिवः ॥

यदा तमस्तन्न दिवा न रात्रिर्न सन्न चासच्छिव एव केवलः ।

तदक्षरं तत्सवितुर्वरेण्यं प्रज्ञा च तस्मात्प्रसृता पुराणी ॥

इत्यादि नारायणः परं ब्रह्मेति च पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादितं, तेनास्य कथमविरोधः ।

[९६] अंत्यल्पमेतत्—

वेदवित्प्रवरप्रोक्तवाक्यन्यायोपबृंहिताः ।

वेदाः साङ्गा हरिं प्राहुर्जगज्जन्मादिकारणं ॥

1.  $M_2$  प्रमाणं for प्राणं— $A_2$  प्रणामं for प्राणं
2.  $P M_1$  नासान्ते,  $A_1$  नानान्ते
3.  $P M_1$  om. संप्रसूयन्ते
4.  $PM_1 A_1$  om. न कारणं— $M_2$  om. न— $M_1$  reads अकारणं for न कारणं
5.  $M_2$  om. न ज्ञायोऽस्ति
6.  $M_2$  om. पुरुषेण
7.  $M_2$  om. अरूपम्
8.  $A_1$  om. अयं ..... यन्ति
9.  $M_2$  om. न सन्
10.  $P$  इत्यल्पम्

जन्माद्यस्य यतः - यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, 'येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्मेति जगज्जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्मेत्यवगम्यते । तच्च जगत्सृष्टिप्रलयप्रकरणेष्ववगन्तव्यम् । सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयमिति जंगहुपादानताजगन्निमित्तताजगदन्तर्यामितादिमुखेन परमकारणं सच्छब्देन प्रतिपादितं ब्रह्मेत्यवगतम् । अयमेवार्थः—ब्रह्म वा इदमेकमेवाग्र आसीदिति शाखान्तरे ब्रह्मशब्देन प्रतिपादितः । अनेन सच्छब्देनाभिहितं ब्रह्मेत्यवगतम् । अयमेवार्थस्तथा शाखान्तर आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीन्नान्यत्किञ्चन मिषदिति सद्ब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यामात्मैवाभिहित इत्यवगम्यते । तैथा च शाखान्तर एको ह वै नारायण आसीन्न ब्रह्म नेशानो 'नेमे द्यावापृथिवी न नक्षत्राणीति सद्ब्रह्मात्मैवादिपरमकारणवादिभिः शब्दैर्नारायण एवाभिधीयत इति निश्चीयते ।

[९७] यमन्तः समुद्रे कवयो वयन्तीत्यादि—नैनमूर्ध्वं न तिर्यञ्चं न मध्ये परिजग्रभत् । न तस्येशो कश्चन तस्य नाम महद्यशः ॥ न संदृशे तिष्ठति

1. P om. येन
2. M<sub>1</sub> °प्रलयपरप्रकरणे°
3. M<sub>1</sub> om. °जगदन्तर्यामिता°
4. P M<sub>2</sub> अभिहितं—M<sub>1</sub> प्रतिपादनं
5. P om. ब्रह्म वा.....तथा च
6. A<sub>1</sub> om. ब्रह्मशब्देन
7. M<sub>1</sub> T °द्व्याभिहितं
8. A<sub>1</sub> om. तथा—M<sub>2</sub> adds आत्मशब्देन आत्मा वा
9. M<sub>3</sub> om. आत्मैव
10. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. तथा च
11. A<sub>1</sub> om. नेमे.....°पृथिवी°—M<sub>2</sub>, T om. न नक्षत्राणि and add इत्यादिना
12. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. °आत्म°

रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम्, हृदा मनीषा मनसाभिवल्लो य एवं विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्तीति सर्वस्मात्परत्वमस्य प्रतिपाद्य, न तस्येशे कश्चनेति तस्मात्परं किमपि न विद्यत इति च प्रतिषिध्य, अद्भ्यः संभूतो हिरण्यगर्भ इत्यष्टाविति तेनैकवाक्यतां गमयति । तच्च महापुरुषप्रकरणं हीश्च ते लक्ष्मीश्च पैत्याविति च नारायण एवेति द्योतयति ।

[९८] अयमर्थो नारायणानुवाके प्रपञ्चितः । सहस्रशीर्षं देवमित्यारभ्य स ब्रह्मा सै शिवः सेन्द्रः सोऽक्षरः परमः स्वराडिति सर्वशाखासु परतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपरानक्षरशिवशंभुपरब्रह्मपरज्योतिःपरतत्त्वपरायणपरमात्मादिसर्वशब्दांस्तत्तद्गुणयोगेन नारायण एव प्रयुज्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य समस्तस्य तदाधारतां तन्निग्राम्यतां तच्छेषतां तदात्मकतां च प्रतिपाद्य ब्रह्मशिवयोरपीन्द्रादिसमानाकारतया तद्विभूतित्वं च प्रतिपादितम् । इदं च वाक्यं केवलपरतत्त्वप्रतिपादनैकपरमन्यत्किंचिदप्यत्र न विधीयते ।

[९९] अस्मिन्वाक्ये प्रतिपादितस्य सर्वस्मात्परत्वेनावस्थितस्य ब्रह्मणो वाक्यान्तरेषु ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादिभूपासनादि विधीयते । अतः प्राणं मनसि सह करणैरित्यादि वाक्यं सर्वकारणे परमात्मनि करणप्राणादि सर्वं विकारजातमुपसंहृत्य तमेव परमात्मानं सर्वस्येशानं ध्यायीतेति परब्रह्मभूतनारायणस्यैव ध्यानं विदधाति ।

[१००] पतिं विश्वस्येति न तस्येशे कश्चनेति च तस्यैव सर्वस्येशानता प्रतिपादिता । अत एव सर्वैश्वर्यसंपन्नः सर्वेश्वरः शंभुराकाशमध्ये ध्येय इति नारायणस्यैव

1. M, किंचिदपि—A, T om. च
2. P M, तेनैव वाक्यतां—M, अवगमयति
3. P पैत्या and adds महोरात्रे पार्श्वे°
4. P. om. स शिवः.....°परब्रह्म°
5. M, °पराक्षर°
6. M, A, प्रयुज्यते
7. P M, add तस्य तदाद्यत्ततां तद्व्याप्यतां
8. P om. प्रतिपादन°...सर्वस्मात्पर—M, °तत्त्वैकप्रतिपादन°—M, om. °एक°
9. M, A, add परत्र°—M, परस्य ब्र
10. A, T om, इति च

परमकारणस्य शंभुशब्दवाच्यस्य ध्यानं विधीयते । कश्च ध्येय इत्यारभ्य कारणं तु ध्येयं इति कार्यस्याध्येयतापूर्वककारणैकध्येयतापरत्वाद्वाक्यस्य । तस्यैव नारायणस्य परमकारणता शंभुशब्दवाच्यता च परमकारणप्रतिपादनैकपरे नारायणनुवाक एव प्रतिपन्नेति तद्विरोध्यर्थान्तरपरिकल्पनं कारणस्यैव ध्येयत्वेन विधिवाक्ये न युज्यते ।

- ५ [१०१] यदपि ततो यदुत्तरतरमित्यत्र पुरुषादन्यस्य परतरत्वं प्रतीयत इत्यभ्यधायि तदपि यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किञ्चिद्यस्मान्नाणीयो न ज्यायोऽस्ति कश्चित्-यस्मादपरं - यस्मादन्यत्किञ्चिदपि परं नास्ति केनापि प्रकारेण पुरुषव्यतिरिक्तस्य परत्वं नास्तीत्यर्थः । अणीयस्त्वं - सूक्ष्मत्वम् । ज्यायस्त्वं - सर्वेश्वरत्वम् । सर्वव्यापित्वा-त्सर्वेश्वरत्वादस्यैतद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कस्याप्यणीयस्त्वं ज्यायस्त्वं च नास्तीत्यर्थः । यस्मान्ना-  
१० णीयो न ज्यायोऽस्ति कश्चिदिति पुरुषादन्यस्य कस्यापि ज्यायस्त्वं निषिद्धमिति तस्मा-दन्यस्य परत्वं न युज्यत इति प्रत्युक्तम् ।

- [१०२] कस्तर्हस्य वाक्यस्यार्थः । अस्य प्रकरणस्थोपक्रमे तमेव विदि-त्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनायेति पुरुषवेदनस्यामृतत्वहेतुतां तद्व्यतिरि-क्तस्यापथतां च प्रतिज्ञाय यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किञ्चित्तेनेदं पूर्णं पुरुषेण सर्व-  
१५ मित्येतदन्तेन सर्वस्मात्परत्वं प्रतिपादितम् । यतः पुरुषतत्त्वमेवोत्तरतरं ततो यदुत्तरतरं पुरुषतत्त्वं तदेवारूपमनामयं य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति, अथेतरे दुःखमेवापियन्तीति

1. M, °त्वादेव
2. T ध्येयत्वविधि°—M, ध्येयत्ववाक्ये
3. P M, A<sub>1</sub> परत्वं
4. A<sub>1</sub> om. यस्मात्परं
5. M<sub>2</sub> नास्तीति
6. M<sub>2</sub> °रिक्तपरत्वं
7. M<sub>2</sub> adds अणीयस्त्वं ज्यायस्त्वं
8. - M<sub>2</sub> adds. अर्थ उच्यते
9. A<sub>1</sub> om. एतद्
10. P. M<sub>2</sub>, add पुरुषस्य सर्वस्मात्

पुरुषवेदनस्यामृतत्वहेतुत्वं तदितरस्यापथत्वं प्रतिज्ञातं सहेतुकमुपसंहृतम् । अन्यथोपक्रम-  
गतप्रतिज्ञाभ्यां विरुध्यते । पुरुषस्थैव शुद्धिगुणयोगेन शिवशब्दाभिधेयत्वं शाश्वतं  
शिवमच्युतमित्यादिना ज्ञातमेव । पुरुष एव शिवशब्दाभिधेय इत्यनन्तरमेव वदति—  
महान्प्रभुर्वै पुरुषः सत्त्वस्थैष प्रवर्तक इति । उक्तैनैव न्यायेन न सन्न चासच्छिव एव  
केवल इत्यादि सर्वं नेयम् ।

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[१०३] किंच न तस्येशो कश्चनेति निरस्तसामान्यधिकसंभावनस्य पुरुषस्या-  
णोरणीयानित्यस्मिन्ननुवाके वेदाद्यन्तरूपतया वेदबीजभूतप्रणवस्य प्रकृतिभूताकारवाच्य-  
तया महेश्वरत्वं प्रतिपाद्य दहरपुण्डरीकमध्यस्थाकाशान्तर्वर्तितयोपास्यत्वमुक्तम् । अयमर्थः—  
सर्वस्य वेदजातस्य प्रकृतिः प्रणव उक्तः । प्रणवस्य च प्रकृतिरकारः । प्रणवविकारो  
वेदः स्वप्रकृतिभूते प्रणवे लीनः । प्रणवोऽप्यकारविकारभूतः स्वप्रकृतावकारे लीनः । १०  
तस्य प्रणवप्रकृतिभूतस्याकारस्य यः परो वाच्यः स एव महेश्वर इति सर्ववाचकजातप्रकृति-  
भूताकारवाच्यः सर्ववाच्यजातप्रकृतिभूतनारायणो यः स महेश्वर इत्यर्थः । यथोक्तं  
भगवता—

अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ।

मत्तः परतरं नान्यत्किंचिदस्ति धनंजय ॥

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अक्षराणामकारोऽस्मि ..... ॥

1. M<sub>1</sub> इतरापथ°
2. M<sub>2</sub> om. शाश्वतं
3. T अभिहित
4. M<sub>3</sub> सर्ववेदशास्त्रस्य
5. M<sub>4</sub> om. उक्तः
6. P M<sub>1</sub> om. च
7. M<sub>2</sub> om. आकरः प्रणव°
8. P M<sub>1</sub> om. ऽपि
9. P M<sub>1</sub> om. अकारस्य
10. M<sub>2</sub> om. एव
11. A<sub>2</sub> °वाचकशब्दजात° M<sub>2</sub> °वाच्यजातस्य
12. A<sub>1</sub> om. भगवता

इति । अं इति ब्रह्मेति च श्रुतेः । अकारो वै सर्वा वागिति च । वाचकजातस्याकार-  
प्रकृतित्वं वाच्यजातस्य ब्रह्मप्रकृतित्वं च सुस्पष्टम् । अतो ब्रह्मणोऽकारवाच्यताप्रतिपादना-  
दकारवाच्यो नारायण एव महेश्वर इति सिद्धम् ।

- [१०४] तस्यैव सहस्रशीर्षं देवमिति केवलपरतत्त्वविशेषप्रतिपादनपरेण  
५ नारायणानुवाकेन सर्वस्मात्परत्वं प्रपञ्चितम् । अनेनानन्यपरेण प्रतिपादितमेव परतत्त्वमन्य-  
परेषु सर्ववाक्येषु केनापि शब्देन प्रतीयमानं तदेवेत्यवगम्यत इति शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो  
वामदेववदिति सूत्रकारेण निर्णीतम् । तदेतत्परं ब्रह्म कचिद्ब्रह्मशिवादिशब्दादवगतमिति  
केवलब्रह्मशिवयोर्न परत्वप्रसङ्गः । अस्मिन्ननन्यपरेऽनुवाके तयोरिन्द्रादितुल्यतया तद्विभूति-  
त्वप्रतिपादनात् । कचिदाकाशप्राणादिशब्देन परं ब्रह्माभिहितमिति भूताकाशप्राणादेर्यथा  
१० न परत्वम् । यत्पुनरिदमाशङ्कितमथ यदिदमस्मिन्नब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म दहरो-  
ऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यं तद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यमित्यत्राकाशशब्देन  
जगदुपादानकारणं प्रतिपाद्य तदन्तर्वर्तिनः कस्यचित्तत्त्वविशेषस्यान्वेष्टव्यता प्रतिपाद्यते ।  
अस्याकाशस्य नामरूपयोर्निर्वोदत्वश्रवणात्पुरुषसूक्ते पुरुषस्य नामरूपयोः कर्तृत्वदर्शनाच्चा-  
काशपर्यायभूतात्पुरुषादन्यस्यान्वेष्टव्यतयोपास्यत्वं प्रतीयत इत्यनधीतवेदानामर्हदृष्टशास्त्राणा-  
१५ मिदं चोद्यं ।

1.  $M_2$  अ इति च— $P M_1$  om. च before श्रुतिः— $PM_1$  read श्रुतेः
2.  $A_1$  om. महेश्वर
3.  $P M_1$  om. °पर°
4.  $M_2$  om. प्रपञ्चितम्
5.  $M_2$  °परत्वप्रतिपादनमेव परत्वम्
6.  $M_2$  सर्वेषु वाक्येषु
7.  $A_2$  वामदेव इति
8. T शब्दावगतम्
9.  $P M_1$  परतत्त्वप्र°
10.  $P M_1$  न यथा
11.  $M_2$  om. तत्त्व°
12.  $A_1$  om. प्रतिपाद्यते... पुरुषादन्यस्य
13.  $M_2$  पुरुषान्तरस्य for पुरुषादन्यस्य
14.  $P M_1$ ,  $A_1$ , अदृष्टशास्त्रविदाम्



[१०५] यतस्तत्र श्रुतिरेवास्य परिहारमाह । वाक्यकारश्च - दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्त-  
राकाशः किं तदत्र विद्यते यदन्वेष्टव्यं यद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यमिति चोदिते यावान्वा अय-  
माकाशस्तावानेषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाश इत्यादिनास्याकाशशब्दवाच्यस्य परमपुरुषस्या-  
नवधिकमहत्त्वं सकलजगत्कारणतया सकलजगदाधारत्वं च प्रतिपाद्य तस्मिन्कामाः  
समाहिता इति कामशब्देनापहतपाप्मत्वादिसत्यसंकल्पपर्यन्तगुणाष्टकं निहितमिति ५  
परमपुरुषवत्परमपुरुषगुणाष्टकस्यापि पृथग्विजिज्ञासितव्यताप्रतिपिपादयिषया तस्मिन्यद-  
न्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यमित्युक्तमिति श्रुत्यैव सर्वं परिहृतम् ।

[१०६] एतदुक्तं भवति - किं तदत्र विद्यते यदन्वेष्टव्यमित्यस्य चोद्यस्य तस्मि-  
न्सर्वस्य जगतः स्रष्टृत्वमाधारत्वं नियन्तृत्वं शेषित्वमपहतपाप्मत्वादयो गुणाश्च विद्यन्त  
इति परिहार इति । तथा च वाक्यकारवचनम्—तस्मिन्यदन्तरिति कामव्यपदेश इति । १०  
काम्यन्त इति कामाः । अपहतपाप्मत्वादयो गुणा इत्यर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति—यदेतद्-  
हराकाशशब्दाभिधेयं निखिलजगदुदयवैभवलयलीलं परं ब्रह्म तस्मिन्यदन्तर्निहितमनवधि-  
कातिशयमपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणाष्टकं तदुभयमप्यन्वेष्टव्यं विजिज्ञासितव्यमिति । यथाह—  
अथ य इहात्मानमनुविद्य ब्रजन्त्येतांश्च सत्यान्कामांस्तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो  
भवतीति । १५

1. M<sub>1</sub> om. किं तदत्र....आकाश
2. P °वाच्य°
3. M<sub>2</sub> °पर्यन्तकल्याणगुणगणयोगः [.....] प्रतिपिपादयिषया
4. M<sub>1</sub> om. परमपुरुषवत्
5. A<sub>2</sub> om. एतद्.....चोद्यस्य
6. M<sub>1,2</sub> तत्र for तदत्र
7. P M<sub>1</sub> अस्मिन्
8. P M<sub>2</sub> तदेतद्
9. P M<sub>1</sub> °पदवाच्यं
10. M<sub>2</sub> [तस्मिन्] तदन्तर्
11. M<sub>2</sub> कामांश्च

- [१०७] यः पुनः कारणस्यैव ध्येयताप्रतिपादनपरे वाक्ये विष्णोरनन्यपर-  
वाक्यप्रतिपादितपरतत्त्वभूतस्य कार्यमध्ये निवेशः स स्वकार्यभूततत्त्वसंख्यापूरणं कुर्वतः  
स्वलीलया जगदुपकाराय स्वेच्छावतार इत्यवगन्तव्यः । यथा लीलया देवसंख्यापूरणं  
कुर्वत उपेन्द्रत्वं परस्यैव, यथा च सूर्यवंशोद्भवराजसंख्यापूरणं कुर्वतः परस्यैव ब्रह्मणो  
५ दाशरथिरूपेण स्वेच्छावतारः, यथा च 'सोमवंशसंख्यापूरणं कुर्वतो भगवतो भूभाराव-  
तारणाय स्वेच्छया वसुदेवगृहेऽवतारः ।

- [१०८] सृष्टिप्रलयप्रकरणेषु नारायण एव परमकारणतया प्रतिपाद्यत इति  
पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । यत्पुनरथर्वशिरसि रुद्रेण स्वसर्वैश्वर्यं प्रपञ्चितं तत्सोऽन्तरादन्तरं प्राविशदिति  
परमात्मप्रवेशादुक्तमिति श्रुत्यैव व्यक्तम् । शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववदिति सूत्रकारे-  
१० णैववादिनामर्थः प्रतिपादितः । यथोक्तं प्रह्लादेनापि—

सर्वगत्वादनन्तस्य स एवाहमवस्थितः ।

मत्तः सर्वमहं सर्वं मयि सर्वं सनातने ॥

- इत्यादि । अत्र सर्वगत्वादनन्तस्येति हेतुरुक्तः । स्वशरीरभूतस्य सर्वस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुन  
आत्मत्वेन सर्वगतः परमात्मेति सर्वे शब्दाः सर्वशरीरं परमात्मानमेवामिदधतीत्युक्तम् ।  
१५ अतोऽहमिति शब्दः स्वात्मप्रकारप्रकारिणं परमात्मानमेवाचष्टे । अत इदमुच्यते ।  
आत्मेत्येव तु गृहीयात्सर्वस्य तन्निष्पत्तेरित्यादिनाहंग्रहणोपासनं वाक्यकारेण कार्यावस्थः  
कारणावस्थश्च स्थूलसूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरः परमात्मैवेति सर्वस्य तन्निष्पत्तेरित्युक्तम् ।

1. A<sub>1</sub> °भूतत्व°

2. M<sub>2</sub> om. स्वलीलया..... कुर्वत (haplography)

3. M<sub>2</sub> सोमवंशराज°—कुर्वतो [.....] स्वेच्छावतारः [.....] सृष्टि°

4. M<sub>2</sub> °कारेणैवायमर्थः—secunda manu °वमादीनां

5. A<sub>2</sub> om. °प्रकार°

6. M<sub>1</sub> °पादानं for °पासनं

7. M<sub>2</sub> interpolates वाक्यवारेण सुस्पष्टमभिहितम् । अतस्तत्र तत्र जगत्कारणा-  
वस्थिततया चिदचिद्वाचकशब्दप्रतिपाद्यचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरः

आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति चेति सूत्रकारेण च । महाभारते च ब्रह्मरुद्रसंवादे  
ब्रह्मा रुद्रं प्रत्याह—

तवान्तरात्मा मम च ये चान्ये देहिंसंज्ञिताः ।

इति । रुद्रस्य ब्रह्मणश्चान्येषां च देहिनां परमेश्वरो नारायणोऽन्तरात्मतयावस्थित इति ।  
तथा तत्रैव—

विष्णुरात्मा भृगवतो भवस्यामिततेजसः ।

तस्माद्भुज्यासिंस्पर्शं स विषेहे महेश्वरः ॥

इति । तत्रैव—

एतौ द्वौ विबुधश्रेष्ठौ प्रसार्दक्रोधजौ स्मृतौ ।

तदादर्शितपन्थानौ सृष्टिसंहारकारकौ ॥

इति । अन्तरात्मतयावस्थितनारायणदर्शितपन्थौ ब्रह्मरुद्रौ सृष्टिसंहारकार्यकरावित्यर्थः ।

[१०९] निमित्तोपादानयोस्तु भेदं वदन्तो वेदबाह्या एव स्युः । जन्माद्यस्य यतः—  
प्रकृतिश्च—प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधादित्यादि वेदवित्प्रणीतसूत्रविरोधात् । सदेव सोम्येदमग्र  
आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्—तदैक्षत बहू स्यां प्रजायेयेति—ब्रह्म वनं ब्रह्म स वृक्ष आसीद्यतो  
द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुः—ब्रह्माध्यतिष्ठद्बुवनानि धारयन्—सर्वे निमेषा जज्ञिरे विद्युतः  
पुरुषादधि—न तस्येशो कश्चन तस्य नाम महद्यशः—नेह नानास्ति किंचन—सर्वस्य वशी

1. M<sub>3</sub> om. च.....भारते

2. M<sub>2</sub> °संस्थिताः secunda manu संज्ञिताः

3. M<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>3</sub> om. च

4. P om. तथा

5. M<sub>3</sub> भवतो

6. M<sub>1</sub> °कोप°

7. P M<sub>1</sub> om. तु

8. P M<sub>1</sub> read ब्रह्म स for तद—A<sub>3</sub> om. तद.....प्रजायेयेति

सर्वस्येशानः—पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भव्यमुतामृतत्वस्येशानः—नान्यः पन्था  
अयनाय विद्यत इत्यादिसर्वश्रुतिविरोधाच्च ।

[११०] इतिहासपुराणेषु च सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयप्रकरणयोरिदमेव परतत्त्वमित्यव-  
गम्यते । यथा महाभारते—

कुंतः सृष्टमिदं सर्वं जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम् ।  
प्रलये च कमभ्येति तन्नो ब्रूहि पितामह ॥

इति पृष्टो—

नारायणो जगन्मूर्तिरनन्तात्मा सनातन ।

इत्यादि च वदति—

१० ऋषयः पितरो देवा महाभूतानि धातवः ।  
जङ्गमाजङ्गमं चेदं जगन्नारायणोद्भवम् ॥

इति च । प्राच्योदीच्यदाक्षिणात्यपाश्चात्यसर्वशिष्टैः सर्वधर्मसर्वतत्त्वव्यवस्थायामिदमेव  
पर्याप्तमित्यविगानपरिगृहीतं वैष्णवं च पुराणं जन्माद्यस्य यत् इति जगज्जन्मादिकारणं  
ब्रह्मेत्यवगम्यते । तज्जन्मादिकारणं किमिति प्रश्नपूर्वकं विष्णोः सकाशादुद्भूतमित्यादिना  
१५ ब्रह्मस्वरूपविशेषप्रतिपादनैकपरतया प्रवृत्तमिति सर्वसंमतम् । तथा तत्रैव—

1. P भाव्यम्

2. P M<sub>1</sub> °प्रलयकरणयोर् M<sub>2</sub> °कारणयोर्, secunda manu प्रकरणयोर्

3. P M<sub>1</sub> om. इति

4. P M<sub>1</sub> केन

5. A<sub>2</sub> वदन्—P M<sub>2</sub> वदन्ति

6. A<sub>1</sub> om. ऋषयः.....इति च

7. P अविगीत°

8. M<sub>1</sub> om. च

9. M<sub>2</sub> किं तज्ज° secunda manu किम्—before इति

10. M<sub>2</sub> om. उद्भूतम्

प्रकृतिर्या मया ख्याता व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वरूपिणी ।

पुरुषश्चाप्युभावेतौ लीयेते परमात्मनि ॥

परमात्मा च सर्वेषामाधारः परमेश्वरः ।

विष्णुनामा स वेदेषु वेदान्तेषु च गीयते ॥

इति । सर्ववेदवेदान्तेषु सर्वैः शब्दैः परमंकारणतयायमेव गीयत इत्यर्थः । यथा सर्वासु  
श्रुतिषु केवलपरब्रह्मस्वरूपविशेषप्रतिपादनायैव प्रवृत्तो नारायणानुवाकस्तथेदं वैष्णवं च  
पुराणम्—

सोऽहमिच्छामि धर्मज्ञ श्रोतुं त्वत्तो यथा जगत् ।

बभूव भूयश्च यथा महाभाग भविष्यति ॥

यन्मयं च जगद्ब्रह्मन्यतश्चैतच्चराचरम् ।

लीनमासीद्यथा यत्र लयमेप्यति यत्र च ॥

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इति । परं ब्रह्म किमिति प्रक्रम्य—

विष्णोः सकाशादुद्भूतं जगत्तत्रैव च स्थितम् ।

स्थितिसंयमकर्तासौ जगतोऽस्य जगच्च सः ॥

परः पराणां परमः परमात्मात्मसंस्थितः ।

रूपवर्णादिनिर्देशविशेषणविवर्जितः ॥

अपक्षयविनाशाभ्यां परिणामाद्धिजन्मभिः ।

वर्जितः शक्यते वक्तुं यः सदास्तीति केवलम् ॥

सर्वत्रासौ समस्तं च वसत्यत्रेति वै यतः ।

ततः स वासुदेवेति विद्वद्भिः परिपठ्यते ॥

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1.  $M_1$  देवेषु for वेदेषु

2.  $M_2$  om. °वेद°

3.  $M_1$  तदिदं

तद्ब्रह्म परं नित्यमजमक्षयमव्ययम् ।  
 एकस्वरूपं च सदा हेयाभावाच्च निर्मलम् ॥  
 तदेव सर्वमेवैतद्व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वरूपवत् ।  
 तथा पुरुषरूपेण कालरूपेण च स्थितम् ॥

- ५ स सर्वभूतप्रकृतिं विकारान्गुणादिदोषांश्च मुने व्यतीतः ।  
 अतीतसर्वावरणोऽखिलात्मा तेनास्तृतं यद्भवान्तराले ॥  
 समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकोऽसौ स्वशक्तिलेशोद्धृतभूतवर्गः ।  
 इच्छागृहीताभिमतोरुदेहः संसाधिताशेषजगद्धितोऽसौ ॥  
 तेजोबलधर्ममहावोधसुवीर्यशक्त्यादिगुणैकराशिः ।  
 १० परः पराणां सकला न यत्र क्लेशादयः सन्ति परावरेशे ॥

स ईश्वरो व्यष्टिसमष्टिरूपोऽव्यक्तस्वरूपः प्रकटस्वरूपः ।  
 सर्वेश्वरः सर्वदृक्सर्ववेत्ता समस्तशक्तिः परमेश्वराख्यः ॥  
 संज्ञायते येन तदस्तदोषं शुद्धं परं निर्मलमेकरूपम् ।  
 संदृश्यते बाप्यधिगम्यते वा तज्ज्ञानमज्ञानमतोऽन्यदुक्तम् ॥

- १५ इति परब्रह्मस्वरूपविशेषनिर्णयायैव प्रवृत्तम् ।

[१११] अन्यानि सर्वाणि पुराणान्येतदविरोधेन नेयानि । अन्यपरत्वं च  
 तत्तदारम्भप्रकारैरवगम्यते । सर्वात्मना विरुद्धांशस्तामसत्वादनानादरणीयः ।

1. P M<sub>1</sub> सदेव
2. M<sub>1</sub> स्वरूपतः
3. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub>, तेनास्मृतं
4. M<sub>1</sub> स्वयत्नलेशाद्
5. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> °सर्गः for °वर्गः
6. M<sub>2</sub> om. °विशेष°—
7. M<sub>1</sub> धृतम् for प्रवृत्तम्
8. T सर्वपुराणा°

[११२] नन्वस्मिन्नपि—

सृष्टिस्थित्यन्तकरणीं ब्रह्मविष्णुशिवात्मिकां ।

स संज्ञां याति भगवानेक एव जनार्दनः ॥

इति त्रिमूर्तिसाम्यं प्रतीयते । नैतदेवम् । एक एव जनार्दन इति जनार्दनस्यैव ब्रह्म-  
शिवादिकृत्स्नप्रपञ्चतादात्म्यं विधीयते । जगच्च स इति पूर्वोक्तमेव विवृणोति—

स्रष्टा सृजति चात्मानं विष्णुः पाल्यं च पाति च ।

उपसंहियते चान्ते संहर्ता च स्वयंप्रभुः ॥

इति च स्रष्टृत्वेनावस्थितं ब्रह्माणं सृज्यं च संहर्तारं संहार्यं च युगपन्निर्दिश्य सर्वस्य  
विष्णुतादात्म्योपदेशात्सृज्यसंहार्यभूताद्वस्तुनः स्रष्टृसंहर्त्रोर्जनार्दनविभूतित्वेन विशेषो  
दृश्यते । जनार्दनविष्णुशब्दयोः पर्यायत्वेन ब्रह्मविष्णुशिवात्मिकामिति विभूतिम् । १०  
अत एव स्वेच्छया लीलार्थं विभूत्यन्तर्भाव उच्यते । यथेदमनन्तरमेवोच्यते—

पृथिव्यापस्तथा तेजो वायुराकाश एव च ।

सर्वेन्द्रियान्तःकरणं पुरुषाख्यं हि यज्जगत् ॥

स एव सर्वभूतात्मा विश्वरूपो यतोऽन्ययः ।

सर्गादिकं ततोऽस्यैव भूतस्थमुपकारकम् ॥

स एव सृज्यः स च सर्गकर्ता स एव पात्यति च पाल्यते च ।

ब्रह्माद्यवस्थाभिरशेषमूर्तिर्विष्णुर्वरिष्ठो वरदो वरेण्यः ॥ इति ।

[११३] अत्र सामानाधिकरण्यनिर्दिष्टं हेयमिश्रप्रपञ्चतादात्म्यं निरवद्यस्य  
निर्विकारस्य समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकस्य ब्रह्मणः कथमुपपद्यत इत्याशङ्क्य स एव सर्वभूता-  
त्मा विश्वरूपो यतोऽन्यय इति स्वयमेवोपपादयति । स एव सर्वेश्वरः परब्रह्मभूतो विष्णुरेव २०  
सर्वं जगदिति प्रतिज्ञाय सर्वभूतात्मा विश्वरूपो यतोऽन्यय इति हेतुरुक्तः । सर्वभूता-  
नामयमात्मा विश्वशरीरो यतोऽन्यय इत्यर्थः । वक्ष्यति च—तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुरिति ।

1. P M<sub>1</sub> add ब्रह्मविष्णुशिवा°

2. M<sub>2</sub> om. विभूति°.....जनार्दन°

3. P M<sub>1,2</sub> विश्वरूपो

एतदुक्तं भवति । अस्याव्ययस्यापि परस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोर्विश्वशरीरतया तादात्म्यमविरुद्ध-  
मित्यात्मशरीरयोश्च स्वभावा व्यवस्थिता एव । एवंभूतस्य सर्वेश्वरस्य विष्णोः प्रपञ्चा-  
न्तर्भूतनियाम्यकोटिनिविष्टब्रह्मादिदेवतिर्यङ्मनुष्येषु तत्तत्समाश्रयणीयत्वाय स्वेच्छावतारः  
पूर्वोक्तः । तदेतद्ब्रह्मादीनां भावनात्रयान्वयेन कर्मवश्यत्वं भगवतः परब्रह्मभूतस्य वासुदेवस्य  
निखिलजगदुपकाराय स्वेच्छया स्वेनैव रूपेण देवादिष्ववतार इति च षष्ठेऽंशे शुभाश्रय-  
प्रकरणे सुव्यक्तमुक्तम् । अस्य देवादिरूपेणावतारेष्वपि न प्राकृतो देह इति महाभारते—

न भूतसंघसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मनः ।

इति प्रतिपादितः । श्रुतिश्च—अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते—तस्य धीराः परिजानन्ति  
योनिमिति । कर्मवश्यानां ब्रह्मादीनामनिच्छतामपि तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणप्रकृतिपरिणामरूप-  
भूतसंघसंस्थानविशेषदेवादिशरीरप्रवेशरूपं जन्मावर्जनीयम् । अयं तु सर्वेश्वरः सत्यसंकल्पो  
भगवानेवंभूतशुभेतरजन्माकुर्वन्नपि स्वेच्छया स्वेनैव निरतिशयकल्याणरूपेण देवादिषु  
जगदुपकाराय बहुधा जायते, तस्यैतस्य शुभेतरजन्माकुर्वतोऽपि स्वकल्याणगुणानन्त्येन  
बहुधा योनिं बहुविधजन्म धीरा-धीमतामग्रेसरा जानन्तीत्यर्थः ।

[११४] तदेतन्निखिलजगन्निमित्तोपादानभूताज्जन्माद्यस्य यतः—प्रकृतिश्च

प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधादित्यादिसूत्रैः प्रतिपादितात्परस्याद्ब्रह्मणः परमपुरुषादन्यस्य कस्य-

1.  $M_2$  सर्वशरीर°
2.  $P$  भुवनत्रया°
3.  $M_1$  °भूतवासु°
4.  $M_1, A_1, \text{om. च}$
5.  $M_2, A, T$  °रूपजन्म°
6.  $P M_1$  °जन्मादि कुर्वन्  $M_1 \text{om. स्वेच्छया.....कुर्वतोऽपि}$
7.  $M_2, A_1$  विज्ञायते
8.  $M_2$  °आनुकुर्वतो
9.  $M_1 \text{om. बहुधा योनिं}$
10.  $M_1$  interpolates after यतः—अस्य विविधविचित्रभोक्तृभोग्यपूर्णस्य जगतो  
यतो जन्मादि तद्ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादयितुं शक्नोति इत्येतद्वाक्यमिति taken  
from Vedāntadīpā ad Br S. 1, 1, 1 ad finem.
11.  $M_2, T$  इत्यादिभिः



चित्परतरत्वं परमतः सेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्य इत्याशङ्क्य सामान्यात्तु—बुद्धार्थः  
पादवत्—स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत्—उपपत्तेश्च—तथान्यप्रतिषेधात्—अनेन सर्व-  
गतत्वमायामादिशब्दादिभ्य इति सूत्रकारः स्वयमेव निराकरोति ।

[११५] मानवे च शास्त्रे—

प्रादुरासीत्तमोनुदः सिसृक्षुर्विविधाः प्रजाः ।

अप एव ससर्जादौ तासु वीर्यमपासृजत् ॥

तस्मिञ्जज्ञे स्वयं ब्रह्मा

इति ब्रह्मणो जन्मश्रवणात्क्षेत्रज्ञत्वमेवावगम्यते । तथा च खलुः परमपुरुषस्य तद्विसृष्टस्य  
च ब्रह्मणः

अयनं तस्य ताः पूर्वं तेन नारायणः स्मृतः ।

तद्विसृष्टः स पुरुषो लोके ब्रह्मेति कीर्त्यते ॥

इति नामनिर्देशाच्च । तथा च वैष्णवे पुराणे हिरण्यगर्भादीनां भावनानात्रयान्वयादशुद्धत्वेन  
शुभाश्रयत्वानर्हतोपपादनात्क्षेत्रज्ञत्वं निश्चीयते ।

[११६] यदपि कैश्चिदुक्तम्—सर्वस्य शब्दजातस्य विध्यर्थवादमन्त्ररूपस्य  
कार्याभिधायित्वेनैव प्रामाण्यं वर्णनीयम् । व्यवहारादन्यत्र शब्दस्य बोधकत्वशक्त्यव- १५

1.  $M_1$ , T परत्वं
2.  $M_2$  उपदेशेभ्यः
3. P  $M_1$  तदन्यत्र प्रतिषेधात्
4. T om. च
5. P भुवन°
6. P  $M_1$  °श्रयानर्ह
7.  $M_2$  न हीयते
8.  $M_2$  शब्द°

धारणासंभवाद्यवहारस्य च कार्यबुद्धिभूलत्वात्कार्यरूप एव शब्दार्थः । नै परिनिष्पन्ने वस्तुनि शब्दः प्रमाणमिति । अत्रोच्यते । प्रवर्तकवाक्यव्यवहार एव शब्दानामर्थबोधकत्वशक्त्यवधारणं कर्तव्यमिति किमियं राजाज्ञा । सिद्धवस्तुषु शब्दस्य बोधकत्वशक्तिग्रहणमत्यन्तसुकरम् । तथा हि—केनचिद्धस्तचेष्टादिनापवरके दण्डः स्थित इति देवदत्ताय ज्ञापयेति प्रेषितः

- ५ कश्चित्तज्ज्ञापने प्रवृत्तोऽपवरके दण्डः स्थित इति शब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते । मूकबद्धस्तचेष्टामिमां जानन्पार्श्वस्थोऽन्यः प्रागव्युत्पन्नोऽपि तस्यार्थस्य बोधनायापवरके दण्डः स्थित इत्यस्य शब्दस्य प्रयोगदर्शनादस्यार्थस्यायं शब्दो बोधक इति जानातीति किमत्र दुष्करम् । तथा बालस्तातोऽयमियं मातायं मातुलोऽयं मनुष्योऽयं मृगश्चन्द्रोऽयमयं च सर्प इति मातापितृप्रभृतिभिः शब्दैः शनैः शनैरङ्गुल्या निर्देशेन तत्र तत्र बहुशः शिक्षितस्तैरेव
- १० शब्दैस्तेष्वर्थेषु स्वात्मनश्च बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा तेष्वर्थेषु तेषां शब्दानामङ्गुल्या निर्देशपूर्वकः प्रयोगः संवन्धान्तराभावात्संकेतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानाच्च बोधकत्वनिबन्धन इति क्रमेण निश्चित्य पुनरप्यस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थ इति पूर्ववृद्धैः शिक्षितः सर्वशब्दानामर्थमवगम्य स्वयमपि सर्वं वाक्यजातं प्रयुङ्क्ते । एवमेव सर्वपदानां स्वार्थाभिधायित्वं संघातविशेषाणां च यथावस्थितसंसर्गविशेषवाचित्वं च जानातीति कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तिरित्यादिनिर्वन्धो
- १५ निर्निबन्धनः । अतः परिनिष्पन्ने वस्तुनि शब्दस्य बोधकत्वशक्त्यवधारणात्सर्वाणि वेदान्तवाक्यानि सकलजगत्कारणं सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरमुक्तलक्षणं ब्रह्म बोधयन्त्येव ।

1.  $M_2$  T om. च

2.  $P M_1 A_1$  वेदार्थः

3.  $P M_1 A_1$  om. न and place it before शब्दः— $A_2$  T निष्पन्नव°

4.  $A_2$  सर्वशब्दानाम्— $M_{2.2}$ .  $A_2$  °बोधनशक्ति°

5.  $M_2$  प्रयुज्यते

6.  $P M_1 A_1$  अङ्गुलिनिर्देशेन

7.  $P M_1$  बुद्ध्या व्युत्पत्तिं

8.  $P M_1 A_1$  °ङ्गुलिनि°

9. T पूर्वकप्रयोगः

10. P जानामीति

[११७] अपि च कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तिरस्तु । वेदान्तवाक्यान्यप्युपासन-  
विषयकार्याधिकृतविशेषणभूतफलत्वेन दुःखासंभिन्नदेशविशेषरूपस्वर्गादिवद्रात्रिसत्रप्रति-  
ष्ठादिवदपगोरणशतयातनासाध्यसाधनभाववच्च कार्योपयोगितयैव सर्वं बोधयन्ति ।  
तथाहि—ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यत्र ब्रह्मोपासनविषयकार्याधिकृतविशेषणभूतफलत्वेन  
ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः श्रूयते—परप्राप्तिकामो ब्रह्म विद्यादित्यत्र प्राप्यतया प्रतीयमानं ब्रह्मस्वरूपं ५  
तद्विशेषणं च सर्वं कार्योपयोगितयैव सिद्धं भवति । तदन्तर्गतमेव जगत्संप्रतृप्तं 'संहर्तृत्व-  
माधारत्वमन्तरात्मत्वमित्याद्युक्तमनुक्तं च सर्वमिति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् ।

[११८] एवं च सति मन्त्रार्थवादगता ह्यविरुद्धा अपूर्वाश्चार्थाः सर्वे विधिशेष-  
तयैव सिद्धा भवन्ति । यथोक्तं द्रमिडभाष्ये - ऋणं हि वै जायत इति श्रुतेरित्यु-  
पक्रम्य यद्यप्यवदानस्तुतिपरं वाक्यं तथापि नासता स्तुतिरुपपद्यत इति । एतदुक्तं भवति— १०  
सर्वो ह्यर्थवादभागो देवताराधनभूतयागादेः साङ्गस्याराध्यदेवतायाश्चादृष्टरूपान्गुणान्स-  
हस्रशो वदन्सहस्रशः कर्मणि प्राशस्त्यबुद्धिमुत्पादयति । तेषामसंज्ञावे प्राशस्त्यबुद्धिरेव न  
स्यादिति कर्मणि प्राशस्त्यबुद्ध्यर्थं गुणसद्भावमेव बोधयतीति । अनयैव दिशा सर्वे  
मन्त्रार्थवादावगता अर्थाः सिद्धाः ।

[११९] अपि च कार्यवाक्यार्थवादिभिः किमिदं कार्यत्वं नामेति वक्तव्यम् । १५  
कृतिभावभाविता कृत्युद्देश्यता चेति चेत् । किमिदं कृत्युद्देश्यत्वम् । यदधिकृत्य कृतिर्वर्तते  
तत्कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमिति चेत् । पुरुषव्यापाररूपायाः कृतेः कोऽयमधिकारो नाम । यत्प्राप्तीच्छया

1. M<sub>3</sub> om. °भूतफल°
2. M<sub>3</sub> adds after परम्—इति तस्मिन् यदन्तस्तद्
3. P M<sub>1</sub> सर्वकार्यो°
4. A<sub>3</sub> T जगतः
5. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>3</sub> om. संहर्तृत्वम्
6. M<sub>3</sub> om. अनुक्तं
7. M<sub>1</sub> °गतात्मवि° M<sub>2,3</sub> °गतापि
8. P M<sub>1</sub> द्रविड°
9. A<sub>1</sub> असंभवे

- कृतिमुत्पादयति पुरुषः तत्कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमिति चेत् । हन्त तर्हीष्टत्वमेव कृत्युद्देश्यत्वम् ।  
 अथैवं मनुषे इष्टस्यैव रूपद्वयमस्ति । इच्छाविषयतया स्थितिः पुरुषप्रेरकत्वं च । तत्र  
 प्रेरकत्वाकारः कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमिति<sup>१</sup> सोऽयं स्वपक्षाभिनिवेशकारितो वृथाश्रमः । तथा हि-  
 इच्छाविषयतया प्रतीतस्य स्वप्रयत्नोत्पत्तिमन्तरेणासिद्धिरेव प्रेरकत्वम् । तत एव प्रवृत्तेः ।  
 ५ इच्छायां जातायामिष्टस्य स्वप्रयत्नोत्पत्तिमन्तरेणासिद्धिः प्रतीयते चेत्तत्स्थितीकीर्णा जायते  
 ततः प्रवर्तते पुरुष इति तत्त्वविदां प्रक्रिया । तस्मादिष्टस्य कृत्यधीनात्मलाभत्वातिरेकि  
 कृत्युद्देश्यत्वं नाम किमपि न दृश्यते । अथोच्यते - इष्टताहेतुश्च पुरुषानुकूलता ।  
 तत्पुरुषानुकूलत्वं कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमिति चेत् । नैवम् । पुरुषानुकूलं सुखमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ।  
 तथा पुरुषाननुकूलं दुःखपर्यायम् । अतः सुखव्यतिरिक्तस्य कस्यापि पुरुषानुकूलत्वं  
 १० न संभवति ।

- ननु च दुःखनिवृत्तेरपि सुखव्यतिरिक्तायाः पुरुषानुकूलता दृष्टा । नैतत् । आत्मा-  
 नुकूलं सुखमात्मप्रतिकूलं दुःखमिति हि सुखदुःखयोर्विवेकः । तत्रात्मानुकूलं  
 सुखमिष्टं भवति । तत्प्रतिकूलं दुःखं चानिष्टम् । अतो दुःखसंयोगस्यासङ्गतया  
 तन्निवृत्तिरपीष्टा भवति । तत एवेष्टतासाम्यादनुकूलताश्रमः । तथा हि—प्रकृतिसंसृष्टस्य  
 १५ संसारिणः पुरुषस्यानुकूलसंयोगः प्रतिकूलसंयोगः स्वरूपेणावस्थितिरिति च तिस्रोऽवस्थाः ।

1. A, इति चेत्
2. M<sub>1</sub>, कारिणो
3. P वृथाश्रमः—M<sub>2</sub> वृथाप्रयासः
4. P चिकीर्षता
5. P M<sub>1</sub> उच्यते
6. A<sub>1</sub> om. तत्पुरुषा<sup>०</sup>.....नैवम्
7. M<sub>2</sub>, पुरुषप्रतिकूलं for पुरुषाननुकूलं
8. M<sub>3</sub> om. तत्प्रतिकूलं
9. M<sub>4</sub>, सामान्याद्
10. M<sub>1</sub> स्वरूपेणावस्थितिर्

तत्र प्रतिकूलसंबन्धनिवृत्तिश्चानुकूलसंबन्धनिवृत्तिश्च स्वरूपेणावस्थितिरेव । तस्मात्प्रति-  
कूलसंयोगे वर्तमाने तन्निवृत्तिरूपा स्वरूपेणावस्थितिरपीष्टा भवति । तत्रेष्टतासाम्यादनु-  
कूलताश्रमः ।

[१२०] अतः सुखरूपत्वादनुकूलतायाः नियोगस्यानुकूलतां वदन्तं प्रामाणिकाः  
परिहसन्ति । इष्टस्यार्थविशेषस्य निर्वर्तकतयैव हि नियोगस्य नियोगत्वं स्थिरत्वपूर्वत्वं च ५  
प्रतीयते । स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यत्र कार्यस्य क्रियातिरिक्तता स्वर्गकामपदसमभिव्याहारेण  
स्वर्गसाधनत्वनिश्चयादेव भवति । न च वाच्यं यजेतेत्यत्र प्रथमं नियोगः स्वप्रधानतयैव  
प्रतीयते स्वर्गकामपदसमभिव्याहारात्त्वसिद्धये स्वर्गसिद्धयानुकूलता च नियोगस्येति । यजे-  
तेति हि धात्वर्थस्य पुरुषप्रयत्नसाध्यता प्रतीयते । स्वर्गकामपदसमभिव्याहारादेव धात्वर्थाति- १०  
रेकिणो नियोगत्वं स्थिरत्वपूर्वत्वं चेत्यादि । तच्च स्वर्गसाधनत्वप्रतीतिनिबन्धनम् । समभि-  
व्याहृतस्वर्गकामपदार्थान्वययोग्यं स्वर्गसाधनमेव कार्यं लिङादयोऽभिदधतीति लोकव्युत्पत्ति-  
रपि तिरस्कृता । एतदुक्तं भवति—समभिव्याहृतपदान्तरवार्थार्थान्वययोग्यमेवेतरपदप्रति-  
पाद्यमित्यन्विताभिधायिपदसंघातरूपवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरमेव प्रतीयते । तच्च स्वर्गसाधन-  
रूपम् । अतः क्रियावदनन्यार्थतापि विरोधादेव परित्यक्तेति । अत एव गङ्गायां घोष १५  
इत्यादौ घोषप्रतिवासयोग्यार्थोपस्थापनपरत्वं गङ्गापदस्याश्रीयते । प्रथमं गङ्गापदेन  
गङ्गार्थः स्मृत इति गङ्गापदार्थस्य <sup>१०</sup>पेयत्वं न वाक्यार्थान्वयीभवति । एवमत्रापि यजेतेत्ये-

1. P M<sub>1</sub> om. अनुकूल<sup>०</sup>.....<sup>०</sup>वृत्तिश्च
2. M<sub>1</sub> <sup>०</sup>रूपेणास्थितिर्
3. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. अपि
4. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> <sup>०</sup>कूलताया यो नियोगस्यानुकूलतां वदति तम्<sup>०</sup>
5. P स्वसिद्धस्वर्गसाधनवृत्तिनिश्चयाद्
6. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> <sup>०</sup>साध्यतैव
7. T om. <sup>०</sup>अर्थ<sup>०</sup>
8. P क्रियापदस्यानर्थ<sup>०</sup>
9. P घोष प्रति<sup>०</sup>
10. P M<sub>2,3</sub> A<sub>2</sub> पेयत्वात्

तावन्मात्रश्रवणे कार्यमनन्यार्थं स्मृतमिति वाक्यार्थान्वयसमये कार्यस्यानन्यार्थता नाव-  
तिष्ठते । कार्याभिधायिपदश्रवणवेलायां प्रथमं कार्यमनन्यार्थं प्रतीतमित्येतदपि न संग-  
च्छते । व्युत्पत्तिकाले गवानयनादिक्रियाया दुःखरूपाया इष्टविशेषसाधनतयैव कार्यता-  
प्रतीतिः । अतो नियोगस्य पुरुषानुकूलत्वं सर्वलोकविरुद्धं नियोगस्य सुखरूपपुरुषानु-  
५ कूलतां वदतः स्वानुभवविरोधश्च । करीर्या वृष्टिकामो यजेतेत्यादिषु सिद्धेऽपि नियोगे  
वृष्ट्यादिसिद्धिनिमित्तस्य वृष्टिव्यतिरेकेण नियोगस्यानुकूलता नानुभूयते । यद्यप्यस्मि-  
न्नन्मनि वृष्ट्यादिसिद्धेरनियमस्तथाप्यनियमादेव नियोगसिद्धिरवश्याश्रयणीया । तस्मिन्न-  
नुकूलतापर्यायसुखानुभूतिर्न दृश्यते । एवमुक्तरीत्या कृतिसाध्येष्टत्वातिरेकि कृत्युद्देश्यत्वं न  
दृश्यते ।

- १० [१२१] कृतिं प्रति शेषित्वं कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमिति चेत् । किमिदं शेषित्वं किं  
च शेषत्वमिति वक्तव्यम् । कार्यं प्रति संबन्धी शेषः । तत्प्रतिसंबन्धित्वं शेषित्वमिति  
चेत् । एवं तर्हि कार्यत्वमेव शेषित्वमित्युक्तं भवति । कार्यत्वमेव विचार्यते । परोद्देश-  
प्रवृत्तकृतिव्याप्त्यर्थत्वं शेषत्वमिति चेत् । कोऽयं परोद्देशो नामेति । अयमेव हि  
विचार्यते । उद्देश्यत्वं नामेप्सितत्वसाध्यत्वमिति चेत् । किमिदमीप्सितत्वम् । कृति-  
१५ प्रयोजनत्वमिति चेत् पुरुषस्य कृत्यारम्भप्रयोजनमेव हि कृतिप्रयोजनम् । स चेच्छा-

1. M<sub>1</sub> om. स्मृतम्.....°अतन्यार्थ°

2. M<sub>2</sub> कार्यान्विताभि°

3. M<sub>2</sub>, प्रतीयते

4. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> °निमित्ते—M<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>2</sub> °निमित्त°—M<sub>3</sub> om. वृष्टिव्यतिरेकेण

5. M<sub>1</sub> सुखे त्वनुभूतिर्

6. P M<sub>1</sub> न विद्यते

7. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>2</sub> om. किंच शेषत्वम्

8. P adds. एव हि

9. P M<sub>1</sub>, om. अयमेव हि

10. P M<sub>1</sub> om. कृतिप्रयोजनत्वम्.....एव हि

विषयः कृत्यधीनात्मलाभं इति पूर्वोक्त एव । अयमेव हि सर्वत्र 'शेषशेषिभावः । परगतातिशयाधानेच्छयोपादेयत्वमेव यस्य स्वरूपं स शेषः परः शेषी । फलोत्पत्तीच्छया यागादेस्तत्प्रयत्नस्य चोपादेयत्वं यागादिसिद्धीच्छयान्यत्सर्वमुपादेयम् ।

[१२२] एवं गर्भदासादीनामपि पुरुषविशेषातिशयाधानेच्छयोपादेयत्वमेव स्वरूपम् । एवमीश्वरगतातिशयाधानेच्छयोपादेयत्वमेव चेतनाचेतनात्मकस्य नित्यस्यानि- ५  
त्यस्य च सर्वस्य वस्तुनः स्वरूपमिति सर्वमीश्वरशेषभूतं सर्वस्य चेश्वरः शेषीति सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः पतिं विश्वस्येत्याद्युक्तम् । कृतिसाध्यं प्रधानं यत्तत्कार्यमभिधीयत इत्ययमर्थः श्रद्धाधनेष्वेव शोभते ।

[१२३] अपि च स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यादिषु लकारवाच्यकर्तृविशेषसमर्पण-  
पराणां स्वर्गकामादिपदानां नियोज्यविशेषसमर्पणपरत्वं शब्दानुशासनविरुद्धं केना- १०  
वगम्यते । साध्यस्वर्गविशिष्टस्य स्वर्गसाधने कर्तृत्वान्वयो न घटत इति <sup>११</sup>चेत् । नियोज्यत्वान्वयोऽपि न घटत इति हि स्वर्गसाधनत्वनिश्चयः । स तु शास्त्रसिद्धे कर्तृत्वान्वये स्वर्गसाधनत्वनिश्चयः क्रियते । यथा भोक्तुकामो देवदत्तगृहं गच्छेदित्युक्ते भोजनकामस्य देवदत्तगृहगमने कर्तृत्वश्रवणादेवं प्रागज्ञातमपि भोजनसाधनत्वं देवदत्त-  
गृहगमनस्यावगम्यते । एवमत्रापि भवति । न क्रियान्तरं प्रति कर्तृतया श्रुतस्य १५

1. P om. शेष°
2. M<sub>2</sub> adds परः प्रतिसंबन्धी शेषी
3. P तत्र यत्नश्चोपा°
4. M<sub>2</sub> °सिद्धि तत्प्रतिसंबन्धी नान्यत्सर्वम्
5. P गर्भदासा°—T गर्भधाना°
6. M<sub>1</sub> सर्ववस्तुनः
7. P M<sub>2</sub> om. सर्वस्य चेश्वरस्य शेषीति
8. P कृतेः साध्यं
9. P om. °विशेष°
10. P °साधन°
11. A<sub>1</sub> om. चेत्.....हि (haplography)
12. P ननु for स तु
13. A<sub>2</sub> om. गच्छेदित्युक्ते
14. P adds भवतीति

क्रियान्तरे कर्तृत्वकल्पनं युक्तम्—यजेतेति हि यागकर्तृतया श्रुतस्य बुद्धौ कर्तृत्व-  
कल्पनं क्रियते । बुद्धेः कर्तृत्वकल्पनमेव हि नियोज्यत्वम् । यथोक्तं—

नियोज्य सर्वकार्यं यः स्वकीयत्वेन बुध्यते ।

इति । यष्ट्वानुगुणं तद्बोद्धृत्वमिति चेत् । देवदत्तः पचेदिति पाके कर्तृतया श्रुतस्य

५ देवदत्तस्य पाकार्थगमनं पाकानुगुणमिति गमने कर्तृत्वकल्पनं न युज्यते ।

[१२४] किं च लिङादिशब्दवाच्यं स्थायिरूपं किमित्यपूर्वमाश्रीयते ।  
स्वर्गकामपदसमभिव्याहारानुपपत्तेरिति चेत् । कात्रानुपपत्तिः । सिषाधयिषितस्वर्गो  
हि स्वर्गकामः । तस्य स्वर्गकामस्य कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसिद्धौ क्षणभङ्गिनी यागादि-  
क्रिया न समर्थेति चेत् । अनाघ्रातवेदसिद्धान्तानामियमनुपपत्तिः । सर्वैः कर्मभिरा-  
१० राधितः परमेश्वरो भगवान्नारायणस्तत्तदिष्टं फलं ददातीति वेदविदो वदन्ति । यथाहु-  
र्वेदविदग्रेसरा द्रमिडाचार्याः—फलसंबन्धेत्सया हि कर्मभिरात्मानं पिप्रीषन्ति स प्रीतोऽलं  
फलायेति शास्त्रमर्यादा इति । फलसंबन्धेच्छया कर्मभिर्यागदानहोमादिभिरिन्द्रादि-  
देवतामुखेन तत्तदन्तर्यामिरूपेणावस्थितमिन्द्रादिशब्दवाच्यं परमात्मानं भगवन्तं वासु-  
देवमरिराधयिषन्ति, स हि कर्मभिराराधितस्तेषामिष्टानि फलानि प्रयच्छतीत्यर्थः ।  
१५ तथा च श्रुतिः—इष्टापूर्तं बहुधा जातं जायमानं विश्वं विभर्ति भुवनस्य नाभिरिति ।

1.  $M_2 A_2$  °कर्तृत्वेन
2. all read स च for सर्व° which is the original reading
3.  $P_1$  अनधीतवेद°
4.  $M_2$  om. परमेश्वरो
5.  $P M_1$  द्रविडा°
6.  $P M_1$  normalize °विभन्त्सया
7.  $M_2$  आत्मानमपि
8.  $P M_{1-2}$  om. इति शास्त्रमर्यादा
9.  $P$  अभिवादयिषन्ति— $M_{1-2}$  आराधयिषन्ति
10.  $M_1$  om. इष्टा°.....नाभिरिति



इष्टापूर्तमिति सकलश्रुतिस्मृतिचोदितं कर्मोच्यते । तद्विधं विभर्ति—इन्द्राग्नि-  
वरुणादिसर्वदेवतासंबन्धितया प्रतीयमानं तत्तदन्तरात्मतयावस्थितः परमपुरुषः स्वयमेव  
विभर्ति स्वयमेव स्वीकरोति । भुवनस्य नाभिः—ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिसर्ववर्णपूर्णस्य भुवनस्य  
धारकः—तैस्तैः कर्मभिराराधितस्तत्तदिष्टफलप्रदानेन भुवनानां धारक इति नाभि-  
रित्युक्तः । अग्निवायुप्रभृतिदेवतान्तरात्मतया तत्तच्छब्दाभिधेयोऽयमेवेत्याह-तदेवाग्नि- ५  
स्तद्वायुस्तत्सूर्यस्तदु चन्द्रमा इति । यथोक्तं भगवता—

यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्तः श्रद्धयार्चितुमिच्छति ।

तस्य तस्याचलां श्रद्धां तामेव विदधाम्यहम् ॥

स तथा श्रद्धया युक्तस्तस्याराधनमीहते ।

लभते च ततः कामान्मयैव विहितान्हि तान् ॥ इति । १०

यां यां तनुमितीन्द्रादिदेवताविशेषास्तत्तदन्तर्यामितयावस्थितस्य भगवतस्तनवः शरीरा-  
णीत्यर्थः ।

अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च ।

इत्यादि । प्रभुरेव चेति सर्वफलानां प्रदाता चेत्यर्थः । यथा च

यज्ञैस्त्वमिज्यसे नित्यं सर्वदेवमयाच्युत ।

यैः स्वधर्मपरैर्नाथ नरैराराधितो भवान् ।

ते तरन्त्यखिलामेतां मायामात्मविमुक्तये ॥ १५

इति । सेतिहासपुराणेषु सर्वेष्वेव वेदेषु सर्वाणि कर्माणि सर्वेश्वराराधनरूपाणि, तैस्तैः  
कर्मभिराराधितः पुरुषोत्तमस्तत्तदिष्टं फलं ददातीति तत्र तत्र प्रपञ्चितम् ।

1. M<sub>2</sub> adds इन्द्राग्निमवरुण°

2. P M<sub>1</sub> om. °पूर्ण°

3. M<sub>2</sub> उक्तिः

4. T om. इति after तनूम्

5. M<sub>1</sub> तथा for यथा

एवमेव हि सर्वशक्तिं सर्वज्ञं सर्वेश्वरं भगवन्तमिन्द्रादिदेवतान्तर्यामिरूपेण याग-  
दानहोमादिवेदोदितसर्वकर्मणां भोक्तारं सर्वफलानां प्रदातारं च सर्वाः श्रुतयो वदन्ति ।  
चतुर्होतारो यत्र संपदं गच्छन्ति देवैरित्याद्याः । चतुर्होतारो यज्ञाः, यत्र परमात्मनि  
देवेष्वन्तर्यामिरूपेणावस्थिते, देवैः संपदं गच्छन्ति—देवैः संबन्धं गच्छन्ति यज्ञा इत्यर्थः ।

- ५ अन्तर्यामिरूपेणावस्थितस्य परमात्मनः शरीरतयावस्थितानामिन्द्रादीनां यागादिसंबन्ध  
इत्युक्तं भवति । यथोक्तं भगवता—

भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसां सर्वलोकमहेश्वरम् ।

इति । तस्मादन्त्यादिदेवतान्तरात्मभूतपरमपुरुषाराधनरूपभूतानि सर्वाणि कर्माणि,  
स एव चाभिलषितफलप्रदातेति किमत्रापूर्वेण व्युत्पत्तिपथदूरवर्तिना वाच्यतयाभ्युपगतेन  
१० कल्पितेन वा प्रयोजनम् । एवं च सति लिङादेः कोऽयमर्थः परिगृहीतो भवति । यज  
देवपूजायामिति देवताराधनभूतयागादेः प्रकृत्यर्थस्य कर्तृव्यापारसाध्यतां व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धां  
लिङादयोऽभिदधतीति न किंचिदनुपपन्नम् । कर्तृवाचिनां प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थस्य कर्तृव्यापार-  
संबन्धप्रकारो हि वाच्यः । भूतवर्तमानादिकर्मण्ये वदन्ति । लिङादयस्तु कर्तृव्यापार-  
साध्यतां वदन्ति ।

- 
1.  $M_{2,3}$  सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं—P सर्वेश्वरं सर्वज्ञं
  2.  $M_2$  °यामितयावस्थिते
  3. T °वस्थितपरमा°
  4. P adds °दीनां यागादीनां
  5. P  $M_1$  इन्द्रादि°
  6. P  $M_1$  °रूपाणि
  7. P  $M_1$  कल्पेन
  8.  $A_3$  om. सति
  9. P  $M_1$   $A_1$  °गृहीत इति चेत्
  10.  $M_1$  °कमित्येव वदन्ति T °दिम्

[१२५] अपि च कामिनः कर्तव्यतया कर्म विधाय कर्मणो देवताराधनरूपतां तद्द्वारा फलसंभवं च तत्तत्कर्मविधिवाक्यान्वेव वदन्ति । वायव्यं श्वेतमालमेत भूति-  
 कामो वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव स्वेन भागधेयेनोपधावति स एवैनं भूतिं गमयती-  
 त्यादीनि । नात्र फलसिद्धयनुपपत्तिः कापि दृश्यत इति फलसाधनत्वावगतिरौपादानि-  
 कैत्यपि न संगच्छति । विध्यपेक्षितं यागादेः फलसाधनत्वप्रकारं वाक्यशेष एव ५  
 बोधयतीत्यर्थः । तस्माद्वाह्मणाय नापशुरेतेत्यत्रापगोरणनिषेधविधिर्परवाक्यशेषे श्रूयमाणं  
 निषेध्यस्यापगोरणस्य शतयातनासाधनत्वं निषेधविध्युपयोगीति हि स्वीक्रियते । अत्र  
 पुनः कामिनः कर्तव्यतया विहितस्य यागादेः काम्यस्वर्गादिसाधनत्वप्रकारं वाक्यशेषा-  
 वगतमनादृत्य किमित्युपादानेन यागादेः फलसाधनत्वं परिकल्प्यते । हिरण्यनिधिमपवरके  
 निधाय याचते कोद्रवादिलुब्धः कृपणं जनमिति श्रूयते तदेतद्युष्मासु दृश्यते । शत- १०  
 यातनासाधनत्वमपि नादृष्टद्वारेण । चेदितान्यनुतिष्ठतो विहितं कर्माकुर्वतो निन्दितानि  
 च कुर्वतः सर्वाणि सुखानि दुःखानि च परमपुरुषानुग्रहनिग्रहाभ्यामेव भवन्ति । एष  
 ह्येवानन्दयाति—अथो सोऽभयं गतो भवति—अथ तस्य भयं भवति—भीषास्माद्वातः पवते  
 भीषोदेति सूर्यो भीषास्मादग्निश्चेन्द्रश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः—इति । एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य  
 प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः—एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि १५  
 ददतो मनुष्याः प्रशंसन्ति यजमानं देवा दर्वी पितरोऽन्वायत्ता इत्याद्यनेकविधाः श्रुतयः  
 सन्ति । यथोक्तं द्रमिडभाष्ये—तस्याज्ञया धावति वायुर्नर्धः स्रवन्ति तेन च कृतसीमानो

1.  $M_{2,2}$  T तद्वारेण
2.  $M_{2,2}$  फलसंसिद्धि
3.  $P M_1$  काचिपि
4.  $P$  om. °पर°
5.  $A_2$  अत्रापि
6.  $M_2$  om. कामिनः
7.  $P$  प्रकल्प्यते
8.  $P$  श्रुतं यत्
9.  $A_{1,2}$  om. अथ तस्य भयं भवति
10.  $P M_1$  पञ्च प्रस्रवन्ति

जलाशयाः समदा इव भेषविसर्पितं कुर्वन्तीति । तत्संकल्पनिबन्धना हीमे लोके न च्यवन्ते न स्फुटन्ते । स्वशासनानुवर्तिनां ज्ञात्वा कारुण्यात्स भगवान्वर्धयेत विद्वान्कर्म-दक्ष इति च ।

[१२६] परमपुरुषयाथात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वकतदुपासनादिविहितकर्मानुष्ठायिनस्तत्प्रा-  
५ दात्तप्राप्तिपर्यन्तानि सुखान्यभयं च यथाधिकारं भवन्ति । तज्ज्ञानपूर्वकं तदुपासनादि विहितं कर्माकुर्वतो निन्दितानि च कुर्वन्तस्त्रिग्रहादेव तदप्राप्तिपूर्वकापरिमितदुःखानि भयं च भवन्ति । यथोक्तं भगवता—

नियतं कुरु कर्म त्वं कर्म ज्यायो ह्यकर्मणः ।

इत्यादिना कृत्स्नं कर्म ज्ञानपूर्वकमनुष्ठेयं विधाय—

१० मयि सर्वाणि कर्माणि संन्यस्य

इति सर्वस्य कर्मणः स्वाराधनतामात्मनां स्वनियाम्यतां च प्रतिपाद्य—

ये मे मतमिदं नित्यमनुतिष्ठन्ति मानवाः ।

श्रद्धावन्तोऽनसूयन्तो मुच्यन्ते तेऽपि कर्मभिः ॥

ये त्वेतदभ्यसूयन्तो नानुतिष्ठन्ति मे मतम् ।

१५ सर्वज्ञानविमूढांस्तान्विद्धि नष्टानचेतसः ॥

- 
1. P M<sub>1</sub> समुद्रा एवमेव विसर्पितं—M<sub>2</sub> समन्दा—A<sub>1</sub> समुद्रा
  2. M<sub>2</sub> तत्संबन्धनि°
  3. P M<sub>1</sub> हेमे for हीमे
  4. M<sub>2</sub>, om. त्व°
  5. P M<sub>1</sub> स्वभावाच्च for स भगवान्
  6. M<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>1</sub> वर्धयते
  7. T °पूर्वकं
  8. M<sub>2</sub> अनुस्थानादिनस्
  9. M<sub>1</sub> यथा for विधाय
  10. M<sub>1</sub> सर्वकर्म°—M<sub>2</sub> om. सर्वस्य

इति स्वाज्ञानुवर्तिनः प्रशस्य विपरीतान्विनिन्द्य पुनरपि स्वाज्ञानुपालनमकुर्वतामासुरप्रकृत्य-  
न्तर्भावमभिधायाधमा गतिश्चोक्ता—

तानहं द्विषतः क्रूरान्संसारेषु नराधमान् ।

क्षिपाम्यजस्रमशुभानासुरीण्वेव योनिषु ॥

आसुरीं योनिमापन्ना मूढा जन्मनि जन्मनि ।

मामप्राप्यैव कौन्तेय ततो यान्त्यधमां गतिम् ॥ इति ।

सर्वकर्माण्यपि सदा कुर्वाणो मद्यपाश्रयः ।

मत्प्रसादादवाप्नोति शाश्वतं पदमव्ययम् ॥

इति च स्वाज्ञानुवर्तिनां शाश्वतं पदं चोक्तम् । अश्रुतवेदान्तानां कर्मण्यश्रद्धा मा  
भूदिति देवताधिकरणेऽतिवादाः कृताः कर्ममात्रे यथा श्रद्धा स्यादिति सर्वमेकशास्त्र- १०  
मिति वेदवित्तिस्त्वान्तः ।

[१२७] तस्यैतस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो नारायणस्यापरिच्छेद्यज्ञानानन्दात्मलत्वस्वरूपव-  
ज्ज्ञानशक्तिवैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजःप्रभृत्यनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणवत्त्वसंकल्पप्रवर्त्यस्वेत-  
रसमस्तचिदचिद्रस्तुजातवत्त्वाभिमतस्वानुरूपैकरूपदिव्यरूपतदुचितनिरतिशयकल्याणवि-  
विधानंतभूषणत्वशक्तिसदृशापरिमितानन्ताश्चर्यनानाविधायुधत्वाभिमतस्वानुरूपस्वरूपगुणवि- १५  
भवैश्वर्यशीलाद्यनवधिकमहिममहिषीस्वानुरूपकल्याणज्ञानक्रियाद्यपरिमेयगुणानन्तपरिजन -

1. P M<sub>1</sub> प्रशस्य
2. P अत्तामा for अधमा
3. P om. स्व°
4. P साभूद्
5. P M<sub>1</sub> एव शस्त्रं
6. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. °शक्ति° and °वीर्य°
7. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>2</sub> गुणगणवत्
8. M<sub>2</sub> °गुणगण°; adds ज्ञानशक्तिवैश्वर्य°
9. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>2</sub> °कल्याणगुण°

- परिच्छदस्वोचितनिखिलभोग्यभोगोपकरणाद्यनन्तमहाविभवावाङ्मनसंगोचरस्वरूपस्वभाव-  
दिव्यस्थानादिनित्यतानिरवद्यतागोचराश्च सहस्रशः श्रुतयः सन्ति । वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्त-  
मादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् । य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषः । तस्य यथा  
कंप्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवमक्षिणी । स य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिन्नयं पुरुषो मनोमयो-  
५ ऽमृतो हिरण्मयः—मनोमय इति मनसैव विशुद्धेन गृह्यत इत्यर्थः—सर्वे निमेषा  
जज्ञिरे विद्युतः पुरुषादधि—विद्युद्वर्णात्पुरुषादित्यर्थः—नीलतोयदमध्यस्था विद्युल्लेखेव  
भास्वरा—मध्यस्थनीलतोयदा विद्युल्लेखेव सेयं दहरपुण्डरीकमध्यस्थाकाशवर्तिनी  
वह्निशिखा स्वान्तर्निहितनीलतोयदाभपरमात्मस्वरूपा स्वान्तर्निहितनीलतोयदा विद्युदिवा-  
भातीत्यर्थः मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः । सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः । आकाशात्मा  
१० सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यानादरः । माहारजनं वास  
इत्याद्याः । अस्येशाना जगतो विष्णुपत्नी । ह्रीश्च ते लक्ष्मीश्च पत्न्यौ । तद्विष्णोः परमं  
पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः । क्षयन्तमस्य रजसः पराके । यदेकमव्यक्तमनन्तरूपं विश्वं  
पुराणं तमसः परस्तात् । यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् । योऽस्याध्यक्षः परमे  
व्योमन् । तदेव भूतं तदु भव्यमा इदं तदक्षरे परमे व्योमन्नित्यादिश्रुतिशतनिश्चितो-  
१५ ऽयमर्थः ।

[१२८] तद्विष्णोः परमं पदमिति विष्णोः परस्य ब्रह्मणः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति  
सूरय इति वचनात् सर्वकालदर्शनवन्तः परिपूर्णज्ञानाः केचन सन्तीति विज्ञायते । ये  
सूरयस्ते सदा पश्यन्तीति वचनव्यक्तिः, ये सदा पश्यन्ति ते सूरय इति वा । उभयपक्षेऽ-

1. P om. °स्वरूप°
2. M<sub>2</sub> adds कंप्यासं दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुर्
3. M<sub>1</sub> om. सर्वे.....वर्थः
4. M<sub>1</sub> om. मध्यस्थनीलतोयदा विद्युल्लेखेव
5. P om. स्वान्त°.....स्वरूपा
6. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>2</sub> om. सत्यकामः
7. P M<sub>1</sub> om. परमे व्योमन्
8. M<sub>2-3</sub> सूरयः सदा पश्यन्ति
9. P के च for केचन

प्यनेकविधानं न संभवतीति चेत् । न । अप्राप्तत्वात्सर्वस्य सर्वविशिष्टं परमस्थानं विधीयते । यथोक्तं—तद्गुणास्ते विधीयेरन्नविभागाद्विधानार्थे न चेदन्येन शिष्टा इति । यथा यदाग्नेयोऽष्टाकपाल इत्यादिकर्मविधौ कर्मणो गुणानां चाप्राप्तत्वेन सर्वगुणविशिष्टं कर्म विधीयते तथात्रापि सूरिभिः सदा दृश्यत्वेन विष्णोः परमस्थानमप्राप्तं प्रतिपादयतीति न कश्चिद्विरोधः । करणमन्त्राः क्रियमाणानुवादिनः स्तोत्रशस्त्ररूपा जपादिषु विनियुक्ताश्च प्रकरणपथिताश्चाप्रकरणपथिताश्च स्वार्थं सर्वं यथावस्थितमेवाप्राप्तमविरुद्धं ब्राह्मणवद्बोधयन्तीति हि वैदिकाः । प्रगीतमन्त्रसाध्यगुणिनिष्ठगुणाभिधानं स्तोत्रम् । अप्रगीतमन्त्रसाध्यगुणिनिष्ठगुणाभिधानं शस्त्रम् । विनियुक्तार्थप्रकाशिनां च देवतादिष्वप्राप्ताविरुद्धगुणविशेषप्रतिपादनं विनियोगानुगुणमेव । नेयं श्रुतिर्मुक्तजनविषया । तेषां सदादर्शनानुपपत्तेः । नापि मुक्तप्रवाहविषया । सदा पश्यन्तीत्येकैककर्तृकविषयतया प्रतीतेः श्रुतिभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । मन्त्रार्थवादगता ह्यर्थाः कार्यपरत्वेऽपि सिध्यन्तीत्युक्तम् । किं पुनः सिद्धवस्तुन्येव तात्पर्यं व्युत्पत्तिसिद्ध इति सर्वमुपपन्नम् । १०

ननु चात्र तद्विष्णोः परमं पदमिति परस्वरूपमेव परमपदशब्देनाभिधीयते । समस्तहेयरहितं विष्ण्वारूपं परमं पदमित्यादिष्वव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् । नैवम् । क्षयन्तमस्य रजसः पराके, तदक्षरे परमे व्योमन्, यो अस्याध्याक्षः परमे व्योमन्, यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन्नित्यादिषु परमस्थानस्यैव दर्शनात् । तद्विष्णोः परमं पदमिति १५

1. P om. अप्राप्तत्वेन.....स्थानम्
2. M<sub>2</sub> अन्न° for स्तोत्रे°—रूपं—M<sub>1</sub> adds °शस्त्रशब्दरूपा
3. P M<sub>1</sub> om. चाप्रकरण° A<sub>1</sub> om. अप्रकरणपथिताश्च
4. A<sub>1</sub> om. यथाव°.....रुद्धं
5. M<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>1</sub>, om. प्रगीत°.....शस्त्रं—are these two definitions interpolated ?
6. M<sub>1</sub> मुक्ता°—M<sub>2</sub> अनेक° for एकैक°
7. M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>2</sub> om. प्रतीतेः A<sub>1</sub> प्रतीतश्रुति°
8. A<sub>2</sub> om. अत्र

व्यतिरेकनिर्देशाच्च । विष्ण्वाख्यं परमं पदमिति विशेषणादन्यदपि परमं पदं विद्यत इति च तेनैव ज्ञायते । तदिदं परस्थानं सूरिभिः सदादृश्यत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यते ।

[१२९] एतदुक्तं भवति - कचित्परस्थानं परमपदशब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते, कचित्प्रकृतिवियुक्तात्मस्वरूपं, कचिद्भगवत्स्वरूपम् । तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति

५ सूरय इति परस्थानम् ।

सर्गस्थित्यन्तकालेषु त्रिविधैव प्रवर्तते ।

गुणप्रवृत्त्या परमं पदं तस्यागुणं महत् ॥

इत्यत्र प्रकृतिवियुक्तात्मस्वरूपम् ।

समस्तहेयरहितं विष्ण्वाख्यं परमं पदम् ।

१० इत्यत्र भगवत्स्वरूपम् । त्रीण्यप्येतानि परमप्राप्तत्वेन परमपदशब्देन प्रतिपाद्यन्ते । कथं त्रयाणां परमप्राप्यत्वमिति चेत् । भगवत्स्वरूपं परमप्राप्यत्वादेव परमं पदम् । इतरयोरपि भगवत्प्राप्तिगर्भत्वादेव परमपदत्वम् । सर्वकर्मबन्धविनिर्मुक्तात्मस्वरूपावाप्ति-

1. P M<sub>1</sub> °निर्देशनाच्च

2. P om. अन्यद्

3. P M<sub>1</sub> परमस्थानं

4. P M<sub>1</sub> परमस्थानं

5. M<sub>2</sub>, पदमिति and om. सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः

6. P M<sub>1</sub> परमस्थानम्

7. M<sub>1</sub>, गुणप्रवृत्त्या

8. M<sub>2</sub> माभूद् for महत्

9. M<sub>2</sub> °वियुक्त°

10. A<sub>1</sub> om. °बन्ध°

11. P A<sub>1</sub> विनिर्मुक्त°



भगवत्प्राप्तिर्गर्भा । त इमे सत्याः कामा अनृतापिधाना इति भगवतो गुणगणस्य तिरोधायकत्वेनानृतशब्देन स्वकर्मणः प्रतिपादनात् ।

[१३०] अनृतरूपतिरोधानं क्षेत्रज्ञकर्मैति कथमवगम्यत इति चेत् ।

अविद्या कर्मसंज्ञान्या तृतीया शक्तिरिष्यते ।

यया क्षेत्रज्ञशक्तिः सा वेष्टिता नृप सर्वगा ॥

संसारतापानखिलानवाप्नोत्यतिसंततान् ।

तया तिरोहितत्वाच्च

इत्यादिवचनात् ।

[१३१] परस्थानप्राप्तिरपि भगवत्प्राप्तिर्गर्भैवेति सुव्यक्तम् । क्षयन्तमस्य रजसः पराक इति रजःशब्देन त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृतिरुच्यते केवलस्य रजसोऽनवस्थानात् । इमां १० त्रिगुणात्मिकां प्रकृतिमतिक्रम्य स्थिते स्थाने क्षयन्तम्—वसन्तमित्यर्थः । अनेन त्रिगुणात्मिकाक्षेत्रज्ञस्य भोग्यभूताद्वस्तुनः परस्ताद्विष्णोर्वासंस्थानमिति गम्यते । वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तादित्यत्रापि तमःशब्देन सैव प्रकृतिरुच्यते । केवलस्य तमसोऽनवस्थानादेव । रजसः पराके क्षयन्तमित्यनेनैकवाक्यत्वात्तमसः परस्ताद्वसन्तं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं पुरुषमहं वेदेत्ययमर्थोऽवगम्यते । सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं १५ ब्रह्म । यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् । तदक्षरे परमे व्योमन्निति तत्स्थानमविकाररूपं परमव्योमशब्दाभिधेयमिति च गम्यते । अक्षरे परमे व्योमन्नित्यस्य स्थानस्याक्षरत्वश्रवणात्क्षररूपादित्यमण्डलादयो न परमव्योमशब्दाभिधेयाः । यत्र पूर्वं

1.  $M_1 A_{1..2}$  °गर्भात्  $M_{2..}$  गर्भता

2.  $M_2$  om. स्व°

3. P  $M_1$  om. एव

4.  $M_2$  इत्यादिनात्र

5.  $M_2$  पुरुषमेतम्

6.  $M_{2..}$   $A_2$  om. तदक्षरे परमे व्योमन्— $M_1$  om. अक्षरे

7. P om. इति.....व्योमन्

8.  $M_1$  रूपादिसत्यमण्डला°—om. न

साध्याः सन्ति देवाः, यत्रर्षयः प्रथमजा ये पुराणा इत्यादिषु च त एव सूरय ईत्यवगम्यते। तद्विप्रासो विपन्यवो जागृवांसः समिन्धते विष्णोर्यत्परमं पदमित्यत्रापि विप्रासो—मेधाविनः, विपन्यवः—स्तुतिशीलाः, जागृवांसः—अस्खलितज्ञानास्तै एवास्खलितज्ञानास्तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा स्तुवन्तः समिन्धत इत्यर्थः।

- ५ [१३२] एतेषां परिजनस्थानादीनां सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदित्यत्र ज्ञान-बलैश्वर्यादिकल्याणगुणगणवर्त्परब्रह्मस्वरूपान्तर्भूतत्वासदेवैकमेवाद्वितीयमिति ब्रह्मान्तर्भावोऽवगम्यते। एषामपि कल्याणगुणैकदेशत्वादेव सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदित्यत्रेदमिति शब्दस्य कर्मवश्यभोक्तृवर्गमिश्रतद्भोग्यभूतप्रपञ्चविषयत्वाच्च सदा पश्यन्ति सूरय इति सदादर्शित्वेन च तेषां कर्मवश्यानन्तर्भावात्। अपहतपाप्मेत्याद्यपिपास इत्यन्तेन
- १० सैलीलोपकरणभूतत्रिगुणप्रकृतिप्राकृततत्संस्पृष्टपुरुषगतं हेयस्वभावं सर्वं प्रतिषिध्य सत्य-काम इत्यनेन स्वभोग्यभोगोपकरणजातस्य सर्वस्य सैत्यता प्रतिपादिता। सत्याः कामा

1. T इति गम्यते
2. P om. समिन्धते.....जागृवांसः
3. P M<sub>1</sub> °विज्ञाना°
4. M<sub>2</sub> om. त.....°ज्ञानास्
5. P M<sub>1</sub> °विज्ञानास्
6. M<sub>2</sub> सङ्गताः for सदा—adds after अर्थः—वर्तमानव्यपदेशाच्च सर्वकाल-संबन्धो जायते तेषां
7. M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>2</sub> om. °गण°
8. M<sub>2</sub> om. °पर°—A<sub>2</sub> om. परब्रह्म°.....त्वात्
9. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> अन्तर्गत्वात्
10. M<sub>1</sub> गम्यते
11. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> सर्वलीलो°—M<sub>2</sub> A<sub>2</sub> स्वलीलो
12. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> °गुणात्मकप्रकृति°
13. A<sub>2</sub> om. सर्वं
14. M<sub>2</sub> सर्वस्यापि
15. M<sub>2</sub> नित्यता for सत्यता

यस्यासौ सत्यकामः । काम्यन्त इति कामाः । तेन परेण ब्रह्मणा स्वभोग्यतदुपकरणादयः  
 स्वाभिमता ये काम्यन्ते ते सत्याः—नित्या इत्यर्थः । अन्यस्य लीलोपकरणस्यापि  
 वस्तुनः प्रमाणसंबन्धयोग्यत्वे सत्यपि विकारास्पदत्वेनास्थिरत्वात्तद्विपरीतं स्थिरत्वमेषां  
 सत्यपदेनोच्यते । सत्यसंकल्प ईत्येतेषु भोग्यतदुपकरणादिषु नित्येषु निरतिशयेष्व-  
 नन्तेषु सत्त्वप्यपूर्वाणामपरिमितानामर्थानामपि संकल्पमात्रेण सिद्धिं वदति । एषां ५  
 च भोगोपकरणानां लीलोपकरणानां चेतनानामचेतनानां स्थिराणामस्थिराणां च  
 तत्संकल्पायत्तस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिभेदादि सर्वं वदति सत्यसंकल्प इति ।

[१३३] इतिहासपुराणयोर्वेदोपबृंहणयोश्चायमर्थ उच्यते—

तौ ते मेधाविनौ दृष्ट्वा वेदेषु परिनिष्ठितौ ।

वेदोपबृंहणार्थाय तावग्राहयत प्रभुः ॥

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इति वेदोपबृंहणतया प्रारब्धे श्रीमद्रामायणे—

व्यक्तमेष महायोगी परमात्मा सनातनः ।

अनादिमध्यनिधनो महतः परमो महान् ॥

तमसः परमो धाता शङ्खचक्रगदाधरः ।

श्रीवत्सवक्षा नित्यश्रीरर्ज्यः शाश्वतो भ्रुवः ॥

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शरा नानाविधाश्चापि धनुरायतविग्रहम् ।

अन्वगच्छन्त काकुत्स्थं सर्वे पुरुषविग्रहाः ॥

विवेश वैष्णवं तेजः सशरीरः सहानुगः ॥

1. P इत्येनं—M<sub>1</sub> इत्यनन्तेषु—M<sub>2</sub> इत्यादिना

2. P om. नित्येषु

3. P M<sub>1</sub> om. अनन्तेषु

4. P विन्दति for वदति

5. A<sub>2</sub> om. स्वरूप°

6. M<sub>2</sub> om. वेदोपबृंहणयोश्

7. P श्रीरामा°

8. P A<sub>1</sub> अजेयः—M<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>2</sub> अहेयः

9. M<sub>2</sub>. T. धाम for तेजः

श्रीमद्विष्णुपुराणे—

समस्ताः शक्तयश्चैता नृप यत्र प्रतिष्ठिताः ।

तद्विश्वैरूप्यं रूपमन्यद्धरेर्भहत् ॥

मूर्तं ब्रह्म महाभाग सर्वब्रह्ममथो हरिः ॥

५ नित्यैवैषा जगन्माता विष्णोः श्रीरनपायिनी ।

यथा सर्वगतो विष्णुस्तथैवेयं द्विजोत्तम ॥

देवत्वे देवदेहेयं मनुष्यत्वे च मानुषी ।

विष्णोर्देहानुरूपां वै करोत्येषात्मनस्तनुम् ॥

एकान्तिनः सदा ब्रह्मध्यायिनो योगिनो हि ये° ।

१० तेषां तत्परमं स्थानं यद्वै पश्यन्ति सूरयः ॥

कलामुहूर्तादिमयश्च कालो न यद्विभूतेः परिणामहेतुः ॥

महाभारते च—

दिव्यं स्थानमजरं चाप्रमेयं दुर्विज्ञेयं चागमैर्गम्यमाद्यम् ।

११ गच्छ प्रभो रक्ष चासान्प्रपन्नान्कल्पे कल्पे जायमानः स्वमूर्त्या ॥

१५ कालः स पचते तत्र न कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुः ।

इति । परस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपवत्त्वं सूत्रकारश्च वदति—अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशादिति

...[१३४] योऽसावादित्यमण्डलान्तर्वर्ती तप्तकार्तस्वरगिरिवरप्रभः सहस्रांशुशत-  
सहस्रकिरणो गम्भीराम्भःसमुद्भूतसुमृष्टनालरविकरविकसितपुण्डरीकदर्लमलायतेक्षणः

1. A<sub>1</sub> T. श्रीविष्णुपुराणे

2. P M<sub>1</sub> हि ते.

3. A<sub>1</sub> om. this line

4. M<sub>1</sub> °प्रभवः

5. P M<sub>1</sub> om. °अमल°

सुभ्रूललाटः सुनासः सुस्मिताधरविद्रुमः सुरुचिरकोमलगण्डः कम्बुग्रीवः समुन्नतांसविलम्बि-  
 चारुरूपदिव्यकर्णकिसलयः पीनवृत्तायतभुजश्चारुतराताम्रकरतलानुरक्ताङ्गुलीभिरलंकृतस्तनु-  
 मध्यो विशालवक्षःस्थलः समविभक्तसर्वाङ्गोऽनिर्देश्यदिव्यरूपसंहननः स्निग्धवर्णः प्रबुद्ध-  
 पुण्डरीकचारुचरणयुगलः स्वानुरूपपीताम्बरधरोऽमलकिरीटकुण्डलहारकौस्तुभकेयूरकटक-  
 नूपुरोदरबन्धनाद्यपरिमिताश्चर्यानन्तदिव्यभूषणः शङ्खचक्रगदासिंहाङ्गुलीवत्सवनमाला-  
 लंकृतोऽनवधिकातिशयसौन्दर्याहंताशेषमनोदृष्टिवृत्तिर्लावण्यामृतपूरिताशेषचराचरभूतजा -  
 तोऽत्यद्भुताचिन्त्यनित्ययौवनः पुष्पहाससुकुमारः पुण्यगन्धवासितानन्तदिगन्तरालस्त्रैलो-  
 क्याक्रमणप्रवृत्तगम्भीरभावः करुणानुरागमधुरलोचनावलोकिताश्रितवर्गः पुरुषवरो दरी-  
 दृश्यते । स च निखिलजगदुदयविभवलयलीलो निरस्तसमस्तहेयः सैमस्तकल्याणगुणनिधिः  
 स्वेतरसमस्तवस्तुविलक्षणः परमात्मा परं ब्रह्म नारायण ईत्यवगम्यते । तद्धर्मोपदेशात्—  
 स एष सर्वेषां लोकानामीष्टे सर्वेषां कामानाम्—स एष सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्य उदित  
 इत्यादिदर्शनात् । तस्यैते गुणाः सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः—अपहतपाप्मा विजर  
 इत्यादि सत्यसंकल्प इत्यन्तम्—विश्वतः परमं नित्यं विश्वं नारायणं हरिम् । पतिं  
 विश्वस्यात्मे श्वरमित्यादिवाक्यप्रतिपादिताः ।

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[१३५] वाक्यकारश्चैतत्सर्वं सुस्पष्टमाह—हिरण्मयः पुरुषो दृश्यत इति  
 प्राज्ञः सर्वान्तरः स्याल्लोककामेशोपदेशात्तथोदयात्पाप्मानमित्यादिना । तस्य च रूपस्या-  
 नित्यतादि वाक्यकारेणैव प्रतिषिद्धम्—स्यात्तद्रूपं कृतकमनुग्रहार्थं तच्चेतनानामैश्वर्या-  
 दित्युपासितुर्नुग्रहार्थः परमपुरुषस्य रूपसंग्रह इति पूर्वपक्षं कृत्वा, रूपं वातीन्द्रियमन्तः-

1.  $M_1$  °र्थः वृताशेष°
2.  $M_{1,2} A_{1,2}$ . T दृश्यते— $M_3$  T om. च
3. P  $M_1 A_1$  interchange समस्त°.....निधिः and स्वेतर°.....लक्षणः
4.  $M_{1,2,3} A_3$  गम्यते
5.  $M_{2,3}$ , ईश्वरः T. ईशः
6.  $PM_1$  om. सर्वस्य वशी
7. P  $M_1 A_1$  om. सुस्पष्टम्
8. T. om. तद् before रूपं

- करणप्रत्यक्षं तन्निर्देशादिति । यथा ज्ञानादयः परस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपतया निर्देशात्स्वरूप-  
भूतगुणास्तथेदमपि रूपं श्रुत्या स्वरूपतया निर्देशात्स्वरूपभूतमित्यर्थः । भाष्यकारेणै-  
तद्व्याख्यातम्—अङ्गसैव विश्वसृजो रूपं तत्तु न चक्षुषा ग्राह्यं मनसा त्वक्छुषेण साधनान्तर-  
वता गृह्यते, न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा मनसा तु विशुद्धेनेति श्रुतेः, न ह्यरूपाया  
५ देवताया रूपमुपदिश्यते, यथाभूतवादि हि शास्त्रम्, माहारजनं वासः—वेदाहमेतं  
पुरुषं महान्तर्मादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तादिति प्रकरणान्तरनिर्देशाच्च साक्षिण इत्यादिना  
हिरण्यमय इति रूपसामान्याच्चन्द्रमुखवत्, न मयङत्र विकारभादाय प्रयुज्यते, अनारभ्य-  
त्वादात्मन इति । यथा ज्ञानादिकल्याणगुणानन्त्यनिर्देशादपरिमितकल्याणगुणविशिष्टं  
परं ब्रह्मेत्यवगम्यत एवमादित्यवर्णं पुरुषमित्यादिनिर्देशात्स्वाभिमतस्वानुरूपकल्याणतमरूपः  
१० परब्रह्मभूतः पुरुषोत्तमो नारायण इति ज्ञायते । तथास्येशाना जगतो विष्णुपत्नी—  
ह्रीश्च ते लक्ष्मीश्च पत्न्यौ—सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः—तमसः परस्तात्—क्षयन्तमस्य रजसः  
पराक इत्यादिना पत्नीपरिजनस्थानादीनां निर्देशादेव तथैव सन्तीत्यवगम्यते । यथाह  
भाष्यकार—यथाभूतवादि हि शास्त्रमिति ।

- [१३६] एतदुक्तं भवति—यथा सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेति निर्देशात्परमात्मस्वरूपं  
१५ समस्तहेयप्रत्यनीकानवधिकानन्दैकतानतयापरिच्छेद्यतया च सकलेतरविलक्षणं तंथा यः  
सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्—परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च—तमेव  
मान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभातीत्यादिनिर्देशान्निरतिशयासंख्येयाश्च

1. T प्रत्यक्षतश्चि°
2. T °भूता गुणास्
3. M<sub>1</sub> om. ग्राह्यं.....चक्षुषा
4. P M<sub>1</sub> om. आदित्य°.....परस्ताद्
5. P. om. रूप°
6. M<sub>1</sub> °त्वाद्यथात्मन
7. P M<sub>1.3</sub>. A<sub>1.3</sub>. om. परं
8. T. om. पत्न्यौ
9. P M<sub>1</sub> om. तथैव
10. M<sub>3</sub> om. तथा यः

गुणाः सकलेतरविलक्षणाः । तथादित्यवर्णमित्यादि निर्देशाद्रूपपरिजनस्थानादयश्च सकलेतर-  
विलक्षणाः स्वासाधारणा अनिर्देश्यस्वरूपस्वभावा इति ।

[१३७] वेदाः प्रमाणं चेद्विध्यर्थवादमन्त्रगतं सर्वमपूर्वमविरुद्धमर्थजातं यथा-  
वस्थितमेव बोधयन्ति । प्रामाण्यं च वेदानामौत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्ध इत्युक्तम् ।  
यथाग्निजलादीनामौष्ण्यादिशक्तियोगः स्वाभाविकः, यथा च चक्षुरादीनामिन्द्रियाणां ५  
बुद्धिविशेषजनकशक्तिः स्वाभाविकी तथा शब्दस्यापि बोधनशक्तिः स्वाभाविकी । न च  
हस्तचेष्टादिवत्संकेतमूलं शब्दस्य बोधकत्वमिति वक्तुं शक्यम् । अनाद्यनुसंधानाविच्छे-  
देऽपि संकेतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानात् । यानि संकेतमूलानि तानि सर्वाणि साक्षाद्वा परंपरया  
वा ज्ञायन्ते । नच देवदत्तादिशब्दवत्कल्पयितुं युक्तम् । तेषु च साक्षाद्वा परंपरया वा  
संकेतो ज्ञायते । गवादिशब्दानां त्वनाद्यनुसंधानाविच्छेदेऽपि संकेताज्ञानादेव बोधकत्व- १०  
शक्तिः स्वाभाविकी । अतोऽग्न्यादीनां दाहकत्वादिशक्तिवदिन्द्रियाणां बोधकत्वशक्तिवच्च  
शब्दस्यापि बोधकत्वशक्तिराश्रयणीया ॥

[१३८] ननु चेन्द्रियवच्छब्दस्यापि बोधकत्वं स्वाभाविकं संबन्धग्रहणं बोध-  
कत्वाय किमित्यपेक्षते, लिङ्गादिवदिति उच्यते—यथा ज्ञातसंबन्धनियमं धूमाद्यग्न्यादि-  
विज्ञानजनकं तथा ज्ञातसंबन्धनियमः शब्दोऽप्यर्थविशेषबुद्धिजनकः । एवं तर्हि शब्दो- १५  
ऽप्यर्थविशेषस्य लिङ्गमित्यनुमानं स्यात्—नैवम् । शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धो बोध्यबोधकभाव

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1. P. ब्रह्मनिर्देशास्व° for अनिर्देश्य°
  2. P M<sub>1</sub> औत्पत्तिकमौत्पत्तिकस्तु—M<sub>2</sub> औत्पत्तिकस्य शब्द°
  3. M<sub>2</sub> शब्दानामपि
  4. T. बोधकत्वशक्तिः
  5. P M<sub>1,2</sub>. A<sub>1</sub> युक्तम्
  6. P M<sub>1</sub> संकेतयित्रज्ञानाद्
  7. T. औष्ण्यादि°
  8. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1,2</sub> om. ननु च ..... up to एवं, in line 10 ; M<sub>2</sub> omits the same portion but adds it on separate leaf secunda manu.

एव धूमादीनां तु संबन्धान्तरमिति तस्य संबन्धस्य ज्ञानद्वारेण बुद्धिजनकत्वमिति विशेषः । एवं गृहीतसंबन्धस्य बोधकत्वदर्शनादनानुसंधानाविच्छेदेऽपि संकेताज्ञानाद्बोधकत्व-शक्तिरेवेति निश्चीयते ।

- [१३९] एवं बोधकानां पदसंघातानां संसर्गविशेषबोधकत्वेन वाक्यशब्दामि-  
 ५ धेयानामुच्चारणक्रमो यत्र पुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकस्ते पौरुषेयाः शब्दा इत्युच्यन्ते । यत्र तु तदुच्चारणक्रमः पूर्वपूर्वोच्चारणक्रमजनितसंस्कारपूर्वकः सर्वदापौरुषेयास्ते च वेदा इत्यु-  
 च्यन्ते । एतदेव वेदानामपौरुषेयत्वं नित्यत्वं च यत्पूर्वपूर्वोच्चारणक्रमजनितसंस्कारेण तमेव क्रमविशेषं स्मृत्वा तेनैव क्रमेणोच्चार्यमाणत्वम् । ते चानुपूर्वीविशेषेण संस्थिता अक्षरराशयो वेदा ऋग्यजुःसामार्थभेदभिन्ना अनन्तशाखा वर्तन्ते । ते च विध्यर्थवाद-  
 १० मन्त्ररूपा वेदाः परब्रह्मभूतनारायणस्वरूपं तदाराधनप्रकारमाराधितात्फलविशेषं च बोध-  
 यन्ति । परमपुरुषवर्तत्स्वरूपतदाराधनतत्फलज्ञापकवेदाख्यशब्दजातं नित्यमेव । वेदाना-  
 मनन्तत्वाददुरवगाहत्वाच्च परमपुरुषनियुक्ताः परमर्षयः कल्पे कल्पे 'निखिलजगदुपकारार्थं वेदार्थं स्मृत्वा विध्यर्थवादमन्त्रमूलानि धर्मशास्त्राणीतिहासपुराणानि च चक्रुः । लौकिकाश्च शब्दा वेदराशेरुद्धृत्यैव तत्तदर्थविशेषनामतया पूर्ववत्प्रयुक्ताः पारंपर्येण प्रयुज्यन्ते । ननु च  
 १५ वैदिक एव सर्वे वाचकाः शब्दाश्चेच्छब्दस्येवं भाषायामेवमिति लक्षणभेदः कथमुपपद्यते ।

1. T. om. अनाद्य
2. M<sub>3</sub> इति गम्यन्ते
3. P. om. तद् before उच्चारण°—M<sub>1</sub> om. °क्रम°
4. M<sub>3</sub> om. °संस्कार°.....up to °जनित° in line 6—A<sub>3</sub> misses one palm-leaf and has a lacuna upto p. 170, line 16 भवन्ति
5. P M<sub>1,2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> om. पूर्व°
6. M<sub>1</sub> om. च
7. M<sub>3</sub> om. °तत्स्वरूप°
8. P M<sub>1,2</sub> A<sub>1</sub> तत्फलजातबीजं
9. P M<sub>1</sub> om. निखिल
10. M<sub>3</sub> om. वेदार्थ°
11. M<sub>1</sub> °वेदशब्दराशेर्



उच्यते—तेषामेव शब्दानां तस्यामेवानुपूर्व्यां वर्तमानानां तथैव प्रयोगः । अन्यत्र प्रयुज्यमानानामन्यथेति न कश्चिद्दोषः ।

[१४०] एवमितिहासपुराणधर्मशास्त्रोपबृंहितसाङ्गवेदवेद्यः परब्रह्मभूतो नारा-  
यणो निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकः सकलेतरविलक्षणोऽपरिच्छिन्नज्ञानानन्दैकस्वरूपः स्वाभाविका-  
नवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरः स्वसंकल्पानुविधायिस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिभेदचिदचि- ५  
द्वस्तुजातोऽपरिच्छेद्यस्वरूपस्वभावानन्तमहाविभूतिर्नानाविधानन्तचेतनाचेतनात्मकप्रपञ्चली-  
लोपकरण इति प्रतिपादितम् । सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म—एतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं—तत्त्वमसि  
श्वेतकेतो—

एनमेके वदन्त्यग्निं मरुतोऽन्ये प्रजापतिम् ।

इन्द्रमेके परे प्राणमपरे ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ॥

१०

ज्योतींषि शुक्लानि च यानि लोके त्रयो लोका लोकपालास्त्रयी च ।

त्रयोऽग्नयश्चाहुतयश्च पञ्च सर्वे देवा देवकीपुत्र एव ॥

त्वं यज्ञस्त्वं वषट्कारस्त्वमोकारः परंतपः ।

ऋतुधामा वसुः पूर्वं वसूनां त्वं प्रजापतिः ॥

जगत्सर्वं शरीरं ते स्थैर्यं ते वसुधातलम् ।

१५

अग्निः कोपः प्रसादस्ते सोमः श्रीवत्सलक्षणः ॥

ज्योतींषि विष्णुर्भुवनानि विष्णुर्वनानि विष्णुर्गिरयो दिशश्च ।

नद्यः समुद्राश्च स एव सर्वं यदस्ति यन्नास्ति च विप्रवर्थ ॥

इत्यादिसामानाधिकरण्यप्रयोगेषु सर्वैः शब्दैः सर्वशरीरतया सर्वप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवाभिधीयत  
इति चोक्तम् । सत्यसंकल्पं परं ब्रह्म स्वयमेव बहुप्रकारं स्यामिति संकल्प्याचित्समष्टि- २०

1. M<sub>8</sub> om. °पर°

2. T °गुणगणाकारः

3. M<sub>8</sub> तथा च मानवः पूर्वं वसूनां

रूपमहाभूतसूक्ष्मवस्तु भोक्तृवर्गसमूहं च स्वस्मिन्प्रलीनं स्वयमेव विभज्य तस्माद्भूत-  
सूक्ष्माद्ब्रह्मनुो महाभूतानि सृष्ट्वा तेषु च भोक्तृवर्गात्मतया प्रवेश्य तैश्चिदधिष्ठितैर्महा-  
भूतैरन्योन्यसंसृष्टैः कृत्स्नं जगद्विधाय स्वयमपि सर्वस्यात्मतया प्रविश्य परमात्मत्वेनाव-  
स्थितं सर्वशरीरं बहुप्रकारमवतिष्ठते । यदिदं महाभूतसूक्ष्मं वस्तु तदेव प्रकृतिशब्दे-  
नाभिधीयते । भोक्तृवर्गसमूह एव पुरुषशब्देन चोच्यते । तौ च प्रकृतिपुरुषौ  
परमात्मशरीरतया परमात्मप्रकारभूतौ । तत्प्रकारः परमात्मैव प्रकृतिपुरुषशब्दाभिधेयः ।  
सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति - तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् - तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च  
त्यच्चाभवत् निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च निलयनं चानिलयनं च विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च सत्यं  
चानृतं च सत्यमभवदिति पूर्वोक्तं सर्वमनयैव श्रुत्या व्यक्तम् ।

१० [१४१] ब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपायश्च शास्त्राधिगततत्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकस्वकर्मानुगृहीतभक्तिनि-  
ष्ठासाध्यानवधिकातिशयप्रियविशदतमप्रत्यक्षतापन्नानुष्ठानरूपपरमभक्तिरेवेत्युक्तम् । भक्ति-  
शब्दश्च प्रीतिविशेषे वर्तते । प्रीतिश्च ज्ञानविशेष एव । ननु च सुखं प्रीतिरित्यनर्था-  
न्तरम् । सुखं च ज्ञानविशेषसाध्यं पदार्थान्तरमिति हि लौकिकाः । नैवम् । येन ज्ञान-  
विशेषेण तत्साध्यमित्युच्यते स एव ज्ञानविशेषः सुखम् ।

१५ [१४२] एतदुक्तं भवति - विषयज्ञानानि सुखदुःखमध्यस्थसाधारणानि ।  
तानि च विषयाधीनविशेषाणि तथा भवन्ति । येन च विषयविशेषेण विशेषितं ज्ञानं  
सुखस्य जनकमित्यभिमतं तद्विषयं ज्ञानमेव सुखं, तदतिरेकि पदार्थान्तरं नोपलभ्यते ।  
तेनैव सुखित्वव्यवहारोपपत्तेश्च । एवंविधसुखरूपज्ञानस्य विशेषकत्वं ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य

1. P. om. °भूत°.....महा°

2. T. सूक्ष्मं

3. M<sub>1</sub> तस्मिन् for स्वस्मिन्

4. M<sub>9</sub> अनुप्रविश्य

5. T. om. च

6. M<sub>1</sub>. A<sub>1</sub>. °परमभक्तिर्

7. T. तद्विषयज्ञानम्

8. M<sub>1</sub> ब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्य

वस्तुनः सातिशयमस्थिरं च । ब्रह्मणस्त्वनवधिकातिशयं स्थिरं चेति । आनन्दो ब्रह्मे-  
त्युच्यते । विषयायत्तत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य सुखरूपतया ब्रह्मैव सुखम् । तदिदमाह—रसो वै  
सः—रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवतीति ब्रह्मैव सुखमिति ब्रह्म लब्ध्वा सुखी  
भवतीत्यर्थः । परमपुरुषः स्वेनैव स्वयमनवधिकातिशयसुखः सन्परस्यापि सुखं  
भवति । सुखरूपत्वाविशेषात् । ब्रह्म यस्य ज्ञानविषयो भवति स सुखी भवतीत्यर्थः । ५  
तदेवं परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणकाकरस्य निरवद्यस्यानन्त-  
महाविभूतेरनवधिकातिशयसौशील्यसौन्दर्यवात्सल्यजलधेः सर्वशेषित्वादात्मनः शेष-  
त्वात्प्रतिसंबन्धितयानुसंधीयमानमनवधिकातिशयप्रीतिविषयं सत्परं ब्रह्मैवैनमात्मानं प्राप-  
यतीति ।

[१४३] ननु चात्यन्तशेषतैवात्मनोऽनवधिकातिशयसुखमित्युक्तं भवति । १०  
तदेतत्सर्वलोकविरुद्धम् । तथा हि सर्वेषामेव चेतनानां स्वातन्त्र्यमेवेष्टतमं दृश्यते,  
पारतन्त्र्यं दुःखतरम् । स्मृतिश्च—

सर्वं परवशं दुःखं सर्वमात्मवशं सुखम् ।

तथा च—

सेवा श्ववृत्तिराख्याता तस्मात्तां परिवर्जयेत् ।

१५

इति । तदिदमनधिगतदेहातिरिक्तात्मस्वरूपाणां शरीरात्माभिमानविजृम्भितम् । तथा  
हि—शरीरं हि मनुष्यत्वादिजातिगुणाश्रयपिण्डभूतं स्वतन्त्रं प्रतीयते । तस्मिन्नेवाहमिति  
संसारिणां प्रीतिः । आत्माभिमानो यादृशस्तदनुगुणैव पुरुषार्थप्रतीतिः । सिंहव्याघ्र-  
वराहमनुष्ययक्षरक्षःपिशाचदेवदानवस्त्रीपुंसव्यवस्थितात्माभिमानानां सुखानि व्यवस्थि-

1. P. °सुखरसं—A<sub>8</sub> सुखस्वरूपः सन्

2. P M<sub>1.8</sub>. om. °गण°

3. P. om. सौशील्य°

4. M<sub>8</sub>. A<sub>8</sub>. T. °वात्सल्यसौन्दर्य°

5. P M<sub>1</sub> °विषयभूतं सत् A<sub>1</sub> विषयभूतं परं

6. M<sub>9</sub> प्रतिपत्तिः for प्रतीतिः

7. M<sub>9</sub> °स्थितानामात्मा°

तानि । तानि च परस्परविरुद्धानि । तस्मादात्माभिमानानुगुणपुरुषार्थव्यवस्थया सर्वं समाहितम् । आत्मस्वरूपं तु देवादिदेहविलक्षणं ज्ञानैकाकारम् । तच्च परशेषतैक-  
स्वरूपम् । यथावस्थितात्माभिमाने तदनुगुणैव पुरुषार्थप्रतीतिः । आत्मा ज्ञानमयोऽमल-  
इति स्मृतेर्ज्ञानैकाकारता प्रतिपन्ना । पतिं विश्वस्येत्यादि श्रुतिगणैः परमात्मशेषतैकाकारता  
५ च प्रतीता । अतः सिंहव्याघ्रादिशरीरात्माभिमानवत्त्वात्तन्व्याभिमानोऽपि कर्मकृतविपरी-  
तात्मज्ञानरूपो वेदितव्यः । अतः कर्मकृतमेव परमपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तविषयाणां सुखत्वम् ।  
अत एव तेषामल्पत्वमस्थिरत्वं च परमपुरुषस्यैव स्वत एव सुखत्वम् । अतस्तदेव स्थिरम-  
नवधिकातिशयं च - कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म - आनन्दो ब्रह्म - सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेति श्रुतेः ।  
ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य वस्तुनः स्वरूपेण सुखत्वाभावः कर्मकृतत्वेन चास्थिरत्वं  
१० भगवता पराशरेणोक्तम्—

नरकस्वर्गसंज्ञे वै पापपुण्ये द्विजोत्तम ।

वस्त्वेकमेव दुःखाय सुखायेर्ष्यागमाय च ।

कोपाय च यतस्तस्माद्वस्तु वस्त्वात्मकं कुतः ॥

सुखदुःखाद्येकान्तरूपिणो वस्तुनो वस्तुत्वं कुतः । तदेकान्तता पुण्यपापकृतेत्यर्थः ।  
१५ एवमनेकपुरुषापेक्षया कस्यचित्सुखमेव कस्यचिद्दुःखं भवतीत्यव्यवस्थां प्रतिपाद्य, एक-  
स्मिन्नपि पुरुषे न व्यवस्थितमित्याह—

तदेव प्रीयते भूत्वा पुनर्दुःखाय जायते ।

तदेव कोपाय यतः प्रसादाय च जायते ॥

तस्माद्दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न च किञ्चित्सुखात्मकम् ।

1. P M<sub>2</sub> adds. °कारता पुरुषार्थता°

2. A<sub>8</sub>. T. प्रतिपादिता

3. P M<sub>1</sub>. T. स्वतन्त्राभिमानो

4. P M<sub>8</sub>. A<sub>1.8</sub>. om. खं ब्रह्म—M<sub>8</sub> om. आनन्दो ब्रह्म

5. M<sub>2</sub> तत्कर्म

6. P<sub>1</sub> वा for च—M<sub>2</sub> om. च

7. M<sub>1</sub> °इत्यवस्थां—A<sub>8</sub> इत्यनवस्थां

इति सुखदुःखात्मकत्वं सर्वस्य वस्तुनः कर्मकृतं न वस्तुस्वरूपकृतम् । अतः कर्मावसाने तदपैतीत्यर्थः ।

[१४४] यत्तु सर्वं परवशं दुःखमित्युक्तं तत्परमपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तानां परस्पर-शेषशेषिभावाभावात्तद्व्यतिरिक्तं प्रति शेषता दुःखमेवेत्युक्तम् । सेवा श्ववृत्तिराख्याते-त्यत्राप्यसेव्यसेवा श्ववृत्तिरेवेत्युक्तम् । स ह्याश्रमैः सैदोपास्यः समस्तैरेक एव त्विति सवैरात्मयाथाल्प्यवेदिभिः सेव्यः पुरुषोत्तम एक एव । यथोक्तं भगवता—

मां च योऽन्यभिचारेण भक्तियोगेन सेवते ।

स गुणान्समतीत्यैतान्ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ॥

इतीयमेव भक्तिरूपा सेवा ब्रह्मविदामिति परम्—तमेवं विद्वानभृत इह भवति—ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवतीत्यादिषु वेदनशब्देनाभिधीयत इत्युक्तम् । यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्य इति विशेषणाद्यमेवैष वृणुत इति भगवता वरणीयत्वं प्रतीयते । वरणीयश्च प्रियतमः । यस्य भगवत्पुनवधिकातिशया प्रीतिर्जायते स एव भगवतः प्रियतमः । तदुक्तं भगवता—

प्रियो हि ज्ञानिनोऽत्यर्थमहं स च मम प्रियः ।

इति । तस्मात्परिभक्तिरूपापन्नमेव वेदनं तत्त्वतो भगवत्प्राप्तिसाधनम् । यथोक्तं भगवता द्वैपायनेन मोक्षधर्मे सर्वोपनिषद्याख्यानरूपम्—

१५

1. M<sub>2</sub> °व्यतिरिक्तात्मानां—M<sub>1</sub> om. °शेष°
2. M<sub>2</sub> om. आख्यातां
3. P M<sub>1</sub> A<sub>1</sub> सदा सेव्यः
4. P om. तु
5. T विद्भिः
6. M<sub>1</sub> ब्रह्मविद for. ब्रह्म वेद
7. M<sub>2</sub> एतदुक्तं भवति for तदुक्तं भगवता
8. P M<sub>1</sub> om. °पर°
9. भगवद्द्वैपायनेन

न संदशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम् ।

भक्त्या च धृत्या च समाहितात्मा ज्ञानस्वरूपं परिपश्यतीह ॥

धृत्या समाहितात्मा भक्त्या पुरुषोत्तमं पश्यति—साक्षात्करोति—प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः ।  
भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्य इत्यनेनैकार्थ्यात् । भक्तिश्च ज्ञानविशेष एवेति सर्वमुपपन्नम् ।

[१४५] सारासारविवेकज्ञा गरीयांसो विमत्सराः ।

प्रमाणतन्त्राः सन्तीति कृतो वेदार्थसंग्रहः ॥

॥ इति श्रीमद्भगवद्रामानुजाचार्यविरचितो वेदार्थसंग्रहः समाप्तः ॥

#### 1. A<sub>5</sub> परिपश्यति

P. adds the colophon श्रीपुराणपुरुषोत्तमो लक्ष्मीविलासलालसो  
गोपीजनस्वजनो राधासमाराधनव्यग्रो विजयतेतराम् ।

वेदार्थसंग्रहमिमं यदि पक्षपातं

त्यक्त्वा (for त्यक्त्वा) पठेत्स परमात्मविदेव मर्त्यः ।

उत्क्रोक्तिलोखमधुराधिपतिमिजस्य

पाठाय पत्रनिचयेस्वत एव सद्यः ॥ १ ॥

पठितोत्तरमीम[i]सा वृथा वेदार्थसंग्रहः ।

अनधीतोत्तरा सैव वृथा वेदार्थसंग्रहः ॥

M<sub>1</sub> adds वेदान्तसंग्रहप्रारम्भः शके १७७१

साधारणसंवत्सरे श्रीषणे लिखितं पुण्यग्रामे ॥

ग्रन्थसंख्या १४०० रौघ्यणि १.

M<sub>2</sub> adds.

तमोघने खलमते कौशीकाश्रिते

जगत्सहो मुगतिमजानतां सताम् ।

सुखाय यो रविरिव सुव्यवातरत्

स सन्मर्ति यतिपतिरातनोतु नः ॥

प्रान्दे श्रवणे मासि राकायामिन्दुवासरे ।

वृसिंहतातदासेनालिखि वेदार्थसंग्रहः ॥

॥ श्रीरामचन्द्राय नमः ॥

### PART III: TRANSLATION.





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- § 16. ChUp. 6, 2, 1 states that Brahman is the universal cause: the true meaning of *sad eva*.
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- § 134. Lyrical evocation of Chāndogya Up. 1, 1, 6.
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## TRANSLATION

§ 1. Homage to the Principal to whom all spiritual<sup>1</sup> and non-spiritual<sup>2</sup> entities are accessory;<sup>3</sup> Who reposes on Śeṣa,<sup>4</sup> and Who is the treasury of immaculate and infinite beautiful qualities :<sup>5</sup> Viṣṇu.<sup>6</sup>

§ 2. May the Sage<sup>7</sup> Yāmuna<sup>8</sup> prosper: He has dispelled the bewildering obscurity of ignorance which, albeit contrary to revelation and

1. cit- "spiritual order of the Universe, sum-total of individual ātmans," generally said of the evolved product of individualized souls, as against *puruṣa*- "the spiritual order" in its subtle, i.e., causal state (cf. infra §140). I prefer the rendering 'spiritual' to THIBAUT's 'sentient' since strictly speaking sentiency is of matter, not of spirit.

2. acit- "non-spiritual order, material or physical component of the Universe," constituting the corporeal counterpart of cit to which it is subservient.

3. *śeṣin*- "principal element to which other elements are accessory," especially the Supreme in relation to the orders of cit and acit which are *śeṣa* "accessory" to him in the sense that they are subservient to him, totally and inseparably dependent on him, serving his eminence. Cf. infra §122 *evamīśvaragatātiśayādhānechayōpādeyatvam . . sarvasya vastunaḥ svarūpam*. This relation of principal-accessory is the counterpart of that of body-soul (*śarīraśarīribhāva*) or mode-modified (*prakāraprakāribh.*) the first esp. under the aspect of the Supreme, the latter two under the aspect of the subject orders.

4. 'pun' (rather 'comparison/equation of the two concepts denoted by one term') on 1. the serpent Ananta-Śeṣa, 2. the subject orders of cit and acit. It would follow from R.'s exposition (§132) of the Supreme's entourage (*śri, paramavyoman* etc.) as forming part of His essence (*svarūpa*-) that strictly speaking Ananta too belongs to this essence and not to the orders of *śeṣa*. "This 'pun' is borrowed from Yāmuna, *Stotratatna* 39-40 *tayā* (sc. *śrīyā*) *āśinam anantabhogini . . śarīrabhedais tava śeṣatām* ("servitude") *gatair yathocitām śeṣa ititare janaiḥ*. In the second sense *śeṣaśāyin*- means "who resides (as the inner ātman) in the subservient orders of cit and acit."

5. *kalyāṇa*- (sc. *guṇa*-), the Supreme's six perfections (*ṣaḍguṇyam*) *jñāna, śakti, bala, vīrya* (also *dhairya*), *aīśvarya, tejas*. R. does not explain himself on the relation of these *guṇas* mutually (for traditional definitions see SCHRAEDER, *Pañcarātra* 32 sqq.; YID. vii); originally qualities somehow related to some aspect of the complex divinity of Viṣṇu (*vīrya*- "heroism" in his Vedic exploits and *avatāras*, cf. GONDA, *Early Viṣṇuism*, 118 sqq.—*bala* "id.", cf. also ŚvetUp. 6, 8 *svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca; śakti* cf. VP. 6, 7, 60 sqq.—*tejas* "solar splendour") their number was apparently fixed at an early date (cf. VP. 6, 5, 79) and, reinterpreted, they played a rôle in the *Pañcarātra* doctrine of the *Vyūhas*, cf. SCHRAEDER, o.c., 34.

6. Viṣṇu- name rarely used by R. for the Supreme (invariably named *Nārāyaṇa*) here employed for the double purpose of stating at the outset R.'s Vaiṣṇava persuasion and of suggesting God's all-pervasiveness: *viṣṇu* = *vyāpin/vyāpaka*-, cf. e.g. GBH. 11, 24 (rt. viṣ-) or/and his entering into the subject orders as their inner Ruler (*antaryāmin*-) (rt. viṣ- cf. ChUp. 6, 3, 2-3). This *maṅgala* sums up the fundamentals of R.'s doctrine.

7. *muni*- invariably defined *ātmanananaśila*-, enlarged on ŚBh. 4, 4, 46 (Th. 710) *idaṃ ca maunaṃ śravaṇapratīṣṭhārthān mananād arthāntarabhūtam upasāndāmbanasya punaḥ punaḥ saṃśīlanam tadbhāvanārūpam* "this mauna ('muni-hood') is something different from mere reflection on the basis of scriptural instruction: it is the repeated mental representation of the very object of worshipful meditation itself, so that it grows upon the mind."

8. YAMUNA (*dravidicē* ALAVANDAR), teachers's teacher of R., attacks in his *Siddhi-traya* the theses of ŚĀṆKARA and BHĀSKARA. On R.'s relation cf. Introd. III.

reason, has spread all over the world: such errors<sup>9</sup> as the view that the Supreme Brahman, being nescient and afflicted with misconceptions, is implicated in *samsāra*; or that the Supreme Brahman is liable to adventitious limiting adjuncts<sup>10</sup> that are different from itself,<sup>11</sup> and as such is subject to *karman*; or that the Supreme Brahman itself is the abode of imperfection.<sup>12</sup>

§ 3. The only meaning which is to be found in the most important part of the whole body of *śrūti*s,<sup>13</sup> which set forth what is blissful for the entire Universe, is as follows: <sup>14</sup> True knowledge of the individual soul<sup>15</sup> and of the Supreme Spirit,<sup>16</sup> applied to the obligations imposed<sup>17</sup> by the various *dharma*s pertaining to each stage and station of life,<sup>18</sup> are to precede pious and humble acts of devotion for and meditation on the Supreme Spirit—acts held extremely dear<sup>19</sup> by the devotee—that ultimately result in the attainment of the Supreme Spirit.

§ 4. In truth, all declarations of the Vedānta are meant to set forth the knowledge of the proper form and nature<sup>20</sup> of the individual soul which are

9. Resp. the advaitin's and the two types (*Bhāskara* and *Yādvaparakāśa*) of *bhedā-bhedavādin*'s positions, summarized and refuted below.

10. *upādhi*- "non-essential element or factor adjoined to the pure form (*svarūpa*-) of an entity which is thereby delimited and conditioned.

11. *para*- "other", showing the insoluble dualism ultimately fundamental to *bhedā-bhedavāda*.

12. *āsubha*- or *heya*-, opp. of *kalyāṇa*-, "imperfect, affected by the various limitations etc., due to *karman* to which souls are subject.

13. i.e., the *upaniṣads* or Vedānta.

14. This sums up the three stages of the one road from transmigration in bondage (*samsāra*-) to the ultimate attainment of perfect bliss; corresponds completely to the three paths—*jñāna*, *karma*, *bhakti*—of the *Gītā* as interpreted by R. See my *Rāmānuja* etc. Intr. 19 sqq.

15. *jīvātman*—"the individualized ātman in natural conjunction with (*samśṛṭa*- "created jointly with", generally "related to, having a relation") the body."

16. *paramātman*—"God as the ātman beyond the individual ātman, as the ātman's inner ātman," connoting both God's transcendence and immanence.

17. *itīkartavyatā*, for the meaning of this term, cf. MNPr. § 126. *dhyāna*- "contemplation inspired by love" synonymous with *bhakti*- and *upāsana*-, *arcana*- esp. "worship of God's image".

18. Station and stage of life = *varṇāśrama*: *varṇa*- "social order founded on religious law" rather than "(sociological) class"—*āśrama*- the ideal life-periods of *brahma-cārīn*—"boy initiated into religiously founded society"; *gṛhastha*—"pater familias, keeper of the fire"—*vanaprastha*—"retired from public life"—*saṃnyāsin* "retired from all social and marital life."

19. R. frequently emphasizes the fact that the loving devotion to God is an act which in itself is extremely dear to the devotee and, as an entirely disinterested mental act, is its own reward. Cf. Ved. § 141-144.

20. *svarūpa*- "proper form" (where 'form' is the principle of individuality, cf. *nāma-rūpa*-), free from adventitious adjuncts but (for R.) possessed of essential properties;



different from the body;<sup>21</sup> the proper form and nature of the Supreme Spirit who is the inner Ruler<sup>22</sup> of the soul; the worship of the Supreme Spirit; and the apprehension of Brahman as perfect boundless bliss which presupposes the revelation of the proper form of the soul that results from the worship of the Supreme Spirit.<sup>23</sup> By setting forth all this the declarations of the Vedānta serve to remove the danger of rebirth which is inevitable since it results from the misconception<sup>24</sup> of the individual soul that it is identical itself with that one of the four types of bodies—sc. gods, from Brahmā onwards,—men—animals—inanimate beings—, into which it has entered by the impulsion of the continuous flow of good or evil karman amassed during ageless ignorance.<sup>25</sup>

*svabhāva*—“this essential form in the process of being and becoming with and through its essential qualities.”

21. Note R.'s definition of body: *yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam taccheṣātaikasvarūpaṃ ca tat tasya śariram iti śarīra-lakṣaṇam āstheyam* ŚBh. 2, 1, 9; cf. Lacombe, ASV. 108 sqq.; Proceedings, All-India Conf., 1946.

22. *antaryāmin*—“God as the immanent principle directing and guiding the soul in its actions in the same way as the soul directs the body;” term from *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* (BĀUp. 3, 7, 22) in the *mādhyaṃdina* recension, which reads *ya ātmani tiṣṭhann antaro 'tmanah*, etc.; on this difference cf. ŚBh. 1, 4, 27; 2, 3, 19.

23. For it is by dedicating all actions to God (BhG. 18, 46) and devoting himself entirely to God (cf. GBh. 2, 61 sqq.) that a person is able to shed the bonds of karman and realize, i.e., recognize, his soul for what it is in essence.

24. *abhimāna*—“misconception (lit. “prejudice, bias, self-centred opinion”) that the aloof ātman is identical with the body which, with the psychological functions of *ahamkāra* “subjectifier”, constitutes the empirical ego that is mistaken for the ātman. Cf. also K. C. VARADACHARI's paper on *abhimāna* in *Rāmānuja's Theory of Knowledge*.—There has never been a paradisiac period before the “Fall” (*jñānabhraṃśa*, *pañcarātric* term); *samsāra* has existed from all eternity; for the corresponding eternity of souls that are never implicated in *samsāra*, the *nityas* or *sūris*, cf. *infra* § 128.—For the way in which the ātman's unlimited knowledge is contracted (*samkucita*—) to the scope of a body-bound soul, see *infra*.

25. Sharply to be distinguished from Śaṅkara's *avidyā* (always rendered “nescience”), R.'s “ignorance” is a real factor which is not some undefinable shadow of the absolute but a concrete lack of knowledge in the *samsāric* being of the fundamental autonomy of its individual ātman as a spiritual entity of unlimited knowledge subject to the supreme Spirit. As the *advaitin* takes knowledge as the essence, nescience takes on a completely different, ultimately inexplicable character; whereas for R. who considers knowledge a property of a substance (*dharmabhūtajñāna*—) ignorance has its limited and definable scope of action. On this point see *infra* § 43. Besides, whereas the cessation of nescience, however conceived, is for the *advaitin* equal to the *summum bonum*, the self-realisation/self-recognition of the individual ātman in the *Sāṃkhyan* sense is for R., although doubtless release, but the next step to the supreme goal of attaining God.

Such declarations are met with in śrutis like "Thou art That,<sup>26</sup> this soul is Brahman,<sup>27</sup> He who, although residing in the soul, is different from that soul, whom the soul does not know, whose body is the soul, and who directs the soul from within, He is the immortal inner Ruler of thy soul,<sup>28</sup> He is the inner soul of all beings, free from all evil, the divine and sole God Nārāyaṇa,<sup>29</sup> 'tis He whom the Brahmins aspire to know by repeating the Vedas, by sacrifice, charity, mortification and fasting,<sup>30</sup> he that knows Brahman attains the Most-High,<sup>31</sup> he that knows this is immortal: there is no other way to tread,"<sup>32</sup> and so on and so forth.

§ 5. The proper form of the soul is free from all various differentiations consisting in the distinctions that are brought about by the natural evolution<sup>33</sup> of prakṛti into the bodies of gods, men, etc. In essence it is only characterized by knowledge and beatitude. When these differentiations of god, man, etc., — which have been brought about by the karman of the soul—have vanished<sup>34</sup> there persists a differentiation in its proper form<sup>35</sup>; it is beyond the power of expression and can only be known by the soul itself. So the soul can only be defined as essentially knowledge,<sup>36</sup> and this essential nature is common to all souls.<sup>37</sup>

26. *tat tvam asi* ChUp. 6, 9, 4; etc.

27. *ayam ātmā brahma* MāṇḍUp. 2.

28. *yā ātmani tiṣṭhann etc.* BĀUp. 3, 7, 22 (Mādhyaṃdina recension)

29. *sa eṣa sarvabhūtāntārātmā* SubālUp. 7.

30. *tam etam vedānuvacanena etc.* BĀUp. 4, 4, 22.

31. *brahmadev āpnoti param* TaittUp. 2, 1

32. *śvetUp.* 3, 8.

33. *pariṇāma*— "the effectuation of an entity which has the same degree of being as its material cause" (cf. e.g. the definition in Vedāntaparibhāṣā I *pariṇāmo nāmapādāna\*sama\*sattākakāryāpattiḥ*); on the *pariṇāma*vāda see Intr. I.

34. S. is unquestionably right in quoting as R.'s references the śloka *ekaśvarūpabhedo hi bāhyakarmāvṛtiprajah/ devādibhede 'padhvaste nāsty evāvārṇo hi saḥ*// VP. 2, 14, 33 "the differentiation in the actually undifferentiated proper form has its origin in the obscuration caused by karman that is extrinsic to the proper form; so when those differentiations of god etc. have disappeared, there is no obscuration left," (also quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 81 in similar context), and *pratyastamitabhedam yat sattāmātram agocaram/vacasāmātmasaṃvedyam taj jñānaṃ brahmasaṃjñitam* // VP. 6, 7, 53 (where *brahma* = *ātma*-), discussed in detail ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 69 sqq. and explained in my paper *The Subhāṣṭrayaprakaraṇa* etc.

35. *svarūpabheda*— "essentially distinct as an individual, having essentially distinct individualities."

36. *jñānasvarūpamityetāvannirdeśyam* cannot be taken to mean that that the ātman is pure knowledge, but that the knowledge characteristic for the ātman is a *svarūpanirūpanadharmā* "an attribute describing the proper form," cf. infra § 43; the tenet that *jñāna* is an attribute, not the essence, is fundamental to R.'s doctrine.—SUDARŚANACHARI in his ed., traces *jñānasvarūpam* to VP. 1, 4, 40, but this st. refers to the Supreme Spirit. I would rather connect it with 6, 7, 53 *yat sattāmātram taj jñānaṃ brahmasaṃjñitam*, interpreted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 69 *ātmānaḥ svarūpaṃ jñānasattaikalakṣaṇam*.

37. R. endorses the Sāṃkhya view that there is an infinite number of ātmans which

§ 6. The proper form of the inner Ruler is as follows : He is the sole cause of the cessation of saṃsāra, which itself consists in the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the phenomenal world<sup>38</sup> constituted by the above spiritual and non-spiritual entities. His proper form is therefore distinct from all entities other than Himself, since He is absolutely opposed to all evil and comprises solely infinite perfection. His beautiful qualities are immeasurable, perfect and innumerable. He is known in the entire Veda under the various designations of *Soul of all*,<sup>39</sup> *the Supreme Brahman*,<sup>40</sup> *Supreme Glory*,<sup>41</sup> *Supreme Principle*,<sup>42</sup> *Supreme Spirit*,<sup>43</sup> *Real Being*,<sup>44</sup> etc.,—all of which denote the Venerable Lord<sup>45</sup> Nārāyaṇa,<sup>46</sup> the Supreme Person.<sup>47</sup> The śrutis are meant to set forth his manifestation,<sup>48</sup> so they expound the universal dominion of the Supreme Spirit as the inner Soul of the totality of spiritual and non-spiritual entities by expressions like *His power*,<sup>49</sup> *His portion*,<sup>50</sup> *His manifestation*,<sup>51</sup> *His form*,<sup>52</sup> *His body*,<sup>53</sup> *His shape*,<sup>54</sup> etc., and by *sāmānādhikarāṇya*<sup>55</sup> constructions.

although mutually distinguished, all have the same generic structure (ākāra-) of unrestricted knowledge.

38. *prapañca*—is the completely evolved phenomenal Universe of matter ensouled by spirit in the gross (*sthūla*-) phase of effect.

39. *sarvātmā* ŚvetUP. 3, 21.

40. *paraṃ brahma* TaittUp. 2, 12

41. *paraṃ jyotiḥ* ChUp. 8, 3, 4.

42. *paraṃ tattvam* ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

43. *paramātmā* BĀUp. 3, 1, 1.

44. *sat* ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

45. *bhagavān*, for the meaning of the term cf. the discussion JRAS 1910-12; cf. also R.'s quotation of VP. 6, 5, 73 sqq. infra.

46. *nārāyaṇa*—for R. the name of the Supreme Personal being *par excellence*, one aspect of whom is denoted by Viṣṇu as the all-pervading supporter of the Universe, cf. infra §§ 99 ff.

47. *puruṣottama*—, term frequently used in the Gītā denotes the Supreme as a spiritual being transcending the *puruṣa* or order of individuals souls constituting his higher prakṛti (the oft-cited passage Gītā 7, 4, sq.).

48. *vaibhava*—“the totality of God's *vibhūti*s, his divine manifestation in the phenomenal world of matter and spirit.”

49. *śakti*—: *parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate* ŚvetUp. 6, 8.

50. *aṃśa*—: *mamaivāṃśo jīvaloke* G. 15, 7; cf. MaitrUp. 5, 2.

51. *vibhūti*—: G. 10, 7 etc. PraśnUp. 5, 4.

52. *rūpa*—: *ekaṃ rūpaṃ bahudhā yaḥ karoti* KathUp. 5, 12.

53. *śarīra*—: *Antaryāmibrahmaṇa* BĀUp. 3, 7, 3-22.

54. *tanu*—: *tasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanuṃ svām* KathUp. 2, 23.

55. *sāmānādhikarāṇya*—grammatical term: community of case relation of two or more words; logical: coordination of the two (or more) terms in a judgment: the lotus is blue etc. Term defined (infra § 26) *bhinnapravyrttinimitānām śabdānām ekasminn arthe vytiṭṭh* “the bearing on one sense of more words with different reasons for their application”. The stock-example is the ‘mahāyākya’ *tattvamasi* discussed in detail infra § 20

§ 7. While attempting to explain these *sāmānādhikarāṇya* constructions, etc., which in fact only propound Brahman's manifestation, some philosophers contend<sup>56</sup> that Brahman is nothing but non-differentiated knowledge. Although it is eternally released and by its very nature self-illuminating, it is identical with the individual soul; this identity is concluded from *sāmānādhikarāṇya* constructions such as *Thou art That*. Accordingly Brahman Itself is nescient and as such may be in bondage as well as released. The entire Universe, with its infinite variety of Sovereign Lord, submissive souls etc., is false, for it is different from pure non-differentiated spirituality. The distinction that one soul is in bondage and the other soul is released cannot be made at all. It is false that some souls have attained release before: only one single body has an indwelling soul and all other bodies have no souls at all; but which body that is cannot be positively determined. The preceptor who imparts knowledge is false, the person who has correct knowledge of the *śāstra*<sup>57</sup> is also false. All this is to be gathered from the *śāstra*, which is false itself.

§ 8. Others<sup>58</sup> occupy a different position and hold that Brahman, though having all perfections like freedom from evil etc.,<sup>59</sup> is—because of the conception of identity—afflicted with some sort of adjunct, so that He may be alternatively in bondage or in released state and is consequently the abode of evolution which takes the form of various imperfections.

§ 9. Others<sup>60</sup> again, describing the exact nature of the conception of identity, maintain that Brahman—ocean of incomparable and immeasurable noble qualities which belong to its nature—is in essence at once distinct and indistinct with regard to all spiritual beings—divine, human, animal, inanimate, infernal, celestial and released, and thus the abode of evolution in the form of all kind of imperfections proper to ether, etc.

## II

§ 10. Philosopher who have pondered over the true meaning of the *śruti* have pointed out a number of errors in the first school which cannot be explained away.<sup>61</sup> As a matter of fact, the *śruti* passage from "*It wished: I be many; I will multiply*"<sup>62</sup> to "*all these creatures, my dear son,*

56. Summary of advaita school.

57. *pramāṇa*.

58. Summary of the BHASKARA school of bhedābhedavāda.

59. *apahatāpāpmā* etc. ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

60. Summary of the YADAVAPRAKASA school of bhedābhedavāda.

61. Here starts R.'s refutation of advaitavāda: first it is shown that the doctrine of absolute non-duality is contradicted by *śruti*, §§ 10-39.

62. *tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti* ChUp. 6, 2, 3—*sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ* etc. ChUp. 6, 8, 4; this entire context is the theme of §§ 10-22.

have their roots in real being; therein they have their abode and their foundation," expounds that the origination, subsistence and resorption etc. of the world are due to the will of Brahman, to whom the word *It*, indicative of the topic under discussion, refers.

Besides, all the perfect attributes which according to other contexts belong to Brahman, those multitudes of immeasurable, perfect and innumerable perfections like omniscience, omnipotence, universal sovereignty, his being modified by all, unequalled and unsurpassed, having all desires materialized and every will realized,<sup>63</sup> and being all-illuminating, as well as his absolute freedom from evil as is proved by countless expressions like *He, who is free from sin*,<sup>64</sup> etc.,—all those perfections are done with in this school.

§ 11. — But, it may be objected, at the very beginning this śruti asserts, by stating that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one,<sup>65</sup> that only the cause has reality. By adducing the instance of the clay<sup>66</sup> it shows that the One, being the cause, is real whereas all transformations have no reality. In the śruti *my dear son, this real being was alone in the beginning and without a second*,<sup>67</sup> all distinctions, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, are denied reality, and it is set forth that Brahman, to whom this "real being" refers, is non-differentiated. In other contexts the so-called purifying statements<sup>68</sup> do also declare that Brahman is absolutely opposed to all distinction: e.g. *Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite*,<sup>69</sup> *He is whole, inactive, unqualified*,<sup>70</sup> *He is knowledge and bliss*,<sup>71</sup> etc. Our conception of the essential simplicity of Brahman does not imply that these words are all synonymous: even when applied to the simplicity of an entity all words retain their peculiar meanings inasmuch as they establish the absolute opposition of that entity to all distinctions.<sup>72</sup>

63. *satyakāma*- (explained infra § 132) and *satyasamkalpa*- from ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

64. *apahatapāpmā* ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

65. i.e. .. *ādeśam* .. *yena* .. *avijñātaṃ vijñātaṃ* ChUp. 6, 1, 3.

66. i.e. *yāthā somyaikena mṛtṭpīṇḍena* etc. ChUp. 6, 1, 5.

67. *sadeva somyedamagra āsidekamevādvitīyam* ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

68. *śodhakāni vākyaṇi*, śruti statements like the ones summed up below (*niṣkalaṃ niṣkriyaṃ* etc.) which, acc. to the advaitin, purify the Supreme Brahman of all differentiating qualities, and, acc. to R., of all imperfect qualities.

69. *satyaṃ jñānamanantaṃ brahma* TaittUp. 2, 1; see infra §§ 28, 3 f.

70. R. must have had in mind SvetUp. 6, 19 *niṣkalaṃ niṣkriyaṃ śāntaṃ niravadyaṃ nirañjanam*; cf. also AdhyātmUp. 62 *nirguṇaṃ niṣkriyaṃ śukṣmaṃ* etc.

71. cf. BĀUp. 4, 9, 3 *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma*.

72. i.e., no quality can be attributed to Brahman. In other words: the above terms *niṣkala* etc. do not express perfect qualities as R. would have it, but deny for Brahman each quality negatively denoted by them. Cf. ŚĀNKAARA TaittUpBh. 2, 1, *viśeṣanāṛthavattve 'pi satyādīnāṃ svārthāparitṛyāya eva* ..... *satyādyair arthavattve tu tadviparītadharmā-*

§ 12. — My reply to this is: No! If everything is false, then it cannot be reasonably held that all can be known when the One is known, for the simple reason that there is no "all" to know.<sup>73</sup> Or else it would follow that truth and falsity are identical. On the other hand, the assertion that we can know all by knowing the One is only tenable in case that "all" has reality of its own by having the One for its soul.

§ 13. The true meaning of our śruti is this: "He said to Svetaketu: 'Stabdho 'sy uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyaḥ',"<sup>74</sup> that is 'you seem to be an accomplished scholar; now, have you questioned your teachers about the ādeśa?' ādeśa- means "he who exercises ādeśa"; this ādeśa is synonymous with praśāsana- "command";<sup>75</sup> in agreement with the śruti it is by the command<sup>76</sup> of that imperishable being, O Gārgī, that the sun and the moon stand apart;<sup>76</sup> similarly in Manu's expression: sarvesām praśāsītāram<sup>77</sup> "the Commander of all". In the context under discussion it is propounded, by the use of the words *ekam eva*,<sup>78</sup> that He is also the material cause. And since the word *advitīyam* denies that there was another operator<sup>79</sup> as well, it is thereby declared that that sole One is also the operative cause.

Therefore the sentence runs like this: "Have you asked about that Commander, who is also the material cause of the world, by whom, when heard-of, known and realized, the unheard-of is heard-of, the unknown is

vadbhyo viśeṣyebhyo brahmaṇo viśeṣyasya niyantrītvam upapadyate; for a discussion see Intr. IV.

73. The assertion (*pratijñā*, term from BrS. 1, 4, 23) that there is someone or something (for R. the personal ādeśa-) *yena* (sc. *viññātena*) *aviññātam viññātam* presupposes the reality of that which is *viññātam*, i.e. the effected Universe (by analogy of the example *yathāikena mṛtipiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnnmayam viññātam syāt*). This very text poses the *satkāryavāda* (cf. 6, 2, 2 *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta*) so that here the identity is urged of the first cause and the effected Universe. If the *advaitin* holds that the Universe is 'false' (*mithyā*) as against *brahman*-true' (*satyam*) there are two alternatives 1. there is no assertion at all but mere tautology: if the one is known the one is known; 2. if that is not accepted this means that the false is equated with the true.

74. ChUp. 6, 1, 3.

75. *ādiśyate 'nenetyādeśaḥ/ādeśaḥ praśāsanaḥ*: ādeśa in the sense of *ādeṣṭr-* with internal object ādeśa- = *praśāsana*- "command"; cf. ŚBh. 1, 4, 23, p. 385 in the same connexion *ādiśyate praśiṣyate 'nenetyādeśaḥ .... sādhakatamatvena kartā vivakṣitaḥ / tamā-deṣṭāram aprākṣyaḥ* etc.

76. *etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane* etc. BĀUp. 3, 8, 9.

77. Manu 12, 122.

78. In *sadeva somyedam agra āsīt ekam evādvitīyam*, acc. to R. (infra § 33) to be construed *idaṃ < prapañcam > agre sad āsīt* "the Universe was at the beginning real"; consequently *ekam eva* states that there is only one material cause and *advitīyam* that there was no second, that is efficient or operative, cause; cf. ŚBh. 2, 1, 15 p. 441 in the same connexion *sarvasaktitvenādhiṣṭhātrantarāśahatayādvitīyam ca*.

79. On *adhiṣṭhātr* cf. my remarks Intr. I....

known and the unrealized is realized?" The meaning which the father has in mind is this: "Have you heard of Brahman, who is the cause of the origination, subsistence and resorption etc. of the entire Universe and who is an ocean of noble qualities without end such as omniscience and the power of having all his desires materialized and his every will realized?" The father bears tacitly in mind the knowledge that the entire Universe, as it is an effect, is known by the knowledge of Brahman Himself whose body is constituted by spiritual and non-spiritual entities in subtle state in which they are cause, just because He is the universal cause — it being said that the cause is the effect in all its variety of configurations;<sup>80</sup> and remaining silent about this knowledge he asks his son: .... *by whom the unheard-of is heard-of, the unknown is known and the unrealized is realized.*

The son does not know the particular knowledge his father has in mind, viz. the knowledge that the One is the cause of all entities. Still he understands that when two entities are different the knowledge of one produces no knowledge of the other. So he raises the objection: *Sir, how can such an ādeśa be?*<sup>81</sup>

§ 14. When this objection is put to him, the father imparts to his son the knowledge that he has in mind and he declares that all is known when the One is known: the One whose proper form is purely knowledge, bliss and perfection, whose greatness is immeasurable, who possesses boundless, unequalled and countless perfections, e.g. the power of having his every will realized, and who essentially is not subject to transformations:<sup>82</sup> that is, the Supreme Brahman Himself, whose body is constituted by spiritual and non-spiritual entities in subtle state, i.e. not individualized by names and forms. This is the One who, by his own free will and for the

80. In R.'s Sāṃkhyan cosmogony the phenomenal world of matter and spirit evolves out of causal substances in which the physical and spiritual orders are contained in a subtle state, the ātmans as puruṣa, yet still mutually distinguishable, not merged in a primeval spirit, and in matter as prakṛti, an amorphous mass not yet individualized by names-and-forms.

81. *katham nu bhagavaḥ sa ādeśo bhavatīti* ChUp. 6, 1, 4.

82. *vikāra*—general name for the 'alterations' (for R. without the pejorative connotation often going with the term) that are brought about in an material object in the process of evolution, and in the knowledge of a spiritual entity in the process of 'egotization' (here the pejorative value is evident), viz. the contraction of his originally and essentially unlimited knowledge; cf. ŚBh. 2, 3, 18 *svarūpānyathābhāvarūpavikāraḥ: viyādāder acetanasya yādṛśo 'nyathābhāvo na tādṛśo jīvasya / .. cidamśasya ca karmaphalaviśeṣabhoktṛtvāya tadanurūpaññānavikāsarūpavikāro bhavati.* The Supreme Being is free from either *vikāra* of essence or *vikāra* of property.

sake of his own sport,<sup>83</sup> constitutes with a portion<sup>84</sup> of Himself the peculiar structure of the world with all its infinite variety of animate and inanimate beings in which it consists.

§ 15. With a view to explain this point that the One—as described above—when known makes everything known, the father adduces an example drawn from common experience in order to illustrate that cause and effect are not different from each other: *yathā somyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnnmayam vijñātaṃ syād vācārambhāṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam*,<sup>85</sup> that means: “a single substance of clay can be transformed into various structures, conditions and forms—jug, bowl etc.—so that within itself it includes diverse practical purposes. Yet, although it may assume diverse denominations, it is an established fact that it remains the same substance clay and does not become another substance for it remains differentiated by the structural peculiarities<sup>86</sup> of clay. So it is possible through the knowledge of one lump of clay to know all that is differentiated by the same structural peculiarities of clay—jugs, bowls and the like.”

§ 16. The son does not know that Brahman is the sole cause of the entire Universe, so he asks: *Sir, you must tell me what that is*.<sup>87</sup> Then the father expounds that Brahman Himself, the omniscient and omnipotent, is the universal cause: he says: *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādivitīyam*. Here the word *idam* denotes “the world”; *agra* means “the time before creation”; and with *sad eva* it is declared that during that time before creation the world was essentially *sat*. He means to say that at the very time of its creation the world was still non-differentiated: so in *ekam eva* he states that the world that was in the state of *sat* was at that time not yet

83. *līlā*: the important conception of God's sport is best understood by its opposite *kāman-*. It contains a free action (an action not resulting from a preceding action in an endless retrogressive succession) performed to no purpose at all: no purpose that of necessity would result in new phalas for the agent to enjoy or to suffer. Hence it is compared to the literally inconsequential playfulness of a child (cf. VP. 1, 2, 18, quoted infra § 42). In creating, sustaining and resorbing the world God has no cause to effectuate and no end to achieve.

84. *aṃśa-*

85. ChUp. 6, 1, 4.

86. *saṃsthāna-* “generic structure of an entity by which it can be classified under a group with a class-name”; cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 32 *tāvataiva gotvāddijātivavyavahāropapatter atirekavāde 'pi saṃsthānasya saṃpratipannatvāc ca saṃsthānam eva jātiḥ / saṃsthānam nāma svāsādhāraṇarūpam iti yathāvastusaṃsthānam anusaṃdheyam*. See Lacombe, ASV, 97-98; SINHA, *Indian Psychology: Perception*, p. 49 f.

87. *bhagavaṃstv eva me tad bravitu* ChUp. 6, 1, 7.



differentiated into names-and-forms.<sup>88</sup> By this same exposition it is made clear that *sat* is the material cause of the world; now the word *advitīyam* denies that there was still another cause, or an operative cause, different from that material cause.

§ 17-a. Then the father proceeds to develop in a lucid manner what he had tacitly borne in mind before in the passage: *Have you asked about that ādeśa by whom the unheard-of is heard-of* etc., namely that the Commander or Operator Himself is the material cause. So he says: "That *sat*, which Itself is at once the material and the operative cause of the world, *tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti*": that means: "That Supreme Brahman, denoted by the word *tad*, who is omniscient and omnipotent and has his every will realized and all his desires materialized, decided nonetheless, for the sake of his own sport: "I be many in the form of a world composed of an infinite variety of spiritual and non-spiritual beings; to that purpose I will multiply." He then created the primordial elements — ether etc.<sup>89</sup> — out of a single portion of Himself. Then again this Supreme Deity, denoted by the name *sat*,<sup>90</sup> *aikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatāḥ anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmariṇe vyākaraṇvāñīti*:<sup>91</sup> by using the expression *anena jīvenātmanā* he declares that the living soul is itself ensouled by Brahman and points out that all non-spiritual matter becomes *padārtha*<sup>92</sup> when the

88. *nāmārūpa*— "principle of individuality of an entity that evolves out of its subtle into its gross state." For the history of this interesting term I refer to MARYLA FALK'S—often speculative—account in *Nāmārūpa and Dharmarūpa*.

89. Note that R. has creation start with *ākāśa* or *viyat* "ethereal space", the first of the 5 'classical' elements of matter (*mahābhūtāni*), whereas the pre-Sāṃkhyan or proto-Sāṃkhyan process described in ChUp. 6, knows only three elements, *tejas*, *āpas* and *anna* resp. (*tat tejo 'srjate* etc. 6, 2, 3) cf. my remarks Intr. I. Though R. does not explain himself there is no doubt that he, as S. suggests, takes *tejas*— '*pradarśanārtham*' "by way of illustrative instance" (cf. also RENOU, *Terminologie* s.v.) denoting implicitly all or some other terms and concepts of the series to which it belongs (for a few examples taken from GBh. see my *Rāmānuja* etc. 37). In the ŚBh., in the *viyadadhikaraṇa* (2, 3, 1 sqq.) this interpretation is enlarged upon. Ś. in ChUpBh. 6, 2, 3 explains similarly. S.'s remark *śrībhāṣye mahadāderapi pradarśanārtham ityuktam* refers to ŚBh. 2, 3, 14 *mahādādikāryānāmapi tattadanantaravastuśarīrakāḥ sa eva puruṣottamaḥ kāraṇam*, so that the *tejas* of ChUp. not only implies the two preceding *mahābhūtāni* (*ākāśa*- and *vāyu*-) but also the preceding evolution of the functions *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* etc.

90. i.e. the *sat* of 6,2, 1 *sat eva soṃya* etc.

91. ChUp. 6, 3, 2.

92. Only after Brahman has entered with the embodied soul (*jīvatman*- supra note 15) into the "three deities" (= the three elements *tejas*-, *āpas*, *anna*-) = 5 *mahābhūtāni* = *prakṛti*) the final stage of creation has been reached: the *prakṛti* with the ensouled spirit is particularized in objects with class-names: *padārtha*- "the object denoted by the name," "class" "rubric of existent entities", that is, *prakṛti* has become the empirical world of discourse.

living soul ensouled by Brahman enters into it, and that then all substance assumes name.<sup>93</sup>

b. In other words: the individual soul is itself ensouled by Brahman, for the soul is a modification of Brahman because it constitutes His body, as appears from another śruti: "... whose body is the soul etc. The non-spiritual entities<sup>94</sup> in the generic structures of a god, a man etc. are modifications of this same individual soul—which is a modification of Brahman himself—because they constitute the soul's body. Consequently all these entities are ultimately ensouled by Brahman. Hence follows that all words which have a definite denotative value owing to the combination of the radical element<sup>95</sup> with a suffix,<sup>96</sup> e.g. god, man, *yakṣa*, *rākṣasa*, cow, game, fowl, tree, creeper, wood, rock, grass, jug, cloth etc., actually denote the entire composite entity: the body; the individual soul represented by it,<sup>97</sup> and finally the inner Ruler of that soul, the Supreme Person in whom that entity terminates. All words denote this entire *compositum* by merely denoting the material mass which has a certain generic structure that is commonly known as being denoted by a certain word.

§ 18. Then the father sets forth in some detail that *sat* is the material cause, the operative cause, the substratum, the controller and the principal<sup>98</sup> of the entire phenomenal world of spiritual and non-spiritual entities: *sanmulāḥ somyemāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ*<sup>99</sup> etc. Thereafter the father proceeds to declare that because of the relation cause-effect, etc., the entire Universe being ensouled by Brahman is real. *aitadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyam*. Finally the assertion that Brahman is the soul of all as He is the soul of the entire Universe, that this entire Universe constitutes His body and that He therefore, as He is modified by the individual soul, can be denoted by the word *tvam*, this assertion is now summed up and applied to one specific individual soul in the statement *tat tvam asi*.<sup>100</sup>

93. R. describes *pādārtha-* here as *nāmaḥāj-*.

94. *vastu-* most-general term for "thing", often a totality: *acidvastu-* / *cidvastu-* "sum-total of non-spiritual / spiritual entities".

95. *prakṛti-* "verbal and nominal radical element" cf. RENOU, *Terminologie* s.v.

96. *pratyaya-* "verbal and nominal affix (case-ending, personal ending, verbal present tense affix)", cf. RENOU, o.c., s.v.

97. *tadabhimānījiva-* for this use cf. Śrībhāṣya 4, 2 20 *kālasabdaḥ kālābhīmāni-devatātivāhikaparāḥ* ~ Gītābhāṣya 8, 23 *atrā kālasabdo .. kālābhīmānidevatābhūjastayā mār* "gopalakṣanārthaḥ".

98. *śeṣin-* supra note 3.

99. ChUp. 6, 8, 4; *sat* as the material cause is *mūla*; as operative cause *āyatanā* (apparently from *ā-YAT-* "making efforts, exerting energy").

100. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

§ 19. In other words, in the above statement *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyam*<sup>101</sup> the words *idaṃ sarvaṃ* refer to the phenomenal world of spiritual and non-spiritual entities. Thus is declared that *eṣa*,<sup>102</sup> or "He", is the soul of this phenomenal world, so that this śruti sets forth that Brahman ensouls the evolved phenomenal world.

Now the question calls for consideration whether Brahman ensouls the world in a soul-body relation, or is essentially identical with the world.<sup>103</sup> When it is supposed that Brahman is essentially identical with the world, this would mean that Brahman's perfections, such as we gathered from the beginning of the context *tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti*: for instance that He is *satyaśaṃkalpa*,<sup>105</sup> are thereby sublated. Besides, we have already learnt particularly from another śruti that He ensouls the world by constituting the soul of the world as a body, sc. from *antaḥpraviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām sarvātmā*,<sup>106</sup> i.e. "having entered into all mankind as its soul in the form of its controller," and consequently *sarvātmā* "the soul of all who form his body." Similarly also the śruti *ya ātmani* etc.<sup>107</sup> The passage under discussion, *anena jīvenātmanā* etc., tells us the same, as we have already pointed out.

Therefore, since all spiritual and non-spiritual entities constitute Brahman's body, Brahman being thus embodied and modified by all, is denoted by all words. Hence the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* construction *tat tvam* denotes Brahman as "the One who is modified by the individual soul inasmuch as this soul constitutes his body".

§ 20. When this is said the sense of the statement *tat tvam asi* becomes clear. *tvam* means "you, i.e. you that were previously held to be no more than the operator of a certain body are in reality a modification of the Supreme Spirit because you constitute his body, and therefore you terminate in this Supreme Spirit [and are incapable of separate existence and activity"]<sup>108</sup>. Hence *tvam* denotes only the inner Ruler of *tvam* as differentiat-

101. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

102. *eṣa* in *aitadātmya*.

103. The word *aitadātmya*- admits of two interpretations: "whose 'essence' is that" and "whose 'soul' is that": the Universe has Brahman for its essence, i.e. Br. is identical with the world; or: it has Him for its soul, i.e., Br. ensouls the world as the ātman ensouls the body.

105. This *satyaśaṃkalpatva* (supra note 63) "the quality of having His every will realized" is exclusively the attribute of the omnipotent Creator who is not subject to the limitations and conditions of the created world; it is what *Dramiḍa* (Appendix Fr. XV) styles a *daivata guṇa*.

106. TaittĀr. 3, 11.

107. BĀUp. 3, 7, 22 (M.).

108. manuscript M<sub>2</sub> adds here an important expression which may conveniently be explained here: *prthaksthiti pravṛtṭyanarha*- "incapable of subsisting and working inde-

ed by the mode *tvam*. Since Brahman is the soul of the embodied individual soul (cf. the śruti *anena jivenātmanānupraviśya, nāmarūpe vyākara-vāṇi*),<sup>109</sup> He has the same name as that individual soul. It follows that both words *tat* and *tvam*, coordinated in a *sāmānādhikaraṇya* construction, denote that one Brahman. The word *tat* refers to Brahman as the One who is the cause of the world, the abode of all perfections, the immaculate and untransmutable<sup>110</sup> One; whereas *tvam* refers to that same Brahman under the aspect of inner Ruler of the individual soul as being modified by the embodied soul. So it is said that the words *tat* and *tvam* both apply to the same Brahman but under different aspects.<sup>111</sup> And in this manner all the various perfections of Brahman, e.g. that he is the perfect, untransformed abode of all beautiful qualities and the universal cause, are preserved and no one is sublated.

§ 21. Laymen<sup>112</sup> who have not received the instruction of the Vedānta do not see that all *padārthas* and all individual souls are ensouled by Brahman, and they think that the full meaning of all words is completely exhausted by the various *padārthas* they denote, which, however, form only part of their full significance. Now that they have heard what the Vedānta declares they know that Brahman is the soul of everything because it is His effect and He is its inner Ruler and that every word denotes Brahman as modified by everything.

But, it is objected, would that not mean that the original meaning<sup>113</sup> of words like cow etc. as denoting specific *padārthas* is sublated?

No: When we elucidated the śruti *nāmarūpe vyākara-vāṇi* we had occasion to say that all words denote the Supreme Spirit only in so far He is differentiated by the non-spiritual matter and the individual soul. Uninstructed laymen might think when they utter a certain word that the

pendently", also *prthaksiddhyanarha*- "incapable of functioning independently (of a substratum)", is said of a quality in relation to its substance and consequently, since the individual soul constitutes a *prakāra* of the Supreme, also of the soul in relation to its Lord.

109. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

110. *niravadya*-; this upaniṣadic term (ŚvetUp. 6, 19), here specified *nirvikārya*-, is very frequently used by R. to describe God's absolute freedom from all imperfection, equivalent to another frequent expression *samastahyapratyanika*- "opposed to all imperfection"-*nirvikārya*:- only the Supreme Being is in no sense subject to *vikāras*, neither in His essence, like *prakṛti*, nor in His attribute, like the *ātman*; cf. supra note 82 and the passages quoted there.

111. Cf. the definition of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* quoted supra note 55.

112. Here the suggestion of § 17 that all language ultimately denotes the Supreme is taken up and developed in a polemical manner.

113. *vyutpatti*- "analytical explication of a word as deriving from a certain root with a certain meaning".

meaning of that word terminates completely in the material component of the entity denoted, which after all is only part of its full significance, and they would think so because the Supreme Spirit, who is the principal component of its meaning, is beyond the empirical means of knowledge.<sup>114</sup> Only when the instruction of the Vedānta is imparted, the proper significance of a word is presented in full measure.

In this way all Vedic words denote their proper meanings but as terminating in the Supreme Spirit. All words are Vedic:<sup>115</sup> the Supreme Brahman has extracted them from the Veda and, after having created all the corresponding objects as He did before, applied these words as names to those objects, which terminate in the Supreme Spirit, as He did before.<sup>116</sup> So Manu says: "In the beginning He created the various names and functions and peculiar *saṁsthās* of all things out of the words of the Veda."<sup>117</sup> *saṁsthā-* has here the meaning of *saṁsthāna-* "generic structure" or *rūpa-* "form".—And the Venerable Parāśara<sup>118</sup> declares: "In the beginning He made the name-and-form of beings—gods, etc.—and the variety of duties out of the words of the Veda".<sup>119</sup>—And the śruti: *sūryācandra-masau dhātā yathāpūrvam akalpayat*<sup>120</sup> "after having created the sun etc. as before He gave them names as before."

§ 22. In this manner a detailed exposition is given<sup>121</sup> of the doctrine that Brahman and the world are not different from each other, which demonstrates that all is known when the One is known. The demonstration that all is an effect of Brahman furnishes proof that that all has reality of itself in so far as it is ensouled by Brahman and not otherwise. Hence it

114. *pratyakṣādyaparicchēdya-* "not circumscribable by perception and inference:" the two *pramāṇas* of empirical knowledge; only the third (for R. also the last) *pramāṇa*, viz. *śabda* "verbal, i.e., scriptural testimony," can give any information on things metempirical; see Intr. IV.

115. This implies that, the Vedas being *apauruṣeya-* "not of human origin", the capacity of all language to denote meanings is not based on convention (*saṁketa-*) but on an inherent metaphysical potency in language in itself. The important point will be discussed infra § 137.

116. Viz., at the beginning of each new kalpa when the Vedas are newly promulgated by Brahṁā. Note that, although here the Supreme Brahman is said to be the promulgator, the traditional view that Brahṁā Caturmukha has this function is not necessarily denied: God works creation through His mode Brahṁā, just as he works the world's sustenance through Viṣṇu and its annihilation through Śambhu, cf. infra § 112.

117. *Manusmṛti* 1, 21 *sarveṣāṃ tu sa nāmāni*.

118. The promulgator of the Viṣṇupurāṇa, father of Vyāsa Dvaipāyana.

119. VP. 1, 5, 64 *nāma rūpam ca bhūtānām*.

120. RV. 10, 90, 1.

121. Viz., by ChUp. 6, 1, 3 as explained above.

is declared: *tat satyam* "that is real",<sup>122</sup> just as in the illustrative example every transmutation of clay is real because it remains essentially clay.

§ 23. The so-called purifying śrutis<sup>123</sup> elucidate also a Supreme Brahman that is perfect and a treasury of all beautiful qualities. Even when they tell that Brahman is the opposite of everything they do not prove that Brahman is a non-differentiated entity:<sup>124</sup> for if He is the opposite of differentiated entities differentiation is necessarily implied.

§ 24. But, it is objected, if it is stated that Brahman is nothing but knowledge,<sup>125</sup> then we can be positive that Brahman is pure and non-differentiated knowledge.

Certainly not, for words which denote properties that describe the proper form of an entity may also refer to the proper form of that entity itself by means of that attribute, just like the names *cow* etc. do.<sup>126</sup> For this reason the Author of the Sūtras declares: *tadguṇasāratvāt tad-*

122. ChUp. 6, 8, 7 *aitadātmyaṃ sarvaṃ idam / tat satyam / sa ātmā*. R. makes *tat* resume *sarvaṃ idam*, so that the interpretation runs: "all this (the phenomenal world of cit and acit) is ensouled by Him: hence that (world) is real, He being the ātman; whereas Śaṅkara makes *tat satyam* refer to the ensouling ātman: *yena cātmanātmavat sarvaṃ idam jagat / tad eva sadākhyam kāraṇam satyam paramārthasat* (ChUpBh. 6, 8, 7), and: *saṃmātratvaṃ ca satyatvaṃ tat satyam iti śrutyantarāt* (TaittUpBh. 2, 1).

123. Here R.'s explanation of the śodhakavākyas is taken up after the provisional suggestions of §§ 11-12.

124. Against the advaitin's contention that these apophatic śrutis assert an unqualified absolute by denying its qualifiedness by the various qualities negated, R. poses his view that the several negations of imperfect qualities imply as many affirmations of perfect qualities.

125. This is the *jñāna* of TaittUp. 2, 1 *satyam jñānam anantaṃ brahma*.

126. In other words: the co-ordination *jñānam brahma in satyam jñānam anantaṃ brahma* is of the same category as those of *satyam brahma* and *anantaṃ brahma*. *Jñāna* here is a distinguishing attribute (*viśeṣaṇa-*) of brahman: so *jñānam brahma* means "Br. is distinguished by the attribute *jñāna*" and not "Br. is *jñāna*". *Jñāna* is a property (*dharma-*) that describes the proper form (*svarūpanirūpaṇadharmā-* "an essential property"), so it may stand for that proper form itself.—Rāmānuja's *drṣṭānta gavādisabdhavāt* requires some elucidation. *Cow* is a class name and hence the word *gauḥ* describes a property common to all the individuals of the bovine genus; a broken-horned individual is a cow, but the relation is unilateral, not reciprocal: not every cow is broken-horned; similarly, not all knowledge is Brahman, for individual ātmans are also knowledge. This same *drṣṭānta* is developed ŚBh. 2, 3, 30: *tathā ca khaṇḍādayo yāvatsvarūpabhāvigotvādidharmasābhādena gaur iti vyapadīśyamānā drśyante / svarūpaṇadharmatvād ity arthaḥ* "So we know from experience that individual cows, broken-horned individuals etc., are designated "cow" as a word denoting the property of bovinity which covers their proper form completely: that is to say, because it is a property describing the proper form."

*vyapadeśaḥ prājñavat*,<sup>127</sup> *yāvadātmabhāvitoṣ ca na doṣaḥ*,<sup>128</sup> Brahman's proper form is designated by knowledge as its defining attribute, but it is not mere knowledge itself.

But how do we know this?

From the śruti which asserts that He is a knower—e.g. *yah sarvajñāḥ sarvavit*,<sup>129</sup> and this can be gathered from hundreds of śrutis, cf. *parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svabhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca*,<sup>130</sup> *viññātāram are kena viññāyād*<sup>131</sup> etc.—; from the fact that knowledge is a property and not a substance, and from the fact that it cannot be logically established that a mere property is a substance. Hence follows that words like *truth*, *knowledge* and the like declare that Brahman is differentiated by, for instance, knowledge in the proper sense of the word. When we disregard the proper sense of the two words *tat* and *tvam* and we make them out to be proof that the proper form of an entity is non-differentiated, we sacrifice their primary meanings.<sup>132</sup>

§ 25. But when it is a positively established fact that two different words bear upon one identical object, then it is sound to assume *lakṣaṇā*, as for example in the sentence *so 'yam Devadattaḥ*. In *so'yam* the word *sa* refers to a person in connection with a different place and a different time, while the word *ayam* refers to a person connected with a near-by place or the present time. The co-ordination of both words denotes identity. But it is impossible to refer to one and the same person as if he were simultaneously connected with incompatible places or durations. So we contend that the two words are only meant to establish mere proper form and that this proper form is one in itself.

This is not true.<sup>133</sup> In the given illustration *so'yam Devadattaḥ* there is not even a semblance of *lakṣaṇā* because there is no contradiction

127. BrS. 2, 3, "because that is (the ātman's) defining property, the (ātman) is designated by that property (namely) as having knowledge."

128. BrS. 2, 3, 30 "(this use of the term *jñāna* as a designation) is not objectionable, also because (*jñāna*) is entirely co-existent with the ātman" Some MSS. and the Pt. ed. interpolate a gloss which is identical with R.'s gloss on this sūtra in Vedāntadīpa.—Acc. to S., the reference to the later sūtra serves to avoid the objection of *lakṣaṇā*: *jātiguṇayor vyaktiguṇiparyantatvasya loke pratyakṣasiddhatvāt tad-  
vācīśabdānāṃ tatparyantatvam āśritam*.

129. MundUp. 1, 1, 1 "who is omniscient, all-knowing."

130. SvetUp. 6, 8 "His paramount power, so is revealed, is manifold, and natural to Him are knowledge, strength and activity."

131. BAUp. 2, 4, 14.

132. This paragraph seems to be directed against Ś.'s interpretation ad TaittUp. 2, 1; for a detailed discussion; see Intr. chapter IV.

133. Same argument in ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 21; for a detailed discussion see Intr. IV. —R. denies the applicability of the *dṛṣṭānta so 'yam Devadattaḥ* which, acc. to the *advaitin*

at all. It is not at all contradictory that one and the same person is involved in two different actions, one past and one present: in the past he was in a remote place, at present he is in a near-by place. So the declaration of the identity of a person involved in two actions, past and present, contains no contradiction, for the contradiction in his presence in two different places is solved by the difference in time.

Even if we assume *lakṣaṇā*, we can never apply it to both terms of a judgment, for a contradiction in terms is already solved by one term with *lakṣaṇā*. Here, as we have said there is no *lakṣaṇā* at all, for there is no contradiction when a person who in the past was connected with one place is at present connected with another place.

§ 26. Similarly in our passage it is declared that there is nothing contradictory in that the Supreme Brahman, who is the cause of the world, is also the soul of the individual soul inasmuch as he is its inner Ruler. Just as the identity of two beings is conceived with the aid of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* (when we leave out those 'beings' there is identity of mere proper form, but that is not the meaning of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*; for, according to the experts, *sāmānādhikarāṇya* is the application to one object of several words in different functions) we have accordingly declared that both beings are identical. But we may not decide on a meaning of a summarizing statement that is contrary to the sense of the preceding section which it is to summarize.<sup>134</sup> For in the preceding paragraphs, the śrutis *tad aikṣata bahu*

(following the Naiyāyikas), is an identity judgment and predicates no attribute to the subject. The Devadatta of 'here and now' cannot be wholly identical with the Devadatta of "then and there" because then and there he had other attributes than here and now. So the identification: this particular D. = that particular D. is contradictory. Here we have to drop from the word "this" (*ayam*) the notion of proximate-ness, from "that" (*sa*) that of remoteness and retain their simple demonstrative value.—R.'s interpretation can be summarized: "this D. was that D.", so that all differences between "this" and "that" (here and now / there and then) are accounted for by the difference in time.

In ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 110 R. resumes this question: *tattvamasyaivādivākyeṣu sāmānādhikarāṇyaṃ na nirviśeṣavastvaikyaparam* etc. . . so 'yam devadatta ity atrāpi na lakṣaṇā / .. deśabhedavirodhās ca kālābhedenā parihṛtaḥ /

134. The "canons of exegesis" of Mīmāṃsā are summed up in the śloka *upakramo-pasaṃhārāv abhyāso 'pūrvatā phalam / arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyaniścaye* // "initial and concluding statements, repetition, novel element of teaching, reward, description and argumentation are the characteristics by which the right interpretation is determined." Most important are *upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra*: the latter may never be in conflict with the former in order to establish the *ekavākyatā* of a context. The *upakrama* of ChUp. 6 is *tad aikṣata bahu syām* (6, 2, 3, developing 6, 2, 1 *sadeva somyedaṃ*), the *upasaṃhāra* *tat tvam asi*. If this *sāmānādhikarāṇya* is taken in the advaitin's sense it would mean that Brahman is identical with the embodied soul (*jīvā*) in its essence; which would make Br. liable to the *jīva*'s characteristic nescience etc.



*syām* etc., it was asserted that Brahman is the sole universal cause and that he has all his desires materialized: contradictory to this would be to declare that Brahman is the substratum of nescience etc.

§ 27. Furthermore,<sup>135</sup> speech can never be a *pramāṇa* to prove a non-differentiated thing; for speech derives its character of *pramāṇa* from the peculiar nature of the words and sentences in which it consists. The nature of a word is to signify the peculiar difference of the object to which it corresponds; that of a sentence to signify the peculiar difference of a complex of such differentiated objects. It follows that speech can never signify a non-differentiated object. Words like "non-different" etc. signify an object—which we have already found to be differentiated by a specific difference—by denying that it has any of the differentiating features found in other objects. Otherwise such words would signify nothing at all, for a word implies numerous differences in the object signified by its radical element and affix, and a sentence signifies numerous complexes of such *padārthas*.

§ 28. But, it may be objected, we have not said that speech is a *pramāṇa* for a non-differentiated self-illuminating entity, for something that is self-evident stands in need of no *pramāṇa*. So all differentiations which arise from superimpositions,<sup>136</sup> e.g. that it is a knower etc., are altogether discarded by all words. When all differentiations have disappeared the mere being remains by itself, undetermined, self-illuminating.

That is not true, for by what word do you then denote that entity in such a way that all differentiations of superimposition disappear?

By the word "pure knowledge".<sup>137</sup>

No! That word too refers to a differentiated substance; for by its radical element and affix it implies difference. The root *JÑĀ* in the sense of "to be conscious (of)"<sup>138</sup> tells us that it has an object and a subject and that it is a specific action with a specific nature which distinguishes it from other actions. The affix tells us that it has gender, number etc. This nature does also persist in the case of a self-evident, self-realized object: were it free from all difference then there would be no realization at all.

135. Cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 28, the passage *śabdasya tu viśeṣeṇa saviśeṣa eva vastuṇy abhidhānasāmarthyam / ... na nirviśeṣavastuṇi śabdaḥ pramāṇam /*

136. *adhyāsa*- "superimposition" defined by Ś. BrSBh. intr. as *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* "superimposition is the projection of something that has been perceived before elsewhere on something else, and is therefore derived from recollection."

137. *jñaptimātra*- see following note.

138. *JÑĀ avabodhana* iti: so Ś. *jñānam jñaptir avabodhaḥ* (TaittUpBh. 2, 1); *avabodhana*- "being awake to, alive to, aware of, conscious of."

We say that knowledge is self-evident or self-realized by virtue of its own nature, viz. the nature of realizing or proving something else.<sup>139</sup>

§ 29. — Brahman's proper form itself illuminates everything always. — But then it is impossible to attribute to it any properties that are foreign to it: when the proper form of a rope appears as such, then it is impossible to attribute to it the property of being a snake. That is why you have to assume an obscuring Nescience. Consequently the object of the clearing knowledge of the śāstra can only be a hidden part in Brahman:<sup>140</sup> otherwise the clearing knowledge would clear nothing at all: for the supposed nature of snake is sublated by the illumination of the nature of rope as different from the substratum of the original error. When there is one differentiation denoted by a word for that entity of pure knowledge, that differentiation must be a distinguishing feature of Brahman.<sup>141</sup> Then it follows that Brahman is differentiated by all the differentiating features expounded by all śrutis.<sup>142</sup>

§ 30. All this proves that the criteriologist have no criterion that in any way demonstrates the existence of a non-differentiated entity.<sup>143</sup> Even in the case of an indeterminate perception<sup>144</sup> the perceived entity is recognized as differentiated; for otherwise it would be impossible to have, in the

139. *anyasādhanaśvabhāvatayā*—S. remarks *jñātur viṣayavyavahārahetutayā hi svayamprakāśatvaṃ tvayā sādhitam* "you arrive at the notion of the self-illuminating character (of knowledge) because it is the ground for the knower to act upon its object" and he adds *svasambandhād arthāntare tadvyavahārahetutvaṃ hi svayamprakāśatva-numānāhetuḥ/evam nirviśeṣatve svayamprakāśatvānupapattir uktā* "the ground on which you conclude to this self-illuminating character is this that (knowledge) is the ground for activity in another matter which therefore stands in relation to itself; consequently the Author states that the notion of *svayamprakāśa* cannot logically be established for an entity that is non-differentiated." This is borrowed from ŚBh. 1, 1, 1 p. 25 *api tu sarvaṃ sādhyanty anubhūtiḥ* (the term is Vimuktātman's, *Iṣṭasiddhi* 1) *svayam eva siddhyati/prayogaś ca/anubhūtir ananyādhīnaśvadharmavyavahārā/svasambandhād arthāntare taddharmavyavahārahetuvāt* etc; the point which R. wants to make is that knowledge can only be proved to be *svataḥsiddha*, if it is, not *anyataḥsiddha*, but *anyasādhana*; hence, far from being unqualified, it is essentially qualified by this very nature of proving other entities.

140. As S. comments: there can be no obscuration unless there is something to be obscured. It would follow then that the advaitin's assertion that Brahman is *svayamprakāśa* cannot be logically maintained in his pakṣa.

141. If Brahman can be known, he must have the property (differentiating attribute) of being knowable.

142. If one differentiation of Brahman propounded in the śruti, viz. that of being knowable, is accepted of Brahman, all other differentiations propounded of Brahman must also be accepted.

143. Neither śabda nor pratyakṣa can prove an undifferentiated entity, nor, a fortiori, can anumāna that departs from pratyakṣa.

144. *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*.

case of a determinate perception, the cognition in so 'yam of an entity differentiated by a previously apprehended modification.<sup>145</sup> From the fact that generic character like bovinity, etc. is a particular structural feature of an entity it follows that already at the indeterminate stage an entity is apprehended in this way: this entity is so with such structural *differentiae*.<sup>146</sup> In the case of a second and subsequent cognitions we recognize that these generic *differentiae* belong to more than one entity. From the second and subsequent cognitions we learn that the *padārtha* called 'modification by

145. In so 'yam the word *saḥ* points to a definite object perceived before, not to a mere indeterminate blur: the very recognition "this is that" proves that "that" had a distinguishing feature which allowed it of being recognized later on as "this" and nothing else, or, as stated in ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 29, of being cognized at all: *nirvikalpakaṃ nāma kenacid viśeṣeṇa viyuktasya grahaṇaṃ na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya / tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādarśanāt /*

146. ŚBh. 1. c. is more elaborate: *kenacid viśeṣeṇedam ittham iti hi sarvā pratitir upajāyate trikoṇasāśnādisamsthāna viśeṣeṇa vinā kasyacid api padārthasya grahaṇāyogāt / ato nirvikalpakaṃ ekajātīyadravyeṣu prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇaṃ trikoṇa- n. is "triangular cow's head", not adjunct. to sāśnā, as THIBAUT and LACOMBE translate; sāśnā "dew-lap" is the lakṣaṇa of gotva. This definition is often found bizarre in comparison with the Western one "horned, cloven-footed, ruminant etc.", but it is an obvious and practical one: it has no doubt its origin in the need for defining a cow not so much from other corniferous and ruminant mammals as from the very similar buffalo with which the cow is herded together and from which it is mainly distinguished by its dew-lap.*

N.B. R.'s theory of indeterminate perception conflicts with that held by the Naiyāyikas. Acc. to the latter (and to the Buddhists who recognize the indeterminate perception as the only possible one) in indeterminate perception an object is seen without any qualities, a mere blur of which it can only be said that it is "something". Annambhaṭṭa (TS. § 42) defines: *niṣprakāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ, yathedaṃ kiṃcit [but cf. Jayantabhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, p. 73, discussing Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya 1, 124: na ca nirvikalpakasamaye yat kiṃcid idam ityādisāmānyaśabdollekhaḥ ko 'pi kaiścid anubhūyate tas-mād gaur ityādi-jñānaṃ śabdātve 'pi tathāvidhasya jñānasya lakṣyasya sadbhāvaṇ na vyartham lakṣaṇam ity evam asaṃbhavadoṣanirākaraṇārtham avyapadeśyapadam iti]* and comments (TD) *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasaṃbandhānavagāhi jñānaṃ ityarthāḥ 'nirvikalpakaḥ is that cognition which is without prakāra, i.e. determinant feature distinguishing it from other cognitions*, comm. "that is to say, cognition which comprehends no relation between the qualifying and the qualifiable," as distinct from determinate perception which does comprehend the relation between qualifying features—name, class etc.—and the object qualified. Similarly the advaitin: *nirvikalpakaṃ tu saṃsargānavagāhi jñānaṃ (VedP.)* but with his own example: *yathā so 'yam devadattas tattvasamītyādivākya-jñānaṃ*. R. argues: indeterminate perception must apprehend an object with some distinguishing feature: for if the indeterminate perception is followed by a determinate one—when the dimly perceived object draws near and is perceived for what it is with all its peculiarities—we recognize it as such: "this is that same object". So we must originally have perceived a differentiating feature to recognize it by. The identification "this is that" presupposes a common feature to both terms sufficiently peculiar to warrant an identification. The Naiyāyika reasons: we cannot know a cow before we know what makes a cow (sc. its *gotva*-), so unless we know its generic peculiarities we cannot know it for a cow. We know beforehand its generic peculiarities by repeated observation of cows. So the

generic structure' is the differentiating feature of more than one entity as it applies to more than one. On the strength of this observation it is said that second and subsequent cognitions are determinate.

From this appears that the assumption<sup>147</sup> that one and the same *padārtha* has a double essence according to its being at once different and non-different should be rejected as self-contradictory. The generic structure itself is a *padārtha* different from the entity that has this structure; because it is a modification of it, it is incapable of functioning separately

simple "this"—perception we have at the indeterminate stage combines with our recollection of the generic peculiarities, and the simple perception combined with the recollection produces the knowledge of the relation: "this is a cow". R. replies: how do we arrive at our knowledge of these generic peculiarities in the first place? Knowledge of the individual precedes that of the class: we perceive a cow, i.e. a member of the class cow, when we see repeated in that individual the features previously perceived in another animal. So R. goes beyond the "recollection of *gotva*" which the Naiyāyika combines with the indeterminate "this" to produce the determinate or complex "perception" 'this cow': this view fails to account for the origin of the very perception of *gotva*. So R. poses that the indeterminate perception is the first complete perception of a previously unknown object, e.g. a cow: never having seen a cow before we perceive it neither as a member of a class, nor yet as an individual: hence R.'s use in Ved. and ŚBh. of the vague word *pinḍa*- "mass, object" which strictly cannot be equated with *vyakti*- (as ABHYANKAR does in his Notes, followed by LACOMBE, Note 306) "individual member of a class", for at that stage its individual peculiarities are no more perceived than its generic *differentiae* (which presuppose class). Determinate becomes our perception when we see our second and third cows: we recognize the same features and see that they are characteristic not of one animal but a number of them: generic features. R. defines ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 29 *ato nirvikalpakaṃ ekajātiyeṣu prathamapiṇḍagrahanam* "indeterminate is our perception when we see the first object of a class of objects." So YID. I, p. 9 *nirvikalpakaṃ nāma guṇasaṃsthānādiviśiṣṭaprathamapiṇḍagrahanam*. This view of *nirvikalpaka* is substantially that of the Prābhākara whereas the *advaitin* follows the Bhāṭṭa; cf. *Prakaraṇapāñcīkā* p. 54-55, esp. *tasmāt sāmānyaviśeṣau dve vastunī pratipadyamānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prathamam u<pa>padyate, kimtu vastvantarānusamdhānaśūnyatayā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatā na pratiyate* "consequently, in the first instance, the (indeterminate) perception proves to establish both generic and individual peculiarities, although, failing the accompanying comparison of another entity (of the same class), these generic features and individual peculiarities are not yet recognized as such," etc.; *savikalpakaṃ tu tat-prṣṭhabhāvi te eva vastunī sāmānyaviśeṣātmanā pratipadyate* "the determinate perception, on the other hand, following on the indeterminate one, apprehends both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as such". See JHA, *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, p. 157 sqq.; KUPPUSWAMI, *Indian Logic*, p. 168-69.

147. *bhedābheda* view, to be refuted in greater detail infra §§ 54ff; they reason thus: one substance may have two "modes of being" (*dvyaṭmakatva*); it may be modified and it may be non-modified. The modifying feature has no real being of its own: it cannot exist apart from its substance. So the modified substance, the substance conjoined with its mode, has an essence of its own. Then the substance may be devoid of modes that are extrinsic to it: so it has another essence of pure entity (*svarūpa*). So one substance has two essence, one including and one excluding its mode.

and for the same reason it is not separately apprehensible. But all this does not prove that that entity has a double essence.

§ 31. Moreover, if the adherent of the doctrine that a non-differentiated entity exists contends that in the case of a self-evident entity the differentiations brought about by superimposition are denied by all words, he should tell us which these words are.

—The śruti *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam ṛttikety eva satyam*<sup>148</sup> for one. This śruti tells us that only the pure entity, which in the given context is implicitly designated as the cause,<sup>149</sup> is real and everything else unreal, because transformation and denomination are merely *vācārambhaṇa*.<sup>150</sup>

—This proves nothing. After it has been asserted that when one is known all becomes known, this illustration is adduced for him who thinks it impossible to have knowledge of one through knowledge of another: it shows that when one and the same entity exists as name-and-form by virtue of a differentiation in its condition by transformation, etc. — which differentiation is absolutely real —, then that entity, when known, remains the same entity also if it have another configuration different from the first one. It is this view for which the above illustration is furnished and no denial of all differentiation can be read in it.<sup>151</sup> In *vācārambhaṇam* the word *vācā* means ‘on account of *vyavahāra* or practical purpose’ and *ārambhaṇa* is “that which is taken hold of”. The name of clay in the condition of clod is one thing and its practical purpose is another.<sup>152</sup> That same clay in the condition of jug, bowl, etc., has different names and different practical purposes; nevertheless it is that same clay which in every transformation is ‘for various practical purposes taken hold of’ by various generic structures and denominations.<sup>153</sup> And it is concluded that that is *eva satyam* “the same remains real”. Thus

148. ChUp. 6, 1, 4.

149. Viz. *sat* of ChUp. 6, 2.

150. Cf. Ś. ad Brs. 2, 1, 14 (= R. 2, 1, 15) *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ* etc.

151. i.e., from being *sūkṣma*- “subtle”, matter is transformed (as a *vikāra* in the causal process of *pariṇāma*) into being *sthūla*- “gross”, constituting particularized entities.

152. For R. the effect is another phase (*avasthā*) of the cause; *vikāra*- is esp. the product of the process of *pariṇāma* viewed under the aspect of its relation to the cause from which it developed.

153. This interpretation is detailed in ŚBh. 2, 1, 15 as follows: *ārabhyata ālabhyate sprśyata ity ārambhaṇam / kṛtyalyuṣṭo bahulam* (Pāṇini 3, 3, 13) *iti karmaṇi lyuṣṭ / vācā vākyapūrvakena vyavahāreṇa* [S (TātpD) ad *vyavahāreṇa* (Ved.): *prayojanatayā hetutvam ityarthah*] *hetumety arthaḥ/ghaṭenodakam āharetyādīvākpūrvako hy udakāharaṇādivyavahārah* /.

the possibility of knowledge of one thing through this knowledge of another thing is illustrated. No entity is being denied reality in this śruti, but the very sense stated above is further enlarged upon.

§ 32. Besides, if it were alleged by the śruti *yenāśrutam śrutam* that everything different from Brahman is unreal, the example *yathā somyaikena mr̥pīṇḍeṇa* would fail to illustrate the point.<sup>154</sup>

—But the point is another one. The lack of reality of the transformations of clay—jug, bowl, etc.—, comparable to the falsity of the snake in the rope, etc.,<sup>155</sup> is not proved for Śvetaketu, who is eager to learn, by another *pramāṇa* and the ratiocination.<sup>156</sup> It is this point that our passage means to prove.

—No, you cannot possibly assume that, for that violates the character of an example introduced by *yathā*.<sup>157</sup>

§ 33. But in the śruti *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*<sup>158</sup> it is obvious that both emphatical particles *sad eva* and *ekam eva* and the emphatical *advitīyam* deny all homogeneous and heterogeneous differentiations exceeding pure being.<sup>159</sup>

This is not true. First he had illustrated with an example that the knowledge of one entity (which can have two modes of being, that of cause and that of effect) when having one mode of being, will give rise to the knowledge that it remains that same entity, even though it have another mode of being. Then, in order to propound that Brahman is the universal cause—which Śvetaketu does not yet know—he begins *sad eva somyedam*. In this passage, to be construed *idam agre sad evāśīd*, the word *agra-* denotes

154. *sādhya*vikāla-; *sādhya-* “probandum”, i.e., the assertion that we may know all by knowing one. The obvious sense of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* is that there is a causal process of *pariṇāma* by which a lump of clay is transformed into clay jugs: which means that these clay jugs, etc., are as real as the lump of clay; so the instance cannot illustrate the irreality of the “all to be known”.

155. The erroneous cognition of a snake where there is only a coiled rope is the stock-example of the falsity of our cognition of diversity in the Universe where there is nothing but the One self-identical Brahman. The ‘metamorphosis’ of the rope into snake is an instance of *vivarta* (cf. infra §§ 36; 49).

156. The *advaitin* is made to suggest that where both sensorial evidence and ratiocination fail to prove the falsity of the world, the sentence *yathā* etc. is a statement of scriptural authority (*śabdapramāṇa*) which proves this falsity apodictically.—The other *pramāṇa* is the *pratyakṣa*, ratiocination (*yukti*) stands for *anumānapramāṇa*; cf. *S. pratyakṣena bādhādarśanān mithyātvāsiddhiḥ/vyāvartamānatvādiyukter ābhāsatvāc ca na mithyātvāsiddhiḥ*.

157. *yathā* introduces a statement of analogy, not a final assertion.

158. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

159. “This (Universe contained in its cause) was *sat* at the beginning. “Ś. explains *sat* as *sattāmātram*.

a specific time, and *idam*<sup>160</sup> refers to the phenomenal world. Of this world denoted by *idam* he says that it exercises an action, viz., the action of being real, and that it is a really being substance. The words *ekam eva* deny that this was already transformed into a variety of names-and-forms.<sup>161</sup> When this has been declared, it is set forth that the world has a material cause which is *sat*. The fact that the omniscient Brahman is a material cause for something else does not contradict His omnipotence: for even in the view that He is associated with something different from Himself as its operator, He remains essentially different from everything else. Therefore the word *advitīyam* negates, on the ground of Brahman's omnipotence, the existence of a separate operator.

There are a number of śrutis, like ours, which first declare that Brahman is the material cause and afterwards that He is also the operative cause. Other śrutis first admit that Brahman is the operative cause and then raise the question: if Brahman is different from everything else, then how can He be the material cause, etc., as well? — and then, by reasoning from Brahman's omnipotence, solve the apparent contradiction and assert that the same Brahman is the material cause and all subsidiary causes as well. In the śruti *kiṃ svid vanaṃ ka u sa vṛkṣa āśīd yato dyāvāpṛthivī niṣṭataḥśur maṇiṣiṇo manasā pṛcchated u tad yad adhyatiṣṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan*<sup>162</sup> it is first imagined that, if Brahman be the material cause, this would contradict our inference from general observation:<sup>163</sup> but subsequently this seeming contradiction is solved by Brahman's categorical difference from everything else in existence: *brahma vanaṃ brahma sa vṛkṣa āśīd yato niṣṭataḥśur maṇiṣiṇo manasā vibravāmi vaḥ brahmādhyatiṣṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan*.<sup>164</sup>

160. It (*idam*) is a substance because real being (*sat*) can be predicated of it.

161. It was not yet manifested as a plurality but abode in a single mass.

162. TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6 "What was the wood, or which was the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth? Ask this with your minds, O wise, that which supervises and supports the worlds." In this śruti, it is assumed, the material cause (*vana-*, *vṛkṣa-*) is distinguished from the operative cause or *adhyatiṣṭhātṛ* (sc. *tad yad adhyatiṣṭhat*); I have translated accordingly.

163. *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* "knowledge by inference from general observations explained by Vātsyāyana (Bhāṣya ad NS. 1, 1, 5) *vrajyāpūrvakam anyatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanam iti / tathā cādityayasya / tasmād asty apratyakṣapy ādityasya vrajyati /* "We see an object in another place than we saw it in before when it has moved; so we conclude the same for the sun (though we have not seen it move); so, albeit unperceived, we know that the sun moves." Similarly, it is observed generally, that no material cause is simultaneously the operative cause as well, so that we might be led to infer the same for Brahman. But since Brahman is categorically different from everything else (*sarvavilakṣaṇa-*), this general observation has no validity as to Him.

164. TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6: "Brahman is the wood, and Br. is the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth: I tell you with the mind, O wise, that it is Brahman that supervises and supports the worlds". (cf. supra note 162).

To resume. In the passage under discussion the words *agra*, etc., show therefore that there are a number of differentiations in Brahman Himself. There is no word to be found in it that voices a negation of differentiations such as you are pleased to assume. On the contrary the existence of a time-differentiation shows clearly that Brahman is the cause and the world his effect: *āsīt* denotes a specific action; then there are His modes of being the material as well as the operative cause of the world; then again His quality of omnipotence as proved by the denial of difference between material and operative: thus differentiations, unsuspected before, are expounded by thousands!

§ 34. Since this śruti means to teach that the relation between cause and effect is one based upon substantial reality, it gives the lie to the *asatkāryavāda* doctrine as voiced in *asad evedam agra āsīd*, etc.,<sup>165</sup> by countering it with the question: "How could that really be so, my son!" i.e., there is no ground whatever for the origination of an entity that did not exist before. That is what he says in *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta*: i.e., an entity that has originated from *asad* remains essentially *asad*, in the same way as an entity—a jug, etc.—that has originated from clay remains essentially clay. The origination of an existent entity is by definition its conjunction with a variety of modes or phases of being, and this conjunction is the ground that it may have a variety of practical purposes.<sup>166</sup>

§ 35. In other words, it is declared that one and the same entity that is a cause becomes an effect when entering upon another mode of being. The point which is sought to establish hereby is this that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one. But this point cannot be proved in the *asatkāryavāda*<sup>167</sup> theory, for according to this theory an effect—called *avayavin*<sup>168</sup> because it has several causes: *nimitta*, *samavāyin*, *asamavāyin*,<sup>169</sup> etc.—originates as a completely different entity. Hence it is impos-

165. ChUp. 6, 2, 1 *tad dhaika āhuḥ—asad evedam agra āsīd*, etc. R. will discuss this śruti presently.

166. *vyavahāra*- cf. supra note 153a.

167. The *asatkāryavāda* (the doctrine that the effect is not contained in its cause but originates as a new entity) is summed up neatly in Annambhaṭṭa's definition of an effect (TS. § 39): *kāryam prāgabhāvapratiyogi* "the effect is the counter-entity of its own antecedent non-existence," i.e., originates unprecedented.

168. "Composite, having members," sc. the various causes.

169. Cf. Annambhaṭṭa's definition (TS. § 40): *kāraṇam trividham samavāyiyasamavāyiniṁmittabhedavat / yatsamavetaṁ kāryam utpadyate tat samavāyikāraṇam / yathā tantavaḥ paṭasya pataśca svagatarūpādeḥ / kāryena kāraṇena vā sahaikasminn arthe samāvetatve sati yat kāraṇam tad asamavāyikāraṇam / yathā tantusaṁyogāḥ paṭasya tanturūpaṁ paṭarūpasya / tadubhayabhinnaṁ nimittakāraṇam / yathā turivemādikaṁ paṭasya /* I refer to Athalye's and Foucher's discussions of these passages.



sible anyhow that the effect is known when the cause is known, inasmuch as the effect is an entity completely different from the entity that is its cause.

But, it may be put forward, what are the grounds on which you reject such a different entity that is *avayavin*?

First the fact that, as even our adversary who maintains that the effect originates as a new entity must agree<sup>170</sup>—the different name, practical purpose etc., which apply to the identical entity, prove that a different phase has been entered upon by the cause; and secondly the fact that we do not see another entity appear at all. Hence it is said that the effect is nothing but the cause in another phase, and that is what our śruti declares.

§ 36. But is the *asatkāryavāda* not rejected just to show that there can be no error without a substratum?<sup>171</sup> For one and the same being which alone is real in the form of spirituality, evolves into the form of the phenomenal world when it is obscured by Nescience.<sup>172</sup> If Nescience is to have a

170. For neither the Naiyāyikas-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the effect originates *ex nihilo*. AS R. declares GBh. 2, 27 *utpattivinnāśādayaḥ sato dravyasyāvasthāviśeṣāḥ / tantuprabhṛtini dravyāni santy eva racanāviśeṣayuktāni paṭādīny ucyante/asatkāryavādināpy etāvad evopalabhyate / nahi tatra tantusamsthānaviśeṣātirekeṇa dravyāntaram pratiyate / kārakavyāpārānāmāntarabhajanavyavahāra viśeṣāṇām etāvataivopapatter na ca dravyāntarakalpanā yuktā /*

171. *niradhiṣṭhānabhramasāmbhava*—; the erroneous cognition of a snake presupposes the existence of a real object (in *casu*, a rope) on which this false cognition is projected or superimposed. Similarly the false cognition of the phenomenal world presupposes the existence of a real substratum or *adhiṣṭhāna*. The Mādhyamika Buddhist, professing the falsity of the world of cognized phenomena, denies that this falsity is projected or superimposed on something real: so they recognize the possibility of falsity projected on a void: *niradhiṣṭhāna / nirālambana*.

172. *ekaṃ cidrūpaṃ satyam evāvidyācchāditam jagadrūpeṇa vivartate*: this sentence sums up the ontologico-cosmogonical doctrine of *advaitavāda*: there is one entity, pure consciousness or spirituality, which alone is real. This one real entity 'unrolls' itself, or develops, into the world when it is obscured by Nescience. Hence follows that, if this Nescience is to have a substratum, the real itself must be its ultimate cause: for, as S. remarks (borrowing his argument from R. §§ 46-47, note 218), if the substratum were not real in itself, it would stand in need of a substratum itself, and so *ad infinitum*. The *vivartavāda* is an attempt to account for the phenomenal world without sacrificing the unchangeability of the absolute. *Vivarta* is both the process and the product of the development of the absolute and real into the finite and non-real, in other words, the transition into an effect that has not the same degree of being as its material cause (*vivarto nāma upādānaviśamasattākakāryāpattiḥ* Dharmarāja's definition, Ved. P. II, § 85; in contradistinction to *pariṇāma*, the transition of a cause into an effect with the same degree of being: *pariṇāmo nāma upādānasamasattākakāryāpattiḥ*). This process of *vivarta* has its origin in the obscuration of the absolute by Nescience, its opposite. Strictly, *avidyā* itself is the *vivarta*, and the phenomenal world the *pariṇāma* of *avidyā*. If the Advaitin wants to have ChUp. 6, 2, 1 confute the Mādhyamika doctrine, his interpretation should run like this: *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta* "how can an 'existent' being derive

substratum, we must assume that the Real itself is its ultimate cause. Which proves that the *asatkāryavāda* theory is untenable.

This is not true. What is actually declared is this that that theory is untenable because the assertion and the illustration that all is known when one is known can only have any bearing at all on the topic if the *satkārya* point of view is adopted. For that matter, in your own position the theory that an error without a substratum is impossible does not admit of proof itself.<sup>173</sup> Your doctrine leads to this conclusion: When one holds that the defect inherent in a spiritual being is real and that this defect is a real basis for errors to arise, then, being oneself afflicted with that defect, one is proved to have a vision of a phantom, say a fairy-tale castle, which in itself is unreal. But when one holds that this defect is unreal and therefore is no real basis for errors to arise, one is proved to have that illusion all the same, because of its very basis being unreal! Actually in your position an error without a substratum is not at all impossible.

§ 37. We have already pointed out that Brahman is declared to be differentiated by all the qualities ascribed to him: for even the so-called purifying statements, *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma, ananda brahma* etc., do not contradict the assertion that one denoted object may be qualified by a number of qualities which are established by *sāmānādhikarāṇya*<sup>174</sup> constructions and by the original sense of the terms.

from nothing?" The Advaitin and Mādhyaṃika concur in that this 'existent' being of the phenomenal world is ultimately unreal. Where they differ is the reality of its ultimate ground, accepted by the former, rejected by the latter. Śaṅkara (ChUpBh.) states that the above śruti attacks the Vaināsikas or Nihilist Buddhists: it is against this interpretation that R. raises his objection; but cf. my remarks Intr. III.

173. The Advaitin derives the illusion of plurality—unreal without doubt—from *avi-dyā* or Nescience, about whose unreality he is less sure: he describes it as neither real nor unreal (*sadasadanirvacanīya*-). As R. will explain later, this leaves three possibilities: it is not *sat*, therefore *asat*; not *asat*, therefore *sat*; neither *sat* nor *asat*, therefore both *asat* and *sat*. Suppose we have an illusion: it must derive either from a real or from an unreal defect. If this defect is real, our illusion is proved, however unreal its content may be. If this defect is unreal, our illusion is still established (*upapanna*) because it cannot have risen from a defect that is non-existent. So in the latter case we are left with a demonstrable illusion for which we cannot account. Consequently the Advaitin, unable to define the defect properly, implicitly admits the possibility of the *niradhiṣṭhānabhrama* which he professes to deny

174. *sāmānādhikarāṇya* shows a distinct peculiarity in the one entity denoted: the stock-example *nīla utpalaḥ* is "a lotus that is blue and thus distinguished from white and red ones." The sense of a word established by grammatical analysis into root (*dhātu*), stem (*prātipadika*) and declined form (*pada*) shows again a number of peculiarities proper to the concept denoted: it may have a gender, be singular, dual or plural, govern or be governed in case relation etc., supra § 28.

§ 38. But the śruti *athāta ādeśo neti neti*<sup>175</sup> is obviously a negation all the way round.

I would ask: exactly what does it negate?

The entire phenomenal world which consists of incorporated and unincorporated beings according to the śruti *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca*.<sup>176</sup>

But, considering the maxim: *Better keep from touching mud than wash it off*,<sup>177</sup> it seems hardly appropriate first to teach that all that was not suspected before to be Brahman's form is actually His form and then in the same breath to deny that same teaching. Let us see what the negation really means. The Author of the Sūtras himself declares: *for it denies that Brahman is only so much as has been said and asserts that He is more than that*:<sup>178</sup> so since immediately afterwards in *atha nāmadheyaṃ satyasya satyam iti prāṇā vai satyaṃ teṣāṃ eṣa satyam*<sup>179</sup> a host of qualities like *satya* etc. is propounded, the preceding *neti neti* denies merely that Brahman is only so much: Brahman is much more than has been stated before. This is the meaning of the above sūtra.

§ 39. But the śruti *neha nānāsti kiṃcana*<sup>180</sup> clearly denies that there is variety.

Here too it is declared later on, in *sarvasya vaśi sarvasyeśānaḥ*,<sup>181</sup> that Brahman is *satyasamkalpa* and sovereign Lord respectively. Hence what is actually denied is not what you think but: a variety that would not be ensouled by Brahman: that alone is the opposite of what is declared in the assertion that the Lord has all entities, spiritual as well as non-spiritual, for his body and that therefore, as the Lord of all and as being modified by all, He exists as the sole One. *In all śrūtis of this description there is nowhere*

175. BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 "so now the teaching 'it is not such nor such'".

176. BĀUp. 2, 3, 1 "verily Brahman has two forms, one embodied and one disembodied;" cf. Ś ad BrS. 3, 2, 22 *kim ayaṃ pratiśedho* (sc. *neti neti*) *rūpe* (sc. *mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca*) *rūpavaccobhayam api pratiśedhati* . . . *dvau caitau pratiśedhau, dvirnetiśabdaprayogāt*.

177. *prakṣaṇāddhi pañkasya dūrād asparśanam varam* a popular maxim (*nyāya*): quoted twice in Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭasiddhi* (pp. 25; 215); to be found in Hitopadeśa I, 185, where the first half reads: *dharmārthaṃ yasya vitteḥ varam tasya nirihatā*.

178. BrS. 3, 2, 22 *prakṛtāitāvattvaṃ hi pratiśedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ*.

179. BĀUp. 4, 3, 6 "so, the name of the real is the real: thus the real is verily the vital airs and the possessor of them is the real."

180. BĀUp. 6, 4, 19 "there is no variety here of any kind."

181. BĀUp. 6, 4, 22 "the ruler of all, the lord of all."

a word to be found which in unmistakable terms denies that Brahman is differentiated.<sup>182</sup>

§ 40. Furthermore, you cannot interpret like this: Brahman who in reality is mere non-differentiated knowledge finds nonetheless variety in Himself when his own proper form is obscured by obscuring nescience. Obscuration is by definition the negation of illumination; so, since you do not admit that illumination is a property of, and exceeding, the proper form itself, it would follow that illumination is the proper form so that actually the proper form itself would disappear! To say that knowledge—synonymous with illumination—is permanent and that illumination is obscured by nescience, means either that the illumination is prevented from originating, or that existing illumination is terminated. Either alternative would mean that, since no illumination can originate, the proper form has ceased to exist.

—But illumination remains permanent and untransformed.

—Then what you say boils down to this: even though there be nescience, there is nothing hidden in Brahman: hence follows that He finds variety in Himself. Now this makes no sense to honest people.<sup>182a</sup>

§ 41. —But even you must agree<sup>183</sup> that the proper form of the soul is knowledge and that the soul is self-illuminating. Now, when the soul is erroneously identified<sup>184</sup> with the proper form of its body, god etc., we must necessarily resort to assuming that the illumination of its proper form is obscured, inasmuch as no other formation<sup>185</sup> can be superimposed on the soul proper when the soul's proper form is known. Besides, the error that you have pointed out applies to only one soul in our case, whereas in your case, since you assume an infinite number of souls, you have to solve it for all souls.

182. This concluding statement rounds off the first part of R.'s refutation of *advaitavāda*, which is, according to the programmatic stanza. (§ 2) *śrutinyāyāpeta*—“in conflict alike with *śruti* and reason.” It has now been shown that the Scriptures lend no support to *advaita*. R. will now demonstrate that its theses cannot stand the test of rational criticism.

182a. *satso anirvacanīyam*: a pun on the repetitious *sadasadanirvacanīya*—with which the *advaitin* describes his *māyā* or *avidyā*.

183. Both R. and Ś. hold that the *ātman* is essentially knowledge, but where Ś. defines the essence as knowledge, R. regards knowledge as the essential property of a substance; and where Ś. accepts only one *ātman* that is at once identical with Brahman, R. admits an infinite plurality of individual *ātman*s subordinated to the Supreme Brahman.

184. *abhimāna*, see supra note § 24.

185. *ākāra*—“configuration, characteristic form”. The *ātman* is, acc. to R. *jñānat-kākāra* (~ *jñānasvarūpa*); by the process of *abhimāna* “presumption (Renou)” the *ātman* is erroneously identified with the empirical ego of a given body: the body's *ākāra* is superimposed on it; now, this superimposition is only conceivable if the proper form is not evident as such.—The term *adhyāsa* supra note 136 belongs particularly to the *advaitin*'s terminology; R. avoids using it.

§ 42. The reply to this objection is this. The Supreme Brahman is by nature such that his proper form is absolutely opposed to imperfection and is solely constituted by infinite knowledge and bliss. He is an ocean of noble qualities<sup>186</sup>—unlimited, unsurpassed and immeasurable—which are proper to his nature. His mode of being is that He is modified by all creatures, for his body is constituted by all entities because he is the inner Ruler of all entities: firstly the non-spiritual entities which enable the spiritual entities to attain the supreme salutary Goal, which are liable to evolutions of infinite variety and which are the objects of experiences for the spiritual entities,—and secondly, the spiritual entities themselves which are of an infinite variety, either bound or released: the sum-total of these entities constitutes a particle of Brahman and forms the material for his sport. They constitute his infinite, universal supernal manifestation which is not affected by the evolutions<sup>187</sup> that are brought about by Time, whose proper form comprises countless divisions, from the smallest to the highest units<sup>188</sup> and which is the operative cause of all evolutions of the Universe: origination, subsistence, resorption etc. It is this Brahman who is the object of our knowledge, that is knowledge imparted by the Veda. This Veda consists of numberless branches arranging themselves according to the part they belong to, Ṛg-, Yajur-, Sāma- and Atharvaveda, whose established doctrines have been transmitted in an uninterrupted series of studies,<sup>189</sup> *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *dharmaśāstra* etc. which are all founded on the Veda, consisting in *vidhi*,<sup>190</sup> *arthavāda*<sup>191</sup> and *mantra*,<sup>192</sup> and which are instituted by a great number of sages who were capable of immediate presentation of Brahman, such as the venerable Dvaipāyana, Parāśara, Vālmīki, Manu, Yājñavalkya,<sup>193</sup> Gautama,<sup>194</sup>

186. *udāraguṇa*-, synonymous with *kalyāṇaguṇa*-, supra note 5.

187. *pariṇāma*-

188. *nimeṣakaṣṭhākalāmuhūrtaparārdhaparyanta*;- *nimeṣa*- "instant": 15 *nimeṣas* make one *kaṣṭhā*: 30 *kaṣṭhās* 1 *kalā*; 30 *kalās* 1 *muhūrta*: 30 *muhūrtas* one natural day (cf. VP. 1, 3, 8-9); *parārdha*- "half the duration of Brahmā's life; cosmic life so far lapsed" VP. 1, 3, 26-28. To this passage cf. VP. 4, 1, 84 *kalāmuhūrtādīmayaś ca kālo na yadvibhūteḥ pariṇāmahetuḥ*. S. adds that Time, though effecting evolution in matter, is subject to evolution itself: *nimeṣa* etc. are the various products. There is no evidence that R. subscribed to the Pañcarātra conception of *akhaṇḍakāla*- "impartite Time" cf. SCHERADER, *Pañcarātra* p. 66; repeated YID V, p. 77; def. ib. *akhaṇḍaḥ kālo nityaḥ kāryaḥ punar anityaḥ* (sc. *kālaḥ*).

189. *pāṭha*- "lit. recital" the oral traditions of the Vedic schools; the idea is that these texts do only repeat, in a more comprehensible form, what from all eternity had been formulated in the Veda.

190. *vidhi*- "injunction."

191. *arthavāda*- "exegetical portion."

192. *mantra*- "Vedic stanza used in ritual."

193. Author of *Yājñavalkyaśmṛti*.

194. Author of *Gautamiyadharmaśāstra*.

Āpastamba<sup>195</sup> etc. Now we recognize Brahman as the object of our knowledge and the Veda as the pramāṇa of our knowledge: could we then be unable to reach a proved conclusion? As the venerable Dvaipāyana declares in the Mahābhārata: . . . who knows that I, unborn and undying, am the world's sovereign lord.<sup>196</sup> Two orders of entities are in this world, a transitory and an imperishable one: the transitory comprises all elements, the imperishable one is called kūtastha. But there is another higher person that is called the Supreme Spirit, who is the eternal Lord who penetrates and supports the entire Universe.<sup>197</sup> And He matures the time; no time is there, there is the Lord alone. Those, my dear, are the evolutions of the realm of the Supreme Spirit. You should reflect on this that this entire transcendent Universe, evolving from the unevolved to the last differentiations and owning a wealth of developments, is Hari's sport.<sup>198</sup> For in Kṛṣṇa alone is the rise and decline of the worlds, and for Kṛṣṇa exist all these beings animate and inanimate.<sup>199</sup> Here kṛṣṇasya hi kṛte "for Kṛṣṇa" means that the Universe is an accessory to Kṛṣṇa.<sup>200</sup> The venerable Parāśara too declares: "The word Bhagavat is used for the pure Supreme Brahman in his infinite manifestation as the first universal cause."<sup>201</sup> The word Bhagavat connotes all his perfections, knowledge, power, strength, sovereignty, fortitude and glory, without any imperfect quality etc.<sup>202</sup> Thus this word Bhagavat is a master-word applicable to none but Vāsudeva who is the Supreme Brahman.<sup>203</sup> This term, whose object, expression and signification are so worthy, applies directly only to Him, and to others only indirectly.<sup>204</sup> That Supreme Order called Viṣṇu is thus qualified; it is immaculate, real, pervasive, perennial and free from all imperfections.<sup>205</sup> And Time, comprising minute, hour etc., is no cause of any evolution in His manifestation.<sup>206</sup> Hear the exploits of Him that sports like a child.<sup>207</sup> Manu, too, says: . . . the Commander of all, subtler than the subtle<sup>208</sup> . . . Yājñavalkya,<sup>209</sup> too: the purification of the kṣetrajña by knowledge of God is deemed the highest. And

195. Eponym of Āpastambiyadharmasūtra.

196. BhG. 10, 3 *yo mām ajam*.

197. BhG. 15, 16-17 *dvāv imau puruṣau*.

198. MBh. 12, 25, 9, *kālam sa pacate*.

199. MBh. 2, 38, 23 *Kṛṣṇa eva hi lokānām*.

200. Same interpretation GBh. 4, 4; on *śeṣa*- supra note 3 and infra § 122.

201. VP. 6, 5, 72 *śuddhe mahāvibhūtyākhye*.

202. VP. 6, 5, 79 *jñānaśaktibalaiśvarya-*.

203. VP. 6, 5, 76 *evam eṣa mahāśabdō*.

204. VP. 6, 5, 77 *tatra pūjyapadārthokti-*

205. VP. 1, 22, 53 *evamprakāram alam*.

206. VP. 4, 1, 84 *kalāmuhūrtādi-*

207. VP. 1, 2, 18 *kṛdato balakasyeva*.

208. Manusmṛti 12, 122; the Vulgate reads *anīyāmsam anorapi*.

209. Yājñavalkyasmṛti 3, 34 *kṣetrajñasyeśvara-jñānād viśuddhīḥ paramā matā*.

Āpastamba declares: *pūḥ prāṇinaḥ sarva eva guhāśayasya*,<sup>210</sup> i.e. "all breathing beings constitute the *pūr* "town" or "body"<sup>211</sup> of Him whose dwelling-place is secret: the Supreme Spirit"; *prāṇinaḥ*<sup>212</sup> means "the composite beings of matter ensouled by the individual soul."

§ 43. But what is the use of this pathos? The objection is still not refuted!

We reply: once we agree upon this we have refuted your entire objection by asserting that contraction and expansion of consciousness,<sup>213</sup> which is a *dharma* of the soul that belongs to its very nature, are supremely real inasmuch as they are caused by *karman*. For you, however, illumination is not a *dharma* but the proper form itself: so contraction and expansion of it cannot reasonably be admitted. Factors like *karman*,<sup>214</sup> which bring about the obscurisation, are the cause that illumination cannot originate. If you assume that nescience is the obscuring factor, then the illumination, which is the proper form, is annihilated, as we have pointed out before. For us, on the other hand, the illumination of knowledge, which is an eternal *dharma* of the proper form, is contracted by *karman* that takes on the form of ignorance. Owing to that contraction the identification<sup>215</sup> of the soul with the proper form of its body, god etc., is brought about. This is the difference between our views. As has been said: *ignorance, also called karman, is considered to be the third power by which the power which is the individual soul that is in everyone is frustrated and has its share of all the sufferings of saṃsāra which have too long a life. And in proportion that this power called individual soul is obscured by the ignorance it works in all beings in different degrees.*<sup>216</sup> Which shows that ignorance, or the *karman* of the individual souls, causes the knowledge, which is a *dharma* proper to them, to contract and expand.

210. Āpastambīyadharmaśūtra 1, 8, 22, 4 *pūḥ prāṇinaḥ sarva eva guhāśayasya*; the reading *sarvaguhāśayasya* of some MSS., adopted by Sudarśanāchari, is, as follows from R.'s own interpretation and Bühler's edition, to be rejected.

211. S. quotes 'the Naighaṇṭukas' (= Halāyudha, Abhidhānaratnamālā 2, 355) *angaṃ vapur varṣma purāṇaṃ pratikam*.

212. *prāṇin-*, synonymous with *śarīrin* "soul in the body."

213. *caitanya-* "spirituality" (<*cetana-* "spiritual being"; advaitic term rarely used by R.), synonymous with *jñāna-* or *prakāśa-*; for a systematic account of the theory of *dharmabhūtājñāna-* see YID chapter VII.

214. Other factors are, acc. to S., *vāsanā* "residue of former impressions creating habits of thought and practice" and the *prakṛti* with its three constituent *guṇas*.

215. *abhimāna*.

216. VP. 6, 7, 61-63; for R.'s interpretation of this VP. context I may refer to my paper *The Śubhāśrayaprakaraṇa* etc.

§ 44. Furthermore, on the authority of the śrutis and on the strength of the doctrine of identity, you have to<sup>217</sup> resort to an obscuring nescience that is a deficiency which causes Brahman's proper form to disappear. Inasmuch as this nescience itself is false, it requires another deficiency that gives rise to the very notion of nescience, just as the phenomenal world requires a deficiency giving rise to the very notion of phenomenal world, viz. the nescience. Therefore, considering that nescience itself cannot be the ultimate cause of false notions, Brahman Itself must be the ultimate cause of false notions: since it has no beginning this nescience must have been false from all eternity: so it must from all eternity have been falsely conceived by Brahman; and since it cannot be admitted that the deficiency that gives rise to the false notion of nescience is ultimately real itself, therefore Brahman Itself is the ultimate cause of the false notion of nescience, this means that Brahman being eternal we would never get rid of nescience and so never be released.<sup>218</sup>

§ 45. On the same grounds<sup>219</sup> we reject the theory: that there is only one body with one soul and the other bodies have no soul, just as the bodies we see in our dreams have no souls: in a dream only the dreamer's body has a soul and all the various and endless bodies that appear during the dream have no souls at all, because they are only the products of the imagination of that single one, so that their souls are false.<sup>220</sup> Now we say,<sup>221</sup> since Brahman

217. "Have to" because the advaitin identifies the proper form with the obscured knowledge.

218. Since the advaitin considers the avidyā to be "illusory" (*mithyārūpa-*), i.e. to have no ultimate reality of its own, he must derive whatever reality it has from a source or basis (*adhiṣṭhāna-*) that is real, just as he, in order to explain the 'illusory' phenomenal world, resorts to avidyā as the source of this illusion. This source of the deficiency avidyā, which therefore must itself be deficient, must be real and not illusory in its turn: otherwise there would be *anavasthā* "regressus ad infinitum", every unreal deficiency deriving from a preceding one. This real source or substratum can be no one but Brahman. Avidyā is admittedly unreal from all eternity, so Brahman must have had this Nescience from all eternity. Now, the advaitin cannot allow the eternal co-existence of truth and untruth; it follows that in the final analysis he allows only for untruth: untruth, falsity etc. is the ultimate reality.

219. Viz. that all except Brahman is illusory (S.).

220. *ekajīva-vāda*; Appaya Dikṣita, *Siddhānta-leśasamgraha*, 2, 2, 32 describes this theory in very similar terms and images: *eko jīvaḥ, tena caikam eva śarīraṃ sajjīvaṃ, anyāni svapnadṛṣṭaśarīraṇāṃ nirjīvaṇi, tadaññānakalpitam jagat, tasya svapnadarśanavat yāvāda vidyam sarvo vyavahārah; baddhamuktavyavasthāpi nāsti jīvasyaikatvāt; śukamuktyādikam api svapnapuruṣāntaramuktyādikam iva kalpitam; atra ca sambhāvitaskalasaṅkāpaṅkaprakṣālaṇam svapnadṛṣṭāntasāliadhārayaiva kartavyam iti.*

221. R.'s argument is: acc. to the advaita only Brahman is real and everything else illusory; consequently all bodies are unreal and there exists no proper jīva existent in a body. Granted that the bodies and souls that we dream about are illusory, the advaitin cannot even maintain that there is an embodied dreamer: the embodied dreamer:



only imagines the existence of souls different from his own proper form and further only imagines that there are any bodies at all, the real existence of an embodied soul in one single body is as false as the body itself, so it follows that all bodies are false and the existence of souls in those bodies is false too. Hence there is no difference between one body and the real existence of a soul in it. But for us when we awake from our dream the personal body of the dreamer and the real existence of a soul in it are not sublated whereas the other bodies and the indwelling souls of our dream are sublated. It follows that they are all false and that only the personal body with its indwelling soul has any reality at all: that is the difference we make.

§ 46. Further we must inquire now how the nescience ceases to exist, and what that cessation is after all.<sup>222</sup>

—The knowledge of identity puts an end to it, and this cessation is of such a kind that it is contrary to inexplicable.

Then we contend: something is contrary to inexplicable means something is explicable:<sup>223</sup> it must be either real, or unreal, or both, there is no other alternative. When it is held to be different from Brahman, then the nescience cannot yet have ceased to exist.<sup>224</sup> When it is held that Brahman Itself is the cessation, then it should have ceased before, because that follows from the knowledge of the Vedānta which teaches that Brahman

is also illusory. The bodies and souls that the (illusory) dreamer dreams about are illusory in the second degree, but the illusory dreamer is no more real than the phantoms of his dream. So, in the final analysis, there is no difference at all between the existence of any body and the existence therein of any soul, whether they are illusory in the first or in the second degree. So the entire instance is inappropriate: appropriate is it when the reality of the dreamer and his body is accepted: only then the illusoriness of the dream's bodies and souls can be defined by the reality of the dreamer's body and soul.

222. S. notes that *kidyāsi* in the question is used pejoratively (*kṣepārtha*), as it well may be: to it correspond in the reply the words *anirvacanīyapratyanīkākāra*, which to R.'s realistic mind is an exceedingly clumsy way of expressing oneself.

223. Anything not inexplicable (*anirvacanīyapratyanika*) is therefore explicable: it must be explained either as real, or as unreal, or as both. If the cessation is unreal, there is nothing to discuss. If it is real, two alternatives present themselves: it is either different from, or identical with Brahman: 1. if it is different, then duality must persist ultimately and Nescience, responsible for duality, has therefore not ceased; 2. if it is identical with Brahman, Nescience has ceased from all eternity, so that Nescience does not appear at all. If the cessation is both real and unreal, Nescience is non-existent on both counts.

224. Being different from Brahman it is 'false' (belonging to the realm of Nescience), and consequently its annihilation is false; so, if Nescience is annihilated, it must still be there to account for the traces of duality left by its own annihilation.

was originally non-differentiated. So your theory that the knowledge of identity as such means cessation of nescience and that without it there is *samsāra* is invalidated.

§ 47. Moreover, the question must be raised: considering that the terminating knowledge itself is also false, who terminates that terminating knowledge in its turn?

—After having put an end to all difference other than itself the terminating knowledge vanishes by itself because its nature is but momentary, even as a fire in a forest or a counter-poison terminate themselves.

No! The terminating knowledge is different from Brahman. Therefore its proper form, and its origination and annihilation are false. Hence follows that the nescience persists in the form of its annihilation.<sup>225</sup> So it remains to be said what puts an end to the notion that that knowledge has been annulled. A forest fire etc. too have of necessity a series of successive developments that are contrary to their initial phase of being.

§ 48. Furthermore, of what kind is the subject of the knowledge which denies everything that is different from Brahman as pure consciousness?

—He has the form of superimposition.

No, for then he is to be denied by, and consequently the object of, the terminating knowledge so that he cannot be its subject.

—Brahman's proper form then.

Then we have two alternatives: is Brahman's proper form *in its pure form* the subject of the terminating knowledge or *in its superimposed form*? If it is *superimposed*, than this superimposition and another nescience from which it derives will persist because they themselves are not the objects of the terminating knowledge. If still another knowledge is assumed to put an end to them, there will be a *regressus ad infinitum*, because this knowledge will also have the triple character of all knowledge. For if it lacks this triple character<sup>226</sup> all knowledge ceases to be knowledge at all, since knowledge is of some subject and has the form of a definite validity for a definite object. So if it lacks this triple character of all knowledge, your terminating knowledge is no more terminating than a knowledge constituting a proper form. When you assume that the subject of knowledge is Brahman's proper

225. As S. remarks: to be annihilated is, by definition, to enter on a phase of being opposed to former phases; it is not completely nothing: *na tu dravyābhāvaḥ*.

226. The 'triple character' (*trirūpatva*), or the three constituent factors of all knowledge are 1. *jñātṛ* "the subject of knowing"; 2. *jñāna-* "the act of knowing"; 3. *jñeya-* "the object of knowing".

form in pure form, then you adopt our point of view. It is ridiculous to say that the proper form of the terminating knowledge as well as the person that exercises this knowledge are to be numbered among the objects that they themselves terminate: not less ridiculous, in fact, than if in the case of an action of cutting wood, when it is said: "Devadatta cuts everything but the earth," this would be taken to mean that the person cutting and the cutting activity itself are to be reckoned among the things that are cut!<sup>227</sup>

§ 49. Further, we should inquire into another question: what source gives rise to that knowledge of identity which puts an end to all diversity?

—That source is the śruti.

That is impossible: for the śruti being different from Brahman is a product of the imagination of nescience and can therefore never act as the source of knowledge that sublates the phenomenal world. For a certain erroneous notion that springs from a faulty cause, for example that a rope is a snake, is not sublated by the cognition that it is no snake but a rope, if that cognition too springs from a faulty cause. Suppose that when we have that notion of snake and are consequently afraid of it, a certain confused person comes along and assures us that it is only a rope and not a snake: then, if we knew that that person is confused, his assurance would not sublate our notion that the rope is a snake and our fear would not vanish.<sup>228</sup> Similarly, a man who has effective knowledge<sup>229</sup> knows at the very time when he hears the śruti that the śruti too is founded on error, since it is different from Brahman. Besides, if a man with knowledge were told that the terminating knowledge and the śāstra in which that knowledge is assembled can be sublated themselves, then he would instantly conclude: "Oh, but then there is no reality in the termination of the phenomenal world," and he would know that the phenomenal world is real, in the same way as he would know, when a man appearing in his dream had told him that his father had died, that his father was still alive in reality. Besides, the statements *tat tvam asi* etc. would not<sup>230</sup> sublate the phenomenal world<sup>231</sup> because they are founded on error, just as the sublating assurance of the confused person to the effect that there was only a rope and no snake would not be sublating at all.

227. Same comparison ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 125 where THIBAUT renders *bhūtalavyatirik-tam* "everything on the surface of the earth", instead of "everything different from the earth itself:" to *bhūta-* corresponds Brahman, the act of knowing sublates everything different from Brahman. LACOMBE translates "tout ce qui dépassait la surface de la terre", which is not very clear.

228. Same argument and comparison ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 54.

229. *prayojakajñānavatāḥ*.

230. i.e., even if the *lakṣita* sense of *tat tvam asi* is admitted.

231. As represented by *tvam*, the embodied ātman.

§ 50. But, in point of fact, would it not be more like this: when we are afraid of something in a dream but we realize while dreaming that it is only a dream, then our previous fear vanishes, as is a matter of common experience: in the same manner this could be possible in our case too.

That is not true, for it is also a matter of common experience that our fear does not cease, even though we realize while dreaming that is all a dream; so that does not make any difference.

§ 51. You say that while we hear the śruti we realize that it is all a dream. But what you actually say is this: the śāstra, although it is false because it is a product of an erring imagination, expounds that Brahman has no second; and because later on it appears that the śāstra cannot validly bear upon a Brahman that is so as the śāstra asserts, it follows that this Brahman is proved. This is improper reasoning, for the assertion that all is nil sublates itself too.

—But this assertion itself is found on error.

Then you say yourself that the assertion that Brahman has no second is also founded on error. The only difference is that the invalidity of the assertion itself that all is nil appears later on. So, he who holds the view that all is nil and he who holds the view that all entities different from Brahman are false do not recognize the reality of the *pramāṇas* that prove their own points; therefore the really competent declare that their views have no title to philosophy at all: *Philosophy marches always on as long as philosophers have real means of knowledge; but the philosophy of the śūnyavādin has no title since it has no means.*<sup>232</sup>

§ 52. Moreover<sup>233</sup> which *pramāṇa* proves that the phenomenal world as apprehended by perception is false?

—As perception can by other means be proved to derive from a deficiency, the non-deficient scripture, being not so proved by other means, sublates perception.

Then I ask: what deficiency can give rise to a perception that has infinite diversity for its object?

—Perception is produced by a deficiency arising from beginningless *vāsanās*<sup>234</sup> of diversity etc.

232. Kumārila, Śloka-vārttika; Nirāmbanavāda, st. 128 cd; the half śloka here translated follows (129 ab): *adhikāro 'nupāyātvaṇ na vāde śūnyavādinah*, where *upāya* = *pramāṇa*.

233. Cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1.

234. Residues of mental impressions, creating a mentality and habits.

But then the śāstra is produced by that same deficiency, so perception and śāstra cannot stand in the relation of thing sublated and thing sublating since they derive from the same deficiency.

§ 53. Perception apprehends the *padārthas* which have definite generic structures, e.g. of a human being, connected with the elements ether, wind etc. and with the sense-objects sound, touch etc. deriving from these elements. The śāstra, on the other hand, is concerned with the proper form of Brahman as modified by endless differentiating features, like his being the immanent soul in all creatures and his being real, with the various methods of worshipping Him, *upāsana* etc., and with the specific fruits that are obtained by His Grace which follows attainment of him, and with the specific eradication of the fundamental causes giving rise to things displeasing Him,—in a word, objects beyond the scope of perception. Hence follows that there can be no contradiction between śāstra and perception. Anyone who maintains the superior authority of śāstra qualified by numerous qualities, such as being the established doctrine transmitted by beginningless and endless uninterrupted studies etc., must necessarily recognize the reality of perception.

But enough of refuting this web of false doctrines and faulty reasoning that is swept away like reed by the forceful wind of hundreds of śrutis in succession. We have done with it!

§ 54. The second school<sup>235</sup> assumes that there is no other entity existing but a Brahman conditioned by adjuncts.<sup>236</sup> It follows that where there is a natural admixture of adjuncts to Brahman all defects inherent in adjuncts will be found in Brahman Himself. That means that all śrutis which set forth that Brahman is free from all defects, e.g. that *there is no imperfection in Him*,<sup>237</sup> are discarded.

§ 55. But the idea is rather like this: a space-unit contained in a jug is of another character than the main space,<sup>238</sup> since only the former is

235. Bhāskara's *bhedābhedavāda*, more precisely *aupādhikavāda*: doctrine that Brahman, conditioned by real *upādhis*, constitutes the phenomenal world.

236. *upādhi*- adjunct, i.e. an accidental factor added to an entity, subjecting it to restrictions and delimitations which condition its mode of being without impairing its essence".

237. *apahatapāpmā*, ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

238. *ākāśa*- "space/ether," first of the *mahābhūtāni*, conceived as a material element that is spatially unlimited: it is held to be *eka*- "indivisibly one" and *vibhu*- "omnipresent". Space may be adjoined to by a jug which has a finite measure of capacity; although this jug with the space contained therein delimits the space to a finite extent, it does not, to the mind of the *aupādhikavādin*, affect its unlimitedness. The comparison,

limited, and both spaces are different from each other. The properties, positive and negative,<sup>239</sup> inherent in these space-units do not affect the main space because the main space is not so particularized. Similarly, the defects inherent in the embodied soul, which is set apart and determined by diversity brought about by adjuncts, do not affect the Supreme Brahman, i.e. the Brahman that is not subjected to adjuncts.

This proves nothing. It is not possible to cut the indivisible main space off from the jug etc. for it cannot be divided up; so that the jug remains connected with the main space itself.<sup>240</sup> Similarly it would follow that since Brahman cannot be cut off, He would remain connected with the adjuncts in his entirety.

—But the particular place in space connected with the jug differs from all other places in space.<sup>241</sup>

From the fact that the main space remains connected with the jug in varying places it follows that, when the jug moves about, any place without any restriction can be connected with the jug.<sup>242</sup> So, since the adjunct is in a comparable way conjoined with Brahman without any constant restriction to a definite place, it would follow that it can move about in varying places in Him, and if it does so, varying places in Brahman would alternately be connected with the adjunct and disconnected: that would mean that the whole of Brahman could be conjoined with the adjunct

although, as far as I can see, not developed by Bhāskara in this way, is found in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, e.g. 2, 3, 43 (p. 141) *katham punar niravayavasya paramātmano 'mśaḥ sambhavati / āgamāt tāvad avagamyate yathāgneḥ kṣudrā viṣphulingā iti dṛṣṭānta iti prañayanāt / yathā cākāśasya pāṭhivādhiṣṭhānāvachchinnaṁ karmacchidraṁ ca*: "but how is it possible that the Supreme Spirit, who is indivisible, has an *amśa*?—This is learnt from the Scriptures: it is demonstrated in the illustrative instance "just as tiny sparks spring up out of a fire, similarly all *prāṇas*, all worlds, all gods, all creatures spring from this *ātman*" (BĀUp. 2, 1, 20), just as from space (a part) is delimited by a substratum like a clay jug, and (the space contained in) the cavity in the ear". Also 1, 4, 21 (p. 81) *samyag āha bhavān asti bhedo 'py anādikālapravṛttāvidyākarmopādhyavacchedād amśo hi parasyāyam jīvo nāma yathāgner viṣphulingāḥ, yathākāśasya pāṭhivādya-dhiṣṭānopādhyavacchinnaḥ chidrapradeśaḥ tadamśasabdagrahaṇaśaktyapekṣā*, etc.

239. *guṇa* and *doṣa*.

240. In other words: the finite character of the space enclosed in a jug cannot be separated from the main space: the main space contains the finitized extent so that, in its entirety, the main space is restricted: it can never transcend this extent.

241. The point which the *aupādhikavādin* wants to make is that the finitized extent of main space, though concededly never disconnected from the main space, yet derives from its isolated finiteness a distinct individuality marking it off from main space: essentially the enclosed space remains space.

242. R. retorts that each and every part of space can be delimited by a jug, so that space is forever alternating between limitedness and unlimitedness. Applied to Brahman this consequence is absurd.

and that every moment He would be bond and released! People in their right minds laugh at this.

§ 56. The one indivisible space is the auditory sense but nevertheless space is only partially defined as a sense:<sup>243</sup> similarly Brahman too can be shown to be partially defined.

It is not reasonable to say that, since a definite place in space if connected with a certain room in the ear that has been prepared by a special sort of wind takes on the function of sense,<sup>244</sup> therefore space itself is *partially* defined as a sense, although that place is infinitely variable.<sup>245</sup> The bodies of all beings move freely without any restriction through space: therefore they are all connected with all and sundry places in space. So, if applied to our topic, it would rather follow that there is endless variation in and no constant restriction to the places in Brahman that are connected with adjuncts.

§ 57. — If we assume that space is the auditory sense by its proper form, we can likewise state that space is partially defined as a sense.<sup>246</sup>

But actually space is not the auditory sense at all. For the Vaidikas declare: *the eleven senses evolve out of the vaikārika ahaṁkāra*.<sup>247</sup>

243. The argument is that only that part of space contained in the aural cavity is the auditory sense. This argument is essentially the same one as that put forward above: even though ākāśa be partially defined as a sense (which R. does not admit), there is no spatially fixed part for it: any part of space may take on this function.

244. The Naiyāyika theory of sound holds that śrotra- "auditory organ" is that extent of space that is delimited by the aural cavity (*kārṇāśaṣṭkulyavacchinnam*). The organ of hearing therefore cannot move out to find its object (as the organ of seeing goes out to find its object), since outside the aural cavity it is plain ākāśa, not śrotra. So the space inside the ear (śrotra) receives the sound. R's expression *vāyuvīṣeṣaṁskṛta* is explained by S. *uccāranaprayatnajanitavāyuvīṣeṣaṁyogasamskṛta*- "prepared by the contact with a particular current of air produced by the energy of producing sounds."

245. R's objection is that all space must be definable as śrotra since space is indivisible: any part of space may happen to be contained in an aural cavity, so all space must have this function.


246. This argument is more urgent: the aupādhikavādin concedes that all space is essentially śrotra, either in potentiality, or, in definite parts of it, in actuality. But, if applied to Brahman this would mean that Brahman is essentially identical with the finite conditioned entities: aupādhikavāda becomes pantheism, implicating the Absolute in the conditions of the finite.

247. However primitive these ancient Sāṃkhyan views may appear, their introduction here is very apt: while, to the very end, arguing by analogy of the dṛṣṭānta supplied by his opponent, R. proves that a scrutiny of the dṛṣṭānta itself puts his adversary in the wrong.—The 11 senses are the *manas*- "co-ordinating organ of sensorial impressions", the 5 sensorial and the 5 motorial senses (*buddhindriya* and *karmendriya*).

The venerable Parāśara says likewise: *taijasānīndriyāṇy āhur devā vaikārikā daśa, ekādaśaṃ manaś cātra devā vaikārikāḥ smṛtaḥ*,<sup>248</sup> i.e. ahaṃkāra is triple: *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*; respectively it is *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. After having declared that the order of creation is such that the elements, space, etc., evolve out of the *tāmasa* form of ahaṃkāra, viz. the *bhūtādi*, he alludes to the rival view that the eleven senses evolve out of the *taijasa* or *rājasa* form of ahaṃkāra. Then he states his own view, namely that the *vaikārika* *indriyas* evolve out of the *sāttvika* ahaṃkāra: *devā vaikārikāḥ smṛtāḥ*, where *devāḥ* means "the senses".<sup>249</sup> In the Mahābhārata it is declared that the *bhūtas* nourish the *āhaṃkārika* *indriyas*.<sup>250</sup> Even if it were true that the senses evolve out of the *bhūtas*, the senses of the *puruṣa* would—since they are transformation of the elements *ākāśa*, etc.—become distinct and peculiar evolved products of these elements,<sup>251</sup> in the same manner as the body. Similarly, it cannot

248. VP. 1, 2, 46-47 "some contend that the *indriyas* derive from the *taijasa* form of ahaṃkāra, (but) the ten senses, and *manas* as the eleventh, are (in fact) products of its *vaikārika* form: hence the senses are known as *vaikārika*."...There is some discrepancy between the various interpretations of the commentaries. Citsukha and Viṣṇucitta explain *devāḥ* as *indriyāṇi* (C. *devāḥ divyanti vyavaharanty ebhir iti devā indriyāṇi*; V. *indriyāṇāṃ devaśabdavācyaṭvaṃ tadadhiṣṭhātṛdevatābhīprāyena*); Śrīdhara and Dattātreyā as the superintending deities, referring to BhP. 2, 5, 30 *divyātārkapraceto'śvī-vahnīndropendramitrakāḥ* (ka- = Prajāpati). The Viśiṣṭādvaitin V. is the only one who interprets like R. *svapakṣam āha-atra devā* etc.; the others have the ten *indriyas* derive from *taijasa*, and only *manas* from *vaikārika*, explaining the plural *vaikārikāḥ* as the superintending deities of *manas*.—R.'s interpretation corresponds to that of Pañcarātra, cf. SCHRADER, *Pañcarātra*, p. 76.

249. The order of evolution described in VP. 1, 2, 34 is as is shown here: Pradhāna → Mahattatva → Ahaṃkāra;



250. Reference is to MBh. 12, 194, 5 ff. and similar texts.

251. Yet, being products of the *bhūtas*, the senses can be distinguished from them: they are not the elements itself, but their products (*śrotra* ← *ākāśa*). It is not clear exactly which stand R. takes: if *ākāśa* is not *śrotra*, then what is *śrotra*? "N'ayant aucune idée du dispositif de l'oreille interne, les Vaiśeṣika-Naiyāyika ont localisé l'organe de l'audition dans le pavillon; et, comme ils n'y apercevaient rien de spécial, au creux de la conque... qui percevait le son: il s'ensuit que dans ce cas particulier l'organe du sens



be refuted that Brahman, being not cut off, nor divisible, nor transformed, would inevitably have without any restriction the defects of conjunction with adjuncts of infinite evil. Now, philosophers who know the scriptures do not think much of this: it is a theory of the very credulous! Assuming that Brahman's essence is subject to evolution, they sublate the śrutis that declare that He is untransformed.<sup>252</sup> And when they say that Brahman itself remains untransformed and that it is Its creative potency that is involved in evolution,<sup>252a</sup> then we raise the question: is this potency an evolved product of Brahman, or is it identical with Brahman? Whichever alternative is adopted, the assumption would remain necessary that Brahman's essence is subject to evolution.

§ 58. The third school<sup>253</sup> assumes that the individual soul and Brahman are different-non-different: it follows that *Brahman* is identical with *soul* and that in the same way as Saubhari<sup>254</sup> is different from himself and the Lord is different from His own incarnations, everyone is different from the Lord. This leads consequently to the conclusion that the defects inherent in the jīvas are also His.

In other words: the view that God Himself constitutes, in *His essence*, the various creatures gods, men, brutes, plants etc., declares that God is identical with these creatures in *essence*. Such being the case, all defects like happiness, unhappiness etc. that go with the soul, also go with the

se confond pour eux avec la substance dont il perçoit la qualité" Foucher, TS, p. 76. Insisting on some sort of a difference between auditory sense and space, comparable to that between body and component elements, R. seems to suggest that the auditory sense is vested in an organ of the body rather than identical with an indefinite and variably localized part of space.

252. Cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 113 *bhedābhedavāde tu brahmany evopādhisamsargāt tat-prayuktañjīvagatadoṣa brahmany eva prāduḥ syur iti nirastanikhiladoṣaguṇātmabhāvopadeśā hi virodhād eva parityaktāḥ syuḥ / svābhāvika**bhedābhedavāde** 'pi brahmaṇaḥ svata eva jīvabhāvābhyupagamād guṇavaddoṣā ca svābhāvikā bhavedur iti nirdoṣabrahmatā-dātmīyopadeśaviruddhā eva. A detailed refutation is given in ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.*

252a. Cf. Bhāskara, BrSBh. 1, 4, 25.

253. School of Yādavaprakāśa, S. sums up the difference between Bhāskara and Yādeva: *acidbrahmaṇo tu sarvasya brahmātmakatvaśruteḥ, nirmalatvādisruter upādhyantarābhyupagame 'navasthānāca bhedābhedau svābhāvikāu abhyupagatau bhāskaramate / yādavaprakāśamate tu muktāu api bhedanirdeśaśruter jīvabrahmaṇo ca svābhāvikāu abhīmatāu iti bhīdā.*

254. Saubhari, mythical person, reputed to possess 50 bodies at once to satisfy his 50 wives (*dr̥ṣyate hi saubhariprabhṛtīnāṃ śaktimatāṃ yugapad anekasārīrapratipattiḥ*, ŚBh. 1, 3, 26), of which he was the sole jīva (*saubhariprabhṛtiṣu hy ātmaikatvenāneka-sārīraprayuktasukhādipratiseṣādhanam ekasya dr̥ṣyate*, ib. 2, 1, 15 p. 434); for the story see VP. 4, 2, 66-133; BhP. 9, 6, 38-55. The purpose of *saubharibhedavat* as well of *svāvatārabhedavat* is to exemplify identity in the guise of plurality: in spite of the seeming difference there is but identity: God is the individual soul.

Lord, just as all actions, e.g. the fetching of water, that go with the jug, bowl etc. which originate from a single lump of clay, also go with that lump of clay itself.

§ 59. — But is it not rather like this: in the same way as a substance of clay *by itself*, when it has no function in the various generic structures of jug, bowl etc., has other effects as well: similarly the Lord *by Himself*, when He does not function as the soul of god, man, animal etc., is possessed of omniscience and of all perfections like the power of having his every will realized.

True. You say that one and the same Lord possesses all sorts of perfections in one part of Himself and all sorts of imperfections in another part of Himself. This is the logical consequence of the fact that two different parts do not make two different Lords.

— But both parts are well distinct<sup>255</sup> from each other.

What do you gain by that? For if the same Lord is in one part eternally miserable you cannot say properly that He is happy in another part. The Lord would be comparable to Devadatta who has one hand anointed with sandal-paste and adorned with bracelets and rings, and his other hand hit by a hammer and hurting with hell-fire!

We may say that this *bhedābheda* doctrine is worse even than the doctrine that Brahman is nescient:<sup>256</sup> for it contends that immeasurable misery is ultimately real and that it can never be overcome because there is no end to beings implicated in *samsāra*.<sup>257</sup>

§ 60. — But the part 'embodied soul' in Him is different from Himself.

Then you are walking on my road. But when the relationship between Lord and soul is described in terms of identity in essence, then it is logically unsound to maintain difference; whereas it is sound when this identity is stated in the terms of a body-soul relation.<sup>258</sup> Contrary to you we can declare that the Lord's qualities are universal, including his Sovereignty over all worlds etc.; and the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* thus retains its proper sense.

§ 61. Further, we say that one and the same entity cannot possibly be different and non-different at once, because that is a contradiction in

255. *vyavasthita*— "delimited one from the other."

256. i.e., *advaitavedānta*.

257. Since God is identical with the *jīva* in bondage, bondage is henceforth inescapable.

258. R.'s solution of 'difference in union'.

terms. If a jug is different from a cloth, than the one cannot exist in the other; only if there is no difference one can exist in the other. But that in the same place and at the same time one and the same entity does at once exist and not exist in another entity is a contradiction in terms.

§ 62. — But one entity can at once exist in another entity in so far as it is class and not exist in so far as it is individual.<sup>259</sup>

If there is no difference between the class 'ox' and the individual 'hornless ox', it follows that the individual 'hornless ox' also exists in the individual 'broken-horned ox'. If class and individual are different and non-different, there are two cases at once: first, if the individual 'broken-horned ox' is not different from the class 'ox', the broken-horned ox exists in the hornless ox; second, if they are different, the class does not exist at all in the individual, just as the class 'buffalo' does not exist in an individual horse.<sup>260</sup> This contradiction is plainly insoluble. Class etc. constitute the generic structure<sup>261</sup> of a given thing and are consequently modifications of that thing; hence, as we have said before,<sup>262</sup> the modifying attribute and the modified thing are different *padārthas*, the modifying attribute has no separate function and cannot be separately apprehended,<sup>263</sup> and the same generic structure can appear as modification in more than one thing.

§ 63. The judgment "*this is he*" is founded upon identity of mode, in the same manner as is the judgment: "*this one is a man-with-a-stick.*"<sup>264</sup> And this very modification, of class etc., is declared to be the differentiation of a given thing. The possession of such a differentiating attribute furnishes the ground on which we treat a thing as different.<sup>265</sup> This modification is at once the ground for acting upon the difference and for acting on the thing itself, in the same way as awareness: just as the being aware

259. That is to say: two entities are non-different inasmuch as they belong to the same class and share the same generic differentiae, whereas at the same time they are different in so far as they differ in individual characteristics; cf. Bhāskara, BrSBh. 1, 1, 4.

260. R. considers this statement under the two aspects by which the *dvayātmakatva* (supra note 147) in *bhinnābhinnatva* can be viewed; *abhinnatva* and *bhinnābhinnatva*; the third aspect of *bhinnatva* conflicts too self-evidently with the alleged *dvayātmakatva* to bear mention. I have interpreted this extremely concise passage with the aid of S.; SRINIVASACHARI's interpretation (*Bhedābheda* p. 211) differs. For a very detailed refutation cf. Vācaspati's *Bhāmātī* on Śaṅkara's BrSBh. 1, 1, 4; cf. also ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.

261. *saṁsthāna*- see supra note 86.

262. Supra § 30.

263. *prthagānupalambha*-

264. S. comments: so 'yam iti buddhir anuvṛttaviśayaavyavahārānvitā buddhis tajjātiyatvabuddhir ayam api gauḥ iti buddhir ity arthah; in the second case *ayam api daṇḍi*, the stick (*daṇḍa*-) is the prakāra.

265. *vyavahārahetu*-

of a given thing furnishes at once the ground for our acting on that thing and for acting upon the awareness<sup>266</sup> itself.

§ 64. In consequence of these reasons all theories that perception apprehends mere being and does not apprehend difference are rejected,<sup>267</sup> firstly because only an entity that has a definite generic structure — class etc. — is apprehended by perception; secondly because this class etc. taking on the form of generic structure furnishes the ground for treating it as different in regard to its correlative. That it is a fallacy to assume evolution in proper form has already been pointed out.<sup>268</sup>

### III

§ 65. All the śrutis — e.g. *He who residing in the earth is different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who directs the earth from within, He is thy soul, the immortal inner Ruler.*<sup>269</sup> *He who residing in the soul is different from the soul, whom the soul does not know, whose body is the soul, who directs the soul from within, He is thy soul, the immortal inner Ruler;*<sup>270</sup> *He who lives within the earth, whose body is the earth, whom the earth does not know, etc. . . . who lives within the akṣara, whose body is the akṣara, whom the akṣara does not know. . . . who lives within death, whose body is death, whom death does not know—He is the One who is the immanent soul of all beings, who is without any evil, the divine unique God Nārāyaṇa;*<sup>271</sup> *Two birds, inseparable companions, have alighted on the same tree. One of them eats the sweet berry; the other looks on without eating;*<sup>272</sup> *The commander of men, who has entered within them, the soul of all;*<sup>273</sup> *after having created it, He entered into it; having entered it It became present and yonder, true and untrue;*<sup>274</sup> *By way of this living soul. . . ;*<sup>275</sup> *When he knows the soul from the mover, then he attains with It immortality;*<sup>276</sup> *when the enjoyer knows the enjoyed and the mover — all three of them are declared to be the triple Brahman;*<sup>277</sup>

266. *saṃvedana-*

267. By his theory of *dvyaṭmakatva* the *bhedābhedavādin* postulates the possibility of apprehending the "pure thing" (*vastusvarūpa-*) apart from its differentiations and attributes. Of this view R. has disposed *supra* § 30.

268. *Supra* § 57.

269. *BĀUp.* 3, 7, 3.

270. *BĀUp.* 3, 7, 22 (*Mādhyaṃdina*).

271. *SubālUp.* 7 *antaḥśarīre nihito guhāyām ajo yasya pṛthivī śarīraṃ yaḥ pṛthivīṃ saṃcaran* (in this order throughout) etc.

272. *MuṇḍUp.* 3, 1, 1.

273. *TaittĀr.* 3, 11.

274. *TaittUp.* 2, 6.

275. *ChUp.* 6, 3, 2.

276. *ŚvetUp.* 1, 6.

277. *ŚvetUp.* 1, 12.

He that eternal, spiritual and unique grants the desires of the eternal spiritual and plural;<sup>278</sup> the Lord of the guṇas, Lord of matter and soul;<sup>279</sup> There are two unborn ones, knowing and not knowing, sovereign and not sovereign;<sup>280</sup>—all these śrutis and hundreds more, as well as the declarations of Vālmiki, Parāśara and Dvaipāyana, foremost of Vedic scholars, corroborating the evidence of the śrutis, such as *the entire world is thy body, the earth is thy fortitude*;<sup>281</sup> *whatsoever is created by all living creatures in the production of all that can be created, O Brahman, that all is verily Hari's body*;<sup>282</sup> *I am the soul, O Guḍākeśa, that is the resting-place of all beings*;<sup>283</sup> *having entered into and residing within the heart of all I am the source of remembrance, knowledge and surmise*;<sup>284</sup>—all these śrutis and smṛtis propound that Brahman Himself is modified by all spiritual and non-spiritual entities; (1) since it is learnt from them that the Supreme Brahman is the soul of all and that all entities, spiritual and non-spiritual, constitute his body; (2) since the body is a *padārtha*<sup>285</sup> only by virtue of its function of modifying the being it embodies; and (3) since, although body and embodied being have different properties, they are not confused with each other.<sup>286</sup> This doctrine of a Brahman modified by all spirit and non-spirit they propound by the use of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* constructions etc., taken in their primary sense, which set forth Brahman's supernal manifestation<sup>287</sup> by declaring that Brahman is embodied by all. For *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is the application of two terms to connote one meaning under the aspects of two modifications. In our interpretation it retains its primary meaning. So in the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of *tat* and *tvam* in *tat tvam asi*<sup>288</sup> the word *tat* refers to the perfect Brahman who is the universal cause and the possessor of all perfections; whereas the word *tvam*, which is used predicatively of spiritual entities, refers to Brahman as being qualified by the individual soul, or as embodied by that soul, existing as the inner Ruler of the soul that constitutes His body. When taken

278. KathUp. 2, 2 (5), 13 = ŚvetUp. 6, 13.

279. ŚvetUp. 6, 16.

280. ŚvetUp. 1, 9.

281. Rāmāyana, 6, 120, 26.

282. VP. 1, 22, 38.

283. BhG. 10, 20.

284. BhG. 15, 15.

285. i.e., exists as a describable magnitude with a definite function.

286. S. explains: *kāṣṭhasya rūmāyās ca dharmabhede saty eva kāṣṭhasya saṃsargaprayuktaṃ lavaṇatvaṃ dṛśyate: evaṃ dharmabhede 'pi saṃsargaprayukto yaḥ saṃkaras tasya śarīraśarīrīṇor asaṃbhavād ity arthaḥ.*

287. *vaibhava*- "totality of the phenomenal manifestations (*vibhūti*) of the divine Personality."

288. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

in the sense that the other schools adopt the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* proper would be violated and Brahman made imperfect.

§ 66. In other words, the declaration that *Brahman* is *such* proves the reality—in subtle and gross phase alike—of the phenomenal world, consisting in a plurality of spiritual and non-spiritual entities, as the mode denoted by the word *such*. Thus the full meaning of the passage *bahu syām prajāyeyeti*<sup>289</sup> is exhausted: the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities exists conditionally as the generic structure<sup>290</sup> of this same Lord who has several generic structures, being either cause or effect.

§ 67. — However, it is a matter of common knowledge that only class and property are modifications of a substance in the form of its generic and specific structure, so that they alone can have the attributive function denoted by the word *such*, and not the substance itself. So it is improper to contend that a *padārtha* capable of independent function is merely, as an attributive 'such,' a modification of the Lord.

Not less common is the knowledge that a substance, too, e.g. a stick, an ear-ring etc., serves to modify another substance.

— But then we see that a possessive suffix<sup>291</sup> is required to make an independent substance like a stick etc. into a mode of another substance: *daṇḍa* — *daṇḍin*, *kuṇḍala* — *kuṇḍalin* etc. Therefore it is against reason, if by means of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* a spiritual or non-spiritual entity that is a substance of the same order as an ox is declared to be a modification of the Lord.

I reply: it is common usage in Vedic as well as in profane speech to call, by *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, certain substances, forming complexes of elements—ox, horse, man, god etc.—the modes of spiritual beings, gods etc., namely as their bodies: for example "Devadatta is born a man because of his good karman; Yajñadatta is born a cow because of his bad karman; another spiritual being is born a god because of his exceedingly good karman," etc.

§ 68. What we mean is this: we are not concerned about whether class, or property, or substance may constitute a mode. When a certain entity serves as a distinctive feature for a certain substance, then we can properly say, by means of a *sāmānādhikarāṇya* construction coordinating that entity with that substance, that it has no function apart from that

289. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

290. *saṁsthāna*—

291. *matvarthīyapratyaya*— "suffix with the sense exemplified by *matu* (p) °mant- / *mat-*," Pāṇini 5, 2, 94 *tad asyāsty asminn* "that is of / in this."

substance and therefore constitutes a mode of it.<sup>292</sup> And if a substance that may have a separate function is in some place at some time wanted as a mode for another substance, then it has a possessive suffix; and that is all the difference there is.

So, since the sum-total of all entities, animate and inanimate, constitute the Lord's body, their proper forms have real existence as the modes of the Lord. Such being the case, the Lord, who is the entity modified by all these entities, is denoted by the various words that denote these entities. Therefore these entities can appropriately be terms in *sāmānādhikaraṇya* with Him. All this we have already expounded in detail when we elucidated the śruti on the separation by name-and-form.<sup>293</sup>

§ 69. Consequently, Brahman Himself is also all effects, since He has the generic structure of being modified by all things: prakṛti, puruṣa, mahat, ahaṁkāra, tanmātra, elements and senses,<sup>294</sup> the Egg of Brahmā consisting in fourteen worlds that derive from the above entities,<sup>295</sup> and the gods, men, brutes,<sup>296</sup> plants etc. that live within that universe. So by knowing solely that Brahman is the cause we know all. In this manner it is established very well that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one. At the same time it is stated, on the strength of the causal relation etc. established hereby,<sup>297</sup> that the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities is ensouled by the Supreme Brahman inasmuch as it modifies Him.

292. i.e. all the material objects and their ensouling spiritual principles (jīva-) are in essence nothing but a mode of the Supreme Being. In the same way as the name of a body may conveniently be used to refer to the spiritual principle residing in it (e.g. *devadatto manuṣyo jātāḥ*, where Devadatta = *jīva* and *manuṣya-* is the body.), so the Supreme Being may be denoted by the name of the jīva (e.g. *tat tvam asi*).

293. ChUp. 6, 2, 3, supra § 17.

294. Sāṃkhyan terms: *puruṣa-* "spiritual order", *prakṛti-* "natura naturans" → *mahat*, first evolution = *buddhi-* "cognitive faculty" → *ahaṁkāra* "subjectifying organ, ego-factor" from which on the one hand evolve the *tanmātras* "rudimentals" (*śabda-* etc.) → elements (*bhūta-*, *ākāśa* etc.), and on the other hand the senses with their co-ordinator *manas* (I follow the account of Viṣṇupurāṇa, 1, 2 to which R. evidently subscribes).

295. Purāṇic cosmological conception of a universe built up in layers of 1. subterranean, 2. terrestrial, 3. celestial worlds hierarchically ordered: (1) *Pātāla*, *Mahātāla*, *Tālātāla*, *Rasātāla*, *Sutāla*, *Atāla*, inhabited by subhuman beings and/or souls in torment; 2. *Bhūloka* "earth"; 3. *Bhuvārloka*, inhabited by superhuman beings; *Svarloka*, suprasolar heaven, also *Indraloka*; *Mahārloka*; *Janārloka*; *Tapārloka*; *Satya-* or *Brahmaloka*.

296. For an explication of the term *tiryāṅc-* in this sense cf. VP. 1, 5, 22

297. S. explains *kāryakāraṇabhāvaśabdena sanmūlāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ* (ChUp. 6, 8, 6) *ity asyārtho vivalcītaḥ*.

§ 70. — But does the negation, expressed in the śrūtis that declare that Brahman is untransmuted and irreproachable,<sup>298</sup> not deny that in his proper form the Supreme Brahman is the substratum of evolution? In *prakṛtiś ca, pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt*<sup>299</sup> the Author of the Sūtras declares that, by virtue of the assertion that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one and on the strength of the adduced instance of the clay and its effects, the Supreme Person is the material cause of the world. But being the material cause means being the substratum of evolution. Now how can this be established?

§ 71. The reply is as follows. It has been said that the phenomenal world animated by souls does equally constitute the material cause. Contrary to the assumption that the Lord suffers evolution in the form of individual soul, is the assertion *nātmā, śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyah*:<sup>300</sup> the notion that Brahman is cruel and partial is refuted by the assertion — based upon the above assumption that the souls have no beginning — that it is the karman of all the various embodied souls that causes cruelty and partiality: *vaiṣamyānairghṛṇye, na: sāpekṣatvāt*.<sup>301</sup> In *na: karmāvibhāgād iti cen; nānāditvād upapadyate cāpy upalabhyate ca*<sup>302</sup> the Author declares that the contingency of obtainment of what is not due to karman and the loss of what is due to karmān would only occur if the embodied souls were not eternal.<sup>303</sup>

§ 72. The śrūtis declare also that prakṛti is without beginning. In *ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahvīm prajāṃ janayanāṁ sarūpām/ajo hy eko juṣamāno 'nuśete jahāty enām bhuktabhogām ajo 'nyaḥ*<sup>304</sup> e.a. it is shown

298. Both terms *nirvikāra-* (*-kārya-*) *niravadya-* express particularly the Absolute Principle's absolute freedom from the conditions and limitations of the 'transformed' effect.

299. BrS. 1, 4, 23 "[Brahman is] the material cause, since [thus] there is no disagreement with the assertion (ChUp. 6, 1, 3) and the illustration (ChUp. 6, 1, 4)."

300. BrS. 2, 3, 18 "The individual soul [does] not [originate, as follows] from the Scriptures and from [its actual] eternity [proved] by those [Scriptures]."

301. BrS. 2, 1, 34 "[If it be objected that this means that] partiality and cruelty [are proper to Brahman, then I reply] no, since [karman] is taken into consideration."

302. BrS. 2, 1, 35 "If it be objected that this is not so, because there is no distinction of karman, [then I reply that it follows from the fact that] the ātman is without beginning: it is established and apprehended."

303. In other words: the very eternity of the ātman enables a perfect justice in retribution to be worked. Whatever befalls to a soul is due to its karman: there is no arbitrary end put to its existence which would subject it to only part of what is rightfully coming to it. ŚBh. 2, 1, 35 repeats the same words *tathānabhyupagame 'kṛtābhyupagamakṛtaviprañāśaprasaṅgaḥ*.

304. MahāNārUp. 9, 2 "With the one uncreated (matter) that has form, and that produces effects of various kinds, one uncreated (soul) joins itself to enjoy it, whereas another uncreated (soul) goes free from it when it has ceased to enjoy it", = ŚvetUp.



that both prakṛti and puruṣa are unborn. The śrutis out of this the Master of māyā created this entire Universe and the other component was tied by the māyā,<sup>305</sup> and you are to know that the māyā is prakṛti and the Master of māyā the Sovereign Lord<sup>306</sup> show that it is the prakṛti that is the substratum of transformation in its proper form.<sup>307</sup> Compare also the śruti the Cow without beginning and without end, she is the genetrix that brings the beings into being,<sup>308</sup> and the smṛti be sure that prakṛti as well as puruṣa are both without beginning, and that transmutations and guṇas alike are the products of prakṛti.<sup>309</sup> Earth, water, fire, wind, ether, manas, buddhi and ahaṃkāra are the eight components of my prakṛti.<sup>310</sup> Know, however, that I have still another prakṛti which is of a higher order than the former, a prakṛti that is constituted by the embodied souls, on which this material world is dependent, O Arjuna.<sup>311</sup> Taking my material from my own prakṛti I create again and again,<sup>312</sup> and under my guidance the prakṛti with its animate and inanimate beings is brought forth.<sup>313</sup>

§ 73. Therefore, since the prakṛti too constitutes the Lord's body, the term prakṛti denotes the Lord—who is the prakṛti's soul—as being modified by prakṛti. Likewise the term puruṣa denotes the Lord—who is the puruṣa's soul—as being modified by puruṣa. Consequently the Lord is also the soul of the transformations of both prakṛti and puruṣa. So the smṛti declares: Viṣṇu is the evolved as well as the unevolved, puruṣa and time; the same Sovereign Lord is alike that which moves<sup>314</sup> and that which is moved, O Brahman.<sup>315</sup> It follows that only that part in the Supreme

4, 5 (reads prajāḥ sṛjyamānām) where no doubt (cf. next stanza dvā suparnā sayujā etc.) a play is intended on ajā "she-goat" with red, white and black kinds, and aja- "he-goat". Red white and black products of the primeval causal matter are the fire (tejas-), water (āpas) and earth (anna-), the three pre- or proto-Sāṃkhyan elements of ChUp. 6, 2, 3; cf. Intr. chap. I.

305. ŚvetUp. 4, 9 asmān māyī sṛjate, and cf. R.'s exegesis ŚBh. 1, 4, 27.

306. ŚvetUp. 4, 10 māyām tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt.

307. As distinct from the ātman which suffers the transformations (vikāra-) of contraction (saṃkoca-) and expansion (vikāsa-) not in its proper form or essence (svarūpa-) but in its attribute knowledge.

308. MantrUp. 5; this stanza, continuing sitāsītā ca raktā ca sarvakāmadughā vibhūḥ, is evidently inspired by ŚvetUp. 4, 5 above.

309. BhG. 13, 19.

310. BhG. 7, 4.

311. BhG. 7, 5.

312. BhG. 9, 8.

313. BhG. 9, 10.

314. i.e. "sets in motion (pravartayati), creates".

315. VP. 1, 2, 18; the "evolved" (vyakta-) is the subtle primeval matter manifested in the gross creation as name-and-form, the "unevolved" (avyakta-) this subtle matter before this manifestation; Time as the nimittakāraṇa operating on prakṛti, the upādāna-kāraṇa, cf. supra note 188.

Spirit—modified by prakṛti—that is constituted by prakṛti is at all subject to transformations; that part in Him that is the substratum of this modification is not subject to them. Likewise all the obstacles of spiritual life<sup>316</sup> belong to that part in the Supreme Spirit, modified by individual soul, that is constituted by the individual soul; that part in Him that is the substratum of the modification 'individual soul' is the Controller, irreproachable,<sup>317</sup> possessed of all perfections and the power of having his every will realized.<sup>318</sup>

§ 74. Such being the case, the Lord has the mode of being of cause on the one hand and on the other hand that of effect, viz. the Universe of which He is the material cause. So there is no difference between cause and effect,<sup>319</sup> and consequently no śruti is contradicted. Thus Brahman has the mode of being of cause when his body is constituted by prakṛti and puruṣa in their subtle phase<sup>320</sup> (i.e. the phase in which they are not yet subject to division by name-and-form: in this phase the Universe is in the state of resorption), and Brahman has the mode of being of effect when his body is constituted by the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities in their gross phase (i.e. in which composite prakṛti and puruṣa are divided by name-and-form into isolated entities: this passage of Brahman into his gross phase is the creation of the Universe). So the venerable Parāśara declares: *He is the cause of the unborn prakṛti and puruṣa which are effects.*<sup>321</sup>

§ 75. This is the reason why all terms that denote prakṛti and puruṣa—modes of the Lord—whether in their subtle or in their gross phase, denote

316. *apuruṣārtha-* "that which is not, or obstructs, the attainment of the puruṣārthas "goals of human endeavour", esp. *paramapuruṣārtha-* "release"; in this connexion the obstructing factors are contraction and expansion of knowledge (*saṃkoca-*, *vikāsa-*), the *vikāras* to which the soul in *samsāra* is subject.—Cf. ŚBh. 1, 4, 27 *tat-(sc. brahma)-prakārabhūtākṣetrajñagatās cāpuruṣārthāḥ: kṣetrajña* is esp. the individual soul in the transmigratory process of undergoing the results of its former acts.

317. In the invariable sense of "free from transformations (*vikāras*)".

318. *satyasamkalpatva-*, divine attribute *par excellence*.

319. This non-difference, it should be noted, is unilateral: the effect, participating in the immanent cause is not "something else (*anya-*) something new" as the Naiyāyikas contend, but materially the same as the cause and hence indiscernibly connected; the cause, however, is completely independent of and different from the effect: there is no reciprocal non-difference, no identity.

320. Note that prakṛti and puruṣa are especially used to denote matter and spirit at the pre-manifest stage as undifferentiated "principles". This undifferentiated subtlety does not, on the one hand, reduce matter to a primordial chaos, nor on the other hand affect the fundamental individuality of the ātmans mutually: they preserve their individuality as monads (*anu-*) while in 'gross creation' they are not so much individualized as particularized, or empiricized, by the bodies with which they are identified.

321. VP. 1, 9, 37.

in their primary sense the Supreme Spirit as being differentiated by the modes they constitute: in the very same manner as the terms god, man etc. denote the individual souls incorporated by the bodies god, man etc. To put it differently: in the same manner as the terms god, man etc. in their primary sense denote the embodied soul that is their modified substratum, since the diverse evolved products of prakṛti—such as god, man etc.—are *padārthas* only in so far as they are modifications of the embodied soul:<sup>322</sup> thus all terms denoting any spiritual and non-spiritual entity denote in their primary senses the Supreme Spirit, since that entity denoted modifies the Supreme Spirit by constituting his body.

§ 76. The relation between soul and body means the relation between substratum and dependent entity incapable of functioning separately, between<sup>323</sup> transcendent controller and thing controlled, between principal and accessory.<sup>324</sup> In this relation the one term is called *ātman* or "soul" because this is the one who *obtains*<sup>325</sup> an object since he is in all respects the substratum, the controller and the principal; the other term is called body, i.e. *form*, because it is a *modification*<sup>326</sup> that is inseparably connected since it is in all respects dependent entity, thing controlled and accessory. For such is the relation between the individual soul and its body. Consequently, inasmuch as all constitute the body of the Supreme Spirit, He can be denoted by all terms.

§ 77. This is declared by a host of śrutis: *sarve vedā yat padam āmananti*,<sup>327</sup> *sarve vedā yatraikaṃ bhavanti*,<sup>328</sup> i.e. "since they denote the sole One, they denote only one single sense," *eko devo bahudhā niviṣṭaḥ*,<sup>329</sup> *sahaiva santam na vijānanti devāḥ*<sup>330</sup> etc., where *devāḥ* means "the senses",<sup>331</sup> i.e., "the senses—terminating in the

322. Cf. supra note 285.

323. *prthaksiddhyanarhādharādhēyabhāva*, esp. the relation between attribute and subject, or mode and modified substance (*prakāraprakāribhāva*-).

324. *śeṣaśeṣibhāva*-, this relation will be explained infra § 121.

325. *āpnotityātmā*; an old etymology possibly inspired by the early occurrence of a prakṛt form *appa*; cf. Sankara ad AitUp. 1, 1: *ātmā āpnoter atter atater vā*, and Ānandagiri who in his vyākhyā quotes the stanza: *yac cāpnoti yad ādatte yac cātti viṣayān iha/yac cāsya saṃtato bhāvas/asmād ātmeti gīyate //*.

326. *prakārabhūtam ity ākāraḥ śarīram*; not a facile play on words: R. tries to bring out the etymological significance of both words: "something built on a basis" pointing at the utter dependence of "mode" or "form" on an inner ensouling principle.

327. KathUp. 4, 15 "the word that all the Vedas cite".

328. CityUp. 11, 1 "in whom all the Vedas become one".

329. CityUp. 14, 1 "the one God residing in many places".

330. CityUp. 11, 4 "the divinities do not know Him with whom they exist".

331. Cf. R.'s interpretation of VP. 1, 2, 46-47, supra note 248.

manas<sup>332</sup> of gods, men etc. have no knowledge of Him who having entered into themselves as their inner soul by being their immanent Ruler, remains with them." So, likewise, the pronouncements of the purāṇas: *natāḥ sma sarvavacasam pratiṣṭhā yatra śāsvatī*;<sup>333</sup> for the basis of a word is in the object denoted. *kāryāṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ pūrvaṃ vacasam vacyam uttamaṃ*<sup>334</sup> *vedaīś ca sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ* etc.<sup>335</sup> "all these terms denote only the immanent Ruler modified by body and soul:" for compare the śruti Well, by entering the three deities by way of their living soul I will separate name and form.<sup>336</sup> Similarly Manu's word: *praśāsītāraṃ sarveṣūṇ aṇīyāṃsam aṇīyasam/ruknābhaṃ svapnadhīgamyam vidyāt taṃ puruṣaṃ param*,<sup>337</sup> i.e. "the *praśāsīt* or "controller"<sup>338</sup> of all, having entered into them, sc. as their inner Ruler, is subtler than the individual souls (*aṇīyāṃsaḥ* "Souls" who are subtler because they pervade<sup>339</sup> all non-spiritual entities), sc. because He pervades<sup>340</sup> them in their turn; *ruknābha-* "having the appearance of the sun"; *svapnadhīgamyā*-<sup>341</sup> "to be arrived at by cognition similar to a dream",

332. "The eleventh sense", the co-ordinating organ of sensual impressions.

333. VP. 1, 4, 23 ab; the stanza continues *taṃ ādyantam aśeṣasya jagataḥ paramaṃ prabham* // "we bow for the paramount Lord, the beginning and the end of the entire Universe, in whom is the perennial basis of all words."

334. JitStotra 1, 7a "the prime cause of the effects, the supreme object denoted by the words"; the second half runs: *yogānāṃ paramāṃ siddhiṃ paramaṃ te padaṃ viduḥ*; according to Dr V. Raghavan from Madras, in a personal communication, the Jitantastotra—a very popular hymn among South-Indian Vaiṣṇavas—is assigned in MSS to the Aṣṭākṣarikalpa of Pañcarātrāgama.

335. BhG. 15, 4.

336. ChUp. 6, 3, 2.

337. Manusmṛti 12, 122; Vulgate reads *aṇor api*.

338. *niyaṇtr-*, signifying God's direction of the soul as its immanent ātman; note that Kullūka gives the same interpretation: *praśāsītāraṃ niyaṇtāraṃ brahmādistambaparyantasya cetanācetanasya*.

339. *vyāpakatayā*; because the soul cannot rightly be said to be 'invariably concomitant' with the body in the Nyāya sense, it follows that the word *vyāpaka-* is used in a more literal sense cf. GBh. 2, 17 *vyāpakatvena niratiśayasūkṣmatvād ātmano vināśanarhasya tadvyatirikto na kaścit padārtho vināśaṃ kartum arhati, tadvyāpyatayā tasmāt sthūlatvāt* etc.

340. God as Viṣṇu the Pervader.

341. Cf. Kullūka: *svapnadhīgamyam dṛṣṭānto 'yam, svapnadhisadṛśajñānagrāhyam/ yathā svapnadhiś cakṣurādibāhyendriyoparame manomātreṇa janyata evam ātmadhīr api*—R., however, evidently takes as the *tertium comparationis* the extraordinary vividness of the images of our dreams. The *anudhyāna-* "contemplation" is an apex state of consciousness in which there is complete immediate presentation of the beloved God, cultivated and at last attained by the uninterrupted remembrance of His perfections. It is synonymous with the *dhṛuvānusmṛti-* ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 9-10, described *seyaṃ smṛtir darśanarūpā pratipādītā/ darśanarūpatā ca pratyakṣāpatīḥ/ ..... ataḥ sākṣātkārarūpā smṛtiḥ smāryamānātyarthapriyatvena svayam atyarthapriyā/ ..... evaṃrūpā dhṛuvānu-smṛtir eva bhaktiśābdenābhidhīyate*.

i.e. apprehensible only by contemplation in a state of extremely lucid perception. *enam eke vadanty agniṃ maruto 'nye prajāpatim/indram eke pare prāṇam अपरे ब्रह्मा शश्वतः*:<sup>342</sup> *eke* sc. "some Vedas": i.e. inasmuch as the Supreme Brahman has, as described above, entered into everything as the *praśāsitr* or immanent Ruler, the terms *agni* etc. denote Him as adequately as the term "eternal Brahman". Similarly another *smṛti*: *ye yajanti pitṛiṃ devān brāhmaṇān sahitāśanān/sarvabhūtāntarātmānaṃ Viṣṇuṃ eva yajanti te*:<sup>343</sup> i.e. the terms *pitṛ*, *god*, *brahman*, *fire* denote, by denoting themselves, simultaneously Viṣṇu Himself as their immanent soul.

§ 78. This is the central meaning of all *sāstras*: the individual souls are as *such* essentially uncontracted,<sup>344</sup> unlimited and perfect knowledge.<sup>345</sup> But they are enveloped<sup>346</sup> by ignorance in the form of *karman*. So they are subject to contraction of knowledge proportionate to their *karman*, and they enter into bodies of various kinds and classes, from *Brahmā* to tuft of grass. Their range of knowledge is now confined to that which their various bodies encompass. So these souls are led to identify themselves with their various bodies and to perform acts that follow from this identification. Consequently they enter the continuous surge of *samsāra*, in this form that they experience<sup>347</sup> the pleasure and pain correlated with these acts. As it is impossible for them to release themselves from this *samsāra* without resorting to the Venerable Lord,<sup>348</sup> therefore, to serve this purpose, the *sāstras* start

342. Manusmṛti 12, 123; the Vulgate reads in a *etam*, in b *manum anye*; "some (Vedas) call him Agni, some the Maruts, others Prajāpati, yet others Indra or Life, others again call him the eternal Brahman".

343. Dakṣasmṛti? "Those who worship the ancestors, the gods, the Brahmins and the fire [so R.; rather "the brahmins who keep the sacrificial fires"], worship really Viṣṇu, the immanent ātman in all creatures".

344. *asaṃkucita*- "not contracted to the limited scope of empirical ego".

345. Note, again, that knowledge is the essential property of the ātman and so may stand for the essence itself.

346. *veṣṭita*-, term taken from VP. 6, 7, 61-62 *avidyā karmasaṃjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktir iṣyate / yayā kṣetrajñasaktiḥ sā veṣṭitā nṛpa sarvagā*.

347. *upabhoga*- term esp. used for the experiencing (suffering / enjoying) of the fruits of *karman* by the *kṣetrajñā*.

348. *bhagavatprapattim antareṇa*. S. remarks that this is said *bhaktiyoganishṭhasyāpi niṣpattiyartham tadanāgatvena prapattir apeksitatvāt prapattiniṣṭhasya svatantratrayo-pāyavāc* ca "because the one who devotes himself to *bhaktiyoga* stands also in need of *prapatti* as a *propaedeusis* to perfect his *bhakti*, and also because *prapatti* by itself, independent (of *bhakti*) is a means for the one who is devoted to *prapatti*". Elsewhere (*Rāmānuja on the Bhagavadgītā*, p. 24 ff). I have tried to show that R. does not consider *prapatti* a separate—let alone superior—'discipline' from *bhakti*, but rather a *propaedeusis* to *bhakti*, or even identical with it; S. inclines—though here at least not too overtly—to the later view that *prapatti* alone (*svatantratrayā*) is a means of release. Considering, however, the evidence of the Ved. I see no reason to change my opinion about the position of *prapatti* in Rāmānuja's doctrine.

with setting forth the equality of all those souls: they are equal because, when they are free from the differentiations god, man etc., they all have the self-same form of knowledge. Then the śāstras declare that that proper form of the soul is itself ensouled by the Venerable Lord, because it is the soul's sole proper form and essence<sup>349</sup> to be accessory to its principal. This stated, they propound subsequently the proper form of the Lord: He is categorically different from everything else as He is in absolute opposition to imperfection and solely comprises perfection; He is the abode of innumerable numbers of beautiful qualities, boundless and absolute; He is the soul immanent in everything, because each and every spiritual and non-spiritual entity is brought into existence by His will. Then the śāstras conclude by expounding that worshipping Him, as well as obtaining the necessities for this worship, is the means of attaining Him.

§ 79. So is said in *nirvāṇamaya evāyam ātmā jñānamayo 'malaḥ/duḥ-khājñānamalā dharmāḥ prakṛtes te na cātmanah*:<sup>350</sup> i.e. inasmuch as they derive from karman resulting from the natural conjunction of soul with matter, the properties summed up do not belong to the proper form of the soul. What is said is this: by distinguishing between that which has got and that which has not,<sup>351</sup> we learn that these properties belong to matter exclusively. Likewise in *vidyāvīṇayasampanne brāhmaṇe gavi hastini/śuni caiva śvāpake ca paṇḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ*,<sup>351a</sup> i.e. *paṇḍitāḥ* are they whose intellects<sup>352</sup> discriminate the proper form of the soul from the prakṛti in the form of god, man, animal, inanimate things with which it is conjoined; they are *samadarśinaḥ*, i.e. by knowing the real nature of the soul, viz. that it is separate from the differentiated forms of that prakṛti, they see that the soul that exists in any of these infinitely diversified configurations has the same form as all other souls.<sup>353</sup> So the pronouncement *ihaiva tair jitaḥ sargo*

349. "ekarasa"; *rasa-* is here taken in the double meaning of "essence" and "ecstasy", corresponding to "ekasvarūpa-/svabhāva" (e.g. GBh. 18, 54) and "ekarati" (GBh. Intr. *aśeṣaśeṣataikarati-*): serving God as His *seṣa* by the loving representation of bhakti is as such a source of extreme joy, as R. repeatedly declares.

350. VP. 6, 7, 22 "this ātman is full of beatitude and knowledge and it is pure; the properties of unhappiness, ignorance and impurity are proper to the prakṛti, not to the ātman"; on *nirvāṇamaya-* cf. R. GBh. 2, 72 *ad brahmanirvāṇam: nirvāṇamayaṇi brahma = sukhaitatānam ātmānam*.—Gītā Press ed. has the less apt reading "ajñānamayā dharmāḥ".

351. *prāptāprāptavivekena*, S. *anvayavyatirekābhyām ity arthaḥ*: discriminating by means of positive and negative arrangement of terms; cf. Foucher, TS. p. 132-34.

351a. BhG. 5. 18 "wise men see the same in a Brahmin accomplished in knowledge and self-discipline, in a cow, an elephant, a dog and a dog-eater".

352. *buddhi-*; cf. R. GBh. 5, 18 *paṇḍitāḥ = ātmayāthātmyavidō* "knowing the essentials of the ātman".

353. Cf. GBh. 5, 18 *jñānaikākāratayā sarvatra samadarśinaḥ/visamākāras tu prakṛter nātmanah/ātmā tu sarvatra jñānaikākāratayā sama iti paśyantīty arthaḥ*.

*yeṣāṃ sām्यe sthitaṃ manaḥ/nirdoṣaṃ hi samaṃ brahma tasmād brahmaṇi te sthitāḥ*,<sup>354</sup> where *nirdoṣa-* means "free from the defect of natural conjunction with differentiated forms of prakṛti, such as gods etc.": thus any member of the order of souls is, when abiding in its proper form, equal to any other member, because it has the common form of knowledge as *nirvāṇa*.<sup>355</sup>

§ 80. Śruti, smṛti, itihāsa and purāṇa propound by using terms like *His body*,<sup>356</sup> *His embodiment*<sup>357</sup> etc. and by *sāmānādhikaraṇya* that this soul described above is essentially accessory<sup>358</sup> to the Lord, controlled by Him and dependent on Him. This we have already set forth above.

§ 81. In the smṛti *daivī hy eṣā guṇamayī mama māyā duratyayā/māṃ eva ye prapadyante māyām etāṃ taranti te*<sup>359</sup> it is declared that that release of the above soul from the saṃsāra in the form of its natural conjunction with prakṛti, which is due to karman and consists in various guṇas, is impossible without resorting to the Lord. The same is established on the strength of śrutis like *no other path is there for him to tread*.<sup>360</sup> In the smṛti: *In an unevolved form do I pervade this entire Universe*:<sup>361</sup> all creatures depend on Me but I do not depend on them. At the same time they do not rest on Me: behold my miraculous power!<sup>362</sup> the Lord explains the diversity of the forms of His sovereignty by His omnipotence. Likewise He says: *viṣṭabhyāham idaṃ kṛtsnam ekāṃśena sthito jagat*,<sup>363</sup> i.e. "having entered into the world—which is of an infinitely varied, miraculous character—as its

354. BhG. 5, 19 "Those who have already here on earth overcome the conjunction have their minds focused on equality; for, if free from defect, the ātmans are equal:" *sarga-* in this (Ved.) connexion is doubtless to be taken as *saṃsarga-* (GBh. *sarga-* = *saṃsāra-*); note that R. here interprets *brahma* as *ātmavastu-* "the order of ātman" (neuter *\*vastu-* corresponding with the neuter of *brahma*) as in GBh. 5, 19; on the equation *brahmaṇ = ātman* (i.e. individual ātman), cf. my *Rāmānuja* etc., p. 34-35.

355. *nirvāṇa-* in the above sense "beatitude" (VP. 6, 7, 22).

356. *śarira-*, e.g. *Antaryāmibrahmaṇa*, BĀH. p. 3, 7, 3-22.

357. *tanu-*, e.g. *KaṭhUp.* 2, 23.

358. *śeṣa-*.

359. BhG. 7, 14 "for that divine Magic of Mine, constituted by guṇas, is hard to overcome: those alone who resort to Me overcome that Magic": on R.'s interpretation of this stanza see my *Rāmānuja* etc. p. 25 f.

360. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1 *taṃ evaṃ vidvān amṛta iha bhavati / nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate*; note that acc. to R. the word for knowing (*vedana-*), sc. in *vidvān*, is synonymous with *upāsana-* or *bhakti-*.

361. BhG. 9, 4; R. GBh. explains *avyaktamūrtinā* as *aprakāśitasvarūpeṇa mayāntaryāmiṇā*.

362. BhG. 9, 5ab.

363. BhG. 10, 42 "supporting this universe I constitute the world with a single portion of myself".

immanent soul with an infinitesimal particle<sup>364</sup> of Myself, I keep supporting it entirely by My will and I remain, while in this form possessing an infinite supernal manifestation, the abode of boundless perfect qualities as I am supremely miraculous." The same He says in: *ekatve sati nānātvaṃ nānātve sati caikatā/acintyaṃ brahmaṇo rūpaṃ kas tad veditum arhati*,<sup>365</sup> i.e. "while remaining one by being its sole controller, He enters the Universe as the soul immanent in the various spiritual and non-spiritual entities; having a variety of modifications in the forms of these entities and instigating a variety of activities He partakes of variety Himself." Having thus, with an infinitesimal particle of Himself, entered into the Universe with all its wonders and variety as its immanent soul and *viṣṭabhya*,<sup>366</sup> i.e. though abiding in variety, the Sovereign Lord of lords, the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Person, Nārāyaṇa, whose hosts of perfections are boundless, unsurpassed and innumerable — who is the perfectly miraculous One — who appears like a blue cloud — who has long eyes so spotless as a lotus leaf — who is radiant with the splendour of thousands of suns —, the One in the Supreme Heaven revealed by śrutis such as *yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyāṃ parame vyoman*<sup>367</sup> *tad aksare parame vyoman*<sup>368</sup> etc., remains nonetheless essentially one.

§ 82. For any other entity but Brahman it is impossible to have another form, nature and power added to its own form, nature and power.<sup>369</sup> But this Supreme Brahman, being categorically different from all entities, has all natures and all powers. Therefore it is not contradictory that this one being has an infinite and wonderful variety of forms and still retains His uniformity in this infinite and immeasurable diversity. So the fear lest there be contradiction in so far as He would be similar to a mere common entity is not justified. As has been said: *śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānām acintyajñānagocarāḥ/yato 'to brahmaṇas tās tu sargādya bhāvaśaktayaḥ // bhavanti tapasām śreṣṭha pāvakasya yathoṣṇatā*:<sup>370</sup> in other words: it is not fit to think that a certain power observed in one single being exclusively

364. *ayutāṃśena* "myriadth portion" has become in GBh. ad 10, 42 even *ayutāyutāṃśena*.

365. ? "in unity there is diversity and unity is in diversity: who is able to know Brahman's inconceivable form?"

366. From BhG. 10, 42 cited above, forming part of the context of śrutis and smṛtis expounding the Universe's utter dependence on God.

367. TaittUp. 2, 1, 1 "who knows that which is laid down in the innermost of the Supreme Heaven".

368. MahānārUp. 1, 2 "that is in the indestructible Supreme Heaven".

369. S. comments: *nahi dāhaśakto 'gnir jādyajananāśaktaḥ*.

370. VP. 1, 3, 2-3 "the potencies of all entities transcend all except inconceivable knowledge: for these potencies, like fieriness in fire, rise from Brahman's creation O most excellent of ascetics!"



among all other beings, such as fire, water etc., is also to be found in another being that is categorically different from the former one: for instance the power of brightness, heat etc. found in fire is not to be found in water, which is categorically different from fire. Similarly it is not fit to infer that Brahman is similar to any other being in anything: He is categorically different from any other. What is meant hereby is: hence follows that Brahman possesses an infinite variety of powers. So it says: *With Thee, Most Eminent One, whose form is this greatly miraculous world, with Thee, greatest of miracles, I am united, O Kṛṣṇa.*<sup>371</sup>

§ 83. I have arrived at the exclusion that this is the doctrine of the scriptures after a painstaking study not only of the endless number of all the various śrutis, but also of the commentaries on them which have been accepted by judicious scholars. It is like this: several śrutis declare that creation and resorption—which are not empirically known by other *pramāṇas* and which are diversified by a continual succession of a plurality of elements whose developments are unlimited—are the doing of Brahman. Some śrutis, e.g. *niravadyaṃ nirañjanam*,<sup>372</sup> *viññānam*,<sup>373</sup> *ānandaṃ*,<sup>374</sup> *nirvikāram*,<sup>375</sup> *niṣkalaṃ niṣkriyaṃ śāntam*,<sup>376</sup> *nirguṇam*<sup>377</sup> etc., assert that Brahman is unqualified and essentially knowledge. Other śrutis, e.g. *neha nāsti kiṃcana mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati*,<sup>378</sup> *yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kaṃ paśyet tat kena kaṃ vijānīyāt*,<sup>379</sup> deny that there is diversity. But other śrutis, like *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit*,<sup>380</sup> *yasya jñānamayaṃ tapaḥ*,<sup>381</sup> *sarvāni rūpāṇi vicitṛya dhīro nāmāni kṛtvābhivadan yad āste*,<sup>382</sup> *sarve nimeṣā jajñire vidyutaḥ puruṣād adhi*,<sup>383</sup> *apahatapāpmā*

371. VP. 5, 19, 7.

372. ŚvetUp. 6, 19 *niṣkalaṃ niṣkriyaṃ śāntam niravadyaṃ nirañjanam*: "without parts, without action, tranquil, irreproachable and immaculate".

373. TaittUp. 3, 5, 1 *viññānam brahma* "Brahman is knowledge".

374. TaittUp. 2, 1.

375. YogaśikhUp. *nirvikāram nirāśrayam* "without causal transformations, not deriving from any cause".

376. ŚvetUp. 6, 19 cited above note 372.

377. MantrUp. 2 *antaḥ paśyanti sattvasthā nirguṇaṃ guṇagahvare* "they who are in sattva see, deep down in the guṇas, the One without guṇas".

378. BĀUp. 4, 4, 19 "there is here no diversity whatever, he that sees diversity here will meet with death after his death".

379. BĀUp. 4, 5, 15 "but when the ātman is all of him, then whom does he know and how?"

380. MuṇḍUp. 1, 1, 9 "who is omniscient, all-knowing".

381. Not identified.

382. CityUp. 12, 7 "that which the sage, after pondering over all its forms and giving them names, keeps saluting".

383. MahānārUp. 1, 8 "all flashes of lightning spring from above the Person".

vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijaghatso 'pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṃkalpaḥ,<sup>384</sup> negate only all those qualities that are held by everyone to be evil, and they declare that Brahman has an infinite number of beautiful qualities: that He is omniscient and omnipotent, that He has separated all according to name-and-form,<sup>385</sup> and that He is the substratum of all.—Other śrūtis, like *sarvaṃ khalv idam brahma tajjalāniti*,<sup>386</sup> *aitadātmyam idam sarvaṃ*,<sup>387</sup> *ekaḥ san bahudhā vicāraḥ*,<sup>388</sup> first expound that the universe in all its diversity is created by Brahman and then declare that both Brahman and Universe are identical. Other śrūtis, e.g., *prthag ātmānaṃ preritāraṃ ca matvā*,<sup>389</sup> *bhoktā bhogyam preritāraṃ ca matvā*,<sup>390</sup> *prajāpatir akāmayate prajāḥ sṛjeyeti*,<sup>391</sup> *patiṃ viśvasyātmesvaraṃ śāśvataṃ śivam acyutaṃ*,<sup>392</sup> *tam īśvarāṇāṃ paramaṃ maheśvaraṃ tam devatāṇāṃ paramaṃ ca daivatam*,<sup>393</sup> *sarvasya vaśi sarvasyeshānaḥ*,<sup>394</sup> propound that Brahman is different from all, that all is subject to Brahman's sovereignty and is accessory to Brahman, and that the Lord is the master.—Others again like *antaḥpraviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānāṃ sarvātmā*,<sup>395</sup> *eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛtaḥ*,<sup>396</sup> *yasya prthivī śarīraṃ . . yasyāpāḥ śarīraṃ . . yasya tejaḥ śarīraṃ*, etc.; *yasyāvvyaktaṃ śarīraṃ . . . yasyākṣaraṃ śarīraṃ . . . yasya mṛtyuḥ śarīraṃ . . . yasyātmā śarīraṃ . . .*,<sup>397</sup> point out the body-

384. ChUp. 8, 7, 1 "exempt from defect, unaging, undying, without sorrow and hunger and thirst, having every will realized and all desires materialized."

385. Viz. ChUp. 6, 3, 2 *seyaṃ devataikṣata- hantāham imāś tistro devatā anena jivenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇāniti*.

386. ChUp. 3. 14. 1 "all this is verily Brahman: the tranquil one meditates (on all things) as having their beginning and end in It." R. follows Śaṅkara's interpretation of *tajjalān* as *taj-ja-la-* ChUpBh. *tasmād brahmaṇo jātāṃ tejobannadikramaṇa* (cf. 6, 2, 3) *sarvaṃ / atas tajjam / tathā tenaiva jananakramaṇa pratilomatayā tasminn eva brahmaṇi liyate tadātmatayā śliṣyata iti tallam*, in ŚBh. 1, 2, 1 (p. 137) *tajjalān iti hetutaḥ sarvaṃ khalv idam brahmeti prasiddhavan nirdeśāt / brahmaṇo jātātvaḥ (= taj-ja-) brahmaṇi līnatvād (= tal-la-) brahmādhīnaḥ jīvanatvād (= tad-ana < AN "to breathe, live") ca hetor brahmātmakaṃ sarvaṃ khalv idam jagad iti*, etc.

387. ChUp. 6, 8, 7 "all this has That for its soul".

388. CityUp. 11, 1 "though unique, manifold reflection".

389. SvetUp. 1, 6 "knowing the ātman and the actuator to be different".

390. Svet Up. 1, 12 "knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the actuator".

391. Not identified. "The lord of creatures desired: may I beget offspring".

392. MahānārUp. 9, 6 "Lord of all, ruler of the soul, the everlasting, auspicious Unfallen One".

393. SvetUp. 6, 7 "Him, paramount lord of the lords, supreme deity of all divinities".

394. BĀUp. 4, 4, 22 "ruler of all, lord of all".

395. TaittĀr. 3, 11 "the instructor of men entered within, the soul of all".

396. BĀUp. 3, 7, 3-22 ".... he is the inner Ruler, the immortal One".

397. SubālUp. 7, 1; the text runs: *antaḥśarīre nihito guhāyām aja eko nityo yasya prthivī śarīraṃ yaḥ prthivīm antare saṃcaran yaṃ prthivī na veda/yasyāpāḥ*

soul relationship that exists between Brahman and the sum-total of entities other than Brahman.

§ 84. We have to interpret all these śrutis in such a manner that there is no contradiction between their statements, however diverse, and that their primary sense is not sacrificed. And we have done so.—The śrutis expounding an untransformed Brahman have their primary sense because they deny that His proper form is subject to evolution.<sup>398</sup> Those declaring that He is unqualified are to be taken as denying that He is associated with the evil qualities mentioned in the context.<sup>399</sup> Those that deny diversity are justly preserved because they signify that Brahman is modified by all inasmuch as He is the inner soul of all:<sup>400</sup> for the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities forms a mode of Brahman by constituting his body. The passages which declare that He is different from all modes, master and lord of all, and the possessor of all perfections and the power of having all his desires materialized and his every will realized,<sup>401</sup> etc., are justly retained by accepting just that. Statements that He is mere knowledge and bliss are preserved because they set forth that the defining property of Brahman's proper form, different from all, substratum of all perfections, lord of all, master of all, basis of all, cause of the origination, subsistence and resorption of all, irreproachable and untransformed, all-ensouling — that this defining property is knowledge<sup>402</sup> in the form of bliss<sup>403</sup> in absolute opposition to imperfection,<sup>404</sup> and that therefore his proper form, being self-illuminating, is nothing but knowledge.<sup>405</sup> Similarly well-founded are the declarations of identity as they

*śarīraṃ* etc., and concludes: *yasya mṛtyuḥ śarīraṃ yo mṛtyum antare saṃcāraṇaṃ mṛtyur na veda/sa eṣa sarvabhūtāntardātmāpahatapāpmā divyo deva eko nārāyaṇaḥ*. The Vulgate does not contain the clause *yasyātmā*, etc.

398. In other words, they point to Brahman as the absolutely transcendent principle from which change may come forth but which itself is not subject to any change whatever.

399. i.e., the contexts like ChUp. 8, 7, 1 and others cited above; cf. also ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, (Th. p. 78ff.).

400. i.e., Brahman is the unitive principle underneath all diversity which clothes Him rather than involves Himself: as the inner Ruler He is strictly identical with Himself.

401. ChUp. 8, 7, 1 *satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ*.

402. Brahman is not knowledge, but is essentially characterized by it; knowledge being His essential property may, if this proviso be well understood, denote His essence.

403. Brahman's knowledge being eminently knowledge of His own perfection may be considered under the aspect of (*rūpa-* "form") perfect bliss.

404. *mala-*, for the more usual *heya-*.

405. *svaprakāśatayā jñānam api svarūpaṃ eva*: in Brahman's absolute self-comprehension the three elements of all knowledge: subject — action — object of knowing, are in perfect unity.

establish that the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* constructions have their primary meaning in a body-soul relationship.<sup>406</sup>

§ 85. Such being the case, the question arises: what is the sense to be concluded from the Veda that is herewith established? That there is no difference,<sup>407</sup> or that there is difference,<sup>408</sup> or that there is a double essence, being at once different and non-different?<sup>409</sup>

All of them are established, because each can be concluded from the Vedānta. Non-difference is established in the sense that Brahman is modified by all because all constitute his body. Both difference and non-difference are established in the sense that the sole Brahman, being modified by the variety of spiritual and non-spiritual entities, abides in variety. There is difference inasmuch as the non-spiritual order, the spiritual order and the Lord have categorically different proper forms and natures and are never confused.

§ 86. But are we not to understand that the knowledge of identity as declared in *tat tvam asi Śvetaketu*,<sup>410</sup> *tasya tāvad eva ciram*,<sup>411</sup> is the means by which Release — that is man's supreme End — is attained?

No, that is not so. Let us consider the śruti *prthag ātmānam pre-ritāraṃ ca matvā juṣṭas tatas tenāmṛtatvam eti*,<sup>412</sup> that means: "after having acquired the knowledge that the soul and its Mover, i.e., the inner Ruler, are separate from each other, one attains *tatas*, i.e., in consequence of this very knowledge that they are separate, the immortality by the favour of that Supreme Spirit. So we have rather to understand that the means by which we can attain immortality in person is the knowledge that the soul and its Controller exist separately.

406. i.e., the identity viewed in the first place as a relation between various aspects of one entity: the person denoted by "thou" is indeed the Supreme Being denoted by "that" as viewed under the aspect of the inner Ruler contained in term-and-entity "thou".

407. The opinion of the Advaitin.

408. The opinion of the later Dvaitins, esp. Mādhva and his school, to whose precursors, possibly under influence of Sāṃkhya dualism, Rāmānuja may refer.

409. The opinion of the bhedābhedavādins; for *dvyaत्मakatā*, cf. supra §30.

410. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

411. ChUp. 6, 14, 2 *tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimokṣya atha sampatsya iti* "it will take him some time before he will have freed himself: then he shall succeed". Ś, ChUpBh. comments: *ato brahmavidō jivanādiprayōjanābhāve'pi pravṛttaphalānām karmaṇām avaśyam eva phalopabhogāḥ syād iti mukteṣuvat tasya tāvad eva ciram iti yuktam evoktam iti*.

412. Śvet Up. 1, 12 "knowing the ātman and the actuator to be different one attains consequently by His favour the immortality".

§ 87. — But as this view is incompatible with the assertion that both are identical, we are compelled to assume that this knowledge works only the attainment of the qualified, not absolutely real Brahman.

Why then could not the opposite be true,<sup>413</sup> on the authority of our śruti that only by means of the knowledge that both are separate we can attain immortality in person?

In other words: when two equally valid views are seemingly contradictory, we have to discover for both a common connotation in which they do not contradict each other.

— But how can they possibly be reconciled?

The word *tvam* refers to Brahman as modified by the embodied soul, for this embodied soul is a mode of the Supreme Brahman—who is the inner Ruler—because it constitutes the body of Him as inner Ruler. The meaning of your śruti is that *this* is the knowledge to be acquired. Whereas the meaning of our śruti is this: it must be realized that the Supreme Spirit—who is the soul of the embodied soul, exists separately from that embodied soul because He is free from all defects and possesses immeasurable, unsurpassed and innumerable beautiful qualities, such as that of having his every will realized, etc. The śruti *bhoktā bhogyam preritāraṃ ca matvā* means that we are to know the Supreme Brahman's three modes of being:

1. The natural properties of the order of *bhogyā*, or object: that it is non-spiritual, absolutely real<sup>414</sup> and always the substratum of transformations;
2. the natural properties of the *bhoktṛ*, or subject, i.e., the embodied soul: that, in spite of its being in essence unimpaired,<sup>415</sup> uncircumscribable knowledge and bliss, it is susceptible to various degrees of contraction and expansion due to ignorance in the form of ageless *karman*; that it is naturally

413. Here R. turns the tables on the *advaitin* by assuming the same intransigence of interpretation: but where the *advaitin* on the strength of a few citations (moreover, according to R., misquoted and misrepresented) rejects all other śrutis, R. proceeds to reconcile the differences which the *advaitin*, just by taking his obstinate stand, had exaggerated and, it is true, grossly overrated.

414. *paramārtha*—: this in fundamental opposition to the *advaitin* who does not admit the ultimate reality of inanimate matter.—*bhogyā*— "object of the soul's phenomenal activities" describes the inanimate matter as having no function apart from, and being completely subservient to, the order of souls.

415. For the soul as such is not subject to transformations, only his property knowledge is.

conjoined with the non-spiritual order which is its object; and that it is capable of release through worship of the Supreme Spirit; etc.

3. The mode of being of the inner Ruler of the above subject and object, and, in essence, the abode of immeasurable virtues.

§ 88. As has been explained by the competent early *ācāryas*<sup>416</sup> in their commentaries, the object of worshipful meditation in the so-called *sadvidyā tat tvam asi* is Brahman as qualified by qualities. The Author of the *Vākya* declares: *yuktaṃ tadguṇakopāśanād*,<sup>417</sup> and *Dramiḍācārya* when treating of the distinctions between the *vidyās*<sup>418</sup> comments as follows: *yady api saccitto na nirbhugnadaivatam guṇagaṇam manasānudhavet tathāpy antarguṇām eva devatām bhajata iti tatrāpi saguṇaiva devatā prāpyate*, that means: "although a person who is *saccitta*, i.e. wholly concentrated on the *sadvidyā*, does not memorize immediately — as he would when concentrating on the *daharavidyā* — the multitude of qualities like freedom from sin which are distinct from pure godhead<sup>419</sup> yet the Deity is also worshipped for anyone of His qualities that are exclusively His as the Supreme Deity — e.g. that of being the universal cause<sup>420</sup> —, because all beautiful qualities are inherent in His proper form, so that in the *sadvidyā* too He is actually worshipped as being distinguished by all the beautiful qualities inherent in His proper form: therefore in the *sadvidyā*, too, the end to be attained is the qualified Brahman: thus are *sadvidyā* and *daharavidyā* distinguished."

§ 89. — However, it has been declared that the Supreme Spirit is the inner Ruler of all creatures and that all are subject to His ruling. If this is true, then there is strictly speaking no one who can be a qualified subject

416. The *pūrvācāryas* who are actually quoted by Rāmānuja in *Ved.* and *ŚBh.* are the authors of the *Dramiḍabhāṣya*, of the *Vṛtti* and of the *Vākya*; I refer to *Intr. II* and *Appendix*.

417. "This is appropriate, on account of the worship of Him as being possessed of these *guṇas*", also quoted *ŚBh.* 1, 1, 1, p. 79; the quotation probably refers to the *daharavidyā* where *ChUp.* 8, 7, 1 a number of properties qualifying the Supreme Soul are enumerated.

418. Selected portions of the principal *Upaniṣads*, constituting a special knowledge and meditation of one of the aspects of the Supreme Being. For a complete list see that appended to A. Govindācārya's *Śrī Bhagavad-Gītā* with Rāmānuja's commentary in English (Madras 1898). The *daharavidyā* has its name from *ChUp.* 8, 1, 1 *atha yad idam asmin brahmapure daharam puṇḍarikam veśma daharo 'sminn antarākāśaḥ / tasmin yad antastad anveṣṭavyam tad vāva vijijñāsitavyam*; the *sadvidyā* from *ChUp.* 6, 2, 1 *sad eva sonyedam agra āśid*, etc.

419. R. explains *nirbhugnadaivatam* (attributive to *guṇagaṇam*) "that by which godhead is altered" (*nirbhugna* - "bent awry") by *guṇagaṇam daivatād vibhaktam*; for my translation, see *Appendix § 2, Fragment XV*.

420. Since according to *ChUp.* 6, 2, 3 the creation proceeds from *sat*,

of the instructions of injunctions and prohibitions.<sup>421</sup> For only someone who is able, by his own mental disposition, to be active or to be inactive can be really a qualified subject of injunctions and prohibitions of the kind: 'you are to do this', 'you are not to do that'. But there is no one like him. The directing Supreme Spirit is the one who ultimately causes everyone to be active in every activity: that is His ascendancy over each and everyone, so is declared. And this is also attested in the śruti: "*Him He incites to righteous action whom He wishes to guide upward beyond the world, and him He incites to unrighteous action whom He wishes to bring down,*"<sup>422</sup> Now, would this not mean that there is cruelty in God because He incites to good and evil actions arbitrarily?

§ 90. — The reply to this is as follows. The Supreme Spirit has bestowed equally upon all spiritual beings all that is required for activity or inactivity, for instance the capacity of spirituality, the capacity of activity, etc. So as to enable them to accomplish this, He has become their substratum and has entered into them as the principal to whom they are accessory, directing them by consenting. The spiritual being, whose capacities are so dependent on Him, performs of his own accord certain acts or refrains of his own accord from certain acts. But while observing the soul in its doings the Supreme Spirit Himself takes no sides. Therefore all is sound. Besides, it depends on every individual case whether He will cause good acts or evil acts to be performed: it is not an invariable rule that He will always cause one or the other in every case. When someone of his own accord has been active before in an extremely good action, then the Venerable Lord is pleased with him and by granting him a mental disposition for good actions helps him to be so active. When, however, someone has indulged in extremely inauspicious actions, then the Venerable Lord incites him to wicked activities by giving him a wicked disposition. So the Venerable Lord Himself has declared: "*When people are always well-disposed and worship Me, I am pleased and I bestow on them a disposition by which they may attain Me. To show them My mercy I dispel — immanent in their souls — the darkness of their ignorance with the radiant torch of knowledge.*"<sup>423</sup> *But the hostile, wicked, unholy criminals I cast away forever in demoniac forms of existence in their saṃsāras.*"<sup>424</sup>

421. In other words, the person who acts or acts not is no longer a free agent: the responsibility for his actions is transferred to the directing inner Ruler.

422. KauśUp. 3, 8 *esa eva* (Vulgate: *esa hy evainam*) *sādhu karma kārayati tam yam bhyo lokebhya unniniṣati, esa eva* (: *esa u evainam*) *aśādhu karma kārayati tam yam adho niniṣati.*

423. BhG. 10, 10-11.

424. BhG. 11, 19.

§ 91. When a person has caused the mass of evil karman, amassed during all his previous existences, to melt away by amassing unequalled good karman;—when he has become wholly dedicated to God as a result of his taking refuge at His lotus-like feet—when he has acquired the moral qualities *śama*, *dama*, *tapas*, *śauca*, *kṣamā*, *arjava*, *bhaya*-*yābhaya**sthānaviveka*, *dayā*, *ahiṃsā*, etc.,<sup>425</sup> and nourishes them by exercising them daily and applying to them his preceding knowledge of the true nature of the ontological orders gathered from the *śāstras* and corroborated by the teachings of the true *ācāryas*,—when he devotes himself to the accomplishment of periodical and occasional acts corresponding to his station and stage of life, as the forms<sup>426</sup> in which he is to worship the Supreme Person and avoids what is forbidden;—when he throws himself altogether<sup>427</sup> at the lotus-like feet of the Supreme Person;—when the darkness concealing his innermost self is dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Person who, supremely compassionate as He is, is pleased with the uninterrupted acts of worship that are dictated by the devotee's *bhakti* in glorification,<sup>428</sup> remembrance,<sup>429</sup> homage,<sup>430</sup> salutation,<sup>431</sup> mortification,<sup>432</sup> exaltation,<sup>433</sup> the listening to the description of His perfections and narrating them himself, meditation,<sup>434</sup>

425. The so-called *ātmaguṇas* enumerated BhG. 10, 4-5: *buddhir jñānam asaṃ-mohaḥ kṣamā satyaṃ damaḥ śamaḥ / sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhāvo 'bhāvo bhayaṃ cābhayaṃ eva ca // ahiṃsā samatā tuṣṭiḥ tapo dānam yaśo 'yaśaḥ . . . .*; and BhG. 18, 42 *śamo damas tapaḥ śaucaṃ kṣāntir ārjavam eva ca / jñānam vijñānam āstikyam brahma-karmasvabhāvaḥ*. R. explains GBh. ad 10, 4-5: *śamo 'ntaḥkaraṇasya tathā* (i.e. *anartha-viṣayebhyo*) *niyamanam*; *damo bāhyakaraṇānām anartha-viṣayebhyo niyamanam*; ad 18, 42 *tapo bhoganiyamanarūpaḥ śāstrasiddhakāyākṣaḥ*; *śaucaṃ śāstriyakarmayogyatā*; *kṣāntiḥ (= kṣamā) paraiḥ pīḍyamānasyāpi avikṛtacittatā*; *ārjavam pareṣu manorūpaṃ bāhya-ceṣṭāprakāśanam*; *bhaya-yābhaya**sthānaviveka*—“well distinguishing when fear and when fearlessness is indicated”, S. explains: *bhagavadupacārābhīrutvaṃ bhaya**sthānavivekaḥ* “anxious care in the service of God”, and *tadrakṣakatvādhya**vasāyādindā nirbhaya**tvam abhaya**sthānavivekaḥ* “fearlessness in resolving to protect Him etc. (i.e. His image etc.)”; *dayā* “compassion” S. *paraduḥkṣāhāṣiṣṇutvaṃ*; *ahiṃsā* “inoffensiveness” R. GBh. 10, 5 *ahiṃsā paraduḥkṣāhetutvaṃ*.

426. *veśa*—“disguise”.

427. i.e. “with all that is his” *\*nyastātmātmiya**śya*.

428. *stuti*—; S. *guṇakathanam bandikṛtyam vā*.

429. *smṛti*—“pondering over God's perfections and representing them incessantly to oneself”.

430. *namaskṛti*—.

431. *vandana*—.

432. *yatana*—“self-sacrifice”, which S., in harmony with the temple atmosphere evoked by *namaskṛti* and *vandana*, explains as *bhagavadudyānādikaraṇam*.

433. *kīrtana*—S. *bhagavannāmoṣṭāraṇam*, probably alluding to Viṣṇu's thousand names (MBh. 13, 433) a litany very popular among Vaiṣṇavas.

434. *anudhyāna*—cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 11-12.



adoration and prostration, etc.; — then will he be able to attain the Supreme Person by virtue of his bhakti, which takes on the form of contemplation in the highest degree of lucid perception,<sup>435</sup> directed to none but Him, uninterrupted, pre-eminent and held precious dear. This has been declared by that most eminent Guru, the venerable Yāmunācārya himself: *ubhayaparikarmitasvāntasyaikāntikātyantikabhaktiyogalabhyaḥ*,<sup>436</sup> that means: "... by someone whose inner faculty has been prepared by karmayoga and jñāna-yoga." Similarly the śruti: "He that has a clear insight in vidyā and avidyā will first conquer death by avidyā and then gain immortality by vidyā,"<sup>437</sup> where *avidyā*<sup>438</sup> stands for the above-mentioned moral conduct according to one's station and stage of life etc., and *vidyā* for the meditation in the form of bhakti. Likewise: "He that resorts to knowledge performs thereby a great deal of sacrifices; when he makes the brahmanvidyā his foundation, he will conquer death by avidyā."<sup>439</sup> In the passage: "He that knows this becomes immortal here and now: no other path is there for him to tread,"<sup>440</sup> those who know Him become immortal,<sup>441</sup> he that knows Brahman attains the Most-High,<sup>442</sup> He who knows the Most-High, who knows Brahman becomes Brahman himself,<sup>442a</sup> the verb to know is equivalent to "to meditate", for it has the sense of *DHYAI*-, "to meditate",<sup>443</sup> in the passage *nididhyāsita-vyaḥ*, etc.<sup>444</sup>

What this "meditation" is is specified by another śruti: "This soul can not be grasped by explication, nor by mere knowledge, nor by great erudition: he alone whom God Himself elects can attain Him: He singles his soul out to serve as His body."<sup>445</sup> That implies that He can only be grasped by

435. *viśadatamapratyakṣatāpanna*°.

436. *Ātmasiddhi* (in *Siddhitraya*), stated as the *siddhānta* in an enumeration of the various views taken of the manner in which God can be attained: "Release is only to be attained by the exclusive bhakti discipline of one whose inner faculty has been trained by both"; refer to my remarks Chapt. III.

437. *ĪśUp.* 11 *vidyāṃ cāvidyāṃ ca yas tad vedobhayaṃ saha / avidyayā mṛtyum tīrvā vidyayāmṛtam ānute*.

438. i.e., *avidyā* in the sense of *karman*, as R. often takes the term; here *karman* esp. as preparatory and ancillary to the "discipline of loving comprehension" or bhakti.

439. *VP.* 6, 6, 12.

440. *TaittĀr.* 3, 1, 13.

441. *MahānārUp.* 1, 11.

442. *TaittUp.* 2, 1, 1.

442a. ? *so yo ha vai tat paraṃ veda brahma veda brahma bhavati*.

443. Cf. *ŚBh.* 1, 1, 1, pp. 8-19; *GBh.* 18, 65.

444. *nididhyāsita-vyaḥ* in *BAUp.* 4, 5, 6 *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhāsita-vyaḥ maitreyi / ātmani khalv are dṛṣṭe śrute mate vijñāta idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam*; cf. *ŚBh.* 4, 1, 1 ad this śruti: *dhyāyatīnā vedanam abhidhīyate / dhyānam ca cintanam / cintanam ca smṛtisamātirūpaṃ na smṛtimātram / upāstir api tadekārthaḥ / ekāgracit-tavṛttinairantarye prayogadarśanāt*.

445. *MuṇḍUp.* 3, 2, 3 *nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyo na medhayaḥ na bahunā śrutena / yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyas tasyaiṣa ātmā vṛṇute tanūṃ svām*.

meditation that takes the form of bhakti, not merely by knowing, for *na medhayā* excludes mere knowledge.

§ 92. In other words, when an aspirant to release is wholly devoted to meditation in the form of knowledge of the kind enjoined by the Vedānta and when an oceanic feeling of perfect love for that meditation itself engulfs him, then by virtue of that love is he able to grasp the Supreme Person. This has been declared by the Venerable Lord: "*that Supreme Person, O Pārtha, can be grasped by exclusive bhakti.*"<sup>446</sup> *By exclusive bhakti, O Arjuna, can I be known and beheld and entered so as I really am.*"<sup>447</sup> *When a person knows Me through bhakti for what I am and who I am in reality, then he knows Me thereby (tatas) in reality and he enters Me immediately,*"<sup>448</sup> i.e., immediately thereafter he enters Me *tatas* "thereby" sc. by virtue of his bhakti.

Bhakti is a kind of knowledge that is so excellent, precious and exclusive that it robs everything else of its interest.<sup>449</sup> Now, he that has acquired this knowledge is elected by the Supreme Person, and so he can grasp Him. This is the full meaning of the śruti cited above.<sup>450</sup> It is through bhaktiyoga, furthered at first by jñānayoga, that is daily intensified in the above way and subsequently by jñānayoga, that such knowledge in the form of supreme bhakti arises.<sup>451</sup> So the venerable Parāśara says: "*A person who acts according to his station and stage of life propitiates the Supreme Person Viṣṇu: there is no other way of satisfying Him.*"<sup>452</sup> And the Supreme Person who, while remaining the Supreme Brahman, had descended to the earth in order to rescue the entire Universe,<sup>453</sup> Himself has declared: "*Listen how a man who keeps to his own task will find the highest achievement: by worshipping Me, from Whom all beings proceed and Who pervades this entire world, in his own task, man finds the supreme achievement:*"<sup>454</sup> He is attainable only by bhakti that has matured in the described manner.

§ 93. This 'path' which is shown in all the śrutis whose meaning is very lucidly explained by the ancient commentaries composed by Bodhā-

446. BhG. 8, 22.

447. BhG. 11, 54.

448. BhG. 18, 55.

449. *svetaravaitṛṇyāvāha*°.

450. MuṇḍUp. 3, 2, 3.

451. Cf. my *Rāmānuja* etc., Introduction Ch. IV.

452. VP. 3, 8, 9.

453. Cf. GBh. Intr....*svam eva rūpaṃ tatsajātiyaśaṁsthānaṃ svasvabhāvaṃ ajahad eva kurvams teṣu teṣu lokeṣu avatīryāvātīrya*, and ŚBh. 1, 3, 2.

454. BhG. 18, 45 cd. 46.

yana,<sup>455</sup> Ṭanka,<sup>456</sup> Dramiḍa,<sup>457</sup> Guhadeva, Kapardi, Bhāruci etc., and accepted by all who are competent to judge, is only to be arrived at by bhakti that has developed along the above lines. And herewith the Cārvākas,<sup>458</sup> the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas,<sup>459</sup> Naiyāyikas,<sup>460</sup> Jaiṇas,<sup>461</sup> and the followers of Kapila<sup>462</sup> and Patañjali<sup>463</sup> are condemned alike, those who are outside the pale of the Veda together with those who derive their heterodoxies from the Veda.<sup>464</sup> For doctrines derived from the Veda may present a completely reverse notion of things: Manu himself equates them with the heresies outside the Veda: "*Heresies outside the Veda and traditional heterodoxies alike are all held to be fruitless after death for they are founded on tamas.*"<sup>465</sup> This means that those whose natural guṇa is the highest sattva, untouched by rajas and tamas, have a truly Vedic interest,<sup>466</sup> and true insight in the real meaning of the Veda.

§ 94. It has been declared in the Mātsyapurāṇa that the *kalpas* or world-ages are *saṃkīrṇāḥ sāttvikāś caiva rājasās tāmasās tathā*:<sup>467</sup> after these periods of Brahmā have been described, namely that some are mixed, some mainly of sattva, some mainly of rajas and some mainly of tamas constituents, it is declared that Brahmā—who is compounded of all three constituents sattva, rajas and tamas—glorifies, in purāṇas that are uttered in any-one of the above ages, those component elements of the world which themselves are again compounded of the same set of constituents: "*Brahmā has of old glorified in a purāṇa uttered in a certain age the particular deity determined by the predominant constituent of the age.*"<sup>468</sup> And specifically:

455. Held to be the author of the Vṛtti which R. occasionally quotes (ŚBh. 1, 1, 10; 1, 2, 1; 1, 3, 7; 1, 3, 32); see Intr. II and Appendix.

456. Considered to be the author of the Vākya quoted in Ved. and ŚBh. (1, 1, 1; 1, 3, 13); also mentioned by Yāmuna who enumerates him among the false teachers; cf. Intr. II and Appendix.

457. Dramiḍabhāṣya's author; cf. Intr. II and Appendix.

458. Materialists and hedonists, followers of Carvāka.

459. aulūkyā-, after the founder Ulūka.

460. ākṣapada-, after the founder Akṣapada or Gautama.

461. kṣapaṇaka- "religious mendicant, esp. Jaina".

462. Kapila was the founder of the Sāṃkhya system.

463. Patañjali was the founder of the Yoga system.

464. Note that R. considers the Sāṃkhya to be rejected *in toto*; with this, no doubt mainly polemical, statement cf. the more conciliant view in the *utpattayasambhā-rādhikaraṇa* ŚBh. 2, 2, 43.

465. Manu 12, 95.

466. vaidiki rūciḥ.

467. Mātsya or Matsya Purāṇa 290, 13 ab.

468. Mātsya P. 290, 15.

*In tāmasa ages the glory of Agni and Śiva is sung,<sup>469</sup> in rājasa ages it is held that it is the superior glory of Brahmā,<sup>470</sup> and in the sāttvika ages is it the superior glory of Hari: in those ages the votaries accomplished in Yoga will achieve their supreme end; in mixed ages that of Sarasvatī...*<sup>471</sup>

In other words, since Brahmā is the primeval *kṣetrajña* or embodied soul, *sattva* will be predominant in some of his days, *rajas* in others and *tamas* in others again. For as the Venerable Lord has said: "*There is no being on earth or in heaven or among the gods that is free from the three prakṛti-born guṇas.*"<sup>472</sup> On the authority of the śruti: "*He who creates Brahmā in the beginning and bestows on him the Vedas.*"<sup>473</sup> we learn also that Brahmā too is a *kṣetrajña*<sup>474</sup> as he is created and subject to the *śāstras*.

So when there is contradiction between *purāṇas* which Brahmā has revealed on days when *sattva* prevailed, and *purāṇas* revealed on other days when other *guṇas* prevailed, then the *purāṇa* that was revealed on a *sāttvika* day contains the truth and another that contradicts the former contains no truth: so Brahmā himself has declared on a day when he was in *sattva* himself,<sup>475</sup> so that the *purāṇas* could decisively be discriminated. This is how the above citation is to be understood.

The Venerable Lord Himself has said what the effects of *sattva*, etc., are: "*From sattva springs knowledge, from rajas greed, and from tamas indolence, bewilderment and ignorance.*"<sup>476</sup> The cognitive faculty<sup>477</sup> is *sāttvika* when it knows activity and inactivity,<sup>478</sup> duty and non-duty, fear and safety, bondage and release. When the cognitive faculty has no exact knowledge of *dharma* and *adharma*, duty and non-duty, then it is *rājasa*. And when it, completely obscured, mistakes *adharma* for *dharma*, and has reverse knowledge of all things, then this faculty is *tāmasa*.<sup>479</sup>

469. Mātsya P. 290, 14 cd.

470. Mātsya P. 290, 14 ef.

471. Mātsya P. 290, 15 (additional śloka).

472. BhG. 18, 40.

473. SvetUp. 6, 18, *yo brahmāṇaṃ vidadhāti pūrvaṃ yo vai vedāṃśca prahiṇoti tasmai*.

474. i.e. an individual soul in, and limited by a body, be it divine.

475. It may be remarked however that Matsya P. has no such pretensions and that other *purāṇas* at times classify it as *tāmasa*; cf. Ādidevānanda's note, YID., p. 181, 29.

476. BhG. 14, 17.

477. *buddhi*-, expl. GBh. 18, 29 *vivekapūrvakanīścayārūpaṃ jñānam* "knowledge based on discrimination and taking the form of decision".

478. GBh. 18, 30 *pravṛtti: abhyudayasāadhanabhūto dharmah; nivṛtti: mokṣa-sāadhanabhūto dharmah*.

479. BhG. 18, 30-32.

All the compilers of purāṇas have compiled their purāṇas after Brahmā himself had told them all the contents. This is said in: "I will narrate the story exactly like the venerable Grandfather, who sprang from the Lotus, has revealed it when he was questioned by the eminent sage Dakṣa and others."<sup>480</sup>

§ 95. — But how can the words of the Veda contradict one another if they are not of human origin?<sup>481</sup>

— We have said before that they do not contradict one another when their true purport has been determined correctly.

For instance the śruti: "After<sup>482</sup> the nasal sound has ceased,<sup>483</sup> the vital air with the senses in the manas should be concentrated in the Supreme Spirit, and one should meditate on the Sovereign and so meditate further on all this. Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra have all been begotten;...not the cause:...the cause alone should be meditated.<sup>484</sup> Sambhu,<sup>485</sup> the Supreme Sovereign enjoying universal sovereignty, should be meditated upon as abiding in the centre of space." "Higher than Whom there is nothing; smaller or larger than Whom there is no one; like a tree He alone stands steadfast in the sky. This Person fills the entire world. Therefore that which is most supreme, that is formless and without defect. Those who know that become immortal, but the others find only misery. Having all faces, heads and necks, dwelling inside all beings, pervading all, this auspicious Venerable Lord is therefore omnipresent;<sup>486</sup> when there was darkness, and neither day, nor night, nor being nor non-being, then the auspicious One was there, alone. That is the imperishable One, that is Savitr's coveted gift, and from that has arisen the ancient knowledge;"<sup>487</sup> etc., etc.: if these śruti seem contradictory, then I remind you that the Supreme Brahman is Nārāyaṇa, as has been declared before. Then how could there be contradiction?

480. VP. 1, 2, 8.

481. *apauruṣeya*—; acc. to the view taken by the Mīmāṃsakas, both pūrva and uttara, the Veda is not a creation of man and thus open to error, but eternally conceived by the Supreme Being and in each age 'viewed' by inspired seers, cf. Intr. IV.

482. AtharvaśikhUp. 2.

483. *nādānte*, i.e. the *anunāsika* of the *praṇava OM*.

484. R. abbreviates; the passage runs: *brahmaviṣṇurudrendrās te saṃprasūyante sarvāṇi cendriyāṇi saha bhūtair; na kāraṇaṃ kāraṇānāṃ dhyātā: kāraṇaṃ tu dhīyeyah* etc.

485. *śambhu* is acc. to R. to be taken not as the well-known auspicious name of Śiva but literally as the "beneficial One", as will be shown.

486. SvetUp. 3, 9-11.

487. SvetUp. 4, 18 *yadā tamaḥ tan na divā* etc.

§ 96. But this is too little.—The Vedas with their aṅgas,<sup>488</sup> corroborated by the glosses of the foremost of Vedic scholars and by ratiocination; proclaim that Brahman is the cause of the world's birth, etc.: "From Him is its birth, etc.,"<sup>489</sup> "That, from which these creatures issue, by which they live when born, to which they return when departing, that you are to inquire into: that is Brahman,"<sup>490</sup> which tells us that Brahman is the cause of the world's birth, etc. We are told the same by the very contexts that treat of the world's creation and resorption. From: "In the beginning, my dear son, sat was alone and without second,"<sup>491</sup> we learn that Brahman, denoted by the word sat is the supreme cause because He is the material and operative cause<sup>492</sup> of the world and its immanent Ruler. This very sense is in another śākhā conveyed with the word Brahman in lieu of sat: "Brahman verily was here alone in the beginning,"<sup>493</sup> so that we know that the word sat denotes Brahman. The same sense we find again in another śākā; "the Soul verily was here alone in the beginning,"<sup>494</sup> so that we know that the words sat and Brahman denote the Soul. Similarly in another śākhā: "Nārāyaṇa was here alone, not Brahmā, not Śiva, nor heaven and earth, nor the constellations,"<sup>495</sup> which is decisive proof that Nārāyaṇa is denoted by all the words for supreme cause, like sat, Brahman, the Soul, etc.

§ 97. In the passage:<sup>496</sup> "Him, whom the sages weave in the middle of the sea, .... Him one cannot apprehend as vertical or horizontal or in between. No one is master to Him and His alone is great fame. His form is not to be beheld, and no one can see Him with his eyes: the wise conceive Him with their minds in their hearts: they who know Him so become immortal," His absolute superiority is propounded; and it is denied that there is anything superior to Him in the passage: "No one is master to Him." Immediately thereafter the quotation in: *adbhyaḥ sambhūto hiraṇyagarbha ity aṣṭau*,<sup>497</sup> connects the above passage as one coherent context with the text beginning: *adbhyaḥ sambhūtaḥ*,<sup>498</sup> where the so-called mahāpuruṣa con-

488. The auxiliary sciences śikṣā, chandas, vyākaraṇa, nirukta, jyotiṣa and kalpa.

489. BrS. 1, 1, 2 *janmādy asya yataḥ*.

490. TaittUp. 3, 1.

491. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

492. cf. supra §§ 32-33.

493. BĀUp. 1, 4, 1.

494. AitUp. 1, 1.

495. MahUp. 1.

496. TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3 *yam antaḥ samudre kavayo vayanī .... nainam ūrdhvaṃ na tīryañcam na madhye pariṇagrabhat* etc.

497. *aṣṭau*, i.e. eight ṛks RV. 10, 121, 1: *hiraṇyagarbhaḥ sam avaratātāgre bhūtasīya jātaḥ patir eka āsit*, ff.

498. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 2.

text:<sup>499</sup> "Hrī and Lakṣmī are His consorts,<sup>500</sup> elucidates that all this bears on Nārāyaṇa alone.

This sense is further enlarged upon in the Nārāyaṇa section,<sup>501</sup> from *sahasraśiṛṣaṃ devam* onwards, concluding with: "He is Brahmā, He is Śiva and Indra,<sup>502</sup> He is Akṣara, He the Supreme self-sufficient Sovereign." Here-with first all the words which in all the different śākhās denote the Supreme Entity — *akṣara, śiva, śambhu, parabrahman, parajyotis, paratattva, parāyaṇa, paramātman*, etc. — with all the qualities inherent in them, are applied to Nārāyaṇa, then it is asserted that all things collectively that are different from Him are dependent on Him, pervaded by Him, supported by Him, controlled by Him, accessory to Him and ensouled by Him; and finally it is declared that Brahmā and Śiva are likewise manifestations of Him, because they are of the same order as Indra and the like. This entire text serves only to expound who is the Supreme Entity; it enjoins nothing else.

§ 99. Other texts, e.g., "He that knows Brahman attains the Most-High",<sup>502a</sup> enjoin that the Supreme Brahman—who is absolutely superior to all, as witness our text above<sup>503</sup>—should be worshipped by *upāsana*,<sup>504</sup> etc. So the declaration *prāṇaṃ manasi saha karaṇaiḥ*,<sup>505</sup> etc. first summarizes all the transformations together—of senses, vital air, etc.—as contained in the Supreme Brahman as the universal cause, and then enjoins: *one should meditate on the Supreme Spirit as the Lord of all*,<sup>506</sup> i.e., the meditation on Nārāyaṇa<sup>507</sup> who is the Supreme Brahman.

§ 100. In "the Lord of all"<sup>508</sup> and "no one is master to Him" it is declared that He is the sovereign over all: so the text enjoins in: "*śambhu, the sovereign Lord, enjoying universal sovereignty, should be meditated*

499. Name derived from the stanza *vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam*.

500. i.e. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 2 *hrīś ca te lakṣmīś ca patnyau*.

501. TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 *sahasraśiṛṣaṃ devam viśvākṣaṃ viśvaśambhuvam / viśvam nārāyaṇaṃ devam akṣaraṃ paramaṃ prabhum / sa brahmā sa śivaḥ sendraḥ so 'kṣaraḥ paramaḥ svarāt*; cf. AtharvaśikhUp. 2.

502. *sendraḥ*, irregular sandhi for *sa indraḥ*.

502a. TaittUp. 2, 1.

503. SvetUp. 3, 9 *yasmāt paraṃ nāparam asti*, or TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3 *na tasyeśa kaścana*.

504. One is reminded of the synonymy of *vedana* (in *brahmadevid-*) and *upāsana*.

505. above AtharvaśikhUp. 2.

506. viz. in *kāraṇaṃ tu dhyeyaḥ sarvaviśvavyasaṃpannaḥ sarveśvaraḥ*, etc.

507. As connected with TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 Nārāyaṇānuvāka.

508. MahānārUp. 9, 3 = TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 *patiṃ viśvasya*, continuing *ātmeśvaraṃ śāśvataṃ śivam acyutam*.

upon in the centre of space,"<sup>509</sup> that Nārāyaṇa—who is the supreme cause and is denoted by the word *śambhu*—is to be the object of our meditation. Since the text: "*who is the object of meditation?.. The cause is the object of meditation*,"<sup>510</sup> propounds that not the effect is the right object of meditation but only the cause, therefore the Nārāyaṇa section—which declares only who is the supreme cause—asserts that Nārāyaṇa Himself is the supreme cause and that the word *śambhu* rightly denotes Him. The invention of other meanings contradictory to that given above is not justified in an assertion that enjoins that only the cause is the right object of meditation.

§ 101. The contention in "*that which is more supreme than Him*,"<sup>511</sup> that something would be known that is higher than that Person is belied by: "*higher than whom there is nothing, subtler or larger than whom there is no one*," i.e. than whom nothing whatever is higher—no thing different from that Person is in any respect higher than Him; *añīyas*—means "subtle" and *jyāyas*—"the Lord of all": for He is the Lord of all because He pervades them all<sup>512</sup>—i.e. nothing different from Him is subtler or more sovereign: this denies that anybody different from this Person is superior to Him, and that means that it is refuted that any superiority can be attributed to anyone but Him.

§ 102. So, what is the meaning of our text? In the beginning of the context under discussion it was asserted—in "*when he knows Him, he passes beyond death: no other way is there for him to tread*"<sup>513</sup>—that knowledge of the Person is the cause of immortality, and that there is no way but this very way of knowledge. Later on, in the concluding passage "*than whom nothing is higher .. this Person fills the entire world*,"<sup>514</sup> it is declared that the Person is superior to all. Finally, the assertion that knowledge is the cause of immortality and that there is no other way is wound up with the reason for it, which is given in the concluding statement: "*therefore—sc. since that Personal Entity is most supreme—that <Personal Entity> is most supreme: that is without form and without defect: they who know this become immortal, but the others find only misery*."<sup>515</sup> This must be the

509. TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1.

510. AtharvaśikUp. 1: *bhagavan kim ādau prayuktaṃ dhyānaṃ dhyāyitavyaṃ kim tad dhyānaṃ ko vā dhyātā kaś ca dhyeya iti*.

511. ŚvetUp. 3, 10.

512. This is to be seen in connexion with the Nārāyaṇānuvāka: *tat sarvaṃ vyāpya nārāyaṇaḥ sthitaḥ*, and: *patiṃ viśvasya*.

513. ŚvetUp. 6, 15 where the borrowal *nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya* shows the connection with TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1.

514. ŚvetUp. 3, 9.

515. ŚvetUp. 3, 10.



sense,<sup>516</sup> otherwise the two assertions made in the opening text would be in conflict with the last one.

The text *sāśvataṃ śivam acyutam* etc. has told us already that this Person may be denoted by the word *śiva*, viz. because He possesses the quality of purity. So our text declares immediately that this Person may be denoted by *śiva*, for: "*the great sovereign Person stirs every being into life.*" And in the manner described all the rest—"there was neither being nor non-being, only the *śiva* was there alone" etc.—can be deduced.

§ 103. Moreover, this Person—with whom no equal or superior can co-exist, as witness the above text "*no one is master to Him*"—is first declared to be—cf. in the same section "*subtler than the subtle*"<sup>518</sup>—the sovereign of the *Om* syllable, which is the matrix of the Vedas it is its beginning and end, inasmuch as He is denoted by the *A* that constitutes the radical element of *Om*.<sup>519</sup> Then, after this declaration is made, it is said that this Person is to be worshipped as dwelling in the space contained within the Little Lotus.<sup>520</sup>

The meaning is as follows: the *Om* syllable is the matrix of the entire Veda, and the *A* is the matrix of the *Om* syllable. The Veda—a transformation of the *Om* syllable—is dissolved in the *Om* which is its own matrix, and the *Om* being a transformation of the *A* is dissolved in the *A* which is its own matrix. Now, the One who is the *para* of, (i.e. the object denoted by) the *A* which is the matrix of the *Om*,<sup>521</sup> that One is the sovereign Lord. Consequently, the Nārāyaṇa who is denoted by the *A* which is the matrix of all denotative words, and who is the matrix of all the objects denoted by those words, is the sovereign Lord: this is the meaning. As the Venerable Lord has said: "*I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire Universe: there is nothing more supreme than I am.*"<sup>522</sup> *I am the A among the letters* etc.<sup>523</sup> On the authority of the śruti "*the A is Brahman*"<sup>524</sup> and "*the A is*

516. The first that by knowing Him one obtains immortality; the second that there is no other way than by knowing Him.

517. ŚvetUp. 3, 12.

518. ŚvetUp. 3, 10: This reference to His subtlety is made to facilitate the transition to the discussion of the OM syllable, which, as will be shown, is the subtlest entity to which the entire Veda can be reduced.

519. For this passage cf. MahānārUp. 10, 8 *yo vedātau prokto vedānte ca pratiṣṭhitaḥ / tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ sa maheśvaraḥ*.

520. MahānārUp. 10, 7 *dahraṃ vipāpmaṃ varam veśmabhūtaṃ yat puṇḍarikam puramadhyastham / tatrapī dahraṃ gaganam viśokam tasminn anyat tad upāsītavyam*; with which compare the *daharavidyā*, ChUp. 8, 1, 1.

521. MahānārUp. 10, 8 cited above: *tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ sa maheśvaraḥ*.

522. BhG. 7, 6cd-7ab.

523. BhG. 10, 33.

524. AitA. 2, 3, 8 (*ad finem*) *a iti brahma*.

the entire language,<sup>525</sup> it is very clear that the A is the matrix of all denotative words and that Brahman is the matrix of all things denoted by words. Therefore, the assertion that Brahman is denoted by the A proves that Nārāyaṇa, who is denoted by the A, is the sovereign Lord.

§ 104. The Nārāyaṇa section, which with *saḥasraśiṛṣaṃ devam* etc.,<sup>526</sup> means to set forth who is the sole Supreme Entity, propounds in detail that He is superior to all. This Supreme Entity, dealt with by that text exclusively, is also in all other texts which deal with other topics understood by one word or the other and is to be regarded as that same Supreme Entity: thus the decision of the Author of the Sūtras in *śāstradrṣṭyā tūpadeśo vāmadeva-vat*.<sup>527</sup> The fact that this very Supreme Entity is in some text to be understood by the words Brahmā, Śiva and the like, does not mean that the mere divinities Brahmā, Śiva etc., are 'supreme' themselves, for the section that deals exclusively with the topic declares explicitly that they form only a manifestation of Him inasmuch as they are on an equal footing with Indra and the like.<sup>528</sup> Similarly in some texts the Supreme Brahman is referred to by the words *ākāśa*,<sup>529</sup> *prāṇa*<sup>530</sup> etc., which does not mean that the element space, or the vital air etc., are imagined to be 'supreme'.

§ 105. — But here an objection may be raised. In the text: "In this town of Brahman there is a little lotus that is a dwelling-place: inside there is a tiny space: that which is inside that space, that should be sought after, that indeed should be inquired into,"<sup>531</sup> the word *space*, serves to denote the material cause of the world, and it is declared that some sort of entity that dwells in that space should be sought after. But, since we hear in the śruti that space effects names-and-forms<sup>532</sup> and we see in the Puruṣasūkta<sup>533</sup> that the *puruṣa* or Person is the agent of the effecting of names-and-forms,

525. AitĀr. 2, 3, 6 (*ad finem*) *akāro vai sarvā vāk*.

526. TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 = MahānārUp. 11, 1.

527. BrS. 1, 1, 31 "this instruction [is made possible] by a true view taken of the Scriptures, [viz.] that it is a case-like Vāmadeva's". ŚBh. 1, 1, 31 R. interprets: This instruction of Indra that he is the object of meditation is to be understood from the Scriptures which state that, as the inner Ruler, God ensouls all entities: so these entities are He, in the same way as Vāmadeva. Similarly in our text the Supreme Entity can, on this principle, be expressed by a great many terms which ultimately denote the inner Ruler within them.

528. viz. *sa brahmā sa śivaḥ sendraḥ so 'kṣaraḥ*.

529. e.g. ChUp. 1, 9, 1 *asya lokasya kā gatir ity ākāśa ity uvāca*; cf. BrS. and ŚBh. 1, 1, 23.

530. e.g. ChUp. 1, 11, 4-5 *prastotar yā devatā prastāvam anvāyattā... katamā sā devateti prāṇa iti hovāca*, cf. BrS. and ŚBh. 1, 1, 24.

531. ChUp. 8, 1, 1, the *daharavidyā*, with which compare MahānārUp. 10, 7 quoted supra note 520.

532. ChUp. 8, 14, 1 *ākāśo vai nāma nāmarūpayor nirvāhitā*.

533. RV. 10, 90, 6ff.

we understand that the One whom we are to revere as the object of the commended inquiry must be another than that Person who is synonymous with space.<sup>534</sup>—This kind of objection is only raised by people who have not studied the Veda and have not seen the śāstras. For the śruti itself disposes of this objection there and then, and so does the Author of the Vākya. The śruti reads: "What is there to be found in that tiny space within the lotus that is to be sought after and inquired into?"<sup>535</sup> and in reply to this objection the śruti first asserts in "Not less vast than the main space is that tiny space contained in the heart,"<sup>536</sup> that there are no limits to the vastness of the Supreme Person, here denoted by the word *space*, and that He supports the entire Universe because He is the cause of the entire Universe,<sup>537</sup> then, in "All desires are contained therein,"<sup>538</sup>—i.e., "in Him are the eight qualities, culminating in *satyasamkalpa*,"<sup>539</sup> contained as in a treasury—the śruti wants to make it clear with the words *apahatapāpmā* ... *satyakāmaḥ*,<sup>540</sup> that the Supreme Person as well as these eight qualities are to be inquired into separately, and so states that "that which is in Him should be sought after,"<sup>541</sup> so the śruti itself refutes the entire objection.

§ 106. In other words: the objection raised with "what is there to be found that should be sought after" is refuted by the statement that in Him there reside his nature of being creator, substratum, controller and principal of the entire world, as well as his qualities *apahatapāpmā* etc. Therefore the Author of the Vākya declares: *tasmin yad antar iti kāmavyapadeśaḥ* "the words 'that which is therein' refer to His desires;" desire means: desired objects; i.e., the qualities of being *apahatapāpmā* etc. In other words: the Supreme Brahman, denoted by the words "tiny space", who creates, sustains and dissolves the entire Universe; that which is contained within that Supreme Brahman—sc. His immeasurable transcendence and his eight qualities of being free from sin etc.,—should both be the objects of inquiry.

So the text continues: "Those who, here on earth, come to know the Spirit and the actualized desires shall find their desires fulfilled in all the worlds."<sup>542</sup>

534. This objection seems to be inspired by Śaṅkara's ChUpBh. 8, 1, 1 *antarākāśa ākāśākhyam brahma / ākāśo vai nāma iti vaksyati*, ff.

535. ChUp. 8, 1, 2.

536. ChUp. 7, 1, 3 *yāvān vā ayam ākāśas tāvān eṣo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāśaḥ*.

537. ChUp. 8, 1, 3 *sarvaṃ tad asmin samāhitam iti*.

538. ChUp. 8, 1, 5 *asmin kāmāḥ samāhitāḥ*.

539. sc. those summed up 8, 1, 5.

540. ChUp. 8, 1, 1.

541. ChUp. 8, 1, 1.

542. ChUp. 8, 1, 6 *atha ya itātmānam anuvidya vrajanty etāṃś ca satyān kāmān teṣāṃ sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmācāro bhavati*,

§ 107. We have to understand that when Viṣṇu<sup>543</sup> — who is the Supreme Entity as declared in the text (which deals with this topic exclusively), that only the cause is the right object of meditation — enters into an effect, then this entering into an effect is a voluntary descent of Him, so as to help the world, just for his sport: thereby He completes the number of entities of certain categories which are his own effects. So, as a matter of sport, the Supreme One becomes Upendra,<sup>544</sup> completing thereby the number of divinities. Likewise the Supreme Brahman has voluntarily descended into the shape of Daśaratha's son Rāma, thereby completing the number of kings of the Solar Dynasty. Similarly the Venerable Lord has voluntarily descended in the House of Vasudeva, to incarnate Himself in Kṛṣṇa in order to support the world, thereby completing the number of scions of the Lunar Dynasty.

§ 108. We have explained before that it is Nārāyaṇa whom the contexts that deal with creation and resorption declare to be the supreme cause. If in the Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad Rudra enlarges upon his own universal sovereignty,<sup>545</sup> then this is true — as witness *so'ntarād antaraṃ prāviśat* — in so far as the Supreme Spirit has entered into him: this is made clear by the śruti itself.<sup>546</sup> The author of the Sūtras declares in *śāstradrṣṭyā tūpadeśo vāmādevavat* that this is the meaning of statements of this type; like that of Prahlāda for example: "Because the Infinite One is omnipresent, I am He. All is from me, I am all, all is in me everlasting, etc."<sup>547</sup> Here the ground that justifies this type of statement is mentioned: the ground is that the Infinite One is omnipresent: the Supreme Spirit is omnipresent as the immanent soul of all spiritual and non-spiritual entities which constitute his own body. So we have said<sup>548</sup> that all words denote the Supreme Spirit Himself as embodied by all entities. Hence the word "I" denotes the Supreme Spirit as the substance modified by a mode of which He himself is the soul. The Author

543. The Supreme Being is here referred to by His name Viṣṇu (rather denoting an aspect of the total divine personality Nārāyaṇa), because this name figures in the AtharvaśikhUp.; rightly S. comments: *atha brahmaviṣṇurudrendrās te sarve samprasūyanta iti viṣṇoḥ kāryatvaśravaṇāt paratvavaikalayaśaṅkāṃ vyudasyati*. It would appear from this paragraph that to R. Viṣṇu would primarily denote the God as the God of incarnations: the etymology *viś-*, always present to his mind, would favour this view.

544. For the story of Kṛṣṇa and the cows and Kṛṣṇa's consecration by Indra with the name Upendra, cf. Harivaṃśa ch. 75 and VP. 5, 12, esp. 12-15.

545. AtharvaśirUp. 1 *devā ha vai svargaṃ lokam āyaṃs te rudraṃ aprechan ko bhavān iti / so 'bravid ahaṃ ekaḥ prathamam āsīd vartāmi ca bhaviṣyāmi ca nānyaḥ kaścin matto vyatirikta iti / so 'ntarād antaraṃ prāviśad diśo vyantaraṃ prāviśat* (S. reads *diśaś cāntaraṃ samprāviśat*).

546. "He has entered within from elsewhere": S: *śarīrād antarasya prāṇāder apy-antaraṃ jīvaṃ prāviśat*.

547. VP. 1, 19, 85.

548. Supra, § 17.

of the Vākya expresses the same in the terms of meditation on God under the aspect of the ego: "One may grasp Him as 'Oneself', for each has in Him his completion:"<sup>549</sup> i.e., it is the Supreme Spirit—either in condition of effect or of cause—who ensouls the body constituted by spiritual and non-spiritual matter in gross or subtle form respectively: this is so because everyone and everything is completed in Him. The same declares the Author of the Sūtras in: "But as the self: this they accept for so have the texts understand them."<sup>550</sup> So, again, in the Mahābhārata in the Brahma-rūdrasamvāda, where Brahmā tells Rudra: "He is the immanent soul of you and me and whoever else has a body:"<sup>551</sup> i.e., the sovereign Lord Nārāyaṇa exists as the immanent soul in Rudra, Brahmā and all embodied beings. Likewise in the same epic: "Viṣṇu is the soul of the venerable Bhava whose might is immense. Therefore the sovereign Lord suffers the bow to be drawn",<sup>552</sup> again in "those two chief gods, who are believed to have sprung from His serenity and from His wrath, work creation and destruction when He has shown them the way,"<sup>553</sup> i.e., Nārāyaṇa, existing as their immanent soul, shows Brahmā and Rudra the way so that they can work creation and resorption respectively.

§ 109. Those who profess that there is difference between the operative and the material cause are heterodox,<sup>554</sup> for they contradict the sūtras which have been composed by an orthodox follower of the Veda, for example: "from Whom the birth etc., of this proceed,"<sup>555</sup> "He is the material cause, for that is in harmony with the promise and the instance,"<sup>556</sup> and moreover they contradict all the hosts of śrutis such as for example; "In the beginning, my dear son, this was sat: it was alone and without second,"<sup>557</sup> that reflected: I be many: I will multiply,<sup>558</sup> the forest was Brahman and the tree was Brahman out of which they build heaven and earth: Brahman underlies the

549. *ātmety eva tu gṛhṇīyāt sarvasya tanniṣpatteḥ*, cf. Appendix § 2, Fr. XI.

550. BrS. 4, 1, 3 *ātmety tūpagaścchanti grāhṇanti ca*; cf. ŚBh.: The sages look upon God as the all-ensouling principle, for this is taught by a number of texts like the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa.

551. MBh. 12, 353 ff. (Calc. Ed. 13743) which reads *mamāntarātmā tava ca*.

552. MBh. 8, 1503cd-1504ab (C. reading *Viṣṇuś cātmā*); in the context Viṣṇu enters the bow.

553. MBh. 12, 343, 19 (C. 12146, reading "ādeṣita"): Brahmā is sprung from His serenity (*prasāda*), Rudra from His wrath.

554. *vedabāhya*- "outside the Veda, not accepting the authority of the Vedic texts."

555. BrS. 1, 1, 2 *janmādy asya yataḥ*.

556. BrS. 1, 4, 23 *praktiś ca pratijñādrṣṭāntānuparodhāt*; the *pratijñā* is the promissory assertion ChUp. 6, 1, 3 *uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyaḥ...yenāśrutam śrutam*, etc.; the *drṣṭānta* the instance of the clay 6, 1, 5; the sūtra refers to 6, 2 where the creation of the world out of sat is taught.

557. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

558. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

worlds supporting it,<sup>559</sup> all the flashes of lightning spring forth from over that Person;<sup>560</sup> no one is master to Him and His alone is great fame;<sup>561</sup> there is no diversity whatever here;<sup>562</sup> ruler of all, sovereign over all;<sup>563</sup> this Person is all that was and that shall be, the sovereign of immortality;<sup>564</sup> no other path is there for him to tread."<sup>565</sup>

§ 110. The epics and purāṇas tell us in the contexts treating of the subsistence and resorption of the world that this is the Supreme Entity. For instance the Mahābhārata: "Who has created this entire world, animate and inanimate? And to whom shall it return? Tell us that, Grandfather."<sup>566</sup> to which Brahmā replies: "Nārāyaṇa, who is embodied by the world, the soul of the infinite, the One everlasting, etc."<sup>567</sup> and also: "ṛṣis, pitṛs, gods, the great elements, the minerals: the entire world, animate and inanimate, springs from Nārāyaṇa."<sup>568</sup>

Likewise is set forth in the Viṣṇupurāṇa which is accepted without dissension by all instructed persons from the East, North, South and West as adequate in so far as it establishes all the laws and all the categories.<sup>569</sup> We learn from the Sūtra: "from whom the birth etc., of this proceed,"<sup>570</sup> that Brahman is the cause of the birth etc. of the world. Now the Viṣṇupurāṇa, which first raises the question: "What has caused the world to be born etc.?" and then gives the answer: "It has originated from Viṣṇu,"<sup>571</sup> serves only to expound a certain aspect of Brahman's proper form: this is the consensus of all.

This text then reads: "The prakṛti, comprising the evolved and the unevolved, of which I have told you, and the puruṣa will both dissolve in the Supreme Spirit. This Supreme Spirit, who is the substratum of all and the paramount sovereign, is sung in the Vedas and Vedāntas by the name of Viṣṇu";<sup>572</sup> i.e. all texts in all the Vedas and Upaniṣads proclaim that He alone

559. TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6.

560. MahānārUp. 1, 8 = TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3.

561. TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3.

562. BĀUp. 4, 4, 19.

563. BĀUp. 4, 4, 22.

564. RV. 10, 90, 2 puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam / utāmyatavasyeśāno.

565. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1.

566. MBh. 12, 182, 1.

567. MBh. 12, 182, 12.

568. MBh. 12, 7074 (C).

569. tattva-

570. BrS. 1, 1, 2

571. VP. 1, 1, 31.

572. VP. 6, 4, 39-40.

is the supreme cause. In the same manner as, among all śrutis, the Nārāyaṇa section serves only to set forth a certain aspect of the Supreme Brahman's proper form, so the Viṣṇupurāṇa only sets forth a certain aspect of Him. Beginning with the question: "What is the Supreme Brahman?" in: "I wish to hear from you who know the dharma how the world was and how it will be again, what is the stuff that the world is made of and whence it comes with all its animate and inanimate creatures, how and where it was when it was dissolved and whither it will return to be dissolved,"<sup>573</sup> the Viṣṇupurāṇa serves only to establish decisively a certain aspect of the Supreme Brahman's proper form. This appears from: "The world has originated from Viṣṇu and in Him it subsists. He is the One who sustains and annihilates the world, and He is the world."<sup>574</sup> He is the paramount sovereign, supreme, existing as the Supreme Spirit, without any particularizing attributes like form, colour etc. He is free from decay and destruction, from evolution, birth and growth, so that it can only be said of Him that He always is. He is in everything and everything dwells in Him: that is why the wise call Him Vāsudeva. That Brahman is supreme, eternal, unborn, undying, imperishable, essentially simple, and always perfect as no imperfection is in It. This Brahman takes on completely the form of puruṣa and that of Time as the proper form of the evolved and the unevolved."<sup>575</sup> "He transcends, O Sage, the matter constituted by all beings and the transformations natural to it and the imperfections inherent in it like its guṇas, etc. He is the universal Spirit, transcending all obscurations, and He covers all that is between heaven and earth. All beautiful qualities are inherent in his nature and He supports the sum-total of creation with a fraction of his omnipotence. The vast body He has assumed is in harmony with His pleasure and taken on by his own wish, and in that body He works the fulfilment of what is salutary to the entire Universe. Comprising the beautiful qualities of glory, force, sovereignty, transcendent knowledge, fortitude, might etc., He is chiefier than the chiefest and none of the afflictions etc. affect Him the paramount sovereign. The Lord's form encompasses all beings in their singleness and in their totality, unevolved and manifest. He is the universal Lord who espies all and knows all, omnipotent and hence called Paramount Sovereign. That by which this Supreme God, free from imperfections, pure, immaculate and simple, is known or seen or understood, that is true knowledge; all that is different from this knowledge is declared to be ignorance."<sup>576</sup>

573. VP. 1, 1, 4-5.

574. VP. 1, 1, 31.

575. VP. 1, 2, 10-14.

576. VP. 6, 5, 83-87.

§ 111. All other purāṇas which give a diverging version should be so interpreted that they are not in conflict with the above one. Their divergence should be understood by considering the way in which each of them had its origin. If they are totally incompatible, then they are to be neglected because they must have had their origin in another guṇa than sattva.<sup>577</sup>

§ 112. —However, does not this very Viṣṇupurāṇa you quoted above tell us that the members of the trimūrti<sup>578</sup> are equal? See the passage: "*The one venerable Lord Janārdana assumes the names of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva to create, sustain and destroy.*"<sup>579</sup> — No, that is not true. The clause "*the one Janārdana*" establishes the fact that the entire phenomenal world, constituted by Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, etc., is ensouled by Janārdana alone. This passage clarifies what has already been stated in "*He is the world*"<sup>580</sup> by declaring that "*as the Creator the transcendent God creates Himself, as Viṣṇu He protects Himself and what is under his protection, and as the Destroyer He destroys Himself at the end.*"<sup>581</sup> Here Brahmā as the creator, the created beings, the destroyer and the destroyed beings are all referred to simultaneously, so that, when it is subsequently asserted that Viṣṇu ensouls all and everything, this assertion shows us the peculiar distinction between creator and destroyer as manifestations of Janārdana on the one hand and created and destroyed beings on the other hand. The words Janārdana and Viṣṇu being synonymous it follows that the manifestation comprises Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva together as a class. Hence it is said that the Supreme Entity exists, by his own choice and for the sake of his own sport, within the manifestation: as is voiced immediately afterwards in: "*Earth, water, fire, wind, ether, all senses and the inner faculty constitute the world called puruṣa. As the imperishable One is the immanent soul of all beings and is embodied by all, therefore the creation etc. localized in these beings are ultimately useful to Him alone. So Viṣṇu, most excellent, beneficent and benevolent, is embodied by all in the various modes of Brahmā etc., in which He is creating and created, protecting, consuming and protected.*"<sup>582</sup>

§ 113. —A doubt may arise here: how is it possible that Brahman, who is irreproachable, untransformed and endowed with all perfections, can ensoul a phenomenal world that is partly evil, as the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* constructions would have us believe?

577. Supra, § 94.

578. "Trinity" of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, constituting the three personified aspects of one supreme and transcendent Deity.

579. VP. 1, 2, 66.

580. VP. 1, 1, 31.

581. VP. 1, 2, 67.

582. VP. 1, 2, 68-69.



—This doubt is conclusively disposed of by the text itself, which proves its contention with: "*inasmuch as the imperishable One is the immanent soul of all beings and embodied by all*"<sup>583</sup> for having asserted that Viṣṇu Himself, the paramount sovereign and the Supreme Brahman, is the entire Universe, the text demonstrates this assertion by giving its ground: "*because the imperishable One is the immanent soul of all beings and embodied by all*."<sup>584</sup> i.e., because the imperishable One is this by all embodied immanent soul of all beings; later on the text will declare that "*all this is in truth Hari's body*."

In other words: there is no contradiction in that Viṣṇu, the Supreme Brahman, is imperishable and yet ensouls the world in so far as all constitute His body: for this defines the respective natures of body and soul from each other. The descent of the sovereign Lord Viṣṇu thus described into animals, men and gods—like Brahmā etc.—dwelling among the countless subservient entities that make up the phenomenal world, this descent, which is voluntary and serves as a refuge in which the different classes may foregather, has already been mentioned above. That those beings, Brahmā etc., are all subject to karman as they belong to the three *bhāvanās*,<sup>585</sup> and that the venerable Lord Vāsudeva, who is the Supreme Brahman, descends among gods etc., by his own free will and in his own proper form to succour the entire Universe is most clearly declared in the sixth book of the Viṣṇupurāṇa in the chapter on *śubhāśraya*.<sup>586</sup> That his body in his incarnation as a god etc., is not of the stuff common bodies are made of is put forward in the Mahābhārata as well: "*the body of this Supreme Spirit has not the common structure of being built up by the various elements*,"<sup>587</sup> and in the śruti: "*Unborn though He remains, He is born variously: the wise know his origin*."<sup>588</sup> The meaning is this: for Brahmā and the like, who are subject to karman, it is

583. VP. 1, 2, 68.

584. VP. 1, 22, 38.

585. *bhāvanā*, term from VP. 6, 7, 47 ff., where it has approximately the sense of "creative potency manifesting itself in three successive ontological orders (*bhāva*-), that of Brahman, the creator, Karman, the creation, and Brahmakarman, the mediators of creation Sanandana, etc. As it is stated that Hiranyagarbha and the gods belong to creation (50-51), R. quotes the *bhāvanātraya* as proof that Brahmā and the gods are *kṣetrajñas* and as such subject to karman. For a detailed discussion of the meaning of the term *bhāvanā* both in VP. and with R., I refer to my paper *The Śubhāśrayaprakaraṇa Viṣṇupurāṇa 6, 7 and the meaning of bhāvanā*, Adyar Library Bulletin (Adyar 1955), XIX, 1-2, p. 3 ff.

586. VP. 6, 7, 47 ff.; for R.'s interpretation of this section I refer to the paper quoted in the preceding note.

587. MBh. ? *na bhūtasamghasamsthāno deho 'sya paramātmanah*.

588. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 3.

inevitable—however much it may be adverse to them—that they are born by gaining entrance in a body of a god etc., which is a particular generic structure built up by combined elements evolved out of prakṛti and which corresponds to their various karman. The sovereign Venerable Lord, however, who has his every will realized, does not suffer births in the way of the above creatures, whose births are tainted by imperfection: still He is born in many ways—as a god etc.—but by his own free will and in his own proper form which is unsurpassingly good, and in order to succour the world. And the wise, i.e., the foremost sages, know his *bahudhā yonim*, i.e., the multiple origin of this sovereign Lord who nonetheless does not suffer imperfect births.

§ 114. Of the doubt, voiced in the sūtra: “*there would be something higher, because of the mention of bridge, measure, relation and difference*”,<sup>589</sup> that there would be someone else who is superior to the Supreme Brahman—who was already declared to be the operative as well as the material cause of this entire Universe in the sūtras: “*from whom the birth etc., of this proceed*”,<sup>590</sup> and matter, for that is in harmony with the promise and the instance”<sup>591</sup>—the Author of the Sūtras himself disposes with “*no, because of resemblance*”,<sup>592</sup> it serves the idea, even as the quarter,<sup>593</sup> because of the difference in place as in the case of light etc.,<sup>594</sup> since it is possible,<sup>595</sup> it is thus, since other views are belied,<sup>596</sup> therefore his omnipresence, as follows from the mention of extent etc.”<sup>597</sup>

§ 115. Similarly<sup>598</sup> we learn from the Mānavadharmasāstra, the text: “*Dispensing the darkness He made his appearance*”,<sup>599</sup> wishing to create his various progeny; in the beginning He brought forth water and therein He discharged his seed,<sup>600</sup> and therein rose Brahmā of himself,”<sup>601</sup> that Brahmā is an em-

589. BrS. 3, 2, 30.

590. BrS. 1, 1, 2.

591. BrS. 1, 4, 23, “matter” in the sense of material cause.

592. BrS. 3, 2, 31.

593. BrS. 3, 2, 32.

594. BrS. 3, 2, 33.

595. BrS. 3, 2, 34.

596. BrS. 3, 2, 35.

597. BrS. 3, 2, 36.

598. The sūtras quoted are exegetical pronouncements on texts in the Chāndogya Up. which might suggest that there is something beyond Brahman, or that Brahman is not absolutely perfect. For the exact interpretation of the cryptic sūtras I refer to R.’s commentary in the Śrībhāṣya.

599. Manusmṛti 1, 6, d [*svayambhūr bhagavān avyakto*] *prādur āsit tamonudāh*.

600. Manusmṛti 1, 8 [*so’bhidhāya śarīrāt svāt*] *sisṛkṣur vīvidhāḥ prajāḥ / apa eva sasarjādau tāsu vīryam apāsrjat*. The Vulgate reads *bijam* (so Kullūka: *śaktirūpam*) *avāsrjat*.

601. Manusmṛti 1, 9 c *tasmiñ jajñe svayaṁ brahmā* [*sarvalokapitāmahaḥ*].

bodied soul, for he is said to have been born. The same follows from the passage: "*the waters were his first course: so He is known as Nārāyaṇa*,<sup>602</sup> and the *puruṣa* He created is reputed in the world to be *Brahmā*,<sup>603</sup> for here explicit mention is made of the names of the Supreme Person as the creator and of *Brahmā* as his creature respectively. In the same manner the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* concludes definitely that *Hiraṇyagarbha* etc. are embodied souls, viz., by the assertion that they are incapable of being *śubhāśraya* or pure object, inasmuch as they are impure—which follows from their connexion with the three *bhāvanās*.

§ 116. There is a school<sup>604</sup> that contends: we must say that the whole body of language, as appearing in the form of injunction, exegesis and formula,<sup>605</sup> is a source of knowledge *only in so far* as language denotes *things to do*.<sup>606</sup> As we cannot understand what is the power of signification of language unless by the purposeful action taken upon it,<sup>607</sup> and as this purposeful action has its origin in a purposive idea of a *thing to do*, it follows that the *Veda* can only bear upon *things to do*,<sup>608</sup> and language can be no source of knowledge about a thing that is completed.<sup>609</sup>

—To this we reply: what does this high and mighty command mean that we must understand that language is capable of denoting meanings *only* and *exclusively* bearing upon practical activities resulting from the

602. VP. 1, 4, 6 *ayanam tasya tāḥ pūrvam tena nārāyaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ*; it would seem that R. (or an early copyist) got his quotations mixed; the *Manusmṛti* text expected here reads, almost identically, *tā yad asyāyanam*, etc. (1, 11 ab).

603. *Manusmṛti* 1, 11 cd *tadvisṛṣṭaḥ so puruṣo loke brahmeti kīrtyate*.

604. The school of the *Prābhākaras* among the *Mīmāṃsakas* who maintain a number of views diverging from those of the *Bhāṭṭas*, or followers of *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*, which have become normative. This discussion of fundamental tenets of the *Prābhākaras* follows generally the same lines as the one at the end of *ŚBh.* 1, 1, 1, but is much more detailed and indispensable for a right understanding of the concise *ŚBh.* passages.

605. Resp. *vidhi*, *arthavāda* and *mantra*.

606. *kārya*; I adopt *Lacombe's* translation (*La doctrine*, etc.) "*choses à faire*" which suggests the dynamism of the peremptory injunction (grammatically expressed by the forms of the imperative, potential, etc.) and at the same time implies the exigencies of action in profane life as well.

607. The idea is that we, learning our language in childhood, do not know the meaning of sentences and words before we have seen them enacted; cf. *Jha*, *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, pp. 235 ff.; see below.

608. The *Veda* is the source of all language and contains all language.

609. i.e., does no longer require a conation, an action taken upon it, because it is *pariṇiṣpanna* "perfectly complete". As *Brahman* is by definition and of necessity a perfectly complete entity which is in no state of becoming itself by outside action taken upon it, it would follow that the *Veda* cannot give significant information about *Brahman*.

speech of an actuating agency?<sup>610</sup> It is perfectly easy to understand the denotative power of speech as bearing upon established things too! Suppose a person A sends a person B to inform Devadatta that the stick is standing in the inner room. A does not tell him by word of mouth but employs a gesture of the hand. If B wants to tell that to Devadatta, he will use spoken language to the effect: "The stick is in the inner room." Now another person C keeps him company; C knows what that original manual gesture signifies, as a dumb man would, but he had no knowledge before of significative language, nevertheless, he knows now what sense the sentence: "The stick is in the inner room," conveys, as he has witnessed how it was used. What is difficult about this?<sup>611</sup>

Similarly the father, mother etc., teach a child by degrees how to speak; first they point again and again with their finger at various persons and objects while using the words for them: "That is father, that is mother, uncle, a man, an animal, the moon, a snake." The child observes that when the same words are used afterwards a certain idea about their objects presents itself to him.<sup>612</sup> So gradually the child concludes that the application

610. The Prābhākara view that language (*śabda*) has an inherent denoting capacity, i.e., the potency of denoting objects by itself, metaphysically, and not by virtue of a human convention, is not denied by Rāmānuja; what he calls into question is the assumed necessity that this denotativeness is only restricted to imperative, etc., sentences enjoining things to be done.

611. It is interesting to remark that R. appears not to have been satisfied with this example: in ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 127 he changed it: *prakaraṇāntarenāpi śabdārthasambandhāva dhāraṇam suśakam/kenacit puruṣeṇa hastaceṣṭādīnāṃ pitā te sukham āsta iti devadattāya jñāpayeti preṣitaḥ kaścit tajjñāpane pravṛttaḥ pitā te sukham āsta iti śabdaṃ prayukte / pārśvastho 'nyo vyāpitsur mukavac ceṣṭāviśeṣajñāsa tajjñāpane pravṛttam imaṃ jñātvānugatas tajjñāpanāya prayuktam imaṃ śabdaṃ śrutvāyaṃ śabdas tadarthabuddhihetur iti niścinoti kāryārtha eva vyutpattir iti nibandho nirnibandhanaḥ*; indeed, the Prābhākara might consider the example *sādhya* *vikala*. Devadatta on obtaining this information that the stick is in the inner room might quite conceivably act upon it and retrieve the stick and by his action show the dumb person the meaning of the sentence. In other words, the sentence can be construed as an injunction, so that R. has not really made his point. The ŚBh. example "your father is keeping well" does not admit of any construction as a *kārya*.

612. *tair eva śabdais teṣu artheṣu svātmanas ca buddhyutpattim dṛṣṭvā*; the construction is succinct but precise; on the basis of our text we can restore a better ŚBh. reading: the parallel ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 127, line 9 should be read with MSS. BC *tair eva śabdais teṣu artheṣu svātmanāṃ buddhyutpattim dṛṣṭvā*, instead of *svātmanā* adopted by Abhyankar and translated by Thibaut (? "those words of themselves give rise...") and Lacombe ("ils, [sc. les enfants,] se rendent progressivement compte que tel ou tel mot fait naître de lui-même [en leur esprit] la notion de tel ou tel objet"). The correct translation there too is "(the children) observe that these words create in them an impression of those various objects": a *buddhyutpatti* of themselves, created by the words, about their objects.

of these words to those objects — preceded by the indication with the finger — is based upon a definite power of denotation that is restricted to those objects only, because the words have as yet only been associated with those and no other objects and because the child does not know of any person who fixes their conventional meanings.<sup>613</sup> When his parents teach him again and tell him that the meaning of this and that word is so and so, the child learns the meanings of all words and is then able to use the language's entire stock of vocables. In the same way he knows that all words have their proper meanings and that particular combinations of words denote certain kinds of natural associations of simple objects.<sup>614</sup> Hence follows that the insistence upon words having meaning only for *things to do* is baseless.<sup>615</sup> Consequently, from the fact that language can be understood to have the power of denoting an object that is established it follows that all the words of the Vedānta do denote Brahman, the cause of the Universe the possessor of all perfections, as defined above.

§ 117. But let us suppose that words have meaning only for *things to do*.<sup>616</sup> Even then the words of the Vedānta would fully denote everything, be it that then everything would be denoted only because it subserves the purpose of a *thing to do* by being the reward that specifies the qualified subject<sup>617</sup> of the *thing to do*—viz., meditation—: in the same way as the *arthavādas*, or exegetical Vedic texts,<sup>618</sup> denote 'heaven'<sup>619</sup>—a particular locality not associated with suffering—or the 'firm foundation'<sup>620</sup> that is the

613. *samketayitr-*

614. This section corresponds almost verbally to ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 127, line 3 ff.

615. Same expression ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 128: *nirbandho niribandhanah; nirbandha-* "insistence, obstinacy (in the teeth of contrary evidence)"

616. This is argued on the basis of the typically Prābhākara theory of *anvitābhidhāna*, according to which a statement derives its significance from the context (of the injunction), as opposed to Kumārila's theory of *abhihitānvaya* according to which "words themselves can express their separate meanings by the function of *abhidhā* or denotation". (COWELL, *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 202, note, quoted by Jha). Rāmānuja's argument runs: the Vedānta enjoins the knowing of ("knowing" of course in R.'s sense of *upāsana*) Brahman: in the context of this injunction Brahman is the fruit or reward of this *kārya* (*brahmanavid āpnoti param*) and is as such significant.

617. *adhikārin-* "possessing the qualities that authorize one to perform and benefit by ritual, etc., actions."

618. On Prābhākara's views on the function of *Arthavāda*, see JHA, pp. 296 ff. where it is stated that "the *arthavāda*, is as much Veda as the *vidhi* [purely injunctive portions] itself, as it also, like the *vidhi*, expresses the *kāryatā* or performability [i.e., the being a *thing to do*] of certain acts".

619. Cf. in the injunction *svargakāmo jyotiṣṭomena yajeta*. (ĀpŚ. S. 10, 2, 1).

620. *pratiṣṭhā*, reference is to PVBr. 23, 2, 4 *prati tiṣṭhanti ha vai ya etā rātrīr upayanti / brahmavarcaśvino 'nnādā bhavanti ya etā rātrīr upayanti*, quoted by Śabara, bhāṣya ad Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras 4, 3, 17, which reads *ha vā*, etc., and omits *rātrīr*,

reward of nocturnal *sattras*, or the relation of means and end that exists between reviling a Brahmin and a fine of one hundred gold pieces.<sup>621</sup>

So the text "*He that knows Brahman attains the Most-High*"<sup>622</sup> would teach the attainment of Brahman, viz. as the reward that specifies the qualified subject to the *thing to do* in worshipping Brahman, and would be equivalent to: "He who aspires to attain the Most-High should know Brahman:" the proper form and the properties of Brahman, which in this text are understood to be the end to be attained, would be established because they subserve the purpose of the *thing to do*; this would include all His properties—of being creator, destroyer, substratum, immanent soul etc., of the world—, so nothing would be disproved anyway.

§ 118. Such being the case, all the objects included in mantras and arthavādas that are not incompatible and are unprecedented<sup>623</sup> are established because they subserve, or are accessory to, the vidhis or injunctions. So it is declared in Dramiḍa's commentary, from "*on the strength of the śruti ṛṇam hi vai jāyate*" onwards: "*the text has the function of praising the cutting; however, no praise is possible if the object be non-existent*:"<sup>624</sup> in other words: the entire division of exegetical texts or arthavāda, which in a thousand ways describes the previously unknown qualities of *yāga* etc., as propitiations of deities, gives in a thousand ways rise to the knowledge<sup>625</sup> that the object of the act is praiseworthy, whereas no such knowledge would arise if these arthavādas did not exist. Hence follows that they inform us of the real existence of qualities, so as to give rise to the knowledge that the object of the act is praiseworthy. Hence follows again that in this very manner all the objects, known through mantras and arthavādas, are proved to exist.

§ 119. Further, those who maintain that the texts bear only on *things to do* should tell us how they define a '*thing to do*'.

—It is that which comes into existence on the existence of an operation and is the aim of that operation.<sup>626</sup>

621. TaittS. 2, 6, 10, 2.

622. TaittUp. 2, 1, 1.

623. *apūrva*—

624. cf. Appendix § 2, Fr. III.

625. It would seem that the point which R. makes here would not be disputed by Prabhākara, as far as Jha's evidence goes: at the most he would dispute the denotativeness or expressiveness of those arthavādas which cannot be connected with a vidhi or injunction.

626. *kāryatva*; *kṛtibhāvabhāvitā kṛtyuddēśyatā ca*; *kṛti* "operation" but not yet materialized, still conative: "volition" is another approximate rendering; cf. JHA, p. 336 "the *kārya* by its very nature is something brought about by *kṛti*, or operation; and

—Then the question arises: what is this 'aim of operation'?

—The aim or objective of operation is that in view of which, or to which end, the operation takes place.<sup>627</sup>

—Then define what is the 'object envisioned by operation', taking operation as a human activity.<sup>628</sup>

—The aim or objective of an operation is that desirous of which man enters upon an operation.<sup>629</sup>

—Well, then the aim, or the thing aimed at by the operation, is identical with the thing desired by man.<sup>630</sup>

Or if you think that a desired object has two aspects: that of being present as the object of desire, and that of actuating a person, and say<sup>631</sup> that the latter aspect, that of actuating a person, alone constitutes the aim of operation is wasted effort due to bias in favour of your own view. For actually the very fact that the object, which is thus understood to be the object of desire, cannot be realized unless an effort is made, actuates a person, for all activity starts thence. When a person understands, after the desire has arisen, that he cannot realize his desire unless he makes an effort, the desire to be active arises and in consequence thereof he is active. This is the view that the experts take. It follows that in reality one's action has

this operation is none other than the exertion [*prayatna*] of the agent." So it is rightly said that *kārya* comes into existence on the preceding existence of an operation. It is moreover that at which the operation aims: *uddeśya*. Lacombe, note 974, remarks "pour Rāmānuja, cette notion est identique à la précédente [i.e., *kārya*, v.B.]; on peut la désigner comme la "fin de l'action" par opposition à la "fin de l'agent", la fin de l'action n'étant que' un moyen de la fin de l'agent;" but the Prābhākara view is the exact opposite of this: in fact the goal of the agent is itself subordinated to the goal of the action: see below.

627. *yad adhikṛtya kṛtir vartate*; in ŚBh., 1. c., the same is expressed more concisely: *kṛtyuddeśyatvaṃ kṛtikarmatvaṃ* "the *kṛtyuddeśa* is the object of the operation".

628. *adhikāra-*

629. ŚBh. 1.c. *kṛtikarmatvaṃ (= kṛtyuddeśyatvaṃ) ca kṛtyā prāptum iṣṭatamatvaṃ* "the object of the operation is that which is most desired to be obtained by the operation".

630. *iṣṭatvaṃ kṛtyuddeśyatvaṃ*; thus the definition is reached that a *kārya* is the object of desire.

631. As the Prābhākara does: the reward—e.g., heaven—is only of secondary importance in itself, as a reward: its main function is to specify the *adhikārin* as one who is *svargakāma* "desirous of heaven" and on whom the *kārya* is incumbent. Consistently reasoned from this premise it follows that the *kārya* is ultimately its own end, or, in more moral terms (the appropriateness of which may, however, be questioned) "duty for duty's sake": I refer to HIRIYANNA's interesting paper *The doctrine of niyoga* J. Or. Res., Madras Vol. XV, Part II (1946).

no other aim or objective than gaining for oneself, as a result of one's own efforts, the object of one's desire; how can you fail to see this?

—Or you may say: the reason why an object is desired is that it is agreeable to a person. The objective of an operation is that which is agreeable to a person. — I reply: No; pleasure is synonymous with that which is agreeable to a person, and suffering with what is disagreeable; so nothing that is not pleasure can be agreeable. But do we not see that cessation of suffering, although it is not positive pleasure, is yet agreeable to a person?

—No! For pleasure and suffering are to be discriminated as follows: pleasure is that which is agreeable to oneself—suffering is that which is disagreeable to oneself. The former of the two, pleasure or what is agreeable, is desirable, and the latter, pleasure or what is disagreeable, is undesirable. So, since we cannot bear suffering, its cessation becomes also desirable: consequently, because it is similarly desirable we mistake it for similarly agreeable.

So a person who is naturally conjoined with prakṛti, and hence implicated in saṃsāra, may be in three conditions: he may be in contact with something agreeable; or with something disagreeable; or he may rest in his proper form. The last condition, that of resting in his proper form, implies cessation of contact alike with something disagreeable and with something agreeable. Therefore when a person is suffering something disagreeable it is likewise desirable for him to rest in his proper form, and, because that is like pleasure in that it is also desirable, he mistakes it for being also agreeable.

§ 120. Therefore, competent criteriologists laugh at one who maintains that the *niyoga*,<sup>632</sup> or mandate, is in itself agreeable, for agreeableness has only the form of pleasure. We understand that a mandate derives its mandatory, permanent and unprecedented character only from its function of leading up to a certain objective that is desired.

In the mandate: *svargakāmo yajeta* the radical action<sup>633</sup> becomes different from the optative mood as the *thing to do*, since this is positively intended as the *means of realizing* heaven inasmuch as the word *svargakāma* is mentioned in direct connection with it.

Don't say that in *yajeta* the *niyoga* is primarily understood to be its own principal factor and that from the connected mention of *svargakāma* follows that the *niyoga* is agreeable to the realization of heaven in order to

632. The usual term of the Prābhākaras for *kārya*.

633. *kriyā*, "the verbal action as such": the *kriyā* of YAJ- is *yajana*- "the act of worshipping (by sacrifices)", whereas the *kārya* of the verb is formed by suffixes, esp. the *linādi* suffixes of the optative/potential mood, etc.



ensure its own realization.<sup>634</sup> In *yajeta* it is rather understood that the radical meaning can only be realized through the exertion of a person. The connected mention of *svargakāma* compels us to assume that something else than the radical meaning is mandatory, permanent and unprecedented, etc.; and this puts a definite restriction to what we are to take as the means of realizing heaven. The optative etc. forms denote as *the thing to do* only a means of realizing heaven which can be construed with the person denoted by the collocated word *svargakāma*. This explication, which is the most natural one, is also violated.

In other words: immediately when we hear a text consisting in words that are intimately interconnected, we understand that the meaning of one word is to be consistently connected with the thing denoted by the other directly connected word. Therefore—since the *realizing means* is to be so construed that it bears upon the sense of the whole text—it is as contradictory and hence untenable for this means to have no further significant bearing as it is for the radical action itself.

Therefore, in sentences like: "There is a cottage on the Ganges," we take it that the word *Ganges* denotes as its meaning "a certain entity that can be dwelt on." Primarily, of course, the word *Ganges* denotes the whole entity "Ganges": but the quality of being drinkable—a quality proper to the entity denoted by the word *Ganges* as a whole—is not directly in keeping with the sense of the sentence as a whole. So here too: when we hear only the word *yajeta*, we remember it simply as a *thing to do*, without further significant bearing: but when we have to bring it in keeping with the sense of the text as a whole, this simple self-contained significance remains no longer.

— But at the moment we hear a word that denotes a *thing to do*, we understand it primarily as a *thing to do*, with no other significance.

634. The *svarga* has the principal function of qualifying the *niyojya* or the person prompted by the mandate; the object to be realized (*sādhya*) by the *niyoga* is not primarily the *svarga* but the *niyoga* itself. Cf. *Prakaranapañcikā*, p. 190 *nanu niyogasya kāmāmanaphalasāadhanatvābhyupagamāt phalasyaiva prādhānyāt tasyaiva vākyaārthatvam ity ata āha*—*ātmasiddhyanukūlasya niyojyasya prasiddhaye/kurvat* (text *kurvan*) *svargādikam api pradhānam kāryam eva naḥ* // etc. "To meet the objection that, since it is understood that the mandate is the means of realizing the desired result, therefore the result itself is the principal and consequently the sentence bears on that, he (Prabhākara?) says: '(The mention of *svargakāma*, etc., serves only) to make known the prompted person who is agreeable (to performing the *niyoga*) because it serves his personal ends; for us the principal is the *kārya* itself which also brings about such results as *svarga*, etc.'"

—That does not rhyme either: for in the case of a mandate like “Fetch the cow” we understand that the action of fetching the cow—involving suffering itself—is a *thing to do* only in so far as it serves as a *means of realizing* a certain desired result. Hence it is contrary to all human experience that the *niyoga* or mandate itself would be agreeable to man, and one who maintains that the mandate is agreeable to man is belied by his own experience.

In the case of mandates like: “One desirous of rain should sacrifice with the *kāriri*,”<sup>635</sup> one will not, when the mandate has been realized, experience the mandate itself as agreeable, because the operative cause of realizing rain is different from rain itself. Even though the rain is not invariably realized in one’s present life, yet, in the very absence of such an invariable rule, one has necessarily to assume that the mandate itself has been realized, and in that mandate no one experiences any pleasure synonymous with agreeableness. In the manner here described there is no other objective of operation than the desired object that is to be realized by the operation.

§ 121. —But<sup>636</sup> the objective of operation is the principal to which the operation itself is accessory.

—Then tell us what makes this principal and what the accessory?

—The accessory is that which is correlated with the *thing to do*, and being the principal means being correlated with that accessory.

—Then you say no more than that the principal is the same as the *thing to do*; but what we are concerned with is, what makes a *thing to do*?

—An accessory is that which admits of being invariably concomitant with an operation taking place in view of the other term.

—Then how do you define the relation “in view of the other term”? For that is what we are concerned with.

635. *kāriryā vr̥ṣṭikāmo yajeta*; *kāriri* is a sacrifice in which the *karira* plant (the thorny *Capparis Aphylla*) figures; the only source to which I have been able to trace this śruti is a quotation by the commentator ad *Ātreyaśākhya Kāṇḍanukrama* of Taitt. Veda, 3, 17: *kalpe .... kārirividhiḥ*, explained: *kalpe—sūtre* (reference is probably to *ĀsvSrS.* 2, 13 *varṣakāmeṣṭiḥ kāririḥ*) *divākīrtyāny ucyante ... kārirividhiḥ; kāririḥ yā* (sic, read *kāriryā*) *vr̥ṣṭikāmo yajeti* (read *yajeteti*), in A. WEBER, *Indische Studien*, 3, p. 373 ff., esp. 394.

636. This paragraph corresponds to *ŚBh.* 1, 1, 1, p. 129; on *śeṣaḥ* in the ritualistic sense of *KMS.* 3, 1, 2 *śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt* “one constituent is accessory when it is subservient to another”.

—The object envisioned is that which is to be realized by the thing intended..

—What is the “thing intended” ?

—The purpose of the operation.

—But I have already replied that the final purpose of the operation is the same as the purpose for which he started operating: and its content is his desire, to gain which he has to resort to operating. Actually the relation between principal and accessory is in any situation as follows: the accessory is in essence that which admits of application to, or which has its use for, another term inasmuch as it serves to support the transcending importance intrinsic to that other term that constitutes the principal. To illustrate: the *yāga* has its use, and so have the exertions required therefor, inasmuch as they serve to bring about the desired result; and everything else has its use, if, and in so far as, it serves to realize the *yāga*.

§ 122. Similarly, it is the essence of born slaves that they have their use in so far as they support the transcending importance of particular persons.<sup>637</sup> In the same manner, all entities—comprising spiritual and non-spiritual beings, eternal and non-eternal—have essentially only their use inasmuch as they support the transcendence of the Lord. Thus everyone and everything is accessory to the Lord and the Lord is principal to all: as has been declared in śrutis like “*the Master of all, the Lord of all, the Patron of the universe, etc.*” Your sense, to wit that the *thing to do* is the principal factor that is to be realized through operation, can only appeal to the credulous.

§ 123. Moreover,<sup>638</sup> in the mandate *svargakāmo yajeta*, and similar mandates, the word *svargakāma* designates the particular agent that is

637. Rāmānuja borrows here no doubt from Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 190 *yathātmana eva saṁvidadhānaḥ svāmī garbhadhāśasyopakaroti tathā niyogo 'pi niyojyasyeti na prādhānyapadapracyutiḥ* “just as a master benefits a born slave by making use of him for his own purposes, so the niyoga benefits the niyojya: but this does not mean that the niyoga loses its status of principal term”. Noteworthy is the turn which Rāmānuja gives to this metaphor by lifting the relation master-slave to a cosmic plane where it represents the relation God-universe. The same metaphor is utilized in ŚBh. loc. cit. but in an altogether different sense and wording: *pradhānaḥ tu bhṛtyapoṣe 'pi svoddeśena pravartata iti cen na, bhṛtyo 'pi pradhānapoṣe svoddeśenaiva pravartate* “don't say that the principal serves his own purposes even by maintaining his servant, for the servant too serves his own purposes in maintaining the principal”.

638. Rāmānuja questions here the propriety of introducing the notion of *niyojya*; acc. to the Prābhākara the *niyojya* is the one who knows that the *kārya* is his to do, and is distinguishable from the agent: the latter is agent of acting, the other of knowing; the personal ending of the verb indicates the *niyojya* in a general way, the word

denoted by the termination of the verb. Now, how do we arrive at the view that this word against the rules of grammar designates the particular *niyojya*, or the person prompted by the mandate?

— It is impossible that a person qualified by *svarga* as the *objective to be realized* is construed as the agent of an action that is not a *means of realizing svarga*.<sup>639</sup>

— But neither can he be construed as the *niyojya*, or the person prompted by the mandate, if that mandate is not the means of realizing *svarga*: which decides that it is a means of realizing *svarga*.<sup>640</sup> But at this decision, that it is a means of realizing *svarga*, we can only arrive when the injunctive text has established with what kind of agent the action is to be construed. To illustrate: when it is said that “he who wants a meal must go to Devadatta’s house,” it follows, from the simple fact that one hears that *he who wants a meal* is the agent of the action of going to Devadatta’s house, that now one also knows something one did not know before: namely that the action of going to Devadatta’s house is the means of obtaining a meal. The same is the case here.<sup>641</sup> Would it be proper to imagine that one who is said to be the agent of one action is

*svargakāma* specifies him. R. argues that this procedure is ungrammatical: the personal ending refers to the *karṭṛ* who is specified as *svargakāma*.

639. The Prābhākara argues that one cannot at the same time be related to the *sādhya*—i.e., the *svarga*—and to the *sādhana*—i.e., the action of sacrificing—. The verbal form *yajeta*, constituting the *kārya*, does as such not at all require a peculiarly specified agent *svargakāma*: the agent is already expressed by the personal ending; in the *niyojya* both the agent and the *svargakāma* are united.

640. Rāmānuja replies that the *niyojya*, that is the prospective agent who desirous of *svarga* knows the *kārya* to be his, cannot be construed with the personal ending either, unless—and that is the point—the *kārya* is primarily the means of realizing *svarga* and not itself. This reverts the order of the Prābhākara: the mere injunction is indifferent unless its purpose is given; that purpose is given in *svargakāma*; consequently *kārya* primarily subserves *svarga*. Otherwise neither the *niyojya* nor the agent *svargakāma* can be construed with *yajeta*. So the connexion of the *karṭṛ* or agent is primarily given in the injunction itself.

641. Agency in one act does not imply agency in another act; acc. to the Prābhākara, the *niyojya* is in the first place the agent of knowing that the *kārya* is his task and in the second place and consequently the *karṭṛ*. But this “agency of knowing” is merely presumed, not given in the injunction, so that the notion of *niyojya* has no title to take precedence over that of *karṭṛ*; so the *vārttika* quoted *Prakarana-paṇicikā*, p. 182: *tathāpi svasambandhikāryaboddhrtvenaivānvaḥ varṇaniya itī niyojya-samarpakatvaṃ evāśrīyata ity evam api kim ity āha—niyojyaḥ... budhyate* (text: *budhyate*): “yet the construction (of the *svargakāma* with the *kārya*) is to be described as his being the knower of the *kārya* as related to himself: so (the word *svargakāma*) is taken as conveying the *niyojya*. He explains how this is in the stanza: “the *niyojya*, etc.”

the agent of another action? That is what you do: for you imagine that the one who is—in *yajeta*—said to be the agent of *yāga*, or sacrifice, is the agent of *buddhi*, or knowing. In fact, just the imagined assumption that he is the agent of knowing makes him the *niyojya*, or the person prompted by the mandate: for you say: “the *niyojya* is he who knows that the thing to do is his to do.”

— But he must first know before he can sacrifice.

— That means that if Devadatta, who is said to be the agent of cooking in “Devadatta must cook,” first goes somewhere in order to cook, he *must* first go somewhere else before he is able to cook. Is it proper to imagine that he is the agent of going?<sup>642</sup>

§ 124. Further, why do you assume that the *apūrva*, as denoted by the optative etc. verbal forms, is something permanent?<sup>643</sup>

— Because otherwise the collocation of the word *svargakāma* would not be accounted for.

— In what sense would it not be accounted for?

— *Svargakāma* is someone who desires to realize *svarga*. If the action of *yāga* etc. would be ephemeral, then it would not enable the *svargakāma* to achieve the realization of heaven since that will take place at another time.

— Then it is only not accounted for the people who have not a ghost of an idea of the final conclusions of the Vedānta. Those who do know their Veda hold that the sovereign Lord, the venerable Nārāyaṇa, grants any desired result when He is propitiated with any ritual act. For instance, Dramiḍācārya, the foremost of the authorities on the Veda, declares:<sup>644</sup>

642. The Prābhākara's contention that the agency of knowing ‘corresponds’ to, or ‘suits’ the agency of sacrificing is not helpful: if Devadatta has to go somewhere in order to be able to perform the duty of cooking enjoined on him in *devadattaḥ pacet*, we may say that his going to cook ‘suits’ his actual cooking, but this agency of going is nowhere given in the simple injunction that he is to cook: that is our presumption.

643. *apūrva*- is in the first place the *codanā*, *vidhi*, itself: KMS. 2, 1, 5 *codanā punar ārambhaḥ*, and Śābarabhāṣya ad loc. *codanety apūrvam brūmaḥ*, etc. Śābara defines ad 1, 1, 2 *kriyāyāḥ pravartakam vacanam*. According to the Prābhākara the *codanā* is “unprecedented” because it is known from no other source than itself: *kriyādhinnam yat kāryam vedyam mānāntarair na tat / ato mānāntarūpūrvam apūrvam ity giyate*. (Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 187). In the second place it is the *codanā*'s own suprasensible effectiveness that persists as something permanent (*sthāyy eva kimcit*) after the *kārya* has been completed until its result will materialize.

644. For a literal translation see Appendix.

phalasambibhatsayā hi karmabhir ātmānaṃ piprīṣantīti sa prīto 'laṃ phalāyeti sāstramaryādā. That is to say: since they want to obtain the results they desire, they want to propitiate, with acts like sacrifice, charity etc., the Supreme Spirit, the venerable Lord Vāsudeva, through the intermediary of deities like Indra etc. whose inner Ruler He is and by whose names He may consequently be denoted: for when He has been propitiated with those acts, He grants the results they desire.—Similarly the śruti: *iṣṭāpūrtam bahudhā jātam jāyamānaṃ viśvaṃ bibharti bhuvanasya nābhiḥ*<sup>645</sup>—*iṣṭāpūrtam*<sup>646</sup> means "the ritual act enjoined by all śrutis and smṛtis:" so *viśvaṃ bibharti* "the Supreme Person 'bears' for Himself, i.e. accepts for Himself all these ritual acts which are understood to be associated with deities like Indra, Agni, Varuṇa etc., whose immanent soul He is;" for He is *bhuvanasya nābhiḥ*, i.e. the supporter of the world comprising the classes of brahmins, kṣatriyas etc.: He is called *nābhiḥ*, or navel, since He by granting the diverse results of the various acts, is as such the bearer of the Universe.—The same śruti declares that He is denoted by the names of the deities Agni, Vāyu and the like, because He is their immanent soul: "that is Agni, that is Vāyu, the sun and the moon"<sup>647</sup>—The Venerable Lord puts it thus: "If any votary wishes to worship with faith any body, then I make that faith of him unshakable. Inspired by that faith he aspires to worship it, and in result he will obtain his desires, which I shall grant him."<sup>648</sup> "Any body" here means that the particular deities etc. constitute the bodies of the Venerable Lord who exists as their inner Ruler.—Again: "For I am the one who enjoy all sacrifices, and I am the patron,"<sup>649</sup> where *patron*<sup>650</sup> means: "the bestower of all results."—So also: "Thou, comprising all gods, art the One who always receivest the sacrifices, O Acyuta!"<sup>651</sup> "Those men who, intent on their proper tasks, propitiate Thee, O Lord, will surpass that illusion entirely to their souls' release."<sup>652</sup>

In Vedas, epics and purāṇas it is set forth at length that all acts are propitiations of the sovereign Lord and that the Supreme Person, when duly propitiated with all these acts, grants their diverse results that are desired. In this very manner, therefore, all śrutis set forth that the omnipotent,

645. MahānārUp. 1, 6 = TaittĀr. 6, 1, 6.

646. R. distinguishes between *iṣṭa*- as śrauta and *pūrta*- as smārta acts.

647. MahānārUp. 1, 7 = TaittĀr. 6, 1, 7: *tad evāgniḥ tad vāyus tat sūryas tad u candramāḥ / tad eva śukram amṛtaṇi tad brahma tad āpaḥ sa prajāpatiḥ*.

648. BhG. 7, 21-22.

649. BhG. 9, 24.

650. *prabhu*- "one who has power".

651. VP. 5, 20, 97; Gītā Press ed. has the expletive 'cintya for the preferable *nityam*.

652. VP. 5, 30, 16.

omniscient and sovereign Venerable Lord is the One who enjoys—as the inner Ruler of the deities Indra etc.—all the acts mentioned in the Veda, *yāga*, *dāna*, *homa*<sup>653</sup> etc., and that He is the One who grants all the results: for instance, the śruti *caturhotāro yatra sampadam gacchanti devaiḥ*,<sup>654</sup> i.e. “in whom—sc. in the Supreme Spirit as the inner Ruler within the gods—the *caturhotṛs*—sc. the sacrifices—come to coincide with the gods—sc. come to be associated with the gods.” In other words: the gods, Indra etc., by existing as the bodies of the Supreme Spirit who is their inner Ruler, are associated with *yāga* etc. Or as the Venerable Lord has put it: “the enjoyer of sacrifice and austerities, the sovereign lord of all worlds.”<sup>655</sup>

To conclude, the ritual acts have the form of propitiations of the Supreme Spirit who is the inner Ruler of the deities Agni and the like. He alone grants the results that are coveted. So what is the point of assuming or imagining that an *apūrva* is denoted, which strays far from the path of etymological explication?<sup>656</sup>

— But, granting this, what sense then have we to assume for the optative etc. verbal forms ?

— YAJ has the sense of “worship of the gods”; hence *yāga*- and other derivatives are propitiations of the deities. The optative etc. verbal suffixes denote that this *yāga* in its radical meaning<sup>657</sup> is—as appears from etymological explication—the object to be realized by the activity of an agent. In this way everything is sound. The terminations which denote agents connote that the radical sense of the word is modified by the connection with the activity of an agent; other affixes denote the present, past and other tenses; whereas the optative affixes indicate that the verbal action is the object to be realized by the activity of an agent.

§ 125. Moreover, the very texts that enjoin the various acts first enjoin that a definite act be performed by an agent who is desirous of its effect, and then they say that that act has the form of propitiation of a deity and that through the intermediary of that deity the effect of that act will be realized: e.g. a text like “One desirous of prosperity must sacrifice a white

653. *yāga*- general term for sacrifice, *homa* particular sacrifice by pouring the substance out in fire, cf. KMS. 4, 2, 27-28.

654. TaittĀr. 3, 11, 2; *caturhotṛ*, name of a recital during the new and full moon rites, denotes by extension the rites themselves.

655. BhG. 5, 29.

656. That the *apūrva* or *codanā*, i.e., the verbal affixes of the potential, etc., moods (*linādi*), should persist as their own eventual effectiveness is an assumption that is at best metagrammatical.

657. *prakṛtyartha*-.

he-goat that is destined for Vāyu: for Vāyu is the nimblest of the deities, On account of its destination, it runs up to Vāyu himself. He leads him to prosperity."<sup>658</sup> here we find nothing that could disprove the realization of the result. Consequently it is unreasonable to say that the knowledge that the acts are means of realizing their results is merely based upon assumption.<sup>659</sup>

I mean this: the subsidiary text that supplements the injunction<sup>660</sup> tells us what modification of the *yāga* as a means of realizing the result is required by the injunction. For instance the injunction: "Therefore one must not revile a Brahmin."<sup>661</sup> In the subsidiary text supplementing this injunction which prohibits reviling we are told that the prohibited act of reviling is a means of realizing a fine of one hundred gold pieces, and we accept this as part of the prohibitive injunction because it subserves the purpose of it. So in the injunction under discussion again we learn from the subsidiary text that the *yāga*, as it is enjoined to be performed by one who has a definite desire, is thereby modified as a means of realizing the *svarga* that is desired. Why disregard this and then smuggle in again this *yāga* as a means of realizing a result by merely assuming that it is? "Hiding his gold treasure in his house, he goes begging with poor people for a poor man's meal,"<sup>662</sup> is a maxim that fits you admirably! Nor is it an invisible factor<sup>663</sup> that makes the reviling a means of being fined one hundred gold pieces. When a person performs the recommended acts, fails to perform the enjoined acts and performs the censured acts, all his pleasures and sufferings are due to the favour and disfavour of the Supreme Person.

There are all sorts of śrutis which declare this: "For He alone brings bliss"<sup>664</sup> . . . then he finds peace . . . no peace befalls him.<sup>665</sup> In fear of Him

658. TaittS. 2, 1, 1 *vāyavyam śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ / vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā / vāyum eva svena bhāgadheyenopa dhāvati / sa evainaṁ bhūtiṁ gamayati*, quoted also ApŚrS. 19, 16, 3.

659. *upādānikī*, S. explains *upādānapramāṇasidhā vidhyākṣepasiddhetarthāḥ* "proved by the means of assumption, i.e., by implied suggestion of the injunction".

660. *vākyasāṣa-*

661. TaittS. 2, 6, 10, 2.

662. A proverb (*nyāya*) according to S. built on *hiraṇyanidhiṁ nihitam akṣetrajñā uparyupari saṁcaranto na vindeyuh* (ChUp. 8, 3, 2) which makes the citation in this connexion subtly insulting.

663. *adrṣṭa-* "includes the transcendental effect produced upon some material thing by a ritual treatment of it which produces no visible effect upon it." It includes the *apūrva* but this "exists of itself, and is not a function of any material or other object" (EDGERTON, MNPr. p. 279, s.v. *apūrva-*).

664. TaittUp. 2, 7 *ēṣa hy evānandayāti*.

665. TaittUp. 2, 7 (... *yadā hy evaiṣa ekasminn adrṣṭe 'bhayaṁ pratiṣṭhām vinda-* date) *atha so 'bhayaṁ gato bhavati*.



the wind blows, the sun rises and run Agni and Indra and finally Death.<sup>666</sup> In obedience to the commandment of Him the imperishable One, O Gārgī, sun and moon stand apart<sup>667</sup> . . . in obedience to His commandment, O Gārgī, men praise the liberal, the gods the sacrificer, and the pitrs are entitled to the darvī.<sup>668</sup> As declared in the Dramiḍabhāṣya: "In obedience to His command the wind blows, the rivers flow; by Him the oceans have been confined and they spring like rams as if they were rutting," and "for being dependent on His will the world neither falls nor bursts asunder. When the Venerable Lord knows that someone follows His commandments, then He makes him prosper in His mercy, for He knows and is capable of acting."<sup>669</sup>

§ 126. When a person performs the enjoined acts such as the worshipping of the Supreme Person—which presupposes true knowledge of Him—then, by His favour, he finds happiness culminating in the attainment of Him, and security,<sup>670</sup> according to his qualification. But when he does not perform the enjoined acts of worshipping Him etc., preceded by true knowledge of Him, and performs censured acts, then he will find immense suffering, which presupposes failure to attain Him, and insecurity. As the Venerable Lord has said: "Perform acts constantly: for acts are better than knowledge": herewith He enjoins that acts must be performed after knowledge has been acquired.<sup>671</sup> Then in "having dedicated all acts to Me"<sup>672</sup> He sets forth that the acts are propitiations of Himself and that the souls are under His control. Then He continues: "The men who always follow what I have taught here, faithfully and without muttering, will find release through acts. But those who mutter against it and refuse to follow my teaching, are ignorant of any knowledge, lost and devoid of understanding: be sure of that,<sup>672a</sup> so as to praise those who obey His commandment and to condemn those who do not. Then He repeats that they who do not keep to His command have a

666 TaittUp. 2, 8 bhīṣmād vātaḥ pavate / bhīṣodeti sūryaḥ / bhīṣmād agniḥ cendraś ca / mṛtyur dhāvati pañcamah.

667. BĀUp. 3, 8, 9.

668. BĀUp. 3, 8, 9 ad finem.

669. Cf. Appendix.

670. abhaya-.

671. BhG. 3, 8; R's interpretation in GBh. ad loc. differs: ataḥ karmayoge 'py ātmano 'kartṛtvabhāvanayātmayāthātmyānusamāhānam antarbhūtam (after which two more arguments for karmayoga's superiority to jñānayoga are given): "consequently karmayoga itself contains an essential knowledge of the ātman because it entails the realization that the ātman itself is not the agent of karman" (cf. my Rāmānuja, etc., p. 20-21); cp. also the GBh. explication: niyatam vyāptam, prakṛtisamprapṛṣṭena hi vyāptam (karma), on which cf. my Rāmānuja, etc., ad loc.

672. BhG. 3, 30.

672a. BhG. 3, 31.

demoniac disposition, and finally He declares their ultimate downfall in: "I hurl these hostile, cruel, despicable and criminal men incessantly into demoniac forms of existence in their *samsāras*. Reduced to demons, confused, and in life after life failing to attain Me, they will gradually go down to the nethermost limit."<sup>673</sup> While He describes the eternal place that the followers of His command will reach in: "He that always performs acts while resorting to Me will attain by My favour for ever the eternal place."<sup>674</sup> In order to prevent that all those people who have not studied the Vedānta should lack faith in acts, emphatical declarations are made in the *devatādhikāraṇa*.<sup>675</sup> However, the final conclusion of those who know the Veda is that all śāstras constitute one śāstra only.

§ 127. There are thousands of śrutis that declare that this Supreme Brahman Nārāyaṇa has a proper form of undefinable knowledge and beatitude in the purest form; He has immeasurable, innumerable, all-surpassing beautiful qualities, such as knowledge, power, strength, sovereignty, fortitude, glory etc.; the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities different from Himself are actuated by an act of His will; He possesses one invariable divine form that is in accordance with His pleasure and in harmony with Himself; He has an infinite variety of unsurpassed beautiful ornaments that suit His form, and immeasurable, endless and marvelous weapons of all kinds that are equal to His power;<sup>676</sup> He has a Consort<sup>677</sup> who suits His pleasure and who is in harmony with Him, possessing an immeasurable eminence of proper form, qualities, supernal power, ascendancy and character; He has an infinite entourage of attendants and necessities,<sup>678</sup> suitable to Him, the knowledge, actions etc. of whom are perfect and whose qualities are limitless; He has an infinite glorious manifestation, such as is fitting to Him, comprising all objects and all means of experience; He has a divine residence, the proper form and nature of which are beyond the ken of thought and the power of expression: all this and so forth is everlasting and irreproachable.

This is declared in the śrutis: "I know that Great Person who has the colour of the sun, beyond matter;<sup>679</sup> that golden Person within the

673. BhG. 16, 19-20

674. BhG. 18, 56.

675. KMS. 9, 1, 9.

676. Cf. the *astrabhūṣaṇādhyāya*, VP. 1, 22.

677. Śrī-, hence the typically Śrī-Vaiṣṇava appellation *Śrīyaḥ paṭiḥ* with which opens the GBh. intr. which is an elaboration of this Ved. paragraph.

678. The attendants are such superior beings as Ananta-Śeṣa, Garuḍa, Viśvakṣena; etc., etc. (YID. 9, p. 134); under *paricchada-* S. mentions *kalācīkāprabhṛtayaḥ* "Ladle, etc. (?)"; the attendants are according to GBh. intr. *sūris*, on which see below.

679. ŚvetUp. 3, 7 *vedāham etaṁ puruṣam*, etc.

sun<sup>680</sup>... His eyes are like a many-coloured lotus;<sup>681</sup> that is the space within the heart: therein is this Person, manomaya-, immortal, golden:<sup>682</sup> manomaya- means "to be grasped by the pure mind only";<sup>683</sup> — "all the flashes of lightning spring forth from over this Person:"<sup>684</sup> sc. "from over this sun-coloured Person;" *nilatoyadamadhyasthā vidyullekheva bhāsvarā*,<sup>685</sup> sc. "like a flash of lightning that has a dark cloud within:"<sup>686</sup> that bundle of flames that burn within the space in the heart of the Little Lotus and whose proper form is the Supreme Spirit appearing as the dark spot within those flames, blazes forth like a flash of lightning that has a dark cloud within itself; — "open to the mind, embodied in the vital airs, radiant, having all desires materialized and every will realized, soul of the space, who has all acts,<sup>687</sup> all desires, all scents, all juices, encompassing all this, voiceless, unconcerned,<sup>688</sup> His saffron-coloured garment;<sup>689</sup> etc., etc.

The same meaning is conveyed by hundreds of śrutis, such as: "Viṣṇu's Consort, Mistress of the world,<sup>690</sup> Hṛī and Lakṣmī are Thy spouses;<sup>691</sup> the sūris regard always that supreme place of Viṣṇu,<sup>692</sup> lying beyond matter;<sup>693</sup> that is one, unevolved, infinite, complete, primordial, beyond matter;<sup>694</sup> he that knows the treasure contained in the innermost Supreme Heaven,<sup>695</sup> who watches in the Supreme Heaven,<sup>696</sup> that is what is and what shall be, that is in the imperishable Supreme Heaven."<sup>697</sup>

680. ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *ya eṣo 'ntar āditye*, etc.

681. ChUp. 1, 6, 7 *tasya yathā kapyāsam*, etc., on the interpretation of which cf. infra §§ 134 ff.

682. TaittUp. 1, 6, 1 *sa ya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya*, etc.

683. Cf. MuṇḍUp. 3, 1, 8: *na cakṣuṣā gṛhyate nāpi vācā manasā tu viśuddhena*.

684. MahānārUp. 1, 6 = TaittĀr. 6, 1, 6.

685. MahānārUp. 3, 12 *nilatoyadamadhyasthā*, etc.

686. *madhyasthanīlatoyadā*; S. explains that the compound is a bahuvrīhi with irregular position of the first member (*pūrvanipāta*) peculiar to *chandas* usage; R. interprets the obvious *tatpuruṣa* comp. in this way to harmonize this śruti with the others cited.

687. S. explains *sarvakarman-* as "the One whose effect is the Universe".

688. ChUp. 3, 14. 2 *manomayaḥ prāṇasārīrah*; no doubt here *manomaya* is to be taken in the sense of "comprehensible by the mind".

689. BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 (*tasya haitasya puruṣasya rūpaṃ*) *yathā mähārajanam vāsaḥ*.

690. TaittS. 4, 4, 12, 5 *tasyeśānā*, etc.

691. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1 *hṛīś ca te*, etc.

692. SubālUp. 6 *tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam*, etc.

693. TaittS. 2, 2, 12, 5 *kṣayantam*, etc.

694. MahānārUp. 1, 5 *yad ekam avyaktam*, etc.

695. TaittUp. 2, 1 *yo veda nīhitam*, etc.

696. RV. 10, 129, 7 *yo 'syādhykṣaḥ parame vyoman*.

697. RV. 10, 90, 2 *tad eva bhūtam u bhavyamā*, etc., cf. MahānārUp. 1, 2.

§ 128. On the authority of the statement in the śruti *tad Viṣṇoḥ paramaṁ padam* that the sūris always regard the supreme residence of Viṣṇu the Supreme Brahman, we know that there is a class of beings of perfect knowledge who have the gift of regarding at all times. The specification of the statement is either that those who are sūris regard it, or that those who regard it are sūris.

—But in neither case more than one *guṇa* can be enjoined.

—That is not true here, because all *guṇas* have not been established:<sup>698</sup> the supreme residence that is qualified by all *guṇas* is enjoined; as witness the Sūtra: "When the *guṇas* are not laid down by another sentence, the Sacrifice as well as its Accessories are enjoined by the same statement; because of their being mixed up in the Injunctive word, but not when the act is set forth by another statement."<sup>699</sup> Even as in the injunction of an act, e.g. *yad āgneyo 'ṣṭakapālo . . . bhavati*,<sup>700</sup> an act is enjoined that is qualified by all *guṇas* or accessories because neither act nor *guṇas* have yet been established: similarly our śruti propounds the supreme residence of Viṣṇu that has not yet been established as being always regarded by the sūris: so there is no contradiction. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the mantras which are *karaṇas*,<sup>701</sup> which allude to something that is being acted,<sup>702</sup> which have the form

698. KMS. 1, 4, 9; the problem is as follows: in the above declaration, however read, two different statements are found: they see that supreme place, and: they are sūris, by which different *guṇas* are 'enjoined'; now in the case where the karman "act" has already been established by another declaration, another subsidiary declaration may describe only one *guṇa*, since otherwise there is *vākyabheda* "syntactical discontinuity": *prāpte karmāṇy anekavidhāne vākyabhedāpatteḥ* (MNPr. § 33, which quotes Kumārila, TantrV. 2, 2, 6 ab. *prāpte karmāṇi nāneko vidhātum śakyate guṇaḥ* "when the acts have been established elsewhere not more than one *guṇa* can be enjoined"). There is another case, which R. envisages, where more than one *guṇa* is allowed, viz. in a *viśiṣṭavidhi* "injunction of an act as being further specified", (MNPr. § 12) for which the quoted KMSūtra provides.

699. KMS. 1, 4, 9.

700. *yad āgneyo 'ṣṭakapālo* ('*māvāsyaṁ paurṇamāsyāṁ cācyuto*) *bhavati* (*suvar-gasya lokasyābhijityai*), adduced as an instance in case by Śabara ad 1, 4, 9, to whose commentary I may refer; the reference is TaittS. 2, 6, 33.

701. *karaṇamantrāḥ*, explained by S. *homādisāadhanatayā vihitaḥ* "enjoined as the means for homa, etc., rites".

702. *kriyamānānuvādinaḥ*, expl. by S.: *barhir devasadanam dāmi ityādayaḥ*; cf. MNPr. § 92 *tad dhi barhiḥ saṁskāradvārāpūrvasaṁbandhīti mantrasya sāmartyāt tadartatve sati nānarthakyaṁ prasaṁjyate*, etc., "inasmuch as the mantra, by virtue of its own denotative potency, is related to the apūrva by means of the preparation of barhis and is thus significant, no insignificance can be imputed to it", etc.; the text is MaitrS. 1, 1, 2.

of *stotra*<sup>703</sup> and *śāstra*,<sup>704</sup> which are applied to *japa* etc.,<sup>705</sup> which are recited in context<sup>706</sup> or not recited in context,<sup>707</sup> all denote their proper sense, if not contradictory and not yet established, in the same way as the *brāhmaṇas*.<sup>708</sup> A *stotra* is a description of *guṇas* found in the *guṇin* which is to be realized by mantras that are sung; *śāstra* is a description of *guṇas* to be found in the *guṇin* which is to be realized by mantras that are not sung. The declaration which the mantras that elucidate their meanings in application make about the particular *guṇas* — neither yet established nor contradictory — that are to be found in deities etc. are in agreement with that application.

The above *śruti*<sup>703</sup> does not apply to persons who are released because it would not be proper to say of them that they always regard.<sup>710</sup> Nor does it apply to the continuous flow of released souls as a whole, for that would stultify the *śruti* because it tells us in *sadā paśyanti* that it applies to each agent separately.<sup>711</sup> We have said before that even if we assume that mantras and *arthavādas* have meanings only for a thing to do their meanings are established: so *a fortiori* when etymological explication proves that they have in fact bearing upon an established thing in their own right. In this manner everything is sound.<sup>712</sup>

— But in the assertion *tad Viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam* the words *paramaṃ padam* denote the proper form of the Supreme One, for we cannot detect a difference between this *śruti* and *śrutis* like: “the Supreme ‘pada’, free from all imperfection, that has the name of Viṣṇu.”<sup>713</sup>

— That is not true, for in *śrutis* like: “lying beyond matter;”<sup>714</sup> “that is in the imperishable Supreme Heaven;”<sup>715</sup> “who watches in the Supreme

703. S.: *gānaviśiṣṭamantroccaraṇa*- “recital of mantras by chanting”.

704. S.: *gānarahitam ekaśrutirūpoccarana*- “recital (of mantras), without chanting as one *śruti*”.

705. S.: i.e., *japa* and *adhyayana*, the former being recital in a low voice, the latter in a loud voice.

706. As e.g., the mantra *barhī devasadanam dāmi* is recited in the context of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* ritual; cf. MNPr. § 92; on *prakaraṇa*- as a criterion (*pramāṇa*) for deciding the function of subsidiaries (*aṅga*-/*śeṣa*-, among which mantra is included), cf. MNPr. §§ 116 ff.

707. On mantras recited out of context, cf. MNPr. §§ 94 f., and §§ 248 ff.

708. i.e., the *vidhi*-, *brāhmaṇa*- par excellence.

709. i.e., *tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*.

710. For before they were released they did not see.

711. For cf. the sequel: *tad viprāso vipanyavo jāgrvāṃsaḥ samindhate*, explained below.

712. Cf. supra.

713. VP. 1, 22, 53.

714. TaittS. 2, 2, 12, 5.

715. TaittUp. 2, 1.

Heaven,"<sup>716</sup> "who knows that which is laid down in the innermost Supreme Heaven,"<sup>717</sup> only a Supreme place is indicated, and in "that Supreme pada of Viṣṇu"<sup>718</sup> it is designated that there is difference between one and the other. So by this very text we learn from the specification "the Supreme 'pada' that has the name of Viṣṇu" that there is yet another supreme 'pada' different from this one, but it is declared that it is this 'pada' or 'place' that is always regarded by the sūris.

§ 129. — In other words: in some texts the words *paramaṃ padam* refer to a supreme place, in other texts they refer to the proper form of the soul as separated from prakṛti; and in other texts again they refer to the proper form of the Venerable Lord Himself. The Supreme Place is referred to in "The sūris regard always the *paramaṃ padam* of Viṣṇu." The proper form of the soul separated from prakṛti is referred to in: "During creation, subsistence and resorption the prakṛti exists on in a triple form according to the activity of the three guṇas; but its *paramaṃ padam* is beyond guṇas and great."<sup>719</sup> Finally the proper form of the Venerable Lord is referred to in "The *paramaṃ padam*, free from all imperfection, that has the name of Viṣṇu."<sup>720</sup> The words *paramaṃ padam* can refer to all three because they constitute the highest attainable end.

— But how can all three of them be the highest attainable end ?

— The proper form of the Venerable Lord is the supreme pada, because that is the highest attainable end in its own right. The other two are supreme 'padas' inasmuch as they are implied in the attainment of the Lord. The realization of the proper form of the soul released from all bonds of karman is implied in the attainment of the Lord:<sup>721</sup> this on the authority of the instruction imparted by the śruti "those desires are real but they are concealed by the unreal,"<sup>722</sup> which, by using the word "unreal" declares that the hosts of perfections of the Lord are concealed by one's personal karman.

§ 130. — But how do you make out that this concealment in the form of the "unreal" is due to the karman of the embodied soul?

716. RV. 10, 129, 7.

717. TaittUp. 2, 1.

718. i.e., the Supreme Residence.

719. VP. 1, 22, 41.

720. VP. 1, 22, 53.

721. Or, to put it differently: the essence of God cannot be attained, i.e., intuitionally realized, unless the soul's essence has been recognized: *ātmāvalokana-* is a pro-paedeutis to the attainment of God: cf. my *Rāmānuja*, etc. Intr. IV.

722. ChUp. 8, 3, 1 *ta ime satyaḥ kāmā anṛtāpidhānāḥ*.

— On the authority of the assertion: “Ignorance, otherwise called *karman*, is regarded as another potency by which the ubiquitous potency of the embodied soul is enveloped, and it meets all the sufferings of *samsāra* in endless succession because it is concealed by that ignorance,<sup>723</sup> etc.”

§ 131. That the attainment of the Supreme Place, too, is implied in the attainment of the Venerable Lord is clear enough: in the śruti “*lying beyond rajas*”<sup>724</sup> the word *rajas* denotes the prakṛti characterized by the three guṇas: for *rajas* has no proper existence alone and isolated from the other guṇas. The sense of the text is consequently: “*Him who lies, i.e. dwells, in a definite place beyond this our prakṛti*” characterized by the three guṇas. So we know by this that the dwelling-place of Viṣṇu must be beyond the matter that is governed by guṇas and that constitutes the embodied soul’s field of experience. In the text “*I know that great person who has the colour of the sun, beyond tamas*,”<sup>725</sup> the same prakṛti is denoted by the word *tamas*. Since *tamas* alone has no proper existence either, this text forms one coherent context with the text reading “*lying beyond rajas*”; so we gather this sense: “*I know that great person, of the colour of the sun, who dwells beyond tamas.*”

The śruti “*who knows Brahman—who is real, knowledge and infinite—laid down in the innermost Supreme Heaven: that is in the imperishable Supreme Heaven*”<sup>726</sup> tells us that the word “*Supreme Heaven*” denote that Supreme Place as having an untransformed form. So since the clause “*the imperishable Supreme Heaven*” asserts that this place is imperishable, the words “*Supreme Heaven*” cannot denote celestial bodies like the sun etc. because those are perishable. Texts such as “*where the ancient gods have found the fulfilment of their ends*,” “*where the first-born ṛṣis of olden times*”<sup>727</sup> etc.” tell us that they are the sūris. Similarly the śruti *taḍ viprāso vipanyavo jāgrvāṃsaḥ samindhate Viṣṇor yat paramaṃ padaṃ*:<sup>728</sup> *viprāsaḥ*, i.e., “*intelligent beings*”—*vipanyavaḥ* “*devoted to glorification*”—*jāgrvāṃsaḥ* “*of unimpaired knowledge*”—the meaning being that those intelligent beings of unimpaired knowledge and incessantly glorifying that Supreme Place of Viṣṇu blaze forth.

723. VP. 6, 7, 61-62.

724. TaittS. 2, 2, 12, 5.

725. ŚvetUp. 3, 7.

726. TaittUp. 2, 1.

727. RV. 10, 90, 16 *yatra pūrve sādhyāḥ santi devāḥ ? yatararṣayaḥ prathamajā ye purāṇāḥ*.

728. SubālUp. 6.

§ 132. In the same way as the hosts of beautiful qualities—knowledge, strength, sovereignty etc.—in the text “*this was sat in the beginning, my dear son,*” so these attendants, this place etc. are implied in the proper form of the Supreme Brahman.<sup>729</sup> Therefore, since they, too, are comprised by the beautiful qualities; since in the śruti “*this was sat in the beginning*” the word *this* encompasses the phenomenal world of objects of experience conjoined with the order of experiencing beings that are subject to karman; and since the former attendants are however not included among the beings subject to karman because they “regard always” according to the śruti “*the sūris regard always*”: therefore the text from *apahatapāpmā* to *apipāsah*<sup>730</sup> negates first the imperfect nature proper to the prakṛti—constituted by the three guṇas—that furnishes the means of His own sport, and the imperfect nature proper to the ordinary prakṛti-conjoined puruṣa; and then, with *satyakāmaḥ*, it asserts the reality of the sum-total of His own objects and means of experience. *Satyakāma-* means “He whose kāmas, i.e. the objects of desire, are real.” Therefore the meaning is: the objects and means of His experience that the Supreme Brahman desires for Himself are real or eternal. The word *satya-* signifies that, whereas an entity that is the means of another’s sport, is liable to transformation and therefore, albeit real in so far as capable of connexion with pramāṇas, yet unreal in so far as impermanent, the sūris etc. on the contrary are permanent. *Satyasaṃkalpa-* asserts, that although these objects and means of experience etc. be eternal, unsurpassed and endless, an infinite number of new entities owe their realization to His will alone. So *satyasaṃkalpa-* declares that the differences in proper form, condition and activity of these means of experience and means of His sport, spiritual and non-spiritual, permanent and non-permanent, are entirely dependent on His volition.

§ 133. This same sense is stated in epics and purāṇas, which corroborate the Vedas as witness this passage: “*Seeing that both were intelligent and firmly established in the Vedas, the Lord made them apprehend, in order to corroborate the Vedas.*”<sup>731</sup> For example it reads in the Holy Rāmāyaṇa, thus composed to support the Veda, as follows: “*That great Yogin, the ancient Supreme Spirit, is in his evolved phase without beginning, middle and end, great beyond the great,*<sup>732</sup> *beyond matter: He is the creator, who bears the Conch-shell, Disc and Club: on His chest is the śrīvatsa curl; He has Sṛī for ever as His consort; He is invincible, eternal and immutable.*”<sup>733</sup> “*Various*

729. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

730. ChUp. 8, 1, 5.

731. Rām. 1, 4, 6 *tau tu medhāvinau dṛṣṭvā*, etc.; the two persons are Kuśa and Lava.

732. The great (*mahat*) here will have the sense of *mahattattva*,

733. Rām. 6, 1, 4, 14-15,



arrows and a long-drawn bow accompany the descendant of Kakutstha; all the individuals follow suit.<sup>734</sup> With body and with entourage he enters the glory of Viṣṇu."<sup>735</sup>

In the Holy Viṣṇupurāṇa: "That multiplicity of forms comprising all the forms in which all these potencies have their seats constitutes another vast form of Hari.<sup>736</sup> Brahman is incorporate, Hari encompasses<sup>737</sup> the entire Brahman. Śrī, Viṣṇu's faithful consort, the Mother of the world is eternal herself, and she is omnipresent even as Viṣṇu Himself is.<sup>738</sup> When He is god, she assumes a divine body, when He is man she assumes a human body: she makes her own body agree with that of Viṣṇu."<sup>739</sup> "The Yogins who in perfect concentration constantly meditate upon Brahman possess that supreme place which the sūris regard." ".... whose manifestation is not subject to the evolutions that are caused by Time consisting of kalā, muhūrta etc."<sup>740</sup>

And in the Mahābhārata: "Go to the divine residence, O Lord, undecaying, unthinkable, unknowable, primordial, which is to be known from the revelations, and protect us, your votaries, by incarnating yourself in every age with your own body.<sup>741</sup> Time gets ripe, and there is no time, there is the Lord alone."<sup>742</sup>

The Author of the Sūtras declares that the Supreme Brahman has form in the sūtra "within, on account of the instruction of His properties."<sup>743</sup>

§ 134. He who is always gloriously visible<sup>744</sup> is the pre-eminent Person who dwells within the orb of the sun.<sup>745</sup> His splendour is like that of a colossal mountain of molten gold<sup>746</sup> and His brilliance that of the rays of hundreds of thousands of suns. His long eyes are spotless like the petals of a lotus<sup>747</sup> which, sprouting forth from deep water on a soft stalk, blossoms in the rays

734. Rām. 7, 109, 7; Vulgate reads in c tathāyudhāni te.

735. Rām. 7, 110, 13 ab; Vulgate reads in c saḥānujaḥ.

736. VP. 6, 7, 70; mahat in the sense of the tattva, and by extension "Universe".

737. VP. 1, 22, 63 cd.

738. VP. 1, 9, 145.

739. VP. 1, 8, 39; Gītā Press ed. reads in b yoganiścaye, in c teṣāṃ tu, in d yat tat.

740. VP. 4, 1, 84 ab.

741. MBh. 12, 5, 27.

742. MBh. 12, 191, 9 ab (Poona cr ed.).

743. BrS. 1, 1, 21 antas taddharmopadeśāt, referring to ChUp. 1, 1, 6, on the basis of which R. will now give a description of the Divine Person.

744. daridṛśyate, intensive built on dṛśyate of ChUp. 1, 6, 6.

745. 1, 6, 6: antar āditye.

746. 1, 6, 6: hiraṇmayāḥ.

747. 1, 6, 7: puṇḍarikam evam akṣiṇī.

of the sun.<sup>748</sup> His eyes<sup>749</sup> and His forehead and His nose are beautiful, His coral-like lips smile graciously, and His soft cheeks are beaming. His neck is as delicately shaped as a conch-shell and His bud-like divine ears, beautifully formed, hang down on His stalwart shoulders. His arms are thick, round and long and He is adorned with fingers that are reddened by nails of a most becoming reddish tinge. His body, with its slender waist and broad chest, is well-proportioned in all parts, and His shape is of an unutterably divine form. His colour is pleasing. His feet are as beautiful as budding lotuses. He wears a yellow robe that suits Him and He is adorned with immeasurable, marvelous, endless and divine ornaments—a spotless diadem, earrings, necklaces, the Kaustubha gem, bracelets, anklets, belt etc.—and with Conch, Disc, Club, Sword, the Bow Śārṅga, the curl Śrīvatsa and the garland Vanamālā.<sup>750</sup> He attracts eye and thought alike of all by the measureless and boundless beauty that is His. He overflows the entire creation of animate and inanimate beings with the nectar of His comeliness. His youth is exceedingly wonderful, unimaginable and eternal. He is as delicately tender as blossoming flowers. He perfumes the infinite space between the cardinal points with the odour of holiness. His profound majesty is for ever encompassing the entire Universe. He looks upon the hosts of His devotees with loving eyes, filled with compassion and affection. His sport is to evolve, sustain and dissolve all the worlds. All evil is foreign to Him—He is the treasury of all beautiful qualities and He is essentially different from all other entities. He is the Supreme Spirit, the Supreme Brahman, Nārāyaṇa. This is the sense to be read in 'on account of the instruction of his properties,'<sup>751</sup> *He rules all the worlds—all His desires,*<sup>752</sup> *'He is beyond all impurities,'*<sup>753</sup> etc. His properties are declared in the texts: *'the ruler of all, the sovereign of all,'*<sup>754</sup> *free from imperfection, unaging, . . . whose every*

748. According to S., who substantiates this statement by quotations, R. here describes what is called *kapyāsa* (1, 6, 7) in three ways: conformably to the three explanations of this disputed term allowed by the Vākyakāra (see Appendix § 2, Fr. XIII); respectively *gambhīrāmbhaḥsamudbhūta-*, borrowed from Dramaḍa (< *kaṁ* "water", *api*, *asa* "ground, soil"); *sumṛṣṭtanāla-* (< *kapi* [< *kaṁ* *pibati*] "stalk"; *āsa* [*yaśminn āste*] "seat"); *ravikaravikāśita-* (< *kapi* [< *kaṁ* *pibati*] "sun", *āsa* [*tenāsyate kṣipyate vikāśyate*] "expansion, blowing").

749. In the sequel R. has been inspired by VP. 6, 7, 80 ff.

750. I refer to VP. 1, 22 on Viṣṇu's ornaments and weapons.

751. BrS. 1, 1, 21 *antas taddharmopadeśāt*.

752. MahUp. ?

753. ChUp. 1, 8, 7.

754. BAUp. 4, 4, 22.

will is realized,<sup>755</sup> 'supreme beyond all, eternal, universal, Nārāyaṇa, Hari,'<sup>756</sup> "Lord of all, sovereign of the souls,"<sup>757</sup> etc.

§ 135. The Author of the Vākya declares all this in: "The śruti "the golden person is regarded"<sup>758</sup> teaches that the One who is knowing is within everything, because we learn that He is the Lord of the world and the desires, and also because He is beyond sin" etc. The same author, after having stated the prima facie view that the Supreme Person would have assumed form to favour His worshipper: "If it be said that His form is temporarily assumed by his sovereign power, in order to favour their thoughts," subsequently denies that His form is not eternal: "That body is beyond sensual perception and only apprehensible by the internal faculty, for this has been declared."<sup>759</sup> i.e. even as the qualities of knowledge etc. have been stated to constitute the proper form of the Supreme Brahman, in the same manner His form belongs to His proper form, for the scriptures declare that His proper form is such.

The same has been commented upon by the Author of the Bhāṣya: "The form of the creator of all is His by nature; however, it cannot be grasped by the eye, it can only be apprehended by the untroubled mind which has another means; this on account of the śruti: "He is not grasped by the eye, nor by speech, but by purified thought." For a deity that is formless cannot be declared to have form, for the śāstra asserts things so as they are: "saffron-coloured garment,"<sup>760</sup> "I know that great person who has the colour of the sun, beyond matter;"<sup>761</sup> and because another context declares that He is a witness," etc. [Vākya] "The word hiraṇmaya- is used, because of similarity of form, just as "moon-faced";" [Bhāṣya] here the suffix -maya- has not the sense of "being a product of" because the soul is not subject to beginning." Even as we learn from the mention of an infinitude of beautiful qualities that the Supreme Brahman is modified by measureless beautiful qualities, in the same way we know by the mention of " . . . that person who has the colour of the sun," etc. that the Supreme Person Nārāyaṇa, who is the Supreme Brahman, has a perfectly beautiful shape which is in accordance with His pleasure and in harmony with Himself. Since the texts: "Viṣṇu's consort, Mistress of this world," "Hrī and Lakṣmī are Thy consorts,"<sup>762</sup> "the

755. ChUp. 8, 1, 5.

756. MahānārUp. 11, 2.

757. MahānārUp. 11, 3.

758. Reference is to ChUp. 8, 1, 6 and 8, 2.

759. Viz. MuṇḍUp. 3, 1, 8.

760. BAUp. 2, 3, 6.

761. ŚvetUp. 3, 7.

762. TaittS. 4, 4, 12, 5.

*sūris regard always,*" *"beyond matter," "lying beyond this matter,"*<sup>763</sup> etc. refer to consorts, attendants, a residence etc., we know also that they actually exist: as the Author of the Bhāṣya declared: *"for the śāstra asserts things so as they are."*

§ 136. In other words: even as the text *"Brahman, who is real, knowledge, eternal"*<sup>764</sup> declares that the proper form of the Supreme Spirit is essentially different from everything else inasmuch as it is antagonistic to all evil and comprises only boundless bliss, and inasmuch as it is undefinable—even as, further, the texts *"Who is omniscient, all-knowing,"*<sup>765</sup> *"His supreme potency is diverse, His knowledge, power and works are proper to His nature,"*<sup>766</sup> *"everything derives its light from this luminary, all this is luminous by His luminosity,"*<sup>767</sup> etc. declare that His qualities which are unsurpassed and innumerable are essentially different from everything else—in the same manner the text *"who has the colour of the sun,"* etc. declares that His form, attendants, residence etc. are essentially different from everything else, are proper to Him exclusively and have an inexplicable proper form and nature.

§ 137. If the Vedas are pramāṇa, then they denote the sum-total of unprecedented and compatible meanings, classified under vidhi, arthavāda and mantra, so as they are in reality. That the Vedas are pramāṇa is stated in the sūtra. *"Meaning is inherent in the word."*<sup>768</sup> Even as the power of heat is inherent in fire etc., and even as the power of originating particular cognitions is inherent in the senses of vision etc., in the same way the power of denotation is inherent in language.<sup>769</sup> It is not right to say that the denotativeness of language is based on convention, as is that of the language of gestures. In the very absence of any knowledge about a person or persons who fixed the convention, although there is no break in the beginningless transmission of the notion (of the denotative character of language), the originally conventional meanings would have been known as such either directly or traditionally. Nor is it right to imagine that the denotativeness of language is as conventional as that of words like Devadatta etc., for with words of that type the convention is known either directly or traditionally. With words like cow, inasmuch as no convention is known, although there

763. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1.

764. TaittUp. 2, 1.

765. MuṇḍUp. 2, 2, 7 *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit.*

766. ŚvetUp. 6, 8 *parānya śaktir vividhaiva.*

767. MuṇḍUp. 2, 3, 10/SvetUp. 6, 14 *tam eva bhāntam.*

768. KMS. 1, 1, 5 *autpattikas tu śabdasyarthena sambandhaḥ.*

769. This theory of the originality of language is the one generally adhered to by the ancient systems, though the (ancient) Naiyāyikas formulate it thus that the denotativeness of language is a convention established by God himself.

is no break in the beginningless transmission of the notion of denotativeness, the power of denotation is inherent. Hence follows that we must assume that the cognitive power of language is inherent in it just as the power of heat is inherent in fire and the power of cognition in the senses of vision etc.

§ 138. — However, if the denotative power of language is inherent in it as it is in the senses, then why is it necessary for a word, in order to be denotative, that its relation to its denotation is apprehended?

— We reply: it is as with the mark-of-inference<sup>770</sup> in logic: just as marks like smoke have invariably a definite relation with the thing marked, fire etc., and so give rise to the cognition that there is fire, so language has also an invariable relation with the denotation and so gives rise to a certain cognition.

— But then language, being the inferential mark of denotation, would be Inference and not a *pramāṇa* in its own right.

— No: the relation between word and meaning is that between means and object of cognition. Smoke etc., have another relation: via an intermediate stage of knowledge of that relation they give rise to a definite cognition, that is the difference.

Summing up, inasmuch as we see that a word has the power of denoting a meaning when the relation between both is apprehended, and inasmuch as we have no knowledge of any convention, although there is no break in the beginningless transmission of our notion of the denotativeness of language, therefore we conclude that the power of denotation is inherent in the word itself.

§ 139. So, denotative combinations of simple words are to be called contextual language.<sup>771</sup> There where the word-order in speaking derives from human cognition<sup>772</sup> we speak of human language. But there where the word-order in speaking always derives from the mental impression<sup>773</sup> left by the previous word-order in an endless retrogressive chain we call them

770. *liṅga*—; I refer to Tarkasamgraha, Buddhikāṇḍa § 48 with Athalye's notes.

771. *vākyaśabda*— "language consisting in propositions and phrases in which a number of single words (*padas*) are coordinated and subordinated to a *vākya*rtha"; on *padasaṃghāta*— cf. Śābarasvāmin's definition *saṃhatyārtham abhidadhāti padāni* (KMSBh. 3, 3, 14).

772. i.e. the construction of sentences and phrases as representing a certain train of thought traceable to human experience.

773. *saṃskāra*—.

preterhuman<sup>774</sup> and we say that the Vedas are preterhuman. That which makes the Vedas preterhuman and eternal is that it is spoken in exactly the same precise order that has been remembered by the mental impressions left by previous orders in an endless retrogressive chain. And these Vedas — congeries of syllables, each of which has its definite place in a regular order from the beginning onwards — continue in an infinite number of branches differing according to the Veda — Ṛg-, Yajur-, Sāma- or Atharva-Veda — to which they belong. And these Vedas, in the form of vidhi, arthavāda and mantra, denote the proper form of Nārāyaṇa, who is the Supreme Brahman, and the manner in which He is to be propitiated, and finally the particular results that follow when He is propitiated. The entire body of language called Veda, which gives rise to the knowledge of the Supreme Person, of His proper form, of the propitiation of Him, and of the fruit thereof, is eternal. Since the Vedas are endless and difficult to understand, the great ṛṣis have been ordered by the Supreme Person to transmit the sense of the Veda in every age in order to help all the worlds, and they have composed the dharmaśāstras, epics and purāṇas which are founded on vidhi, arthavāda and mantra.<sup>775</sup> The profane words are extracted as before from the vocabulary of the Vedas and are applied, as before, to certain objects as their names,<sup>776</sup> and their usage is fixed by tradition.

— However, if all the words denoting meanings are ultimately Vedic, is it proper then to define them separately as belonging either to the hymns or to profane parlance?<sup>777</sup>

— In the Vedas the same words have their appointed place in that regular order only and are there alone used, whereas the words used elsewhere are used differently, so we commit no error.

§ 140. Thus it is set forth that Nārāyaṇa — who is the Supreme Brahman — to be known from the Vedas with their subsiduaries, corroborated by epics, purāṇas and dharmaśāstras, is antagonistic to all evil and essentially

774. *apauruṣeya-*; the sentences of the Veda do not represent a train of thought traceable to human experience: a sentence like *svargakāmo yajeta* can only have a preterhuman origin since its contents cannot be derived from human knowledge: hence it is "unprecedented". All such sentences together form a huge frame of interdependencies in which elements are comprehensible from within but never from without.

775. S. suggests a distinction between the dharmaśāstras as continuing and supporting the *pūrvabhāga*—pre-upaniṣad Veda—and the epics and purāṇas supporting the Upaniṣads.

776. S. refers justly to VP. 1, 5, 63, quoted by R. supra § 21 in a similar connexion.

777. Resp. *chandas-* and *bhāṣā-*; for references see RENOU, *Terminologie*, s.v. *bhāṣa-*.

different from everything else. His proper form is purely boundless knowledge and bliss. He is a treasury of hosts of natural, innumerable beautiful qualities. All spiritual and non-spiritual entities, in all the varieties of proper form, modes of existence and activities, obey His volition. The proper form and nature of His infinite supernal manifestation<sup>778</sup> are undefinable. The means of His sport are constituted by the phenomenal world consisting of an infinite variety of spiritual and non-spiritual entities. In the śrutis<sup>779</sup> "all this is verily Brahman, all this is ensouled by Him....Thou art That, Śvetaketu,<sup>780</sup> some call Him Agni, others the Maruts, others Prajāpati, others Indra, others the vital air, others the eternal Brahman,<sup>781</sup> the splendours and brightnesses that are in the world; the world, the world-protectors and the three Vedas; the three fires and five oblations: the Son of Devakī is all and all the gods,<sup>782</sup> You are the sacrifice, You are the vaśaṭ, You are the Om syllable,<sup>783</sup> You are Ṛtadhāman, the ancient Vasu of the Vasus, Prajāpati,<sup>784</sup> the entire world is Thy body and the earth is Thy fortitude; fire, wrath, grace, soma is Thine, O Thou who art adorned with the Śrīvatsa;<sup>785</sup> Viṣṇu is the luminaries, Viṣṇu is the woods, Viṣṇu is the lands, Viṣṇu is the mountains and spaces, He is the rivers and the oceans, He is all what and what is not, O great priest:"<sup>786</sup> in all these śrutis all words used in *sāmānādhikarāṇya* declare that Brahman is modified by all because all constitute His body, as I have said before.

The Supreme Brahman, whose every will is true, wills, of His own accord, that He be modified by the many. He then, of His own accord, divides the subtle elemental matter in the form of the totality of non-spiritual entities from the multitudinous hosts of experiencing entities, which were both dissolved in himself hitherto, and creates out of the subtle elemental matter the primeval elements, introduces into them as their souls the experiencing entities, creates the entire Universe out of these primeval elements controlled by spiritual souls in mutual conjunction, and then of His own accord enters into them as their immanent soul<sup>787</sup> and exists on as the

778. mahāvibhūti-

779. ChUp. 3, 14, 1 sarvaṃ khalv idam brahma.

780. ChUp. 6, 8, 7 aitadātmyaṃ idam sarvaṃ (tat satyam sa ātmā) tat tvam asi Śvetaketo.

781. Manu 12, 123 where the vulgate reads manum anye for maruto 'nye.

782. MBh.?

783. Rām. 6, 120, 20.

784. Rām. 6, 120, 7.

785. Rām. 6, 120, 26.

786. VP. 2, 12, 38.

787. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

Supreme Spirit whose body is formed by all, and is thus modified by the many. This subtle matter of the primeval elements is called by the name of prakṛti, and all the experiencing entities are in their totality denoted by the name puruṣa. Both prakṛti and puruṣa constitute modes of the Supreme Spirit because they constitute the Supreme Spirit's body. Hence the Supreme Spirit Himself can be denoted by the words prakṛti and puruṣa. All this, which has been expounded before, is elucidated by the śruti: "*He willed: I be many: I will multiply; having created that, He entered into that; when He had entered into that it was present and yonder, it was explained and unexplained, an abode and not an abode, knowledge and not knowledge, true and false; and it was real.*"<sup>788</sup>

§ 141. We have already declared that the means of attaining Brahman is a superior bhakti in the form of rememorization staggered to a state of extremely lucid perception, which is immeasurably and overwhelmingly dear to the devotee. It is achieved by complete devotion of bhakti which is furthered by the performance of one's proper acts preceded by knowledge of the orders of reality as learnt from the śāstra.<sup>789</sup> The word bhakti has the sense of a kind of love, and this love again that of a certain kind of knowledge.

— However, according to people in the world love has no other sense than that of pleasure, and pleasure that is to be realized by a certain kind of knowledge is a different thing altogether.

— No, for whatever kind of knowledge is said to lead to pleasure is pleasure itself.

§ 142. In other words: cognitions with a content fall either under pleasure or suffering, or the state of neither pleasure nor suffering, and they become one or the other of these three according to their content or object. If knowledge particularized by a particular object excites pleasure, it is held dear accordingly. The cognition that has that pleasurable object is pleasure itself, and we do not notice any different thing: particularly because this cognition leads to the practical behaviour of being happy. The capacity of particularizing such a pleasurable cognition is but relative and impermanent in any object different from Brahman, but in Brahman Itself it is absolute and permanent: it is said that "*Brahman is bliss.*"<sup>790</sup> Since knowledge is pleasurable if its object is pleasurable, Brahman is pleasurable as such.

788. TaittUp. 2, 6.

789. i.e. the discriminatory knowledge of the ontological orders of prakṛti, puruṣa and God.

790. TaittUp. 3, 6 ānando brahma.



This is declared in: "*He is pleasure: He that obtains this pleasure becomes happy*,"<sup>791</sup> i.e., Brahman being pleasure one is happy when one has attained Brahman. The Supreme Person, being in His own right and of His own accord boundless and absolute bliss, becomes bliss to another too, because there is no differentiation in that He is beatitudinous.<sup>792</sup> So the meaning of our text is: He that has Brahman as the object of his knowledge becomes happy. When it is realized that the soul stands in a relation of subservience to the Supreme Brahman because this Supreme Brahman — treasury of hosts of innumerable absolute and immeasurable beautiful qualities, irreproachable, possessing an infinite supernal manifestation — ocean of immeasurable and absolute goodness, beauty and love — is the Principal to which the soul is accessory or subservient, then the Supreme Brahman who is thus an object of absolute love leads the soul to Himself.

§ 143. — However, this would mean in other words that the soul's absolute subservience itself is immeasurable and absolute happiness: but this is contradicted by all experience, for we see that literally all spiritual beings have one great wish: to be completely independent; compared with that, dependence means suffering. And there is the *smṛti*: "*All dependence means suffering*,"<sup>793</sup> and in the same line: "*Service is called a dog's way, so try to avoid it.*"<sup>794</sup>

— This attitude reveals the misconceived identification<sup>795</sup> of body and soul by those who have not learnt that the soul is essentially different from the body. For the body, which, as a matter of fact, is a mass in which qualities, such as the generic structure of man, etc., subsist, is held to be independent and they who are bound to *samsāra* think that the body is the 'I'.<sup>796</sup> Whatever misconception one has of one's own soul, one holds the end of life to agree with that. What is pleasure is differently determined according to the body for which the soul is mistaken — lion, tiger, boar, man, yakṣa, rakṣas, piśāca, god, dānava, male, female, etc. — and these different pleasures are mutually incompatible. So everything is judged by whatever aim of life corresponds to the mistaken identity of the soul. The proper form of the soul has, however, knowledge for its one and only form, and is essentially different from the body, god, etc., and the soul's essence is that it is

791. TaittUp. 2, 7, *raso vai saḥ / raso hy evāyaṃ labdhvānandī bhavati*.

792. God is beatitudinous in self-contemplation: being his own object; if as such he is another's object there is no difference in his being a beatitudinous object.

793. Manusmṛti 6, 160 a *sarvaṃ paravaśaṃ duḥkhaṃ (sarvaṃ ātmavaśaṃ sukhaṃ)*.

794. Manusmṛti 6, 4.

795.. *abhimāna*..

796. i.e. the self, soul or ātman is confused with empirical ego.

subservient to Another. When this conception of the soul as it really is has been formed the end of life is held to be that which is in accordance with that. The *smṛti*: "*The soul is pure knowledge*"<sup>797</sup> declares that the soul's only form is knowledge. From numerous *śruti*s of the kind of "*the Master of all*"<sup>798</sup> we know that the soul's sole form is to be subservient to the Supreme Spirit. Therefore the wishful misconception of independence must be regarded as an erroneous cognition due to *karman*, just as the wishful misconception that the soul is identical with the body of a lion, tiger, etc. Consequently it is also due to *karman* that objects other than the Supreme Person are pleasurable. Therefore they are slight and impermanent, while the Supreme Person is happiness in Himself, so that this happiness is permanent, immeasurable and absolute—on the authority of the *śruti*: "*Brahman is joy, Brahman is space*;<sup>799</sup> *Brahman is bliss*;<sup>800</sup> *Brahman is real, knowledge, infinite*."<sup>801</sup> No other entity other than Brahman is essentially happiness, and if it happens to be pleasurable, it is impermanent because it is due to *karman*: this has been declared by the venerable Parāśara: "*sinful karman and auspicious karman are called hell or heaven*;<sup>802</sup> *one and the same thing may lead to suffering, pleasure and jealousy and wrath: so for what reason has that thing that character?*"<sup>803</sup> i.e., what makes an entity that is completely or enduringly pleasure, pain, etc., just that entity? This exclusive character is due to good and evil *karman*. After showing the want of consistency when we consider a number of persons, in that the pleasure of one is the suffering of another, he says that that same inconsistency holds also in one and the same person: "*That which led to joy now leads again to pain, and what led to wrath now leads to peace*,"<sup>804</sup> i.e., that any thing is markedly pleasure or pain is due to the effects of *karman*, not to the proper form of that thing itself; hence it disappears when an end is put to *karman*.

§ 144. The *smṛti* that you just quoted "*all dependence means suffering*"<sup>805</sup> declares as a matter of fact that, since there is no mutual relationship of principal and subservient terms with entities that are different from the Supreme Person, any subservience to something different from Him is suffering. In "*service is called a dog's way*"<sup>806</sup> it is stated that obedience to one who is not worth it is a dog's way. According to the text: "*For He alone*

797. VP. 6, 7, 22.

798. MahānārUp. 9, 3.

799. ChUp. 4, 10, 5 (*prāṇo brahma*) *kaṃ brahma khaṃ brahma* (iti).

800. TaittUp. 3, 6.

801. TaittUp. 2, 1.

802. VP. 4, 6, 44 cd.

803. VP. 4, 6, 45.

804. VP. 4, 6, 46-47.

805. Manusmṛti 6, 160.

806. Manusmṛti 6, 4.

should be worshipped by all always in all stages of life,"<sup>807</sup> only the Supreme Person is worthy of the obedience of all those who know what the true nature of the soul is. As the Venerable Lord put it: "When a man serves Me through unerring devotion to bhakti, he will pass beyond the guṇas and become Brahman."<sup>808</sup> This service in the form of bhakti is denoted by the word for "knowing" in the śrutis: "He that knows Brahman attains the Most-High,"<sup>809</sup> "He that knows this, becomes immortal,"<sup>810</sup> knowing Brahman he becomes Brahman,"<sup>811</sup> etc. From the specifying text: "He whom He chooses may attain Him,"<sup>812</sup> we understand from the clause: "whom He chooses" that one must be elected and that the most beloved one is elected. The most beloved of the Lord is he in whom boundless and absolute love for the Lord has been inspired: this is stated by the Lord in: "For I am exceedingly beloved of the knower and he is beloved by Me."<sup>813</sup> Therefore it is knowledge which has risen to superior bhakti that is really the means of attaining the Lord, as the lord Dvaipāyana declares in the Mokṣadharma by way of comment upon all the Upaniṣads: "His form is not to be beheld and no one perceives Him with the eye, only he who has concentrated on his soul espies — by bhakti and discrimination<sup>814</sup> — the proper form of knowledge in this life,"<sup>815</sup> i.e., after having realized one's own soul by discrimination, one sees the Supreme Spirit by bhakti, sc. one has immediate presentation of Him, attains Him: this follows because the meaning is the same as in the text: "...but by exclusive bhakti can I..."<sup>816</sup> Since bhakti is taken as a form of cognition, everything is established.

§ 145. Considering that there must be people who are at once profound enough and without professional jealousy and who know how to discriminate between what is of the essence and what not, I have written for them this Summary of the Meaning of the Veda.<sup>817</sup>

807. MBh. ?

808. BhG. 14, 26.

809. TaittUp. 2, 1.

810. TaittĀr. 3, 1, 3.

811. MuṇḍUp. 3, 2, 9 (so yo ha vai tat paramam) brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati.

812. MuṇḍUp. 3, 2, 3.

813. BhG. 7, 17.

814. dhṛti- "discrimination" as according to R.. GBh. ad 6, 25 where he glosses buddhyā dhṛtigṛhītayā by vivekaviśayayā.

815. MBh. 12, 230, 68 cd—69 ab (Kumbhakonam ed.).

816. BhG. 11, 54 bhaktyā tv ananyayā śakya aham evaṁvidho 'rjuna/jñātum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca paramtapa //

817. Inspired by Yāmuna? cf. Āgamaprāmānya stt. 2-3 ye 'mī kecana matsarāt sarvasya durmānasārā narāḥ / gambhīrām guṇasālinim api giram nindanti nindantu te // sārāsaravicārakauśaladaśāpāre pare 'vasthītāḥ / santaḥ santy anasūyavo 'pi bahavaḥ śaṁsanti ye madgīram //



## APPENDIX

### § 1. Fragments from Bodhāyana's Vṛtti.

- I. On *atha* in *athāto brahmajijñāsā* (BrS. 1, 1, 1) —  
*vṛttāt karmādhigamād anantaram brahmavividiṣā* —  
“immediately after knowledge of *karman* has been acquired does the desire of knowing *brahman* arise.”  
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 2.
- II. On *idem*, following on Fragment I —  
*saṃhitam etac chārīrakam Jaiminiyena ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇeneti śāstraika-*  
*tvāsiddhiḥ* —  
“since this Śārīraka forms one volume with Jaimini's Sūtras in 16 Chapters, it is proved that both constitute one and the same śāstra.”  
— quoted 1, 1, 1, p. 2.
- III. On *jyotiṣā* in BrS. 1, 4, 13 (14) *jyotiṣaikaṣām asaty anne* —  
*jagadvyūpāravarjam samāno jyotiṣā* —  
“(the ātman is) equal to Light when free from involvement in the world's activities.”  
— quoted 1, 1, 1, p. 79.
- IV. ad BrS. 1, 1, 10 *gatisāmānyāt* —  
*satā somya tadā saṃpanno bhavatīti saṃpattayasampattibhyām etad*  
*avasīyate* —  
“in the text ‘(when a person sleeps) then, my son, he is joined with the Existent’ (ChUp. 6, 8, 1) that is decided on the strength of joining and disjoining” — Apparently in the same connexion the Vṛtti quotes BĀUp. 4, 3, 21 *prājñenātmanā pariṣvaktāḥ* ‘(thus, when this person is) embraced by the conscient soul (he knows nothing inside or outside)’.  
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 10.
- V. ad BrS. 1, 2, 1, *sarvatra prasiddhopadeśāt* —  
*sarvaṃ khalv asti sarvātmā brahmeśaḥ* —  
“Brahman is ‘verily everything’ (= ChUp. 3, 14, 1 *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*), ‘the soul of all’ (= ŚvetUp. 3, 21), ‘the Lord’ (= ŚvetUp. 3, 7 *īśaṃ taṃ jñātvāmṛtā bhavanti*).”  
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 2, 1.

- VI. ad BrS. 1, 3, 7 (8) *bhūmā saṃprasādād adhy upadeśāt — bhūmā tv eveti bhūmā brahma nāmādi paramparayātmana ūrdhvam asyopadeśāt —*  
 "according to the text '(one should try to know) that *bhūmā* ("vast one")' Brahman is *bhūmā*, for the instruction thereof is, in the preceding part, of the ātman by the series beginning with *nāma* etc." In other words, ChUp. 7, 2, 3 (and the preceding 7, 1, 3 ff.) bears on the ātman, for the *satya* of 7, 15, 5 can be connected with the *satya* of 8, 3 which explicitly bears on the ātman; note that *brahman* is interchangeable with *ātman*.  
 — quoted ŚBh. 1, 3, 7.
- VII. ad BrS. 1, 3, 30 (31) ff. *madhvādiṣv asaṃbhavād anadhikāraṃ Jaiminiḥ/jyotiṣi bhāvāc ca/bhāvaṃ tu Bādarāyaṇo 'sti hi — asti hi madhvādiṣu saṃbhavo brahmaṇa eva sarvatra nicāyyatvāt —*  
 "it is possible that (the gods are qualified for) the *madhvidyā* etc. for Brahman is to be sought for in everything."  
 — quoted ŚBh. 1, 3, 32.

## § 2. Vākya and Dṛamīḍabhāṣya.

### A. Fragments possibly from BĀUp.Bhāṣya of Dṛamīḍa.

- I. (Unconnected) *phalasaṃbibhatsayā karmabhir ātmānaṃ pipṛisanti sa prīto 'laṃ phalāya iti śāstramaryādā —*  
 "If they, motivated by the desire to be provided with the fruits, are anxious to please the ātman with acts, then, when he is pleased, he suffices to bestow those fruits — thus disposes scripture."  
 — ŚBh. 2, 2, 3 has the variant *phalavidhatsayā* "motivated by the desire to ordain those fruits": *lectio facilior* for °*bibhats*°.  
 — quoted Ved. § 124; ŚBh. 2, 2, 3.
- II. ad BĀUp. 3, 8, 9 *etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane gārgi sūryacandra-masau vidhṛtau tiṣṭhataḥ* etc.; cf. also TaittUp. 2, 8 — *asyājñayā dhāvati vāyuh/nādyah sravanti/tena kṛtasīmāno jalāsayaḥ samadā iva meṣavisarpitaṃ kurvanti —*  
 "At his behest the wind runs, the rivers flow; the oceans, shown their limits by him, jump crazily like (rutting) rams."  
 — quoted Ved. § 124.
- Ila. Apparently same context as II —  
*tatsaṃkalpanibandhanā hīme lokā na cyavante na sphuṭante / svaśāsanānuvartitaṃ jñātvā kārurayāt sa bhagavān vardhayeta vidvān karmadakṣaḥ —*

"For all these worlds, being supported by his will, do not collapse, nor do they fly apart. When he knows that one follows his command then, mercifully, the Venerable Lord, who knows, who is equal to the task, will make one prosper."

— cf. BĀUp. quoted in II; for the second half compare 3, 8, 10.

— quoted Ved. § 124.

### III. Unconnected.

Bh. *ṛṇaṃ ha vai jāyata iti śruter . . . yady api avadānastutiparaṃ vākyaṃ tathāpi nāsatā stutir upapadyate.*

"On account of the śruti: "There shall indeed be debt . . .", even though the statement be meant (only) to praise the offering, yet there can be no praise if the object is non-existent."

— Reference is to ŚatBr. 1, 7, 2, 1-6, ending *tad avadānaṃ nāma*; in the context *avadāna* has the general sense of offering, to cover both *yāga* and *homa*. It is clear that Dramiḍa argues that the *arthavāda* must establish the objects referred to, even though it have the function of praising the object, for without object no praise: in other words, *arthavāda* portions are not less significant than pure *vidhi* portions.

— quoted Ved. § 118.

### B. Fragments from ChUpVākya and Bhāṣya.

### IV. (Unconnected) —

V. *upaniṣaṇṇatvād upaniṣat* — Bh. *gahane hīyaṃ vidyā saṃni-  
viṣṭā* — Vāmanaṭīkā *gahane brahmaṇy upaniṣaṇṇā* —

"The term *upaniṣat* derives from the fact that it is put down."

"For this meditation is contained in the mysterious One."

"It is put down in the mysterious, i.e. the brahman."

— quoted Venkaṭanātha, Tattvaṭīkā I, p. 34.

V. ad ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *hiraṇmayah puruṣo dṛśyate* —

V. *hiraṇmaya iti rūpasāmānyāc candramukhavat* —

Bh. *nā mayad atra vikāram ādāya prayujyate / anārabhyatvād  
ātmanah* —

"'Golden' is used because of similarity of colour; it is a comparison of the type *candramukha* "moon-like face".

"The suffix *°maya-* is here not used in the sense of modification: that would not agree with the fact that the ātman is not caused."

— quoted Ved. § 135; TātpD. p. 156.

- VI. ad ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *atha ya eṣo 'ntarāditye hiraṇmayah puruṣo V. hiraṇmayah puruṣo dṛśyata iti prājñah sarvāntaraḥ syāt / lokakāmayapadeśāt tathodayāt pāpmanām* —

"In the text 'the golden person is seen' it is the conscient One, entered into all who is meant: this follows from the fact that the world's desire is mentioned and that he transcends the evil things." — "the world's desire" cf. ChUp. 1, 7, 6 *sa eṣa ye caitasmād arvāṇco lokās teṣāṃ ceṣṭe manuṣyakāmānām ca*; "he transcends all evil according to 1, 6, 7; that he enters everything is expressed in 1, 7." — quoted Ved. § 135.

- VII. In the same connexion the objection and reply —

V. *syāt tad rūpaṃ kṛtakam anugrahārtham / taccetasām aiśvaryāt / rūpaṃ vātindriyam antahkaraṇapratyakṣanirdeśāt* —

— "Could it be that that body [or: his body] is artificial, meant as a favour (i.e. to favour meditation)? For he has power over their minds."

— "Rather is it suprasensible, for it is said that it is evident to the inner faculty."

— that there is a pūrvapakṣa — so Dramaḍa — follows from initial *syāt*; *vā* in the sense of *viparyaya*, cf. BrS. 2, 2, 41; *kṛtaka* — "artificial, make-believe, illusory."

Bh. *na vā māyāmātram / aṅjasaiva viśvasrjo rūpaṃ / tat tu na cakṣuṣā grāhyam / manasā tv akalauṣeṇa sādhanāntaravatā gṛhyate* — *na cakṣuṣā gṛhyate nāpi vācā manasā tu viśuddhena iti śruteḥ / na hy arūpāyā devatāyā rūpaṃ upadiśyate / yathābhūtavādi hi śāstram / mākārajanam vāsaḥ — vedāham etaṃ puruṣam mahāntam ādityavarṇam tamasaḥ parastād iti prakaraṇāntaranirdeśac ca sākṣiṇaḥ* —

"No, the body is not made of *māyā*: the body of the Creator of all can only be natural. It can however not be grasped by the eye; but it is grasped by the mind which, when freed from impurity, disposes of another means of perception: this follows from the śruti: "It is not grasped by the eye, nor by the word, but by the mind if pure." For scripture will not teach that a disembodied deity possesses a body: scripture states things just as they are. Other contexts also set forth that he is a witness (i.e. embodied person): "(that Person has a body like) a saffron-coloured garment" "I know that great Person, with the colour of the sun, beyond darkness." — the śrutis are respectively MuṇḍUp. 3, 1, 8; BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 and ŚvetUp. 3, 7.

— quoted Ved. § 135.



VIII. ad ChUp. 1, 6, 7 *kapyāsam puṇḍarīkam* —

[S. remarks that the Vākyakāra enumerates 6 possible meanings of *kapyāsam*, and rejects three: 1. *ādityamaṇḍalam*, 2. *markaṭa-prṣṭham*, 3. *īśadvikāsitam*; and accepts three 1.] *ādityakṣiptam śrīmatvāt* "(splendour) emitted by the sun, for (the lotus) is resplendent" [2. *nālāsanam*, 3. *jalabhuvam*.]

Bh. comments on second set of three with — *gambhīrāmbhaḥ* . . . "deep water."

—cf. Rāmānuja's description *gambhīrāmbhaḥsamudbhūta-sumṛṣṭa-nālaravikaravikāsitā-*, corresponding to the acceptable renderings 3, 2 and 1.

—quoted TātpD. p. 326.

IX. V. *sakṛt pratyayaṁ kuryāc chabdārthasya kṛtatvāt prayājādivat / siddham tūpāsanaśabdāt* —

"One should conceive this idea just once, because thereby the sense of the scripture has already been accomplished completely, as in the case of the *Prayāja's* etc." "No, (what has been said, viz. that it is repetitive) is proved by the use of the word *upāsana*."

—R. interprets both sentences as *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*, as would also follow the Vākyakāra's definition of *abhyāsa*. This quotation most probably precedes in order that on *upāsana* (see X).

—The meaning of the *pūrvapakṣin's* reference is this: the *prayāja's* are a group of accessory sacrifices in the *darsāpūrṇamāsa* rites; to them correspond 6 *pradhānayāgas*, so that it would follow that to each *pradhānayāga* a *prayāja* is to be joined, but according to *tantra* (the rule by which an accessory is to be performed only once for an entire group of principals) the *prayāja* is performed only once; *tantra* is defined by Śabaravāmin KMS. 11, 1, 1 *tatra yat sakṛt kṛtaṁ bahūnām upakaroti tat tantram ity ucyate*.

—quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 9

X. ad Ch. Up. 3, 14, 1 *sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ brahma tajjalān iti śānta upāsita* —

V. *vedanam upāsanam syāt / tadviśaye śravaṇāt / upāsanam syād dhruvānusmṛtir / darśanāc ca* —

"Meditating would be knowing: for this follows from the śrutis on this topic. Meditating then would be constant rememorization also, for it is representing visually."

—connexion with ChUp. uncertain; so is their suggested coherence. The term *dhruvānusmṛti* is derived from ChUp. 7, 26, 2 (infra). The suggested sense of *darśanāc* is according to Rāmānuja's expli-

cation, but not certain. No comment of Dramiḍa.  
—quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, pp. 9 and 10.

- XI. ad ChUp. 3, 14, 1 *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma . . . yathākratur  
asmīṇl loke puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati* —  
V. *ātmetyeva tu gṛhṇāyāt / sarvasya tanniṣpatteḥ* —

“One must only realize that (all this) is the ātman; (then he becomes that which is thought) for all is fulfilled in the ātman.”

— connexion uncertain but probable; no comment of Dramiḍa.

—quoted Ved. § 108; ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 18; p. 116 (partly).

- XII. V. *pariṇāmas tu syād dadhyādivat* —

“there is an inner causal change, as in the case of curds turning into butter, etc.”

—Most probably in connexion with the *sadvidyā* ChUp. 6, 1, 4 and explaining the word *vikāra*—; cf. Intr. Chapter IV, ref. is to ChUp. 6, 6,

—No comments of Dramiḍa quoted, but it is stated that the author of the *vṛtti* on the Vākya, doubtless identical with the *bhāṣya*, adheres to the same view.

—quoted Bhāskara, BrS. 1, 4, 25.

- XIII. ad ChUp. 7, 26, 2 *āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ / sattvaśuddhau  
dhruvā smṛtiḥ / smṛtilambhe sarvagranthīnām vipramokṣaḥ* —

V. *tallabdhir vivekavimokābhīyāsakriyākalyāṇānavasādānuddhar-  
ṣebhyaḥ sambhavān nirvacanāc ca / . . . jātyāśrayanimittāduṣṭād  
annāt kāyaśuddhir vivekaḥ / vimokaḥ kāmānabhiṣvaṅgaḥ / āram-  
bhaṇasaṃśīlanam punaḥpunar abhyāsaḥ / pañcamahāyajñādyanu-  
ṣṭhānam śaktitaḥ kriyā / satyārjavaḍāyādānāhimsānabhidhyāḥ kalyā-  
ṇāni / deśakālavaśamyāc chokavastvādyanusmṛteś ca tajjanyam  
dānyam abhāsvaratvaṃ manaso 'vasādaḥ / tadviparyayo 'nava-  
sādaḥ / tadviparyayaajā tuṣṭir uddharṣaḥ / tadviparyayaajo 'nud-  
dharṣaḥ* —

—“That ātman is attained by distinction, detachment, exercise, rite, moral virtues, non-despondency, non-contentment: for this agrees (with the śruti) and is also explicitly stated. Distinction is purity of body through nourishment that is pure in kind, provenance, and without [spoiling] accidents. Detachment is ceasing to long for desired things. Exercise is repeated meditation on the ārambhaṇa-śruti. Rite is to capacity performing of the five major sacrifices etc. The moral virtues are veridicity, honesty, compassionateness, generosity, non-offensiveness, freedom from desires. Despondency is the misery, the dullness of mind caused by the vicissitudes in space and time and by the memory of painful things etc.; its opposite

is non-despondency. Contentment is the satisfaction caused by the opposites of the above; non-contentment is caused by the opposite of satisfaction."

— Connexion with this ChUp. passage in its entirety uncertain; Bh. has commented on the passage and given references to corresponding śrutis. R. mentions one reference to BhG. explicitly: *tadbhāva-bhāvitaḥ* BhG. 7, 26 *ad abhyāsa*.

— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, pp. 11-2.

- XIV. ad ChUp. 8, 1, 1 *tasmin yad antas tad anveṣṭavyaṃ tad vāva vijijñāsitaṃ* —

V. *tasmin yad antar iti kāmavyapadeśaḥ* —

"In the clause 'that which is therein' reference is made to the desires."

— quoted Ved. § 106; ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 80.

- XV. ad ChUp. 8, 1, 1 (*daharavidyā*) —

V. *yuktam / tadguṇakopāsanāt* —

"(Also with regard to the *sadvidyā*) it is appropriate; for meditation is on an object that has those qualities" —

Bh. *yady api saccitto na nirbhugnadaivatam guṇagaṇam manasānu-dhāvet tathāpy antarguṇam eva devatām bhajate* —

"Although one, when meditating on the *sadvidyā*, does not pursue with one's thought the multitude of qualities that are negative and divine, still one lovingly approaches the Deity as having inner qualities."

— Dramiḍa's comment probably not directly on this Vākya, cf. Rāmānuja: *vyākhyātam ca Dramiḍācāryeṇa vidyāvikalpaṃ vadatā*.

— Rendering of Dr. not certain; R. differs. I take it that *nirbhugna* refers to the qualities of the *Daharavidyā* *apahatapāpmā* etc., which are negative, and *daivata* to the qualities *satyakāmaḥ satya-saṃkalpaḥ*, which are strictly divine. That the passage was obscure to early philosophers is proved by Sarvajñātman's diverging interpretation (*infra*).

—quoted Ved. § 88; ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 79.

- XVI. ad ChUp. 8, 1, 6 *ya iḥtāmānam anuvidya vrajanty etāṃś ca satyān kāmāṃs teṣāṃ sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmācāro bhavati* —

Bh. *devatāsāyujyād aśarīrasyāpi devatāvat sarvārthasiddhiḥ syāt* —

"Because (the soul) will be united with the deity, therefore, though being without a body, it will find all its ends accomplished, as if it were the deity itself."

— connexion uncertain, but suggested by R's quotation of the śruti in the immediate sequel.

— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 79.

XVII. ad ChUp. 8, 12, 1 . . . āto vai saśarīraḥ priyāpriyābhyām / na vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayor apahatir asti / aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spṛsataḥ —

Bh. yathā loke rājā pracuradandaśūke ghore 'narthasaṃkaṭe 'pi pradeśe vartamāno 'pi vyajanādyavadhūtadeho doṣair na spṛsyate 'bhipretāṃś ca lokān punar api pālayiṣyati bhogāṃś ca gandhādīn viśvajanabhogyān dhārayati tathāsau lokaśvaro bhramatsva-sāmarthyacāmaro doṣair na spṛsyate rakṣati ca lokān brahmalokādīn bhogāṃś ca viśvajanopabhogyān dhārayati —

"Just as a king on earth who, though living in a place teeming with mosquitoes and infested with horrible beasts of prey, yet keeping his body clean with ointments etc. is not touched by infections and will time and again protect the beloved countries and support the objects of experience, smell etc., that are within everybody's reach to enjoy, similarly He, the king of the worlds, waving the fan of his omnipotence, is not touched by defects and protects the worlds from the Brahmaloaka onwards, and supports the objects of experience that are to be enjoyed by all mankind."

— If R.'s reference is right, the passage patently attacks the view that the śruti referred to declares that the Supreme Being has no body. — quoted ŚBh. 2, 1, 14.

C. Indirect evidence from quotations.

XVIII. Sarvajñātman's references in Saṃkṣepaśārīraka III, 217 ff.<sup>1</sup>

— ātreyaavākyam api saṃvyavahāramātram  
kāryaṃ samastam iti naḥ kathayāmbabhūva /  
satkāryavādaviṣayo na hi doṣarāśir  
māyāmaye bhavitum utsahate virodhāt // 217 //  
kāṇādadarśanasamāśrayadoṣarāśir  
dūrān nirasta iha saṃvyavahāramātram /  
vedāntabhūmikuśalo munir atrivaṃśyas  
tenāha kāryam iha saṃvyavahāramātram // 218 //  
ṣaṣṭhaprapāṭhakanibaddham udīritam yat  
tat satyam eva khalu satyasamāśrayatvāt /

1. For the translation see Intr. Ch. II, p. 25.

tatraiva yat punar uvāca samudrapheṇa-  
 dṛṣṭāntapūrvakam ado vyavahārādṛṣṭyā // 219 //  
 pūrvam vikāram upavarṇya śanaiḥśanais tad-  
 dṛṣṭim viśṛjya nikaṭam parigrhya tasmāt /  
 sarvaṃ vikāram atha samvyavahāramātram  
 advaitam eva parirakṣati vākyakāraḥ // 220 //  
 antarguṇā bhagavatī paradevateti  
 pratyagguṇeti bhagavān api Bhāṣyakāraḥ /  
 āha sma yat tad iha nirguṇavāde.  
 saṃgacchate na tu punaḥ saguṇapravāde // 221 //

XIXa. Bhāskara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1, 1, 3 ad finem gives as an example of true knowledge to be gained from "false" instruction a parable that is substantially identical with one quoted by Sureśvara and ascribed to Dramiḍa (see b.):

— dṛśyate ca loka mithyāviśaya upadeśas tattvajñānārthaparaḥ-  
 yathā kila kaścid rājaputras taskarair āñya niṣādarājya niveditas  
 tena cāsau putratvena parigrhīto mleccchācārābhiratir evāste / taṃ  
 rājamantṛi tatrāgatya mleccchajātyanugūṇam evācāraṃ kaṃcid  
 anuvārṇya paścādbhūte rājaputro 'si na mleccchaputra iti grāhite  
 samastamleccchācāraṃ hitvā svarūpam eva pratipadyate.

"In profane experience, too, it is found that an instruction dealing with something false leads to knowledge of the truth; as, for example: a certain prince was abducted by robbers, and brought to a Niṣāda chieftain; and, adopted by the chieftain as his son, the prince lived contentedly as a barbarian. Then a minister of the king came there and observed how the prince followed a way of life that was typical of the barbarian race; after some time when the minister had made him understand that he was the son of a king, not of a barbarian, he abandoned the barbarian way of life and knew his true self."

— Dvivedin's edition om. āñya after taskarair and bhūte after paścād, both restored from Madras Govt. MSS. Library R. 6123.

— kila at the beginning and iti at the end would indicate that the story is a quotation; none of 6 MSS consulted, however, add anything in support.

XIXb. Sureśvara's story of the prince reared by hunters, BĀUpBhāṣya-vārttika 2, 1, 506 ff. Anandagiri ad 506 introduces the ākhyāyikā with: tattvamādivākyam aikyaparaṃ taccheṣaḥ śṛṣṭyādivākyam ity atra Draviḍācāryapraṇītām ākhyāyikām avatārayati —  
 ācakṣate tatrā cātra kecd ākhyāyikām śubhām /  
 yathābhilasitārtho 'yaṃ yathā saṃbhāvayate sphuṭaḥ // 506 //

yathā hi kaścit prāg āsīc cakravartino suto yuvā /  
 vyādhiyogopaghātāder unmattaḥ samapadyata // 507 //  
 dhvastarājābhīmānaḥ san mugdho vanam upēyivān /  
 vyādhaiḥ parigrhītaś ca vyādho 'smṛty abhimanayate // 508 //  
 tat karmā tadalaṃkāraḥ kālena mahatābhavat /  
 dhvastarājatvasaṃskāro vasañ śabarasadmani // 509 //  
 śubhausādhynupayogāc ca svasthadhīḥ samajāyata /  
 svasvabhāvānurodhāc ca vyādhebhyo vyutthitātmadhīḥ // 510 //  
 tacchīlarūpakarmabhyo vyāvṛttadhīṣaṇaḥ svataḥ /  
 kevalasmṛtyabhāvāc ca na vyādhatvaṃ jahāty asau // 511 //  
 kutaścīd āgamāj jñātvā tam upetyāpratārakaḥ /  
 tajjātikarmasaṃbandhatattvavit tatpituḥ sakhā // 512 //  
 pravṛtṭyā karmaṇā jātyā cakravartyucitais tathā /  
 lakṣaṇai rājaputrātvaṃ yathā kaścit prabodhayet // 513 //  
 labdhamātrasmṛtiḥ so 'tha rājāsmṛty avabodhataḥ /  
 bādhitvā svam asaṃbodhaṃ hitvā vyādhatvaṃ ātmanaḥ // 514 //  
 rājyābhīšekam āpnoti prāpya śimhāsanaṃ pituḥ /  
 avāptarājasūnutvāt tatprāptau nāpi ceṣṭate // 515 //  
 mohādhyastātma vyādhatvān mohadhvaṃsātirekataḥ /  
 rājaputrātvasaṃprāptau nānyat kiṃcid apekṣate // 516 //  
 yathā tathāyaṃ brahmaiva brahmāsaṃbodhamātrataḥ /  
 buddhīndriyaśarīrādāv ātmatvaṃ pratipedivān // 517 //

["In support of the view that the assertion "Thou art that" states identity and that the passages dealing with creation etc. (ChUp. 6, 2, 1 ff.) are subordinate to that assertion, he introduces a parable that has been composed by Draviḍācārya."]

"In this connexion some tell a beautiful tale to bring out clearly the meaning which is intended here.

Formerly there was a young prince, the son of an emperor, and, due to an infection of some disease, he went mad. Having lost the notion that he was a king, he made for the woods in his bewilderment. He was adopted by hunters and thought that he was a hunter himself: and for a long time he acted and dressed as they did, living in a tribal settlement without any memory of his royal status. Then, by the beneficial use of medicinal herbs, his mind was cured and, in accordance with his real nature, his self-esteem rose beyond the level of hunters. Still, although his mind turned away from their habits, appearance and activities, he did not give up the hunters' way of life for his memory alone had not yet returned. By some report a friend of his father's, who knew what his status and duties were in reality, got to know him and approached him without guile: and


as he himself had concluded from the other's carriage, acts, nobility and the marks of imperial stature, he told him that he was a prince. By *knowing* that he was a prince his memory was restored: his ignorance about himself was superseded and he gave up what was of the hunter in himself. Having arrived at his father's throne he underwent the ceremony of the royal consecration, and when he had been restored as a prince he deviated from his position never more. Having regained his princely status by the mere difference that the disappearance of his illusion made (for it was illusion that his notion of being a hunter was suggested to his real self), he had nothing left to desire. Likewise this person, who is really Brahman, is led by his mere unconsciousness of Brahman to attribute to his mind, senses, body etc.

XIXc. The same story is referred to in Sāṃkhyasūtra 4, 1 *rājaputravat tat-tvopadeśāt* "on account of the instruction about the true nature, as in the case of the royal prince" and described by Vijñānabhikṣu, Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya ad loc.

—*atreyam ākhyāyikā-kaścid rājaputro gaṇḍarkṣajanmanā purān niḥsāritaḥ śabareṇa kenacit posito 'haṃ śabara ity abhimanyamāna āste / taṃ jīvantam jñātvā kaścid amātyaḥ prabodhayati na tvam śabaro rājaputro' sīti / sa yathā jhaṭity eva cāṇḍālābhimanam tyaktvā tāttvikam rājabhāvam evāmbate rājāham asmīti, evam eva ....*

—"The story about this is as follows: a certain royal prince was abducted from his town by a bear and reared by a tribesman and he lived in the mistaken conviction that he himself was a tribesman. Having discovered that the prince was alive a minister revealed to him that he was not a tribesman but a royal prince. And even as he gave up at once his notion that he was an outcaste and was restored to his true nature of royalty with the true knowledge: "I am a king," in a like manner etc..."

—*gaṇḍarkṣa* is further unknown; it is either a bear characterized by heavy jaws, or a rhinoceros (*gaṇḍa*), the latter meaning being less plausible.





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## ADDENDUM

The emendation proposed in Introduction, note 73 (*saṃpradāyaḥ / ataḥ samāśritaḥ* for DVIVENIN's impossible *saṃpradāyamataḥ*) is to be rejected in favour of the reading *saṃpradāyāgataḥ* found in the oldest MS of Bhāskara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, the palm-leaf grantha, R 6123 of the Madras Government Sanskrit Manuscripts Library; 5 other MSS consulted have DVIVENIN's *lectio*. The passage now reads: "This [*sc. pariṇāma-pakṣaḥ*], being the traditional view-point, has been adopted by the Authors of the Vākya and the Vṛtti on the Chāndogya".

p. 73, n. 5	A <sub>2</sub>	
81,	1	yasyātmā śarīram
95,	6	malapratyanikānantajñānānandaikasvarūpaṃ svābhāvikanavadhikātiśayā-parimito...
99,	4	śarīram
101,	8	eva hi brahmavyatiriktatvena
105,	15	yathā kāryāntarānvitam
120,	9	delete <i>daṇḍa</i>
133,	7	add <i>daṇḍa</i> after svarād iti
158,	9	add <i>daṇḍa</i> before manomayaḥ



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